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ABSTRACT 
LONERGAN ON THE HISTORICAL CAUSALITY OF CHRIST: 
 AN INTERPRETATION OF THE REDEMPTION:  
 A SUPPLEMENT TO DE VERBO INCARNATO 
 
 
John Volk, B.S., MBA, M.Div. 
 
Marquette University, 2012 
 
 
 In 1958, the Canadian Jesuit theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) 
completed a draft of a major text on redemption.  He stated that the text was to be an 
addition to his book De Verbo Incarnato, with the purpose of explaining the historical 
causality of Christ.  The Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, has produced a 
preliminary English translation titled The Redemption: A Supplement to De Verbo 
Incarnato.  To date, there has been no interpretation of this text.  This dissertation aims at 
making a contribution towards the remedy of this lacuna in Lonergan studies.  The 
dissertation interprets Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ, 
through an interpretation of his text.   
 
 The dissertation employs the methodology of what Lonergan named the 
“hermeneutical circle:” the meaning of the whole is grasped through the parts, and the 
parts through the whole.  In this dissertation, each chapter is interpreted in the wider 
context of the whole.  Each chapter is also interpreted in the order presented in 
Lonergan’s text, since that text is organized according to what Lonergan, following 
Aquinas, calls the ordo disciplinae or ordo doctrinae, the order of learning and teaching, 
the ideal mode of explaining systematic understanding. 
 
 Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ follows from his 
understanding of history itself, where the fundamental unit is culture and the fundamental 
nature of human causality is social.  Lonergan understands culture through a set of terms 
and relations he names the “human good of order.”  This order is an expression of 
cultural meanings and values, whether for good or evil.  The historical causality of Christ 
involves a proper causal series in which God’s redemptive agency is mediated into 
human history, through Christ and his members, to transform cultural evil into good by 
transforming cultural meanings and values.  The principal meaning and value is the “Law 
of the Cross.”  According to the divine plan, this law is the governing principle of 
salvation history.  Since human causality is fundamentally social, the historical causality 
of Christ is mediated through others who understand this law and judge it as worthy to be 
chosen. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Purpose of the Study 
 The Canadian Jesuit theologian Bernard J.F. Lonergan (1904-1984) is regarded by 
many as one of the greatest philosophical and theological minds of the twentieth century.  
He is best known from his works Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (1957)
1
 and 
Method in Theology (1972).
2
  His historical scholarship on the thought of Thomas 
Aquinas is represented in two groundbreaking and perhaps definitive interpretations of 
Aquinas,
3
 making Lonergan one of the world’s foremost Thomist scholars.  His literary 
output extends far beyond these works, including a handful of texts in Christology. 
Among these texts is an unpublished Latin manuscript written during his years at 
the Gregorian University.
4
  He did not give a title to this work.  In early circulation it was 
known from the opening pages as De bono et malo, or simply De bono.
5
 
                                                 
1
 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).  
Originally published in 1957 (London: Longmans, Green, & Co.).  Hereafter cited as Insight. 
2
 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).  Hereafter cited as 
Method. 
3
 Robert M. Doran, S.J., “Lonergan: An Appreciation,” in The Desires of the Human Heart: An 
Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Vernon Gregson (New York: Paulist, 1988), 2.  
Doran references the following works:  Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the 
Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder and Herder; London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1971); Verbum:  Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. David B. Burrell, C.S.C. (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).  Each has subsequently been republished as part of the 
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran , vol. 1 (2000) and  
vol. 2 (1997), respectively. 
4
 Lonergan taught at the Gregorian University from 1953 to 1965.  The autograph Latin typescript of the 
manuscript is found in File 657 in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute with the label “Bono et 
Malo etc. 179 pp,” and File 674 with the label “De Opere Christi (art.  35-44).”  The former contains the 
first five chapters of the work.  The latter contains the sixth and final chapter.  The six chapters of the Latin 
manuscript can also be found on www.bernardlonergan.com at 25300DTL060, 25310DTL060, 
25320DTL060, 25330DTL060, 25340DTL060, and 25460DTL060, respectively. 
5
 Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., Christ and History: The Christology of Bernard Lonergan from 1935 to 1982 
(Ottawa: Novalis, 2005), 102. 
 2 
Lonergan handed this text over to Frederick Crowe in August 1972, stating that 
the text was to be an addition to his book De Verbo Incarnato
6
 with the purpose of 
explaining the “historical causality” of Christ.7  The work was never added to the book.   
The Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, has produced an unpublished English 
translation of De bono titled The Redemption: A Supplement to De Verbo Incarnato.
8
  
The University of Toronto Press, in collaboration with the Lonergan Research Institute, 
plans to publish this text as volume 9 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 
(CWL), under the general editorship of Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe. 
 This dissertation is driven by the following question:  What is Bernard Lonergan’s 
understanding of the historical causality of Christ in the Supplement?  My purpose is to 
understand Lonergan’s understanding.  As such this dissertation is an interpretation of the 
Supplement. 
The following question naturally arises:  why a need to interpret the Supplement?  
The rationale assumes that the task of interpreting Lonergan’s thought should precede the 
tasks of developing and implementing his thought.
9
  There has been some research on 
specific sections of the Supplement, but not a full interpretation.   
                                                 
6
 Bernard Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, Third edition (Rome:  Pontifical Gregorian University, 1964).  
Hereafter cited in text as DVI.  Any references to DVI will rely on Charles Hefling’s unpublished English 
translation, The Incarnate Word (Toronto: Lonergan Research Institute, 2006). 
7
 Crowe, Christ and History, 100. 
8
 Bernard Lonergan, The Redemption: A Supplement to De Verbo Incarnato, unpublished English 
translation of De bono, trans. Michael G. Shields, S.J. (Toronto: Lonergan Research Institute, 2000).  
Hereafter cited in text as Supplement.  I will rely on Shields’s translation in citations from the Supplement.  
Page numbers will reference both the original Latin text and Shields’s translation.  Lonergan’s original 
Latin text will be referenced as De bono et malo, abbreviated DBM.  Lonergan numbered the first 179 
pages (Chapters 1 to 4).  From page 180 on I will add an asterisk (*180, *181, etc.).  Shields’s English 
translation will be referenced as the Supplement.   
9
 Frederick Crowe, who along with Robert Doran is the general co-editor of the CWL, makes a compelling 
argument for the ongoing task of interpreting Lonergan as a preliminary step in developing and 
implementing Lonergan’s thought.  See Frederick E. Crowe, “The Task of Interpreting Lonergan,” in 
Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, ed. Michael Vertin (Washington: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1989), 145. 
 3 
Furthermore, Lonergan’s early theological writings, including the Supplement, 
were written in Latin, a barrier for many contemporary theologians.  Only in recent years 
have English translations been made available.
10
  Complicating this problem is the fact 
that neither DVI nor the Supplement has been published in English, though both are 
scheduled for publication in separate volumes of the CWL.  Finally, the Supplement, as 
with Lonergan’s theological writings in general, is less known than either Insight or 
Method.  Although Insight and Method have tremendous implications for developing the 
categories Lonergan envisioned for a contemporary systematic theology, neither was 
intended to understand explicit theological doctrines.   
My motivation for interpreting the Supplement is based on a deep interest in 
Lonergan’s theology of redemption.  In DVI, he identifies the intrinsic intelligibility of 
redemption as the “Law of the Cross.”11  In the Supplement Lonergan not only develops 
the notion of the law of the cross, but he also develops an understanding of how Christ, as 
historical agent, moves others through their intellect and will to embrace this law. 
I stumbled across a description of Lonergan’s law of the cross accidentally.  In 
2005 the pastoral director at my local parish handed me a copy of an article by Joseph 
Komonchak, titled “The Violence of the Cross: A Mystery, not a Punishment.”12  
Komonchak argued that the mystery of the cross was not a necessity, not a punishment 
from God, but a mystery: “The reign of sin and death was absorbed by his [Christ’s] love 
and forgiveness, a frightful evil was transformed into a transcendent good, an execution 
                                                 
10
 For example, Lonergan’s Latin treatise on a systematic Trinitarian theology, De Deo trino, Pars 
systematica, has recently been published in English.  See Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 
vol. 12 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, trans. 
Michael Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).   
11
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 576. 
12
 Joseph Komonchak, “The Violence of the Cross:  A Mystery, not a Punishment,” Commonweal 132 (Jan 
28, 2005), 19-22. 
 4 
became a self-sacrifice.”13  He went on to say that this understanding is what Bernard 
Lonergan called “the law of the cross.”  I had known Lonergan’s name in association 
with Insight and Method, but until then I had no knowledge of his theological writings, 
and certainly no knowledge of the “law of the cross.”  I found the argument compelling, 
sending me on a journey to learn more about Lonergan’s soteriology. 
The reason the pastoral director of my parish handed me this article is that she 
knew I was deeply interested in a particular theological question:  how do we understand 
the salvific significance of Christ’s passion and death?  The cross is the primary visual 
symbol of Christianity.  Yet the literal meaning of the symbol recalls an ancient method 
of torturing and executing undesirables with maximum degradation and humiliation, 
meant not only to kill, but to send a political message.  Crucifixion was a symbolic act 
with a clear and frightening meaning.14 
The sad history of crucifixion circles back to the question:  how do we understand 
the salvific significance of Christ’s passion and death?  Like others, I was exposed to 
many interpretations of the cross.  Some I found problematic, particularly theories 
tending to understand Christ’s passion along the lines of “satispassion” or “penal 
substitution.”  Since that time, through study of Lonergan’s theology of redemption, I am 
hopeful that Lonergan offers the Church a systematic theology of a very difficult doctrine 
while avoiding what he himself would consider problematic interpretations of Christ’s 
passion.  And he does so while remaining faithful to the Leonine injunction vetera novis 
                                                 
13
 Komonchak, “The Violence of the Cross,” 22. 
14
 N.T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 543.  On the history of 
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augere et perficere – to enlarge and enrich the old with the new.15  Lonergan adopted this 
injunction as a central inspiration for much of his life’s work.16  His adoption of the 
injunction is exemplified in his effort to reconcile the permanence of the meaning of 
dogmas affirmed in the constitution, Dei Filius,
17
 promulgated by the First Vatican 
Council, with historicity characterizing human thought and action.  
In brief, the rationale for an interpretation is a means toward an end.  The end is to 
develop and implement Lonergan’s thought.  The mission of the Lonergan Research 
Institute is to preserve, promote, develop, and implement the work of Bernard 
Lonergan.
18
  My hope is that this interpretation contributes to this mission. 
 
1.2 The Date, Purpose, and Structure of the Supplement 
 
 
1.2.1 The Date 
 
 
When Lonergan handed the text to Frederick Crowe in 1972, Lonergan stated that 
the text dated to 1963-1964.  However, in at least three letters from Rome during the 
period 1956 to 1958, Lonergan discussed progress on the manuscript.  Crowe states: 
From 1956 to 1958, in at least three letters from Rome, Lonergan spoke of a major work 
he was preparing.  On June 12, 1956, he wrote that he was planning a work on 
redemption.  On November 17, 1957, he reported that he had started work on it in that 
academic year.  On May 25, 1958, he wrote: ‘I have got 6 chapters (45 articles) on the 
redemption pretty well done.  May be able to bring manuscript to Halifax’ (he was to 
spend the summer in that city.)
19
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Based on these letters, the dating of 1963-1964 is problematic.
20
  The letter of 
May 25, 1958, provides convincing evidence that the Supplement was essentially 
completed in 1958.  Whether Lonergan brought the manuscript to Halifax is unknown.  
His main work in Halifax during the summer of 1958 would have been the lectures on 
Insight, subsequently published as Understanding and Being.
21
   
We can only speculate on why Lonergan mentioned 1963-1964 for the dating of 
the manuscript.  He may not have fully known the contents of the folder he handed over 
to Crowe.  Or perhaps ca. 1963 he began to edit the work of 1958.  Crowe notes that the 
manuscript does show evidence of an unfinished state:  for example, the lack of 
numbering of pages after page 179.
22
   
Another theory is that Lonergan completed chapter 6 of the Supplement sometime 
between 1960 and 1964.  The evidence is based on the fact that there is a section of the 
1964 edition of DVI which is lacking in the 1960 edition.  The section is titled “vita 
humana et historica” (human, historical life) and according to Crowe it corresponds 
closely with material found in chapter 6 of the Supplement.
23
   Perhaps after Lonergan 
had written DVI he may have thought to incorporate material from the Supplement. 
It is thus possible that Lonergan completed chapter 6 between 1960 and 1964, and 
then introduced the section “vita humana et historica” into the 1964 edition of DVI.  This 
is only a hypothesis which tries to reconcile Lonergan’s own statement against the May 
1958 letter stating that he had completed six chapters.  However, for the purpose of this 
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dissertation, I will assume Crowe’s hypothesis that the Supplement was substantially if 
not fully completed in 1958.   
 
1.2.2 Purpose 
 
 
Lonergan’s stated purpose was to explain the “historical causality of Christ.”24  
He once summarized his own lifework as follows:  “All my work has been introducing 
history into Catholic theology.”25  Lonergan’s desire to introduce history into theology 
was part of his theological project to embrace shifts to modernity which he considered 
authentic.  One of these shifts was from classicism to critical history.  Classicism holds 
the mistaken view that culture is normative, that there is just one human culture.
26
  
Critical history holds the view that culture must be conceived empirically, and that there 
are many cultures.  Critical history acknowledges the fact of historical process, and seeks 
a historical perspective that attempts to understand cultural developments in investigating 
how patterns of living, institutions, and common meanings develop over the course of 
history.  This may be called a historicist viewpoint.
27
  Lonergan’s concern to move from 
a classicist to a historicist viewpoint influenced his entire philosophical-theological 
project.   
In the first chapter, Lonergan identifies the guiding question of his Supplement:  
how are earthly realities of redemption to be brought together since it is our duty to work 
with Christ?  He quotes Ephesians 1:9-10 as the mystery prompting this question, a 
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mystery hidden in God to gather all creation in heaven and earth under one head, Christ.  
However, Lonergan’s question is more limited:  his question relates to how earthly 
realities are to be brought together.  Lonergan’s hope was that a deeper and more fruitful 
understanding of the answer to this question would underscore how important the great 
gift of redemption is in addressing contemporary problems, since through God’s grace 
human agents cooperate with God in bringing these earthly realities together.  Therefore, 
although Lonergan’s purpose in the Supplement was part of his larger project to introduce 
history into Catholic theology, his desire to embrace historicity was not solely for the 
purpose of advancing an understanding of the historical causality of Christ.  There was 
also a practical purpose.  In the Supplement, a more fruitful understanding of redemption, 
through an understanding of the historical causality of Christ, would hopefully lead to a 
more fruitful praxis in cooperating with God to address contemporary problems.  I will 
return to this theme in my final chapter. 
 
1.2.3 Structure 
 
 
The Supplement includes six chapters and forty-five articles.  The Supplement is a 
rather large text, and the six finished chapters in the English translation come to eighty-
thousand words.  An abbreviated outline is presented below: 
 Chapter 1: Good and Evil (articles 1 – 8) 
 Chapter 2: The Justice of God (articles 9 – 15) 
 Chapter 3: On the Death and Resurrection of Christ (articles 16 – 21) 
 Chapter 4: The Cross of Christ (articles 22 – 25) 
 Chapter 5: The Satisfaction Given by Christ (articles 26 – 34) 
 Chapter 6: The Work of Christ (articles 35 – 45) 
 
The Supplement does not follow the thesis format of DVI, even though Lonergan 
had told Crowe that the work was to be an addition to DVI.  This is a question I will take 
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up in the conclusion of the dissertation.  The dating of the Supplement relative to DVI 
makes Lonergan’s comment an enigma.  The Supplement reads as a standalone text on 
redemption, not as a supplement to an existing work.   
Chapter 1 on “Good and Evil” is essentially a theological anthropology, serving 
as background information for latter chapters.  Chapter 2 on the “Justice of God” is also 
background material, but rather than an anthropology it is a theology, arguing that the 
norm of divine justice is divine wisdom.  The exercise of divine justice manifested in 
creation is the creative act proceeding from God’s will, but an act following God’s 
wisdom.  The effect is the actual order of the universe in all its concrete determinations. 
Chapter 3 is simply intended to collect the relevant passages of scripture in order 
to establish the doctrine of redemption.  Lonergan did the same thing in Thesis 15 of DVI.  
The structure exemplifies Lonergan’s methodology.  He establishes theological truths 
(doctrines) before he attempts to understand those truths (systematics). 
Chapter 4 includes an article on the “Law of the Cross,” which is essentially the 
transformation of evil into good, witnessed in Christ as a fact accomplished, but also 
addressed as a precept to those who wish to follow Christ.  Chapter 4 is very similar in 
content to Thesis 17 of DVI. 
Chapter 5 includes treatment of the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction.  Lonergan 
may have chosen to deal with this doctrine in chapter 5 based on a statement he makes at 
the end of chapter 4.  There he ends the chapter stating that in no other way does God 
draw evil out of good than according to the meaning, the law, the mystery, and the justice 
of the cross, and that God would not impose this law on others without imposing it on 
 10 
himself, that is, doing first what he requires of others for the sake of his glory.
28
  Chapter 
5 is very similar in content to Thesis 16 of DVI. 
Chapter 6 in the Latin manuscript does not have a title.  The file from the 
Lonergan Archives simply begins with Article 35, titled “De Opere Christi.”  In the 
English translation the chapter title is borrowed from the title of the first article, so 
chapter 6 in the English translation is titled “The Work of Christ.”  Chapter 6 represents 
the point where Lonergan explicitly addresses the fundamental question of the 
Supplement: the historical causality of Christ. 
 My purpose in this section has been to provide a brief introduction to the 
Supplement.  As part of this introduction, it is of help to situate the Supplement in the 
context of Lonergan’s other contributions on redemption.  I will be referencing these 
other works in my interpretation.  I provide a brief review of each in the next section.   
 
1.3 Lonergan on Redemption: A Brief Review of His Contributions 
 
 
1.3.1 Pantōn Anakephalaiōsis (1935)29 
 
Pantōn Anakephalaiōsis is an essay written in April of 1935.  As required by the 
Jesuits, Lonergan needed four years of theological studies.  These years were done at the 
Gregorian University from 1933 to 1937.  The Pantōn essay was a student essay written 
during this period. 
The title and topic is taken from Ephesians 1:10.  The term Pantōn 
Anakephalaiōsis is one part of a seven-part title, which in its totality reads Pantōn 
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Anakephalaiōsis / A Theory of Human Solidarity / A Metaphysics for the Interpretation 
of St. Paul / A Theology for the Social Order, / Catholic Action, / And the Kingship of 
Christ, / In incipient outline.  The phrase “A Theology for...” governs grammatically the 
next three lines, so the last three lines in the title refer sequentially to a “Theology for the 
Social Order,” a “Theology for Catholic Action,” and a “Theology for the Kingship of 
Christ.”  The essay includes an introduction, followed by six parts.30   
 The basic purpose of the essay is to suggest that a metaphysics is the key to 
understanding the Pauline conception of Christ as the pantōn anakephalaiōsis.  Lonergan 
states that “It is from the basis of a metaphysical conception of man, one in nature and 
operation, working through a material to an intelligible plurality in a transient dynamism 
in which no man is more than an instrumental cause and no causation fails to affect all 
men, that we attempt to interpret St. Paul.”31  Lonergan states that since human operation 
is necessarily instrumental, then there is a particular significance to leadership, “to be the 
first agent in human history.”32  Adam, premoved by Eve, premoved by the serpent, set 
up the reign of sin.  Christ, the new Adam, set up the kingdom of God.
33
 In other words, 
premotion, whether from Adam or Christ, results in a solidary chain of causation in 
which each instrument transfers the motion received from those before to those that will 
follow.  Christ originates what Lonergan calls the “absolute Geist of dogma” into the 
organism of humanity.  The “absolute Geist of dogma” is divinely revealed truth.34 
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In this essay, Lonergan understood that matter individuates human persons, but 
the idea is the basis of human unity, whether economically, culturally, politically, or 
religiously.  When there is decline, reasonableness of the idea is not to blame, but sin, 
which is the refusal to follow reason.  Christ, as the new head of humanity, originates the 
idea that will reunify what sin has torn asunder.  “The unity of man achieved by intellect 
has to be a unity in truth, if it is to be stable.  Peace fundamentally is this unity in truth 
and only phenomenally is it ‘order with tranquility.’”35  The only truth that can unify is 
the absolute Geist of dogma, and this originates with Christ. 
 Lonergan’s argument depends on a metaphysics of human solidarity, and his 
metaphysics of human solidarity is based on his view that human beings are one universal 
nature in terms of what we are, in virtue of our form, but many in terms of material 
differentiation.  This is a philosophical argument.  The same argument could be made 
theologically, based on revelation that we are made in the image and likeness of God. 
Furthermore, no human intellect is an island.  What we think is governed by the 
historical situation.  And the historical situation, at any moment in time, is a product of 
the achievements and errors of the past.  The point here is that there is a solidarity to 
human thought, a unity of human intellects, whether in achievement or error.  This unity 
of intellect results in what Lonergan calls an “effective” uniformity of wills.36  Why is the 
pantōn anakephalaiōsis possible in the first place?  Because humans are simply not 
individuals.  Humanity is an organism, where each person is an instrumental cause.  The 
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principle of premotion, whether from Adam or Christ, transforms these instrumental 
causes into a solidary chain of causation.
37
  
Since the essay is fundamentally concerned with the work of Christ, we can 
categorize this as one of Lonergan’s contributions to a theology of redemption.  In 
Crowe’s commentary, he states that the body of the essay is “through and through a study 
of the historical causality of Christ.”38  Thus the Supplement was not Lonergan’s first 
contribution to an understanding of the historical causality of Christ.  He addressed the 
question as early as 1935. 
 
1.3.2 Chapter 20 of Insight (1953) 
 
 
There is a heuristic structure for anticipating the answer to a question whenever 
the object of inquiry admits antecedent determinations.
39
  In chapter 20 of Insight, 
Lonergan develops a heuristic structure for the solution to the problem of evil.  His 
heuristic structure includes thirty-one points.   
In chapter 20, he does not explicitly use the word “redemption” but speaks of 
God’s “solution to the problem of evil.”  Charles Hefling argues that other writings make 
it clear that redemption is what he is talking about.
40
  For example, in a paper of 1973, 
Lonergan refers to Insight’s “rather theological analysis of human history,” conceived as 
three approximations.  The first is progress, resulting from intelligent and reasonable 
human acts.  The second is decline, resulting from unintelligent and unreasonable human 
acts.  The third is a redemptive process resulting from God’s gift of his grace and the 
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manifestation of his love in Christ Jesus.  “The whole idea was presented in chapter 
twenty of Insight.”41  Here Lonergan’s statement confirms two points.  First, what he 
means by a “solution to the problem of evil” is redemption.  Second, the structure of 
history, as presented in chapter 20, can be understood as a triad of progress, decline, and 
redemption.
42
  In fact, at one point in the composition of the material that would become 
chapter 20 of Insight, Lonergan gave the title “The Structure of History.”43   This 
structure is not to be understood in a sequential sense.  The vectors of progress, decline, 
and redemption are always operative in history. 
For Lonergan, the foundational antecedent determinations with the greatest 
influence on a heuristic structure to the solution of the problem of evil are (1) that there is 
an intelligible unity of the actual world order; (2) that this intelligible unity is a product of 
God’s wisdom, goodness, and power; and (3) since there are no divine afterthoughts, a 
solution to the problem of evil will be in harmonious continuation with the actual, 
concrete order of this universe.
44
  Since there are no divine afterthoughts, the existing 
world order, as we currently understand it, already has the potential for the solution.  To 
state otherwise would be to suggest that God thinks as we do.  Thus the solution will be 
“within the intelligibility of the actual world order” or otherwise stated in “harmonious 
continuation” of the existing order.45  Furthermore, the solution will be one, since there is 
one God, one world order, and one problem that is both individual and social.  This 
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solution will be universally accessible.  The problem is not restricted to any persons of a 
particular class or time, and the solution has to meet this reality.
46
 
There is not space here to cover all thirty-one points in Lonergan’s heuristic 
structure.  However, of central importance is what he calls “new conjugate forms” 
required in the human intellect, will, and sensitivity.
47
  A conjugate form is essentially a 
“habit,” as understood by Aquinas.  These habits will be supernatural: faith, hope, and 
charity.  These habits allow the human intellect and will to apprehend and cooperate with 
God’s solution to the problem of evil.  But what of human sensitivity?  Lonergan says 
that although the solution will be implemented primarily in our intellect and will through 
the habits of faith, hope, and charity, the solution must also penetrate to the sensitive 
level of human living, since the exercise of human intelligence presupposes “a suitable 
flow of sensitive and imaginative presentations.”48  In other words, the solution must 
capture our sensitivity and intersubjectivity.  Lonergan names this aspect of the solution 
mystery, since mystery is not only a symbol of the uncomprehended, not only a sign of 
what is grasped, but a psychic force that “sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, 
to the joyful, courageous, wholehearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the 
tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but 
transcended.”49 
Finally, we should note the importance of Insight for its value as a heuristic which 
can guide some of the questions in our interpretation of the Supplement.  In the epilogue 
to Insight, Lonergan stated that in regard to any individual who has embraced God’s 
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solution to the problem of evil, there is to be added the consideration of “cumulative 
historical development.”50  How might one develop this historical aspect?  He suggests 
this aspect has a peculiar relevance to the treatise on the mystical body of Christ, and that 
this treatise would be incomplete if it fails to draw upon a theory of history.
51
  Statements 
such as this give us a clue into the thought of Lonergan on the intersection of redemption 
and history, aside from what he says in the Supplement.  All of Lonergan’s contributions 
on redemption, and particularly Insight, can serve as a heuristic to ask the right questions 
in our interpretation of the Supplement.  To this end, when we come to his final chapter, I 
will explicitly interpret how Lonergan understands history itself as a preliminary question 
before I attempt to interpret his understanding of Christ’s historical causality presented in 
that chapter. 
 
1.3.3 De ratione convenientiae (1954)
52
 
 
 
De ratione convenientiae was Lonergan’s first writing in Christology at the 
Gregorian.  As was the custom of the time, Lonergan used a manual in the courses he 
taught.  At the Gregorian he began using the manual of Charles Boyer.
53
 De ratione 
convenientiae was intended as a supplement to Boyer’s manual.  Eventually Lonergan 
wrote his own Christology manual, DVI, first published in 1960. 
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The text is known from the three words beginning the title: De ratione 
convenientiae, translated as “The Notion of Fittingness.”54  The text is divided into six 
parts:  (1) The Notion of Fittingness, (2) The Root of Fittingness, (3) The Excellence of 
Order, (4) The Conceptually Distinguished Formalities, (5) The Fittingness of the 
Incarnation, (6) The Necessity of the Incarnation, and (7) The Purpose of the Incarnation. 
 De ratione convenientiae addresses the traditional scholastic question concerning 
the purpose of the Incarnation.  In the text, Lonergan argues that the Incarnation is the 
“principle of the restoration of order,”55 first and foremost “for the sake of the order of 
the universe, and indeed for the sake of this order according to all its concrete details, and 
in a special way as an order disrupted by sin and needing to be repaired by the mercy of 
God.”56  
The notion of “fittingness” is integral to Lonergan’s argument for the purpose of 
the Incarnation.  This explains why he begins with the notion and root of fittingness 
itself.  The text, as the title indicates, is concerned with how theologians apply method to 
the question of the purpose of the Incarnation.  Having given a number of reasons why 
the Incarnation was not “necessary,” following the tradition of Aquinas, Lonergan gives a 
brief exhortation to the proper theological method for addressing the question:    
From the foregoing [that is, the argument that the Incarnation was not necessary] it is 
clear how important it is for a theologian to have a good grasp of the notion of fittingness.  
For since fittingness implies intelligibility in the proper sense and yet an intelligibility 
that is in no way necessary, a theologian can inquire into the appropriate reasons for 
things and understand them without in any way infringing upon God’s freedom and the 
gratuitousness of the supernatural order.
57
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 Section 5, on the Fittingness of the Incarnation, is the longest section of the 
manuscript.  In Crowe’s commentary, he notes that this relatively long section “might be 
called a theology of history in the style of chapter 20 of Insight.”58  In the section 
Lonergan discusses three principles which govern the entire movement of human history:  
our intellectual nature, our defectable human will, and the help of a merciful God.
59
 The 
three principles correspond to the triad of progress-decline-redemption, Lonergan’s basic 
structure of history, which he elaborated in chapter 20 of Insight.  Furthermore, Lonergan 
lists four elements of the solution to the problem of the reign of sin:  (1) a revelation 
accepted through faith in God, (2) hope of a life to come, (3) charity, and (4) mystery.  
These four elements were previously listed by Lonergan in his heuristic for a solution to 
the problem of evil in chapter 20 of Insight.  The correlation is not surprising.  Lonergan 
finished Insight in 1953, though it was not published until 1957.  De ratione 
convenientiae would have been composed only a short time later, after Lonergan finished 
Insight and headed to Rome.
60
 
 In terms of chronology and thought, De ratione convenientiae may be viewed as 
an intermediate work between the Pantōn essay of 1935 and the Supplement of 1958: 
This opusculum [De ratione convenientiae] has some importance for the mediating role it 
might play in Lonergan’s thought, namely, between 1935 and the unfinished work on 
historical causality in the work I am calling de bono...The mediation found in chronology 
matches that found in thought.  The dialectic of history and the restoration of world order 
through Christ are in continuity with the themes of the pantōn paper on one side (1935) 
and with the more systematic treatment of de bono on the other (1958 – as I shall argue).  
In between we have de ratione convenientiae (1954) with its three-tiered structure of 
history...”61 
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1.3.4 The Lecture on Redemption (1958) 
 
 On September 25, 1958, Lonergan gave a lecture on redemption as part of a 
course titled “The God of Christian Teaching” at the Thomas More Institute in 
Montreal.
62
 Assuming the Supplement was completed in May of 1958, this lecture 
represents his next contribution on redemption from a chronological perspective. 
 The lecture outlines some general features of the intelligibility of redemption.  As 
with any intelligibility, the intelligibility of redemption is “some act of the mind, some 
act of understanding.”63  What is grasped when one understands is named an 
intelligibility. 
Lonergan lists five aspects in the intelligibility of redemption: (1) while the 
redemption is intelligible, it is not a necessity, since intelligibility is not the same as 
necessity; (2) the intelligibility is a dynamic intelligibility, meaning that it is not a matter 
of deductive thought, but rather dialectical thought: the fundamental element in the drama 
of redemption is the reversal of roles described in the New Testament, where the 
fundamental reversal is that death, the penalty of sin, has through Christ become the 
means of redemption; (3) the intelligibility is an incarnate intelligibility, which means 
that it is not abstract; (4) the intelligibility is a complex intelligibility, where “complex” 
denotes that the intelligibility of redemption must take into account the category of sin, 
which in itself is unintelligible; and (5) the intelligibility is a multiple intelligibility.   
                                                 
62
 Transcribed and first published in Bernard Lonergan: 3 Lectures, edited with introduction by R. Eric 
O’Connor (Montreal: Thomas More Institute), 1-28.  For the latest edition see Bernard Lonergan, “The 
Redemption,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1958-1964, vol. 6 of Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan, eds. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1996), 3-28. 
63
 Lonergan, “The Redemption,” 8. 
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The fifth point on “multiple intelligibility” needs clarification.  What Lonergan 
means can be clarified by understanding his appropriation of Aquinas, specifically q. 48, 
articles 1 – 4, 6, in the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae.  In this series of articles, 
Aquinas explains how Christ’s passion brings about our salvation.  Aquinas does not 
attempt to explain this in a single formula.  He is satisfied to explain it under five 
different aspects:  1) by way of merit, 2) by way of satisfaction, 3) by way of sacrifice, 4) 
by way of redemption, and 5) by way of efficient causality.
64
  Charles Hefling rightly 
notes that Aquinas’s five aspects are not simply disconnected sententiae, “but neither do 
they have a clearly intelligible unity.”65  
During this lecture in 1958, Lonergan cautioned against forcing the mystery of 
redemption into a single, unified viewpoint.  He acknowledged the legitimacy of 
Aquinas’s approach.  However, in an ironic twist, in the last section of the lecture he then 
suggests how one might approach a unified view.
66
  In the published transcription of the 
lecture, an editorial note explains that Lonergan’s caution against a unified view is not a 
contradiction with his own attempt at that unified view.
67
  Lonergan inherited Aquinas’s 
“multiple intelligibility.”  But Lonergan’s own habitual orientation was always to strive 
for a unified understanding of redemption. 
In the lecture he states that the fundamental category for a unified view is the 
category of mystery.  Here mystery is not a truth that we cannot adequately understand in 
this life, but mystery in the sense of the New Testament narrative: the secret counsel of 
                                                 
64
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter ST), Tertia Pars, q. 48, aa.  1-4, 6. 
65
 Charles Hefling, “Lonergan’s Cur Deus Homo: Revisiting the ‘Law of the Cross,’” in Meaning and 
History in Systematic Theology: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Doran, S.J., ed. John D. Dadosky 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2009), 163. 
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 Lonergan, “The Redemption,” Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1958-1964,  24. 
67
 Lonergan, “The Redemption,” Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1958-1964,  14, n. 26.  Hefling 
states that this long editorial note is anonymous, but he is of the opinion that its manner and content 
strongly suggest Crowe’s authorship.  See Hefling, “Lonergan’s Cur Deus Homo,” 163, n. 13. 
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God.  His clue to a unified view of redemption is to notice how the New Testament 
relates the “secret counsel of God” to a number of antitheses:  the comparison of the first 
Adam and second Adam, the transformation of death into new life and the means of 
salvation, the transition from an old covenant to a new covenant.  Lonergan would indeed 
provide his own unified understanding of redemption, what he called the “Law of the 
Cross.”  He provided this in chapter 4 of the Supplement, and in Thesis 17 of DVI. 
 
1.3.5 Theses 15-17 of De Verbo Incarnato 
 
 
 DVI was originally published in 1960, with new editions in 1961 and 1964. 
Other than the Supplement, Lonergan’s most extensive treatment of redemption is found 
in Theses 15-17 in DVI, the last section collectively titled “Redemption.”   
The purpose of Thesis 15 is to establish the certitude of the doctrine of 
redemption by appealing to the New Testament.  Thesis 15 is not concerned with 
systematic understanding.  The thesis states that redemption denotes not only an end but 
also a mediation on the part of Christ’s suffering, death, and resurrection.  Lonergan 
categorizes this mediation in terms of (1) a price that has been paid, (2) Christ the 
Mediator’s vicarious suffering and death for sinners and on account of sins, (3) the 
sacrifice offered by our High Priest in his own blood, (4) meritorious obedience, and (5) 
the power of the risen Lord and the eternal Priest’s intercession.   
In a scholion near the end of Thesis 15, Lonergan recalls that Aquinas listed five 
modes or effects of how Christ’s passion brings about salvation: 1) by way of merit, 2) by 
way of satisfaction, 3) by way of sacrifice, 4) by way of redemption (price paid, ransom), 
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and 5) by way of efficient causality.
68
  Lonergan correlates each of Aquinas’s articles to 
one of his own categories in Thesis 15. 
At the end of the thesis, Lonergan states that the several modes and effects of 
redemption are “so deeply settled in Catholic thought that it is scarcely necessary to add 
to what the Angelic Doctor wrote.  When it comes to satisfaction, however, opinions 
differ.  Accordingly we present next a separate thesis on it.”69 
Thesis 16 is Lonergan’s systematic speculation on the meaning of Christ’s 
satisfaction.
70
  Lonergan does incorporate the fact of “punishment” into his understanding 
of Christ’s satisfaction, but not in the context of retributive justice.  He argues that the 
context is one of pardon sought and granted.  In this context, Christ’s satisfaction is his 
voluntary taking on of suffering and death to express his detestation and sorrow over the 
sins of the human race, resulting in the forgiveness of sin and reconciliation between God 
and sinners.  Thus Christ’s satisfaction was vicarious, and his motivation was charity. 
Since Lonergan holds that systematic understanding of the mysteries of faith is 
imperfect and analogical, he seeks out the proper analogy.  For Lonergan, the proper 
analogy to grasp the intelligibility of Christ’s satisfaction is the sacrament of penance, 
first suggested by the Council of Trent.  However, Trent did not develop the analogy.  
Lonergan considers that the intelligible context to understand Christ’s satisfaction has 
more similarity to interpersonal relationships than commercial transactions, so he invites 
the reader to see the reasonableness of using the analogy of the sacrament of penance to 
understand the intelligibility of Christ’s satisfaction.  This is why Lonergan understands 
                                                 
68
 ST, III, q. 48, aa.  1-4, 6. 
69
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 484. 
70
 In Thesis 16, Lonergan included a theological note that Christ’s satisfaction was presumed though not 
strictly defined by the Council of Trent.  See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 488. 
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Christ’s satisfaction as an expression of the interior disposition of “detestation and 
sorrow.”  The language is straight out of Trent’s teaching on the sacrament of penance, 
specifically on the nature of contrition.
71
 
Thesis 16 is a systematic theology, but only with respect to the doctrine of 
Christ’s satisfaction.  It is not yet the “unified view” of redemption Lonergan is moving 
towards.  That will come in the next thesis. 
 Thesis 17 is Lonergan’s “unified” view of the intelligibility of redemption.  In the 
Lonergan community, his thesis is commonly known as the “Law of the Cross” based on 
the phrase at the end of the thesis.  Thesis 17 formally states: 
This is why the Son of God became man, suffered, died, and was  resurrected: because 
divine wisdom has ordained and divine goodness has willed not to do away with the evils 
of the human race through power, but to convert those evils into a supreme good 
according to the just and mysterious law of the cross.
72
 
 
Lonergan gave the title “Understanding the Mystery” to Thesis 17.  In Hefling’s 
unpublished translation, the subtitle “Law of the Cross” has been added because 
Lonergan often referred to his thesis in that way.
73
  He tended to downplay his Latin 
theology, but he considered this thesis a valid achievement.
74
  He identified the law of the 
cross as the “intrinsic intelligibility of redemption.”75 Lonergan himself, in a lecture 
given to the Canon Law Society of America, identified his thesis on the lex crucis as the 
strictly theological component of the dynamic structure of human history.
76
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 DB 897, DS 1676, ND 1622. 
72
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 532. 
73
 See note 1 of Thesis 17, Hefling’s translation. 
74
 Charles Hefling, “A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement: Lonergan on Christ’s Satisfaction,” 
Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 10 (1992). 
75
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 576. 
76
 Bernard Lonergan, “Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness,” Second 
Collection, 7. 
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The law of the cross is a principle of transformation in which evils are 
transformed into a supreme good.  This supreme good is a new community.  The supreme 
good is the “whole Christ, head and members, in this life as well as in the life to come, in 
all their concrete determinations and relations.”77  The law of the cross is a law embodied 
and revealed in Christ, but it is also a precept addressed to Christian disciples.  In 
summary, Thesis 17 amounts to Lonergan’s systematic, unified intelligibility of 
redemption.  The law of the cross is without doubt the most well-known and most widely 
researched aspect of Lonergan’s soteriology.  
 
1.4 The History of Research on the Supplement 
 
 
There has not yet been a complete interpretation of the Supplement.  Perhaps the 
closest we have is a chapter devoted to the Supplement by Frederick Crowe in Christ and 
History.
78
  The scope of Crowe’s project in this book did not allow him to give a full 
interpretation of Lonergan’s Supplement. 
Bernard Arputhasamy studied the Supplement in order to explicate the 
fundamental meaning of Lonergan’s notion of the “Law of the Cross.”79  Although 
Arputhasamy’s principal text was the Supplement, his research focused only on the law of 
the cross discussed in chapter 4.   
In the most recent dissertation on Lonergan’s theology of redemption, Mark 
Miller also offers an interpretation of Lonergan.
 80
  The goal of his dissertation was to 
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 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 553. 
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 Crowe, Christ and History, chapter 9. 
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 Bernard Hyacinth Arputhasamy, S.J., “Redemption: Understanding Lonergan's Fundamental Meaning of 
the Law of the Cross as the Transformation of Evil into Good,” Th.M., Regis College, Toronto, 2005. 
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interpret Lonergan’s understanding of how the passion of Jesus Christ is salvific.  
However, Miller does not treat the Supplement. 
Charles Hefling has interpreted a section of the Supplement, specifically an 
interpretation of article 45, chapter 6, where Lonergan takes up Anselm’s question, Cur 
Deus Homo?  He presented the essay at the 35th annual Lonergan Workshop at Boston 
College in June 2008.  The essay was subsequently published in the Festschrift honoring 
Robert Doran.
81
   
 
1.5 Method and Outline of the Study 
 
 
Methodologically, my research is an interpretation of Lonergan, where 
interpretation is understood within the theological method of Bernard Lonergan himself.  
For Lonergan, theological method is divided into eight functional specialties: research, 
interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and 
communications.
82
  Interpretation has as its own proper end to understand what was 
meant in the material one is interpreting.  The task of interpretation is thus to 
communicate what was meant.  The intent is to grasp “meaning in its proper historical 
context, in accord with its proper mode and level of thought and expression, in the light 
of circumstances and intention of the writer....its product is the commentary or 
monograph.”83   
Within Lonergan’s functional specialties, systematics and interpretation both aim 
at understanding.  The purpose of systematics is to seek the imperfect and analogical 
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understanding of the mysteries of faith already judged to be true through faith.  Where 
systematics seeks to understand the mysteries of faith (expressed in doctrines), 
interpretation seeks to understand what others have understood.  My study of the 
Supplement, although it involves systematic reflection, is not aiming to develop a 
systematic theology of redemption.  My intent is to understand Lonergan’s 
understanding.  Since interpretation presupposes research, my work is primarily in the 
first two functional specialties, research and interpretation. 
Based on Lonergan’s description of the functional specialty interpretation,84 my 
approach will seek to understand Lonergan by (1) understanding the purpose and context 
in which he wrote the Supplement, (2) understanding the text itself, where the whole of 
the text is understood through its parts, and the parts are understood through the whole,
85
 
and (3) understanding the author himself, first and foremost through the Supplement, but 
also by making connections to his other writings that are judged, in my opinion, as 
relevant to interpreting his understanding of the historical causality of Christ.  Close 
consideration will be given to Lonergan’s contributions to a theology of redemption, as 
well as his writings dealing with causality and/or history. 
The dissertation will follow the order of the Supplement.  An interpretation is a 
communication of meaning to a reader.  Following Lonergan’s order facilitates this 
communication.  Lonergan began his Supplement as he did because it followed the 
pattern of what he, following Aquinas, called the ordo disciplinae or ordo doctrinae, the 
order of learning and teaching.  This order is a manner of presentation that postpones 
solutions that presuppose knowledge of other solutions.  As such, the next chapter will 
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 For Lonergan’s understanding of interpretation, see Method in Theology, 127, 153-173. 
85
 Lonergan names this dynamic between parts and whole the “hermeneutical circle.”  See Method in 
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interpret the first chapter of the Supplement.  Each subsequent chapter correlates to a 
specific chapter in the Supplement, following Lonergan’s order.  In the conclusion, I will 
briefly summarize my interpretation of the fundamental themes in Lonergan’s 
understanding of the historical causality of Christ.  I will include there a hypothesis of the 
Supplement’s relation to De Verbo Incarnato, as well as a brief interpretation of the 
practical orientation of the Supplement and how this orientation sheds light on a 
contributing factor relating to Lonergan’s motivation to write the text.
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CHAPTER 2: GOOD AND EVIL 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Our purpose here is to interpret the first chapter of the Supplement, titled “Good 
and Evil.”1  The first chapter of the Supplement is divided into eight articles: (1) On the 
Good in General;  (2) The Human Good of Order;  (3) Communication:  Signs and 
Symbols;  (4) The Comparison of Goods;  (5) Evil;  (6) From Evil, Good;  (7) Human 
Powerlessness; and (8) Original Sin. 
Lonergan’s intent to understand the historical causality of Christ has its biblical 
roots in the Pauline conception of the pantōn anakephalaiōsis (Eph. 1:9-10).  Chapter 1 
includes two introductory paragraphs prior to the first article.  
To us has been revealed the hidden plan of God's will, ‘to gather all creation both in 
heaven and on earth under one head, Christ’ (Ephesians 1.9-10).  While it is hardly 
surprising that we here below have little inkling about how heavenly things might be 
gathered in Christ, it would seem to be a rather more serious matter if we were to neglect 
the question of how earthly realities are to be brought together, especially since it is our 
duty to work with ‘the one who holds the whole building together and makes it grow into 
a sacred temple in the Lord’ (Ephesians 2.21). 
 
Accordingly, we have decided that careful consideration must be given to inquiring, first, 
about the nature of the good, how the human good is located especially in order, by what 
law the human good of order is corrupted by sin, and finally what human resources there 
are for restoring the human good of order.  If we have well understood these things, we 
shall have a deeper and more fruitful understanding of how important in addressing any 
and all of our contemporary problems is the great gift that God our Father has bestowed 
upon us in the Holy Spirit through our Lord Jesus Christ crucified and risen.
2
 
                                                 
1
 “Caput Primum.  DE BONO ET MALO,” DBM, 1-65 [Supplement, 1-27]. 
2
 “Notum nobis factum est divinae voluntatis sacramentum ‘omnia in Christo instaurare sive quae in caelis 
sive quae in terris sunt in ipso’ (Eph 1, 9.10).  Quod si his in terris parum perspicimus quemadmodum 
caelestia in Christo instaurentur, haud forte mirandum est.  Sed gravius esse videtur si pariter 
praetermittimus quemadmodum instaurentur ipsa terrestria, cum nostri sit collaborare ut omnis aedificatio 
constructa crescat in templum sanctum in Domino (Eph 2, 21). 
Quam ob causam diligenter imprimis considerandum esse duximus quale sit bonum, quemadmodum 
humanum bonum praecipue in ordine ponatur, qua lege humanum ordinis bonum peccato corrumpatur, 
quaenam denique sit humana potentia ad humanum ordinis bonum restaurandum.  Haec enim si perspecta 
habuerimus, et plenius et fructuosius intelligemus, quanti momenti sit in omnibus et singulis hodiernae 
vitae problematibus magnum illud Dei Patris beneficium, quod per Dominum nostrum crucifixum et 
resurrectum in sancto Spiritu accepimus.”  DBM, 1 [Supplement, 1]. 
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 Lonergan’s strategy is to consider good and evil in terms of three movements:  
how the human good is located especially in order, how the human good of order is 
corrupted by evil, and the potential for restoring the human good of order.  Readers 
familiar with Lonergan’s interest in history may immediately identify this as a correlation 
to his theological analysis of history, commonly articulated as a threefold approximation 
of progress, decline, and redemption.
3
  The first approximation, progress, assumes that 
human beings always do what is intelligent and reasonable.  The second approximation, 
decline, acknowledge the fact of sin, that human beings are biased and so do what is 
unintelligent and unreasonable.  The third approximation is the redemptive process from 
God’s gift of his grace to individuals and from the manifestation of his love in Christ 
Jesus.
4
  Lonergan presented this whole idea in chapter 20 of Insight where he developed 
his heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil. 
 Any single approximation in Lonergan’s theological analysis of history does not 
explain reality in the concrete, actual sense.  Each approximation is an abstraction of a 
particular aspect of reality.  Reality is explained when all three are considered together.  
Now Lonergan’s threefold approximation is essentially a transposition of the theological 
categories of nature, sin, and grace into a historical context, resulting in an anthropology 
that distinguishes, yet combines, two components of concrete human reality:  a constant 
                                                 
3
 The roots of Lonergan’s theological analysis of history go back to the 1930s.  Borrowing from Newton’s 
planetary theory which included three approximations to explain the actual movement of planets, Lonergan 
developed a theological analysis of human history, based on the three approximations of progress, decline, 
and redemption.  See Bernard Lonergan, “Insight Revisited,” Second Collection, 271-272.  The caveat here 
is that the Supplement’s inquiry into “what human resources there are for restoring the human good of 
order” does not correspond perfectly to redemption understood in the supernatural sense.  Since Lonergan 
will explicitly consider the doctrine of redemption in chapters 3-6, it makes sense that he would not fully 
explore redemption in this first chapter. 
4
 Lonergan, “Insight Revisited,” 272. 
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human nature and a variable human history.  “Nature is given man at birth.  Historicity is 
what man makes of man.”5 
 The present chapter is essentially organized according to the three approximations 
of progress, decline, and restoration, albeit our treatment of restoration will not 
correspond to a treatment of the doctrine of redemption, for the reasons previously 
stated.
6
  Furthermore, we include a section to interpret how this chapter functions as a 
starting point for the Supplement.  In that section one of our aims is to briefly interpret the 
function of Lonergan’s first chapter in the wider context of the Supplement.  In citations 
from Lonergan’s text, I include page references to the original Latin and the English 
translation.  The former will be cited as De bono et malo (abbreviated DBM).  The latter 
will be cited as the Supplement.  Lonergan numbered the first 179 pages of DBM.  
References to DBM, from page 180 on, will include an asterisk. 
 
2.2 A Brief Description of Articles 1 - 8 
 
 
2.2.1 Article 1:  On the Good in General
7
 
 
 
 The first article is a metaphysical consideration of the good.  Lonergan makes 
seven major points: (1) all good is being; (2) good denotes something concrete; (3) good 
denotes all things; (4) since only God is good by essence, all other things are good by 
participation; (5) since only God is good by essence, we can only understand, conceive, 
and know the good imperfectly and analogically; (6) there are two ways of considering 
created good:  particular goods and good of order.  The former refers to things desired.  
                                                 
5
 Bernard Lonergan “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” A Third Collection, Papers by Bernard 
J.F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 170.  
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 See note 3. 
7
 “Articulus I.  De Bono in Genere,” DBM, 2-6 [Supplement, 1-3]. 
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The latter refers to the concrete dynamic whole which includes the desire, the desirer, the 
means of attainment, and enjoyment of the good obtained; (7) there are three ways of 
considering the good of order:  (a) abstract; (b) schematic, typical, and hypothetical; (c) 
actual.  The actual order is the one divine wisdom infallibly knows, divine goodness has 
effectively chosen, and divine power irresistibly implements.
8
  Lonergan’s first three 
points are all logical deductions from the metaphysical axiom that “‘Good’ and ‘being’ 
are convertible terms…”9  The next two are based on the doctrine that only God is good 
by essence.  Lonergan’s source for these first five points is likely Aquinas.10 
 Lonergan concludes the article with three doctrines from Aquinas:  (1) divine 
wisdom orders all things, the divine decree wills all things, and divine power effects one 
world order;
11
 (2) the purpose of the universe is the good existing in the universe, and this 
good is the order of the universe itself;
12
  (3) the universe as a whole is a more perfect 
participation and reflection of divine goodness than any individual creature.
13
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Lonergan, DBM, 2-5 [Supplement, 2-3]. 
9
 “Nam ens et bonum convertuntur;” DBM, 2 [Supplement, 1].  Evidently the Latin phrase ens et bonum 
convertuntur (being and good are convertible) became a standard phrase in the thirteenth century, although 
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Transcendentality of Goodness:  Suárez’s Solution to the Problem of Positive Evils,” in Being and 
Goodness:  The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald 
(Cornell University: Cornell University Press, 1991), 152. 
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 In the epilogue to Insight, Lonergan states that he had spent “years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas...”  
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first on gratia operans (the topic of his dissertation) and second on his investigation into Thomas’s thought 
on Trinitarian theory, resulting in the series of verbum articles published in Theological Studies in the 
1940s, subsequently published as Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas.  Aquinas’s doctrine on the 
convertibleness of being and good is found in ST I, q. 5, a. 1.  Being and good are really the same, differing 
only in idea.  Goodness presents the aspect of desirableness (rationem appetibilis) of being, whereas being 
qua being does not.  Thomas’s doctrine that only God is good by essence is found in ST I, q. 6, a. 3.  
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 Lonergan, DBM, 6 [Supplement, 3].  ST I, q. 47, a. 3 c. 
12
 Lonergan, DBM, 6 [Supplement, 3].  ST I, q. 103, a. 2 ad 3m. 
13
 Lonergan, DBM, 6 [Supplement, 3].  ST 1, q. 47, a. 1 c.   
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2.2.2 Article 2:  The Human Good of Order
14
 
 
 
 The second article shifts focus to the human good.  The article is divided into 
three subsections: (1) the good of order in human affairs, (2) how the human good of 
order progresses, and (3) the meaning of “higher culture.” 
 The Good of Order in Human Affairs: Human beings are born into an existing 
good of order, but through their reason and will they establish and improve their own 
good of order through historical process.15  They do this because they desire particular 
goods in a recurrent manner.  Working individually, human beings cannot establish a 
good of order.  So they form societies.  Through collaboration and cooperation they 
establish a human good of order that provides particular goods in a recurrent manner.
16
  
The human good of order includes the family, the economy, and the polity.
17
 
 How the Human Good of Order Progresses:  When a critical history analyzes the 
good of order in human societies, across time and across space, we discover great 
diversity.  This diversity reveals the fact of progress.  For Lonergan the cause of progress 
is not found so much in external circumstances as in intellectual development.
18
  The 
human intellect is always critiquing the situation and imagining new possibilities.  If a 
situation is improved, the cycle begins anew.  So there is a circular movement to 
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progress.  “There is no intrinsic reason why this progressive cycle should end, since the 
mind by its very nature is said to be that which can make and become all things.”19 
 Lonergan identifies two aspects of the human good of order:  (1) A general 
structure independent of time and place.  Always and everywhere people desire a flow of 
particular goods, they collaborate to create an order to make this possible, and this 
collaboration creates interpersonal relationships;  (2)  An intrinsic principle of change; 
improvements continually take place as the result of insights and communal decisions.
20
 
 This intrinsic principle of change is Aristotle’s insight that human nature is “that 
which can make and become all things.”21  If this principle is understood, factors that 
distinguish primitive cultures from higher cultures can be explained genetically.
22
  “If 
such genetic explanation is valid, we may readily grasp both the importance of an 
historical understanding of reality and the nature of what is called ‘human solidarity.’”23  
 A historical understanding of reality, based on genetic explanation, grasps a 
general theorem that the human good of order has been built up gradually through history 
from the insights and communal decisions of human beings.  Human solidarity reveals 
that the human good of order is an immense accumulation of insights, discoveries, and 
decisions of the past.  Virtually everything we learn is through this good of order.
24
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 34 
 The Meaning of Higher Culture:  In this section Lonergan distinguishes a third 
aspect of the human good of order, the cultural good.  The cultural good is grounded in 
four innate human desires:  (1) the natural desire to understand, (2) the natural desire for 
rectitude and for moral consistency between reason and will, (3) the natural desire for 
happiness, and (4) the natural desire for immortality.  In addition to these innate desires, 
human nature includes a “remarkable elevation of feeling” (mira illa sentimentorum 
elevatio) and a “polymorphous sensibility” (sensibilitatis plasticitas) revealing us to be 
embodied spirits more than animals who have the use of reason.
25
  The cultural good is 
an “internal” good of order, so Lonergan qualifies that the human good of order he has 
been describing thus far is the “external good of order” (bonum humanum exterius).26   
 Human beings are motivated to satisfy their innate desires.  They can proceed via 
two routes: (1) the mystical route of withdrawal, or (2) engagement with society.  The 
latter has two stages: primitive society and a more highly developed culture.
27
 
 Primitive cultures are not inferior to higher cultures.  Both seek particular goods.  
Both develop a good of order.  Both exhibit a concern with spiritual realities.  Both use 
signs.  Higher cultures, however, reflect on their signs.  This reflection develops into a 
technical elaboration of signs in the fields of grammar, rhetoric, logic, semantics, and 
criteriology.  This allows natural intellectual desire to acquire accurate knowledge of 
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natural realities, and analogical knowledge of spiritual realities.
28
  Without the technical 
elaboration of signs, there would be little or no sharing of insights required for cultural 
progress.  Since the principal distinguishing factor of higher culture is the reflection on 
signs, Lonergan states that higher culture resides in the intellect and will.  As such, higher 
culture, due to its superior power, influences all the judgments and choices through which 
the external good of order develops.
29
  Lonergan ends the article noting that down 
through the ages, cultural development is often obscured by great evils.
30
  
 
2.2.3 Article 3:  Communication: Signs and Symbols
31
 
 
 
 Without the power and efficacy of signs all collaborative effort, all tradition, and 
all progress would disappear.
32
  Lonergan identifies four fundamental principles in the 
nature of signs:  (1) concretion, (2) conformity, (3) information, and (4) mediation. 
 Concretion refers to the concrete nature of signification:  signs are communicated 
from one person to another.
33
  Conformity refers to a connection in sensibilities between 
persons who communicate.
34
  There are degrees of conformity.  Some signs communicate 
knowledge.  Others evoke sympathy, compassion, or involvement.  Information refers to 
a conformity between persons in their mutual understanding, judgment, and desires.  
When these three are operative, the community is said to be of “one mind and heart” 
(animam et cor unum) and virtually certain to will and choose the same things.
35
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Mediation refers to mediums of communication.  The human body is foremost and tends 
to be immediate.  Verbal and written communications are mediated.
36
   
 Lonergan ends the article describing a far more perfect kind of sign: God’s Word-
made-flesh.  Through his flesh Christ communicates what belongs to his human nature 
and his divine person.  Christ’s signs also comprise the elements of concreteness, 
conformity, information, and mediation, but they differ by reason of their pre-eminent 
dignity.  Whatever the human spirit can do, Christ can do more effectively.  Thus Christ’s 
signs and all other signs are related analogically.  However, both possess instrumentality 
for advancing the external good of order as well as interior development of the mind and 
the steadfastness of the will.  But whereas human signs bring about an earthly 
commonwealth, the mystery of the incarnate Word establishes, promotes and brings to 
fulfillment the kingdom of God.
37
 
 
2.2.4 Article 4:  The Comparison of Goods
38
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins with a Thomistic doctrine that God can do absolutely everything 
that does not involve an internal contradiction.
39
  It is the function of divine wisdom to 
set things in order.  As such, there are as many possible orders of reality (or worlds) as 
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required for the ordering of all possible beings.  And since the end of creation is to 
manifest divine goodness, wisdom cannot fall short of attaining its end.  Any possible 
world is so “sagaciously ordered by divine wisdom” (sollerter per divinam sapientiam) 
that it may be chosen by divine goodness as a manifestation of this goodness.
40
 
 Lonergan uses the metaphysical elements of potency, form, and act to designate 
the order of created good.  The potential element is in any possible being.  The formal 
element is the wise ordering of things.  The actual element, or value, is its suitability to an 
end and worthiness to be chosen.  Whatever is found in created good is necessarily 
present in human goods, so human goods can also be divided according to the potential, 
formal, and actual elements.  The potential element is particular goods.  The formal 
element is the external good of order.  The actual element, value, is the cultural good.
41
  
There is a hierarchy among these three levels.
42
  The external good of order is superior to 
particular goods since it enables particular goods to be had in a continuous fashion.  
Cultural good is superior to the external good of order.  Cultural good aims at wisdom 
and goodness, and through values directs the external good of order toward progress. 
 Human beings are originated goods, created by God.  But since we are made in 
the image and likeness of God, by virtue of our imagination, intelligence, and choice we 
participate in the divine perfection to the degree that we are also originators of goods.  
This corresponds to the notion of personal value in Method.
43
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 In so far as we strive to maintain and improve the cultural good, we desire 
 (a) a human imagination that can represent accurately what intelligence conceives as 
good, (b) skills and knowledge to wisely order particular goods and also spiritual goods, 
and (c) human wisdom and goodness that knows and wills better orders.  Wisdom and 
goodness are to be preferred to the others based on their intrinsic dignity and 
consequences.  The wiser and  better we are, the more perfectly we express the image of 
the triune God.  Due to intrinsic excellence of wisdom and goodness, there is an interior 
order in the human person where our sensitive part is subordinated to reason, and reason 
subordinated to God.
44
  This interior order is of utmost value.
45
  The interior order 
corresponds to the notion of religious value in Method.
46
  We are not left to our natural 
powers to attain our end, the divine goodness itself: “in the actual state of things it is by 
the infused gifts of grace and by these alone that we are set aright and in good order, 
constituted adopted sons of God and temples of the Holy Spirit, with personal access to 
God the Father.”47 
 Lonergan concludes the article emphasizing the importance of interpersonal 
relationships.  Interpersonal relationships have the most bearing on the collaboration and 
cooperation that preserves and develops the external good of order and the cultural good.  
But Lonergan makes a distinction.  There are interpersonal relationships among human 
beings, and then there are interpersonal relationships between human beings and God.  
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The latter preserve and perfect the cultural good through sanctifying grace.  Through 
actual graces we exercise and develop within ourselves the image of the triune God.
48
 
 
2.2.5 Article 5:  Evil
49
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins with the metaphysical principle that evil is the opposite of the 
good.  Since good signifies being, then evil has no positive reality.
50
  Because evil is the 
opposite of good, then evil is divided into originating and originated evil.  Originated evil 
includes particular evils, the evil of order, and cultural evil.
51
  The evil of order denotes a 
steady series of particular evils, a breakdown in action and coordination, blocking of 
coordination through crime or incompetent institutions, and breakdown in personal 
relationships.  Cultural evil leads people from spiritual concerns to exclusively material 
concerns and undermines the unity of minds and hearts by imposing on society an 
outward uniformity by force, economic deprivation, or insidious psychological means.
52
 
Originating evil is the cause of all originated evils.  Originating evil is linked to 
any deficiencies in imagination, intelligence, and rational freedom.
53
  Among these 
deficiencies, the worst is the failure of that which is best, rational consciousness.
54
 
 As with progress, there is a circular movement in the phenomenon of decline.
55
   
The failure of rational freedom corrupts the external situation and the corrupt external 
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situation influences the intellect.  Since the corrupt situation is absurd, the intellect cannot 
find intelligibility in the situation.  Intelligence, finding no intelligibility, substitutes one 
unintelligible situation for another.  The intellect itself becomes infected and in turn 
prevents rational freedom from acting on the situation. 
 Decline in the external good of order does not leave cultural good untainted.  
Culture and life, theory and praxis, the ideal and the real, become alien to each other.  
Culture adapts to life, theory to praxis, and the ideal is dismissed as a dream or a myth.
56
 
“Just like the external good of order, cultural good also is subject both to the law of 
decline and the law of progress.”57   Worst among the damage done to the cultural good is 
cultural aberration that confuses evil for good, true for false, and hides its own 
corruption.  Cultural evil can spread its corruption through a society, disseminating falsity 
under the guise of truth.
58
 
 
2.2.6 Article 6:  From Evil, Good
59
 
 
 
 In the world there is a potency to bring good out of evil.  This potency is 
grounded in our changeable material nature.
60
  From a materialistic perspective, good is 
brought forth from evil in that renewal occurs through the process of death and birth.
61
  
 However, there is restoration in a truer sense when our experience of particular 
evils reveals to us what a better order might be and directs us to improve the external 
good of order and promote the cultural good.  But promoting the cultural good and 
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transforming cultural evils are two different things.  Lonergan states that cultural evils 
call for a heaven-sent redeemer.
62
   Another way of stating this is that reflection in itself, 
triggered by the individual or social experience of particular evils, cannot endow us with 
wisdom and goodness.
63
  We recall that for Lonergan cultural good aims at wisdom and 
goodness, which would explain why he judges that our own resources are not sufficient 
to endow us with wisdom and goodness since this would involve the transformation of 
cultural evil.  In short, we are powerless to overcome cultural evil by our own resources.  
This is the emphasis in which Lonergan ends the article, preparing us for the next article 
on human powerlessness. 
 
2.2.7 Article 7:  Human Powerlessness
64
 
 
 
 Our experience of particular evils leads us to improve the external good of order, 
and our experience of the evils of order disposes us to reflection on cultural good, while 
leaving us powerless to overcome cultural evil.
65
  Thus Lonergan begins the seventh 
article by summarizing the conclusion of the sixth article.  When cultural evils are not 
eradicated, the external human good of order is in constant decline, and ultimately the 
human good is totally extinguished.  The reign of sin leads to death (Rom 5:21).
66
  
 There are four root causes of our powerlessness:  (1) darkness of intellect, (2) 
weakness of will, (3) the objective difficulty of good, and (4) alienation from God.     
 Darkness of Intellect:  Darkness of intellect is a failure of intelligence to discern 
what is truly good.  If the intellect does not know what is truly good, the will is not able 
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to choose the good.  This darkness hinders good and spreads evil, though it may occur 
without subjective guilt.  The solution is learning.  However, people are not motivated to 
learn unless they want to because of a perceived practical advantage.  Many people are so 
totally caught up in practical matters that the absurdity of corrupt situations is 
rationalized.  Learning that does not square with the absurdity is pushed aside.  Lonergan 
states it is no wonder Vatican I taught the relative necessity of divine revelation.
67
 
 Weakness of Will:  There is a distinction between the will itself, and the 
willingness to act.  Human freedom is the essential ability to will or not to will.  But 
between will and act there are habits and dispositions, developed through experience, 
which form the character of our will.
68
  The weakness of will boils down to the difficulty 
in developing the character of one’s willingness.  The difficulty is exacerbated because 
darkness of the intellect and weakness of the will conspire to strengthen each other.
69
 
 Objective Difficulty of the Good:  Over time the social proliferation of evils means 
that we are going to suffer, and this suffering is not easily tolerated.  We incline toward 
sin because we shrink from suffering.  The way leading from evil, that breaks the vicious 
circle, is the way of the cross.  Refusing to shrink from suffering denies that the absurd is 
absurd and therefore to be endured, resulting in an increase in evils.
70
 
 Alienation from God.  This is idolatrous thought and action: thinking and acting 
that we ourselves are the First Cause, and correspondingly denying that we are 
instruments of God to do the good intended by God.71 
 
                                                 
67
 Lonergan, DBM, 53 [Supplement, 22]. 
68
 In Insight this equates to “willingness.”  See Insight, 646. 
69
 Lonergan, DBM, 54-59 [Supplement, 22-24]. 
70
 Lonergan, DBM, 60-61 [Supplement, 25]. 
71
 Lonergan, DBM, 63 [Supplement, 25-26]. 
 43 
2.2.8 Article 8:  Original Sin
72
 
 
 
 This is the briefest article in the chapter, one page in the Latin text.  The root 
causes of human powerlessness all flow from original sin.  What people can do and may 
even want to do, they are unable to do.  Human impotence reveals humanity’s need for 
redemption.
73
  
 
 2.3 Lonergan’s Starting Point 
 
 
At the beginning of the first chapter Lonergan states that the hidden plan of God’s 
will has been revealed, to gather all creation both in heaven and on earth under one head, 
Christ (Eph. 1:9-10).  Lonergan’s question is how earthly realities are to be brought 
together.  The restriction of the question to earthly realties is consistent with his statement 
to Fr. Crowe that the Supplement had the purpose of explaining the historical causality of 
Christ.  Lonergan then decides that a careful consideration must be given to how the 
human good is put in order, how the human good of order is corrupted by sin, and what 
human resources are available for restoring the human good of order. 
It is quite evident that Lonergan considers earthly realities through the category of 
the good, and that his focus is specifically the human good of order.  As such, the first 
chapter is essentially an anthropology.  Lonergan’s view of the human good of order is 
not a static view.  It is a historical view.  The human good of order progresses and 
declines through historical process.  As well, human resources can restore the human 
good of order, but only to a certain extent.   
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Why does Lonergan understand earthly realities through the category of the 
human good of order?  To answer this we begin by recalling the ending of the first article.  
Lonergan cites three doctrines of Aquinas.  The first is that the order of the universe is 
one, ordered by divine wisdom, chosen by divine will, and effected by divine power.  The 
second states that the purpose of the universe is the good of the order of the universe 
itself.  The third states that the universe as a whole is a more perfect participation in 
divine goodness than any individual creature.
74
  
These Thomistic doctrines suggest that order plays a significant role in 
Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ.  The suggestion is 
confirmed when we look ahead to the sixth chapter of the Supplement to discover his 
interpretation of the purpose or end of the Incarnation, and the means toward this end.  
The end of the Incarnation is redemption, but Lonergan distinguishes a primary and 
secondary end.  The primary end is the divine goodness itself.  The secondary end is 
restoration of the fallen order of the universe.  The secondary end is also called the 
external glory of God, or the order of the universe which is the most excellent thing in 
creation.
75
  This secondary end, according to Scripture, is also the Body of Christ, head 
and members, as all things in heaven and on earth are brought together and reconciled in 
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Christ (Eph 1:10; Col 1:20).
76
  Lonergan also understands the Body of Christ as a good of 
order, but in this case a supernatural good of order.
77
 
The means by which Christ brings about this secondary end is not an 
eschatological, apocalyptic transformation of the human good of order.  In the sixth 
chapter Lonergan will consider the historical agency of Christ, and there Lonergan will 
state that the effect of Christ’s historical action as a whole is the total human good of 
order, both external and cultural, past, present, and future.
78
  In other words, the work of 
Christ is a historical process.   
The reason Christ’s work is a historical process, rather than an apocalyptic event, 
is based on two fundamental principles.  First, although we have been justified by Christ, 
we have not yet wholly appropriated salvation.
79
  Redemption is an ongoing, historical 
process requiring human cooperation.  This is not absolutely necessary, but it is fitting.
80
  
Lonergan holds to the same position in The Triune God: Systematics: “The end of the 
divine missions is not attained without cooperation of human beings: ‘He who created 
you without you will not justify you without you.’”81  His understanding of our 
cooperation with God should not be interpreted merely as the cooperation to attain 
individual salvation.  We are called to cooperate with God not merely for our individual 
salvation, but because the human good that divine wisdom has ordered and divine power 
has chosen comes into existence through human beings who understand, judge, and 
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agree.
82
  Thus there is a social aspect of salvation, a social agency if you will.  But social 
agency reveals historical agency: 
Well now!  The very fact that many are linked together so as to be able to have a 
common understanding and agreement about the same thing is already a good of order.  
Hence human beings need a good of order before they either actuate this same good and 
so preserve it or change it for the better or for the worse.  This means that a social agent 
becomes an historical agent.
83
 
 
What Lonergan is getting at here is that our notion of history is not merely a 
hindsight that discerns transitions from one state to another.  History itself is a 
constitutive element of the human good of order.  The human good and human history are 
intimately related in Lonergan’s thought.  In fact, in Topics in Education he states that his 
notion of the human good is interconvertible with his notion of the structure of history.
84
  
Lonergan’s structure of history is the threefold dialectic of progress, decline, and 
redemption we discussed in the introduction.  For Lonergan, the human good is a history, 
“a concrete, cumulative process resulting from developing human apprehension and 
human choices that may be good or evil.  And that concrete, developing process is what 
the human good in this life is...”85   
The second principle, explained in his second chapter on the justice of God, is that 
God directs the common course of things in history through secondary causality in 
accordance with the nature of things and the laws of nature.
86
  This theological 
presupposition rules out as unfitting a redemption brought about by destroying the 
corrupted good and replacing it with something completely new.  In God’s redemptive 
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plan, the human good is not destroyed, but rather transformed in harmony with the world 
order which actually exists.  To deny this would be to suggest that God’s wisdom, which 
orders the universe to every last detail, did not foresee the need for redemption.  For 
Lonergan, this type of thinking amounts to an anthropomorphic blunder.  Divine wisdom 
does not learn by experience, or by trial and error.  In one immediate intuition, divine 
wisdom foresees, orders, and commissions all things from the beginning of eternity.
87
  
In brief, the function of the first chapter in the wider context of the Supplement is 
to define what the problem is that the historical causality of Christ is meant to address, 
and to setup a general framework to understand how the historical causality of Christ 
addresses this situation.  Both the problem and the solution are understood by Lonergan 
in terms of their socio-historical dimensions, using the basic category of the human good 
of order.  The human good of order is Lonergan’s fundamental category to understand 
history itself.  We will interpret, in more detail, his general theory of history when we 
come to his final chapter.  For now, what is essential to grasp is that Lonergan’s historical 
consideration of the human good is a fundamental presupposition behind his 
understanding of the secondary end of redemption and the means by which Christ brings 
this end about through historical process. 
It is reasonable that Lonergan would begin the Supplement with this 
presupposition.  Following Aquinas, he holds that systematic understanding should 
proceed according to the ordo disciplinae or ordo doctrinae.
88
  This first chapter is 
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consistent with this methodology.  This first chapter is essentially a historical-minded 
anthropology, functioning as background material for the Christology of chapters 3-6. 
 
2.4 The Human Good of Order and Historical Progress 
 
 
 The human good of order is the good in the context of human affairs.  Lonergan’s 
structure of the human good of order is: (1) particular goods desired by persons; (2) the 
external good of order, a concrete dynamic whole that structures human life such that 
particular goods can be acquired on a continuous and secure basis; and (3) the cultural 
good, which is principally an internal aspect of the human good of order aiming at 
wisdom and goodness, and constituted by values residing in the hearts and minds of the 
members of a society.   
 The cultural good, through the apprehension and judgment of values, influences 
the emergence and development of the external good of order.  The external good of 
order arranges particular goods in a systematic way.  Lonergan equates the external good 
of order with system, which “stands to particular goods as a dynamic artificial form to the 
materials put in order by design.”89  What Lonergan means here can be understood 
through an example he used during the 1957 Lectures on Mathematical Logic and 
Existentialism: 
What is an artificial form?  Well, if you put bricks and stone and wood together in a 
certain way you get a house.  But a house is not bricks or wood or stone.  It is the order 
imposed upon bricks and wood and stone.
90
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Thus a dynamic artificial form is not a natural form, but rather a form, an intelligibility, 
imposed upon materials by intelligence.  When Lonergan states that a “house is not 
bricks or wood or stone,” he is suggesting that a random pile of these materials is not an 
intelligible unity.  It is merely a coincidental aggregate of materials in which there is 
some unity based on spatial juxtaposition.  But a house is not merely spatial juxtaposition 
of materials.  A house exhibits an intelligible unity due to the artificial dynamic form 
arranging the materials.  By analogy, the external good of order is an intelligible unity 
imposed on materials by intelligence. 
 In the second article, Lonergan distinguished two aspects in the human good of 
order:  (1) a general structure which exhibits uniformity and constancy despite place and 
time, and (2) historical progress.  We will consider each of these separately. 
 
2.4.1 The General Structure of the Human Good of Order 
 
 
 In the second article Lonergan identified an aspect of the structure of the human 
good of order which he termed the “general structure” of the human good of order: 
In its general structure it [the human good of order] exhibits a certain uniformity and 
constancy in the fact that always and everywhere people seek a continuous and secure 
flow of particular goods, that always and everywhere they pursue this series through 
coordinated operations, that always and everywhere their collaboration gives rise to both 
external public institutions and interior habits of mind, and that always and everywhere 
the division of goods, collaborative effort, common institutions, and these interior habits 
themselves give rise to interpersonal relationships.
91
 
 
 In describing the general structure, Lonergan’s repeated phrase “always and 
everywhere” (semper et ubique) reveals an anticipation of what later in 1959 he would 
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call an “invariant structure” of the human good.  In her doctoral dissertation, M. Shawn 
Copeland studied the genetic development of the idea of the human good in the thought 
of Bernard Lonergan.
92
  Copeland notes that Lonergan made a first and second 
articulation of the human good in the 1950s.  The first was in the 1951 essay “The Role 
of a Catholic University in the Modern World.”93  The second was in Topics in 
Education.
94
 
 Topics in Education reveals a development in Lonergan’s thought contrasted to 
the 1951 essay.  In the former, Lonergan identified the human good as having an 
invariant structure, a notion he had not previously identified in either Insight or the 1951 
essay.
95
  Lonergan identified three levels of this invariant structure:  (1) the particular 
good, (2) the good of order, and (3) value.
96
  Copeland explains what Lonergan means by 
invariant structure: 
By “invariant structure” Lonergan means that which is true about the human good at any 
place or time.  It will be helpful to think of an invariant structure as an implicit definition.  
Implicit definitions are relational structures, the terms are fixed by the relations.  The 
concrete meaning can be whatever satisfies the exigencies of the terms and their 
relations; that meaning is grounded in direct insights into the objects of inquiry.  As an 
implicit definition of a society, the invariant structure of the human good identifies and 
specifies the basic terms and relations – particular goods, the good of order, value. 97 
 
 Lonergan’s notion of the “general structure” of the human good of order is 
equivalent to what he later terms an invariant structure, and it should be interpreted as an 
implicit definition as Copeland describes.  An implicit definition does not designate 
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content.  An implicit definition designates a relationship between terms, where the 
relations are settled by the terms, and the terms settled by the relations.
98
  Thus the 
general structure of the human good of order does not specify any specific particular 
goods, or any specific good of order, or any specific set of values.  Nevertheless, the 
general structure is not merely descriptive.  It is explanatory.  It grasps the intelligible 
relations between the three levels of the human good of order. 
 As an implicit definition, Lonergan’s general structure is also a heuristic 
structure.  There is a heuristic structure for anticipating the answer to a question 
whenever the object of inquiry admits antecedent determinations.
99
  As such, a heuristic 
structure anticipates the intelligibility of the unknown, and guides inquiry toward 
knowing the unknown.
100
  Lonergan’s general structure of the human good of order thus 
admits antecedent determinations:  at any place or time, there will be persons desiring 
particular goods, a good of order to secure the flow of particular goods, and a cultural 
good whose values influence the emergence and development of the good of order.   
 
2.4.2 Historical Progress in the Human Good of Order 
 
 
What does Lonergan mean by historical progress?  For Lonergan, progress is a 
cumulative improvement in the human good of order through history.  It is not just one 
step forward, but the accumulation of many steps forward.
101
  The notion of progress 
acknowledges that improvement is from one situation to another.  As a result of people’s 
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insights and decisions, an initial situation is improved, and a later situation takes shape.
102
  
The later situation then becomes the initial situation for a new progressive cycle.  
Progress is not improvement ex nihilo.  This is consistent with Lonergan’s notion of 
progress in Insight:  progress is a cumulative process.
103
  In the following subsections we 
will interpret Lonergan’s notion of progress according to two themes operative in his 
thought:  (a) the intrinsic principle of progress, and (b) the social dynamic of progress. 
 
2.4.2.1   The Intrinsic Principle of Progress 
 
 
Lonergan stated that the reason for the great variety and diversity across societies 
is found not so much in external circumstances as in the internal factor of intellectual 
development.
104
  The Supplement uncovers two principles of intellectual development.  
One is individual, the other social.  The individual principle is Aristotle’s insight that 
human intellect is that which can make and become all things.
105
 In my interpretation of 
Lonergan, this individual principle is logically prior to the social principle, and as such it 
is the intrinsic principle, the ultimate ground if you will, of historical process.  My 
interpretation is based on Lonergan’s statement that this intrinsic principle of change is 
within human nature itself.
106
  This intrinsic principle is the natural desire to understand 
that will not be satisfied until we know God through his essence.
107
  Lonergan listed this 
first among the four innate desires of human nature. 
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 This innate desire to understand, that will not be satisfied until we know God 
through his essence, is what in Insight is identified as the spontaneous nature of human 
inquiry, which Lonergan describes as the pure, detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire 
to know.
108
  This desire to know is manifested in questions for intelligence (what? why? 
how?) and questions for reflection (is it so?).  For Lonergan, this desire is the ultimate 
ground of progress in the human good of order.  
 The spontaneous inquiry of human nature leads to the spontaneous accumulation 
of insights within the individual.  Questions are followed by insights, which lead to 
further questions based on the incompleteness of previous insights.  Lonergan calls this 
pattern the “self-correcting process of learning.”109  When given free reign, the pure 
desire to know will unfold in a cascade of questions for intelligence and reflection, 
leading to an accumulation of insights, which is learning.  But learning is not merely an 
individual affair.  There is also a social dynamic to learning, in other words a social 
dynamic of intellectual development. 
 
2.4.2.2   The Social Dynamic of Progress 
 
  
 Lonergan explains that human beings are spontaneously motivated to collaborate 
and cooperate so that they may all have a steady, secure access to particular goods.
110
  
The reason is that individuals, on their own, do not have the resources to create the good 
of order that would satisfy their desires.  So they are motivated to help satisfy the desires 
of others, and collectively everyone’s desires are met.  The external good of order results. 
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 In my interpretation, the social dynamic of progress is equivalent to the social 
dynamic of intellectual development.  It is the pure desire to know operative in the social 
context.  It is the desire of human beings to collaborate and cooperate to improve.  One 
improves one’s lot by helping to improve theirs.  Lonergan describes this social dynamic 
as a circular movement.  The concrete social situation influences a person’s intellect.  The 
intellect, restless as it is, influences the will to devise something new.  Discoveries are 
made which beget new ideas.  Persuasion among members of the society produces 
agreement to introduce new ways of doing things and new ways of collaborative effort.  
The external situation improves.  Human intellect critiques the new situation, and the 
cycle begins anew.  There is no reason why this cycle should end.
111
 
 This circular process, over time, equates to a cumulative social acquisition of 
insights.  This leads to another important aspect of the social dynamic of progress, which  
Lonergan names “human solidarity.”112  For Lonergan, human solidarity recognizes that 
the human good of order is an immense and carefully preserved accumulation of human 
discoveries.  Since each of us is born into an existing good of order, we learn virtually 
everything from this common fund of human discovery.
113
   
 Lonergan’s notion of human solidarity reflects the social dimension of intellectual 
development, in other words the social nature of learning.  Again, we have recourse to 
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Insight for some helpful thoughts to interpret what Lonergan is getting at.  Human beings, 
through their collaboration and cooperation, are also naturally inclined to communicate 
and share their insights.  In other words, teaching goes hand in hand with learning.  
Although Lonergan made this statement in the context of discussing common sense 
knowledge, it also applies to theoretical knowledge.
114
  The spontaneous collaboration 
and communication of knowledge is the communal development of intelligence. 
 In my interpretation, Lonergan’s understanding of human solidarity is an 
expansion of his notion of “belief.”  He has spoken of belief in a number of works, but 
chapter 20 of Insight has perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the topic.
115
  
Belief is the reception of reliably communicated knowledge, as distinct from immanently 
generated knowledge.  The latter is knowledge acquired through one’s own cognitional 
acts of experiencing, understanding, and judgment.  However, the vast majority of any 
person’s knowledge comes through belief.  Lonergan said that “Ninety-eight percent of 
what a genius knows, he believes.”116  Each successive generation benefits from the 
knowledge of previous generations.
117
  Belief is a constitutive component of human 
solidarity, but it is only one element.  His notion of human solidarity describes a common 
fund of human discovery beyond the discovery of knowledge.  However, by analogy, his 
notion of belief can be used to understand his broader notion of human solidarity.  
 Finally we need to mention the role that emergent probability plays in Lonergan’s 
analysis of human development.
118
  It is highly probable that this notion was operative in 
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his thought when he wrote the Supplement, though he did not make explicit reference to 
the term.  Emergent probability is Lonergan’s worldview to explain the emergence and 
survival of new intelligible unities, according to classical and statistical laws.
119
  But for 
our purpose we only intend to note the role of emergent probability in human 
development, since human affairs also fall under the dominion of emergent probability.
120
  
But intelligence introduces a new factor.  Human beings, depending on their intellectual 
development, can take the initiative in bringing about the material and social conditions 
that make schemes of recurrence not just possible, but actual.  In this fashion “man 
becomes for man the executor of the emergent probability in human affairs.”121  The 
greater the degree that societies understand emergent probability, the greater the degree 
they can direct history in the trajectory of progress. 
 Next we need to consider another factor in the social dynamic of progress, and 
this is the cultural good.  In order to interpret Lonergan’s understanding of the cultural 
good, and how the cultural good directs historical progress, it is helpful if we identify a 
few major aspects of Lonergan’s understanding of the cultural good. 
 First, the cultural good is primarily the social path of human beings striving to 
satisfy their innate desires, as opposed to the mystical path of withdrawal.  The interior 
life is rooted in the four natural desires Lonergan described in the second article:  (1) the 
natural desire to understand, (2) the natural desire for rectitude and for moral consistency 
between reason and will, (3) the natural desire for happiness, and (4) the natural desire 
for immortality.  As such, Lonergan associates the cultural good to interior 
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development.
122
  Alternately he speaks of these innate desires as spiritual needs, and the 
cultural good as the means that leads people from material to spiritual concerns.
123
  The 
cultural good is rooted deeply in human nature. 
 Second, there is a distinction between primitive cultures and advanced cultures.  
In the unpublished English translation there is the statement that culture has two stages: 
“...that of a primitive society and that of a more highly developed culture.”124  I do not 
interpret this as suggesting that primitive society lacks culture.  Lonergan’s general 
structure of the human good of order implies that always and everywhere there is a third 
level of the human good, whether the society is primitive or more advanced.  And 
elsewhere he has explicitly stated that even primitive societies have culture in the true 
sense of the word.
125
  Lonergan’s point in the Supplement is to emphasize the fact that 
cultures develop, and his means of doing so is to contrast primitive and higher cultures.   
The primary difference between primitive cultures and advanced cultures is that the latter 
reflect on their signs.  The technical elaboration of signs is itself a cultural good, and 
because it needs nothing external apart from signs it can be easily preserved and 
transported to other places.
126
  
 Third, the cultural good involves a relationship between values, wisdom, and 
goodness.  Value is the good suitable to an end and worthy to be chosen.
127
  Furthermore, 
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Lonergan’s repeated emphasis on wisdom and goodness and the manner he relates these 
to the cultural good implies that the cultural good ultimately aims at wisdom and 
goodness, and wisdom and goodness are to be preferred to all other goods.
128
  As such, 
wisdom and goodness are required to discern values, to discern what is worthy to be 
chosen.  Lonergan conceives wisdom in the tradition of Aquinas, which is to say that it is 
the function of wisdom to set things in order.
129
  So human wisdom would not only 
discern what is good, but would also set about ordering those goods worthy to be chosen. 
 Fourth, although Lonergan’s understanding of the cultural good emphasizes 
interior development, he makes a distinction between two kinds of cultural good.  One 
kind originates from the innate desires.  The other is concerned with the tasks of daily 
living.
130
  In my interpretation these two kinds of cultural good correspond to the two 
dimensions of culture distinguished by Robert Doran: 
Moreover, culture is distinguished into the two dimensions of the everyday set of 
meanings and values informing a given way of life, and the reflexive level arising from 
scientific, scholarly, philosophic, and theological understanding of the everyday.
131
 
 
 The “later” Lonergan  defined culture as a set of meanings and values informing a 
common way of life.
132
  In the Supplement, the category of “meaning” in Lonergan’s 
notion of culture is not explicitly brought out.  The Supplement identifies the reflexive 
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level Doran mentions, as well as the values informing a way of life.  I would argue 
however that the aspect of meaning is implicit in Lonergan’s understanding of culture in 
the Supplement given the strong emphasis on the relationship between the cultural good 
and development of the interior, spiritual life. 
 We can summarize these four points as follows.  The cultural good enriches our 
interior life, and the interior life influences all the judgments and choices by which the 
external good of order develops.
133
  The values of a culture influence how that culture’s 
external good of order is put together and progresses.  The values will identify good truly 
worthy of being chosen to the degree that the culture fosters the development of wisdom 
and goodness in its members, for it is wisdom and goodness that discern, order, and 
implement values.  Furthermore, any culture, primitive or advanced, uses signs to 
regulate the external good of order.  But those cultures which reflect on their signs have 
the ability to develop and communicate theoretical insights in pure science, psychology, 
economics, political science, and history, and this capability gives rise to a superior 
power to develop the external good of order.
134
 
 
 
2.5 The Human Good of Order and Historical Decline 
 
 
 In the previous section we considered the human good of order, and historical 
process, in the context of Lonergan’s first approximation in his structure of history.  This 
approximation assumes that human beings act intelligently and reasonably.  On its own, 
this one approximation does not account for reality.  Lonergan’s second approximation 
accounts for the fact of evil and the resulting historical decline of the human good. 
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 The human good of order is not apart from evil.  In the fifth article we noted that 
Lonergan conceived evil as having no positive reality.  This basic definition of evil is 
Thomas’s position:  evil is the absence of the good.135   Since evil is the opposite of the 
good, then there is an opposite of the human good of order, in other words a “structure” 
of evil comprised of particular evils, the evil of order, and cultural evil.  In the next two 
subsections we will consider two aspects of this structure of evil:  (1) evil as part of the 
general structure of the human good of order, and (2) historical decline in the human 
good of order. 
 
2.5.1  Evil in the General Structure of the Human Good of Order 
 
 
 In the Supplement, Lonergan identifies a general structure of the human good, 
which we considered in the previous section.  Based on Lonergan’s understanding of the 
human good in the 1959 Cincinnati lectures, we interpreted that this general structure is 
equivalent to what Lonergan would later call an invariant structure in the 1959 lectures.  
Now even though good is not apart from evil, in the Supplement Lonergan does not 
explicitly state that evil is part of the “general” structure of the human good of order.  In 
my interpretation, this is implied and perhaps so obvious Lonergan did not need to state 
it.  But he does state this explicitly in the 1959 Cincinnati lectures: 
We have discussed some preliminaries on the good, the invariant structure of the human 
good as object, and certain general features of that structure...Now we can make what we 
have said a bit clearer and more concrete if we consider evil, the negation of the good.  
Just as there is a whole series of aspects to the invariant structure of the good, so there is 
a whole series of opposite aspects that are evil.
136
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 In the 1959 Cincinnati lectures Lonergan goes on to identify these evils as 
particular evils, organized evils, and negation of value.
137
  These correspond to what 
Lonergan in the Supplement identifies as originated evil: particular evils, the evil of 
order, and cultural evil. 
 When originated evil is interpreted as part of the general structure of the human 
good of order, then originated evil can be considered as an implicit definition.  In this 
sense no specific particular evils, no specific evil of order, and no specific cultural evil is 
identified.  Even though the cause of evil is not intelligible, there is an intelligible relation 
between the terms designated in originated evil.  Cultural evils lead to corruptions in the 
external good of order resulting in the evil of order, and the evil of order leads to 
particular evils.  Again, the specifics will vary with place and time.  And as a heuristic, 
we can anticipate that in any society there will be particular evils, evils of order, and 
cultural evils. In brief, the consideration of evil, as Lonergan stated in the 1959 
Cincinnati lectures, fills out the invariant structure of the human good to make it clearer 
and more concrete.  In effect, what this does is take into account Lonergan’s second 
approximation in this theological analysis of history.  As each approximation is added, 
we come closer to reality. 
 
2.5.2  Historical Decline in the Human Good of Order 
 
 
As the external good of order and the cultural good are subject to the law of 
progress, they are also subject to the law of decline.  In the following subsections we will 
interpret Lonergan’s understanding of decline according to two themes operative in 
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Lonergan’s thought:  (a) the intrinsic principle of decline, and (b) the social dynamic of 
decline. 
 
2.5.2.1  The Intrinsic Principle of Decline 
 
 
 Lonergan’s article on human powerless makes it rather clear that the root cause, 
the intrinsic principle of decline in human history, is human impotence with regard to the 
good.
138
  This impotence has four causes:  (1) darkness of intellect, (2) weakness of will, 
(3) the objective difficulty of good, and (4) alienation from God.  Lonergan’s 
understanding of human powerlessness is not so much based on acts of sin per se, but on 
the inclination to sin that we cannot overcome through our own natural resources.  The 
inclination to sin does not imply that we are unable to do any good, but rather than we 
cannot avoid sin for any sustained period of time, even though we intend the good.  
Intention is one thing, but performance is another.
139
  Lonergan made the same point in 
Topics in Education: 
According to the theologians, there is proof that man in this life without divine grace 
cannot long avoid grievous sin.  That incapacity to avoid sin without grace is moral 
impotence.
140
 
 
 In the last article on original sin Lonergan traces the causes of our powerlessness 
to original sin.  This is not surprising given Lonergan’s identification of “darkness of 
intellect” and “weakness of will” as two of the four root causes of human 
powerlessness.
141
  Thus Lonergan’s understanding of human powerlessness is a theology 
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of original sin, an explanation in line with traditional Catholic doctrine.  Due to original 
sin, and despite baptism, there remains in human nature an inclination to sin.
142
   
 Failures of rational freedom are an unavoidable consequence of impotence.  It is 
true that Lonergan includes the failure of rational freedom in the larger notion of 
“originating evil” which itself includes failures of imagination and intelligence.  
However, based on Lonergan’s description of originating evil, as well as the effect of the 
failure of rational freedom on the other two faculties, in my interpretation the failure of 
rational freedom should be linked with human powerless as the intrinsic principle of 
historical decline.  Inclination to sin is a fact of human nature, but it is only in actual sins 
that decline becomes a historical reality.  For Lonergan, rational freedom is the best of 
the human faculties, and he states that the worst corruption is the corruption of that which 
is best.
143
  This failure of rational freedom has no reason.  There is no “why” to explain 
the failure, otherwise it would not be a failure of rational freedom.  This explanation 
corresponds to what later in the Supplement Lonergan will name the “evil of guilt” or 
“evil of sin.”144   
With regard to the conquering of evil, we must distinguish between the evil of guilt, or 
sin, and the consequent evil of punishment.  The evil of guilt is the lack of reasonableness 
within the rational consciousness of a rational creature.  The evil of punishment includes 
the evil consequences of sin...
145
 
 
 Lonergan’s later distinction between malum culpae and malum poenae is 
equivalent to his distinction in Insight between “basic sin” and “moral evil.”  “Basic sin” 
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is the failure of free will to choose a moral obligatory course of action, or on the other 
hand, a failure to reject a morally reprehensible course of action.  “Moral evil” refers to 
the evil consequences of basic sin.  Moral evil increases the temptation to sin, in both the 
person and his or her social milieu.
146
  This distinction in Insight, as well as in the 
Supplement, can ultimately be traced to Lonergan’s appropriation of Aquinas.  For 
Aquinas, in voluntary matters evil is divided into fault (culpa) or pain/punishment 
(poena).
147
  The translation of the Latin term poena as “pain” or “punishment” (or 
“penalty”) can distort the Scholastic meaning, given how the English word “punishment” 
is typically understood in contemporary language.  The Latin poena simply means a 
deprivation of some human good.  But poena is always a result of culpa.
148
 
 In summary, moral impotence or human powerlessness refers to the human 
inclination to sin, a result of original sin.  The inclination to sin will ultimately be realized 
in acts of basic sin, which in this first chapter of the Supplement are described as failures 
of rational freedom.  Later in the Supplement Lonergan will use the term malum culpae 
(evil of sin).  When we take into account failures of imagination and intelligence, we now 
have Lonergan’s notion of “originating evil.”  In my interpretation, “originating evil” is 
best understood as a social dynamic of decline that proceeds from individual failures of 
rational consciousness.  We will turn to this next. 
 
2.5.2.2  The Social Dynamic of Decline 
 
 
 The ideal line of intellectual development, both individually and socially, was 
discussed in the section on how the human good of order progresses.  This is Lonergan’s 
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first approximation in his structure of history, that is, what history would look like if all 
human persons acted reasonably and responsibly.  But the actual world includes failures 
in intellectual development, and this is what Lonergan means by “originating evils.”  
Human beings are originating evils to the extent that there is a failure or deficiency of 
“imagination” (imaginationem), “mind” (intelligentiam), or “rational freedom” 
(rationalem libertatem).
149
  I interpret intelligentiam to imply what Insight would 
consider the two basic cognitional operations of intelligence, namely understanding and 
judgment.  
 It is clear that “originating evil” in this first chapter of the Supplement includes, 
yet has a broader meaning than the “evil of sin” (malum culpae).  I suggest the reason is 
based on the manner Lonergan chooses to explain the human situation in this first 
chapter.  The human situation is the human good of order understood in its historical 
context.  Since Lonergan’s historical-minded anthropology understands human beings as 
originator of goods, then if evil is the opposite of good we logically arrive at the notion of 
originating evil. 
 Furthermore, if Lonergan were to limit originating evil to original sin or malum 
culpae, he would be technically correct, but this would lack the explanatory power he is 
aiming for.  Lonergan’s notion of originating evil has a fuller explanatory power to 
explain the social dynamic of historical decline because, like intellectual development, it 
accounts for the circular movement between sin and evil.  The failure of rational freedom 
corrupts the external, social situation, and this in turn feeds back into the subject, 
inclining the subject to further sin.  So Lonergan’s notion of originating evil includes a 
                                                 
149
 Lonergan, DBM, 30 [Supplement, 13]. 
 66 
social dynamic, just as his understanding of intellectual development includes a social 
dynamic. 
 It may help us to understand this social dynamic if we consider Lonergan’s 
notions of bias developed in Insight.  In Insight, Lonergan states that the principle of 
decline is bias.
150
  His notion of bias is well-known among scholars who have 
appropriated his thought to develop a contemporary theology of sin, particularly social 
sin.
151
  Let us briefly review Lonergan’s four notions of bias. 
 Dramatic bias is primarily an unconscious flight from understanding which  
inhibits insights from emerging into consciousness because the insights do not confirm an 
existing viewpoint and behavior.
152
 The result is a scotosis, a blind spot in understanding.  
Individual bias is egoism that chooses the good of the individual over the common good.  
The individual brushes aside further questions or insights which would suggest a moral 
course of action favoring the greater good.  Individual bias is not totally unaware of its 
self-deception.
153
  Group bias is similar to individual bias, but its intent is to preserve and 
promote the interests of a dominant group, at the expense of other groups.
154
  General 
bias raises commonsense knowledge to ultimacy.  Theoretical knowledge is dismissed as 
irrelevant.
155
  General bias is the idolatry of commonsense knowledge, and can infect 
every member of society. 
 The Supplement does not explicitly use the language of “bias” to explain 
originating evil.  Lonergan chose to use different language.  Nevertheless, his 
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understanding of bias seems equivalent to his understanding of “originating evil.”  I base 
the judgment on two reasons. 
 First, both bias and originating evil cannot simply be equated with malum culpae.  
Both have a broader meaning.  Bias, like originating evil, is a result of sin and an 
inclination to further sin.  My judgment that bias is a result of sin and a further cause of 
sin is based on Lonergan’s statements in Topics in Education, DVI, and the Supplement.  
In the first two, Lonergan describes bias as a result of sin and a further cause of sin.
156
  In 
the Supplement, the judgment is implicit based on the mutually reinforcing dynamic 
which Lonergan established between originating evil and originated evil.  This circular 
movement begins with the failure of rational freedom: 
If that which is judge and master of all the others is corrupted, it follows necessarily that 
the others will be corrupted.  Indeed, the very mainspring of progress is thus turned into 
something regressive and destructive...Now if the choice of the will is irrational and 
absurd, so is the consequent action; and if the action is irrational and absurd, the change 
in the objective situation will be no less irrational and absurd...The power of the intellect 
is surely very great, since the intellect is that which is able to make and become all 
things.  But its power is not so great that it can actually understand that which is absurd...  
From all this it is clear that that circular movement by which the external situation 
influences the intellect which in turn influences the will to act upon that situation can be 
not only progressive but also regressive...  But to the degree to which the absurd creeps 
in, love is replaced by hatred, virtue by vice, good institutions by instruments of 
wickedness, cooperation by strife, diligence by inertia, abundance by want, and the 
universal power of the mind by intellectual impotence.
157
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 If bias results from sin as originated evil results from originating evil, then it 
would seem we can correlate Lonergan’s notions of bias to his understanding of 
originated evil.  Originated evils include particular evils, the evil of order, or cultural evil.  
Our use of bias to interpret originated evils will be limited to individual, group, and 
general bias because our focus here is on the social dynamic of decline.  The source of 
individual, group, and general bias results from a social dynamic, an aberration in social 
attitudes ultimately traced to the dialectical tension between spontaneous human 
intersubjectivity and an intelligently designed social order.
158
   Both individual and group 
bias are evils of order because, as originated evil, they allow and even promote the gain 
of individuals and groups at the expense of others.  These represent corruptions of the 
external good of order (that is, our social structures).  Examples of group bias, embedded 
in our social structures, include sexism and racism.   
 On the other hand, general bias is cultural evil.  In the article on evil, Lonergan 
distinguishes two types of cultural good.  One is conceived and developed by the natural 
desire for understanding, uprightness, true happiness, and immortality.  The other is 
patterned after the concrete circumstances of human living, where theory and praxis are 
hardly distinguished.
159
  When culture is infected with evil, the culture does not 
sufficiently recognize the value of theory.  Culture adapts theory to praxis, and theory is 
essentially rendered impotent for cultural transformation: 
So long as this initial irrationality remains, people will travel along another less arduous 
road, so that culture becomes adapted to life, theory to praxis, and that ideal itself 
dismissed as a mere myth, or but a dream.160 
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 This corresponds to Lonergan’s thought in Insight on the characteristic of general 
bias.  General bias sacrifices theory to praxis because it sees no value in reaching abstract 
or universal knowledge.
161
  If we interpret cultural evil as general bias, we can understand 
Lonergan to mean that rational consciousness elevates common sense to such a degree as 
effectively regulating other forms of knowledge to irrelevancy.  Rationalization of the 
absurd becomes a byproduct: culture is adapted to the way things already are and theory 
is adapted to praxis.  Ultimately, the effect of cultural evil or general bias is that it renders 
a culture impotent to direct history.  Where emergent probability was society’s ally in 
directing progress, general bias renders this cooperation impotent: 
The challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or 
destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice.  
Common sense accepts the challenge, but it does so only partially.  It needs to be guided 
but it is incompetent to choose its guide.  It becomes involved in incoherent enterprises.  
It is subjected to disasters that no one expects, that remain unexplained after their 
occurrence, that can be explained only on the level of scientific or philosophical thought, 
that even when explained can be prevented from recurring only by subordinating 
common sense to a higher specialization of human intelligence.
162
 
 
 In short, common sense on its own is not up to the task of directing history toward 
progress because common sense is unequal to human science in the task of thinking on 
the level of history.
163
  The solution, which in Insight is named “cosmopolis,” would have 
common sense yield to human science.  This is not to downplay the value of common 
sense, of practicality.  In fact, as Lonergan states, it is a “withdrawal from practicality to 
save practicality.”164 
 What is more alarming is the cultural aberration which results from cultural evil.  
When the external good of order breaks down, it reveals its corruption.  But cultural evil 
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hides its corruption.  It spreads the false under the guise of truth, and less rational 
individuals may even be drawn to such evil.
165
  Lonergan makes an equivalent judgment 
in Insight.
166
  This is why it is so difficult to cure general bias or cultural evils, and this is 
why in Insight Lonergan associates general bias to the longer cycle of decline. 
 
2.6 The Human Good of Order and Restoration 
 
 
 Our term “restoration” includes restoration in the natural sense.  However, it also 
includes restoration in the supernatural sense.  In the Supplement, Lonergan’s discussion 
of restoration through human resources is contained in the sixth article (From Evil, 
Good).  In this article Lonergan establishes the possibility of restoration.  The ground of 
this possibility is that a changeable material creature can be renewed from evil and 
restored to good.
167
  But the focus of the article is on restoration through human 
resources, and the recognition of its limits.  Lonergan emphasizes “renewal” and 
“restoration” in the human good of order, but he does not explicitly refer to “redemption” 
(redemptione).
168
  He does, however, state that cultural evils call for a heaven-sent 
redeemer (redemptorem divinitus).
169
 
 Lonergan’s understanding of restoration in the sixth article carries a wider 
meaning than redemption typically understood.  His notion of restoration is natural or 
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supernatural.  Either way, restoration is not an obliteration of individuals or society.  It is 
bringing good out of evil.  This wider meaning of redemption is consistent with 
Lonergan’s discussion of redemption in Topics in Education.170   Restoration through 
strictly human resources occurs when our experience of particular evils reveals what 
good order is and leads us to design a more effective external good of order and promotes 
the cultural good.
171
  But human resources on their own cannot overcome cultural evil.  
Cultural evils call for a heaven-sent redeemer. 
 Although Lonergan will explicitly consider redemption in chapters 3-6, this first 
chapter of the Supplement includes scattered references to supernatural restoration, 
corresponding to Lonergan’s third approximation in his theological view of history. 
 One example is in the third article (Communication: Signs and Symbols).  
Lonergan speaks of the most perfect kind of sign, God’s Word-made-Flesh, who through 
his divine person and human nature communicates through signs as an instrument for 
advancing human life in all its aspects.
172
 
 Another example is in the fourth article.  Lonergan identifies personal 
relationships as having the most bearing on the collaboration and cooperation that 
preserves and develops the good of order and the cultural good.  Personal relationships 
are grounded on a certain degree of understanding and agreement, or in other words a 
certain coming together in one mind and heart.  Personal relationships are the foundation 
of cooperation.  If human beings make their own history, then personal relationships must 
be at the very heart of historical process.  In fact, later in the Supplement Lonergan will 
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state that “...understanding and agreement is the foundation of all human cooperation--in 
fact, virtually the whole of what is properly human causality.”173  But in terms of the 
personal relationships constitutive of the cultural good,  Lonergan describes these 
relationships as being perfected, and receiving their efficacy, from sanctifying grace.
174
  
Lonergan’s point here, since it is found in the fourth article on the comparison of goods, 
is to explain that the cultural good, though superior to the good of order, is not the 
ultimate value.  The ultimate value is God’s value which enters into humanity through 
grace, transforming our own values.  When we take into account God’s gift of grace, 
cultural good is now subordinate to what later in Method will be called religious value.  
The gift of grace has the greatest influence in the hierarchy of the human good, and this 
grace develops interpersonal relationships, between God and us, and between ourselves.  
Interpersonal relationships are integral to Lonergan’s understanding of the historical 
drama of redemption.
175
 
 
2.7 Summary 
 
 
In this first chapter Lonergan has made the first step in articulating his 
presuppositions, the framework if you will for his Christology.  The first chapter 
develops a notion of the human good of order as a three-tiered structure of particular 
goods, an external good of order, and culture good.  This human good of order undergoes 
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progress, decline, and restoration.  With respect to restoration, human resources can 
transform some evils into good, but not cultural evils.  Cultural evils reveal our need for a 
supernatural restoration. 
 This first chapter of the Supplement, concerned as it is with the human good of 
order, is primarily an anthropology.  But it is a historical-minded anthropology.  This 
does not rule out the validity of a universal human nature.  A historical-minded 
anthropology is a higher synthesis.  Lonergan once stated that “A contemporary ontology 
would distinguish between two components in the concrete human reality:  on the one 
hand, a constant human nature; on the other hand, a variable human historicity.  Nature is 
given man at birth.  Historicity is what man makes of man.”176  Both are valid, and both 
are included in Lonergan’s anthropology which serves as a context for his understanding 
of redemption and the historical causality of Christ.  The Supplement’s second chapter, 
on the Justice of God, builds on and fills out the framework.  We will turn to this next. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE JUSTICE OF GOD 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Our purpose here is to interpret the second chapter of the Supplement titled “The 
Justice of God.”1  The chapter includes articles 9-15 of the Supplement:  (9) The Notion 
of Divine Justice, (10) The Just Order of Reality, (11) The Historical Order of Justice, 
(12) The Personal Order of Justice, (13) The Just Will of God, (14) Voluntarism and 
Related Errors, and (15) Recapitulation of the Foregoing. 
 The chapter begins with a brief introduction: 
The word ‘justice’ conjures up thoughts of law codes and lawyers, judges and juries, 
prisons and prison-guards, hangmen and gallows.  Immersed as we are in things of sense, 
the more strongly a thing impinges upon our senses and moves our feelings, the more true 
and real we consider it to be. 
 
But such a notion, or rather general impression, of justice is quite inadequate in dealing 
with the justice of God.  What the Apostle Paul calls “the manifold wisdom of God” (Eph 
3:10) must be understood as being at the same time the law of God's justice.  In itself it is 
simple and infinite, but so long as we are in this life we cannot contemplate it as it is.  We 
must proceed, rather, by way of analogy from our knowledge of created things to form 
some notion, however imperfect, of infinite perfection. 
 
Not all created things are equally helpful to us in this endeavor.  In this chapter, therefore, 
we shall move step by step from a consideration of order in the world, of the actual 
human condition, and of God's personal justice, while leaving room for the further 
development of this idea which in the next chapter can and must be made in treating of 
the Incarnate Word.
2 
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3.2 A Brief Description of Articles 9 – 15 
 
 
3.2.1 Article 9:  The Notion of Divine Justice
3
 
 
 
 Since we can only know God’s justice by analogy,4 Lonergan begins with a 
consideration of which divisions of human justice are appropriate analogies for 
understanding divine justice.  Human justice is divided into commutative, legal, 
distributive, and social justice.  Lonergan then explains the meaning of these terms: 
Justice implies a rightness of order, and order brings a multiplicity of things together into 
a unity and whole.  When many things taken separately are in right order among 
themselves, there is commutative justice; when the many individuals are duly 
subordinated to the unity and whole, there is legal justice; when the unity and whole is 
correctly related to the many individuals, there is distributive justice; and if the whole 
order itself is performing properly, there is social justice--though this latter division is 
somewhat disputed.5 
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new division of justice per se, or whether it is equivalent to the classical notion of general or legal justice.  
As Normand Paulhus notes, there is confusion surrounding the term “social justice” in contemporary 
ethical dialogue.  Paulhus made this statement in the mid 1980s, and if true this confusion would have 
certainly existed in the 1950s.  See Normand J. Paulhus, “Uses and Misuses of the Term ‘Social Justice’ in 
the Roman Catholic Tradition,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 15 (1987), 261.  On the background and 
origins of “social justice,” see Brian J. Benestad, “The Catholic Concept of Social Justice:  A Historical 
Perspective,” Communio 11 (winter 1984), 364-381. 
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 Since God cannot be subordinate to creatures nor on the same footing with them, 
Lonergan rules out commutative and legal justice as analogies.
6
  God is however the 
source and giver of all gifts, and since distributive justice refers to the right ordering of 
these gifts, distributive justice can be attributed to God.
7
  Finally Lonergan rules out 
social justice as an analogy, though his argument is more complex: 
Finally, since the order among these gifts is in fact the order of the whole created 
universe, an order which without change includes within itself whatever is conducive to 
the good of all partial orders, what may be termed ‘social justice’ cannot be attributed to 
God.
8
 
 
 Lonergan then lists a number of theological doctrines regarding the order of the 
universe, all appropriated from Aquinas.  The order of the universe is: 
1. An artificial form of the universe by which this world is one.
9
  
2. The good of order and intrinsic end of the universe.
10
 
3. An arrangement or series of causes, referred to as fate.
11
 
4. Evidence for the existence of God.
12
  
5. In its unity evidence for the uniqueness of God.
13
 
6. In its appropriateness evidence of the distributive justice of God.
14
 
7. In its goodness the best in all creation, in itself directly intended by God, the cause of 
all things, and necessarily an idea in the divine mind containing in its unity the ideas 
of all other created things.
15
 
 
 Next Lonergan lists a number of theological doctrines on the relationship between 
possible world orders and divine wisdom, power, justice, and will, as well as a number of 
theological doctrines related to God’s “idea of order” (ratio ordinis): 
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9
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 Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28].  Lonergan references ST, I, q. 2, a. 3 c. 
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1. Putting things in order is the function of wisdom.  Since divine wisdom is infinite, 
extending to all that divine power can effect,
16
 there is in the divine mind not only the 
idea of the order of the universe, but the ideas of all possible orders, so there is 
nothing intrinsically possible
17
 that God could not most wisely do.
18
 
2. It is inadmissible that infinite wisdom should order possible realities in such a way as 
to deny to each thing what properly belongs to it; thus any order conceived by God is 
most wise and most just.
19
 
3. Since the object of the will is a good apprehended by the mind, it is impossible for 
God to will anything not within the purview of his wisdom.
20
  
4. Therefore, as divine wisdom is the law of divine justice, the divine will which follows 
divine wisdom is necessarily right and just, whether it chooses to create this world, 
some other word, or no world at all. 
5. Inasmuch as God's idea of order sees to it that created things are brought to their due 
and proper ends, it is called divine providence.
21
 
6. Inasmuch as divine providence is carried out by divine will and power, it is called 
divine governance.
22
 
7. Inasmuch as the idea of order, containing in an intentional way all things ordered, is 
related to the things that are ordered, the idea of order is the logical truth of divine 
knowledge.  And inasmuch as the things ordered are related to God’s idea of order, 
this is the ontological truth of things.
23
 
8. The idea of order as being in the mind of God is the eternal law.
24
 
9. Participation by creatures in the eternal law is natural law.
25
 
10. Inasmuch as everything that exists or happens is ordained by divine wisdom, a reason 
can be assigned to it; but inasmuch as the whole order is freely chosen by the divine 
will, the ultimate reason of all things is God's free choice.
26
 
 
 Lonergan concludes the article with a summary: 
To sum up: the justice of God in its origin belongs to the divine wisdom, in its exercise to 
the just choice of a wise order, and in its effects it is found in created things, inasmuch as 
they are wisely and justly ordered, both among themselves and in relation to their 
ultimate end, which is God himself.
27
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 “Quae cum ita sint, Dei iustitia originaliter quidem ad divinam sapientiam pertinet, actualiter autem ad 
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3.2.2 Article 10:  The Just Order of Reality
28
 
 
 
 Lonergan’s stated purpose in the article is to understand the order of reality 
conceived by divine wisdom, chosen by divine will, and effected by divine power.
29
  
Lonergan’s understanding of this order is the concurrence of three elements:  (1) innate 
forms and laws, (2) a complex of laws, (3) linked complexes of laws. 
 Innate Forms and Laws:  First, all things have an intrinsic order.  This intrinsic 
order is governed by innate forms and natural laws given to all things: 
A natural law is simply a participation in the eternal law by which non-human material 
creatures spontaneously proceed to their proper activity and end, while human beings are 
moved not only to act but also to know how they ought to act and to freely choose on the 
basis of this knowledge.
30
 
 
 A Complex of Laws:  Second, certain interrelationships of beings in the order of 
reality reveal a whole complex (or series) of laws.
31
  Natural laws, considered 
individually, abstract from concrete reality and thus afford only hypothetical knowledge.  
A complex of laws is a concatenation of several laws which moves us to a closer 
understanding of reality: 
…so it is one thing to determine what theoretically should occur under the proper 
conditions and circumstances, but quite another to determine schematically the particular 
combination or conjunction of factors as a result of which at certain times the proper 
conditions will be fulfilled and the events forecast will actually happen.
32
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 “Articulus X.  DE IUSTO RERUM ORDINES,” DBM, 70-79 [Supplement, 29-32]. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, 70 [Supplement, 29].   
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 Linked Complexes of Laws:  Third, although the notion of a complex of laws 
moves us closer to concrete reality, it is still insufficient.  There is not just one complex 
of laws, but many, and these complexes are interrelated.
33
   
 Lonergan then states that the order of reality, considered as a whole, is itself 
intended by God and not merely a coincidental byproduct of a linked complex of natures 
and natural laws.  In other words, the order of reality is itself conceived by divine 
wisdom, down to the smallest detail of each being, in its arrangement with other beings 
and in relation to its proper end.
34
 
 Lonergan admits that we do not have perfect scientific knowledge of this one 
order of reality and hence we cannot perfectly understand, in terms of natures and laws, 
how divine wisdom and providence arranges and directs each thing to its proper end.
35
  
But he states that where perfect knowledge is lacking imperfect knowledge is possible by 
applying certain principles in a general way.  Lonergan employs three principles:  (1) no 
created being is capable of unconditioned operation, (2) the common course of things and 
the order of the universe is the proper effect of God, and (3) the proper effect of God is 
produced through secondary causes.  Let us look at each of these individually. 
 No created being is capable of unconditioned operation:  The operation of any 
created being is hypothetical.  What this means is that the right conditions must be 
fulfilled for that being to operate in accordance with its nature.  But what fulfills the 
conditions?  Ultimately, it is divine providence.  Lonergan explains: 
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Hence in the creation and conservation of all things, since the operations of each one are 
conditioned and hypothetical, there is no proportionate cause per se for a thing to actually 
operate.  If you assert that one thing already operating fulfills the conditions requisite for 
the operation of another, you are factually correct but you still do not have an explanation 
of the fact.  For it is not a matter of chance that (1) some beings operate in such a way as 
to fulfill the conditions under which other beings begin to operate; (2) all things are 
constantly so arranged that none of them is deprived of the assistance of others that are 
already in operation;
36
 and (3) from this constant arrangement of things and the complex 
of laws of nature not only does there result the simple fact of actual operations, but there 
is produced also that marvelous and beneficent order which we call the common course 
of things and events. Now if all this does not come about by chance, it is divine 
providence that sees to it that each being actually operates and that all things are 
instruments in bringing about the order of the universe.
37
 
 
 The common course of things and the order of the universe is the proper effect of 
God:  The common course of things and the order of the universe can, ultimately, only be 
produced by God.  It is true that the operations of beings, whether individually or 
collectively, can fulfill the conditions for the operations of others.  But even if beings 
operating collectively fulfill the conditions for the operations of others, there must have 
already been an ordering in them prior to their operating.  All things, taken together, 
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31].   
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receive from God the arrangement and ordering enabling them to produce a well-ordered 
common effect.
38
 
 The proper effect of God is produced through secondary causes:  Lonergan states 
that beings would be created and conserved in vain if they did not operate, and as he has 
already established, this operation is not possible without ordering and direction from 
divine wisdom and providence.
39
  As ordered and directed by God, beings cannot fail in 
effecting the common course and order intended by divine wisdom.  “Divine goodness or 
divine justice has no higher rule than divine wisdom itself.”40 
 From the foregoing, Lonergan makes a general statement on the nature of divine 
justice:  (1)  the ultimate end to which all things are directed is the manifestation of 
divine goodness; (2) the means used by divine wisdom is the nature of things and natural 
laws; (3) divine wisdom does not learn by trial and error, but in one intuition has 
foreseen, ordered, and commissioned all things from the very beginning of the universe 
down to the end; and (4) the purpose of this one divine plan is to arrange and connect 
things in serial or circular patterns of operations, through time and co-temporal, so that 
the common course of events and the order of the universe  results.
41
 
 Lonergan ends by addressing a number of hypothetical questions.  I will cite two.  
First, why the Incarnation?  Second, why is the spread of the faith so slow?  To these 
Lonergan states that it is God’s way to act through secondary causes in accordance with 
their natures.  God himself became man that he might be a secondary and proportionate 
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 82 
cause in restoring all things (Eph. 1:10).  And the spread of the faith is slow because the 
kingdom is proclaimed and propagated through secondary causes, human beings.
42
 
 
3.2.3 Article 11:  The Historical Order of Justice
43
 
 
 
 Lonergan’s purpose in the article is to apply what he has said about the general 
nature of the order of divine justice to human history.  He notes an isomorphism between 
the three levels of the human good and the three elements in the order of divine justice:  
(1)  a particular good follows the operation of some law of nature; (2) the external good 
of order is a certain schematic pattern, serial or circular; (3) the cultural good is 
concerned with spreading and perfecting that interior order by which human beings, in 
exercising their reason and will, provide for themselves and also, in some way, 
participate in divine providence.
44
 
 As evil is also part of human history, evil is not outside the order of divine justice.  
Since God works through secondary causes, God makes use of human free will, but 
human free will can incline toward evil.  Nevertheless, the fact of evil does not invalidate 
the order of divine justice.  God has arranged the order of this universe such that not only 
does good result from good, but good may also come out of evil. 
 Lonergan concludes with a response to a hypothetical objection that the historical 
order of justice is so general, failing to take into account the personal order of justice, that 
the historical order of justice might not be just with respect to individuals.  Lonergan’s 
response situates human nature (that is, the individual) in the context of human history.  
An individual’s human nature is not absolved from the development that all other 
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material creatures must endure through historical process.  The whole person, in body, 
mind, and through relationships, belongs by his or her very nature to the historical 
process.  As such, his or her inclusion within this process and subordination to its laws 
and order is both wise and just.
45
 
 
3.2.4 Article 12:  The Personal Order of Justice
46
 
 
 
 Human beings are part of the historical order of justice in order that they may be 
taken up into another order.  Death will remove each person from the historical order.  
This removal brings persons to the day of judgment.  The personal order of justice is the 
judgment of our quality of life lived here below, and that judgment will bring reward 
(praemietur) or punishment (puniatur).
47
  One’s acts, whether good or evil, not only 
contribute to the objective historical process, but they also self-constitute one to be good 
or evil.  The bulk of the article explains the nature of this self-constitution.  While we are 
living we can change, but death will bring a halt to change.
48
 
 All our actions can be reduced to good or evil.  Good acts consent to the dictates 
of reason, making oneself an intelligible work.  A well-ordered, intelligible individual 
had made herself or himself a person in whom sense is subordinated to reason, and reason 
is subordinated to God.
49
  On the other hand, persons who commit evil acts refuse to 
consent to the dictates of reason.  Through evil acts one makes oneself an unintelligible 
work and withdraws from the intelligible order conceived by divine wisdom.  The work 
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of any person, whether intelligible (good) or absurd (evil), will perdure.  This is the 
ground of the personal order of justice.
50
   
 Lonergan ends the article noting that the distinction between the objective process 
of the historical order of justice on the one hand, and the personal order of justice on the 
other, implies no distinction on the part of God.  There is however a basis for the 
distinction in human affairs.  What we make of ourselves in this life, whether good or 
evil, shall remain in the life to come.
51
   
 
3.2.5 Article 13:  The Just Will of God
52
 
 
 
 One may ask why God chose this order of reality and not some other?  To this 
question Lonergan replies that God could have instituted another order, so long as this 
involved no internal contradiction.
53
   But as to why God chose this particular order and 
not some other, Lonergan states that we are up against mystery and inquiry must give 
way to humble submission.  Lonergan refers to the wisdom of St. Augustine: even if God 
had created a different order, it would still have failed to satisfy our wisdom.
54
  Our duty 
is simply to acquiesce to God’s choice, and our model for such acquiescence is Christ 
himself: 
Just as Christ himself did not ask for another world but in all things submitted his will to 
his Father's, “becoming obedient unto death, death on the cross” (Phil 2:8), so we also 
accept this actual order of reality as a command given to us by God our Father.
55
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 Following this statement Lonergan makes certain points to dispel 
anthropomorphic conceptions of God’s will.  As God knows himself and all other things 
in one act of understanding, God wills himself and all else in one single volitional act.
56
  
We can conclude from this that if one is to speak with strict theological accuracy, one 
will always say that God wills Christ’s atonement because of sin, the forgiveness of sins 
because of the atonement, reward on account of merit, and punishment on account of sin.  
It is an anthropomorphic error to express the foregoing in language suggesting that God 
wills atonement because he hates sin, or that he wills forgiveness of sins because the 
atonement has placated him, or that he wills reward because meritorious deeds have 
pleased him, or that he wills punishment because sins have offended him.
57
  Lonergan 
explains the error and the implications: 
The former set of statements affirm the one act in which God wills many things as 
interrelated; the latter imply a multiplicity of volitional acts on the part of God and 
sometimes make a created thing the cause and the divine will the effect.  
 
One must not consider this strictness in speaking to be of little importance in the question 
at hand.  When the main objection to the dogma of the redemption is that it is 
anthropomorphic, no Catholic theologian should provide any sort of handle to this 
calumny.
58
 
 
 Lonergan then takes up a familiar question: since evil does in fact exist in this 
world, does God will evil?  Following Aquinas, Lonergan appeals to the distinction 
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between indirect and direct willingness.  God indirectly wills both the evil of punishment 
and the evil of natural defects because God directly wills the good of personal justice and 
the good of the order of nature, and these evils are made possible because of God’s direct 
willing of these two goods, respectively.
59
  Since the evil of sin is not connected to any 
good whatsoever, God neither directly nor indirectly wills the evil of sin.
60
   
 The remainder of the article attends to a number of hypothetical objections to the 
theological doctrine that God neither directly nor indirectly wills the evil of sin.  Among 
these objections is that sin should not be permitted by God.  Lonergan replies that it is a 
good thing that there exist rational creatures that are truly free and who can sin, and it is 
also a good thing for the evil of sin to be transmuted into the goodness of redemption.
61
 
 
3.2.6 Article 14:  Voluntarism and Related Errors
62
 
 
  
 There are two kinds of voluntarism: (1) one that is relatively conscious, which 
praises the role of the will; and (2) one that is relatively unconscious, which ignores the 
significance of intelligibility and thus exaggerates the role of the will.  Lonergan 
considers the former relatively harmless, but refutes the latter through four arguments. 
 First, “the divine will follows the intellect.”63  Since the object of the will is a good 
as known, it is thus impossible for God to will anything that is not in his wisdom.
64
  To 
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assert that justice depends on the will alone is equivalent to asserting that the divine will 
does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, which is blasphemy.
65
 
 Second, “the order of divine wisdom in not necessary in all things.”66  The 
intelligible and the necessary are not synonymous.
67
  The former has a wider extension.  
The fact is most obvious in the redemption.  The redemption is intelligible, but not 
necessary.  Voluntarism holds a too superficial understanding of intelligibility, and as 
such falls into the error of giving primacy to the divine intellect in necessary things and 
primacy to the divine will in others. 
 Third, “the possible and the fitting are not strictly demonstrated.”68  The 
intelligible is of two kinds:  the necessary and the possible.  The former is demonstrated 
by necessary arguments and the latter by accumulating evidence and making the 
connections among the evidence.  The natural and human sciences investigate the 
possible, not the necessary.  Demanding proofs, rather than seeking increasing 
understanding, repeats the experience of the fourteenth century when the desire for 
certitude trumped the desire for understanding.
69
 
 Fourth, “the order of understanding is not the same as the order of wisdom.”70  
Lonergan’s purpose here is to account for the non-intelligible evil of sin.  Do we include 
sins in the order of this universe?  If we do, then it would seem God is the author of sin.  
If we do not, then it would seem that God’s dominion is not universal.  Lonergan’s 
solution distinguishes the order of understanding and the order of wisdom.  Intelligence 
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seeks to know the intelligible through the process of experiencing, understanding, and 
judgment.  The act of understanding is the pivotal point in this process.  The intelligible 
emerges in the act of understanding.  As such, intelligence can put intelligibles into a 
meaningful order.  But intelligence cannot order the non-intelligible (such as the evil of 
sin) because the act of understanding can only know the intelligible.  However, the scope 
and power of the order of wisdom extends beyond the order of understanding.  Wisdom 
can order the intelligible and the non-intelligible.  “It [wisdom] looks to whatever 
actually exist, even if they ought not to exist and cannot be understood.”71 The rule of 
divine justice is not divine intelligence, but divine wisdom.  As such, God can conceive 
an order which includes the evil of sin, even though God neither directly nor indirectly 
wills the evil of sin.  As such, God is not the author of sin.  But since God chose an order 
which allows sin, God’s dominion is entirely universal.72 
 
3.2.7 Article 15:  Recapitulation of the Foregoing
73
 
 
 
 This article summarizes major points in the chapter.  Lonergan begins by restating 
what is perhaps the central theological doctrine:  the ground and norm of divine justice is 
divine wisdom.
74
  The exercise of divine justice is God’s free choice, and its effect is the 
actual concrete order of the universe in all its determinations.
75
 
 Lonergan then recalls that his method has respected the mystery of divine justice.  
He has approached divine justice analogically, admitted that our knowledge is imperfect, 
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and has made the point that it is fruitless to inquire into what might have been, into other 
possible world orders God could have chosen.  Our duty is to acquiesce to the choice God 
has actually made, to adore the holiness of God’s will, and to obey God’s decrees.76  
 Lonergan also recalls a consistent theme of the chapter:  his concern with 
anthropomorphism.  Lonergan acknowledges that at times this is difficult to avoid.  There 
is an inadequacy of all analogy.
77
  With this caution noted, he reviews the advantages of 
his method.  He has reached an understanding of divine justice by attending to the actual 
order of reality, which in its entirety is the proper effect of God.  This is a concrete, not 
an abstract method of conceiving divine justice.  Also, recourse to God’s simplicity and 
immutability minimizes the possibility of anthropomorphism.  The distinction between 
the order of understanding and the order of wisdom allows us to account for everything 
within the actual world order, including the non-intelligible.
78
 
 At the end of the article Lonergan introduces a distinction between divine justice 
on the one hand, and divine goodness, generosity, and mercy on the other.  The 
distinction is considered in three ways:  (1) as rooted in God, (2) as rooted in the 
comparison of created effects, and (3) as rooted in the relationship of God to creatures. 
 As rooted in God:  God is just since he chooses an order of reality conceived by 
divine wisdom.  God is good since he freely pours forth being and good.  God is generous 
since his wisdom orders reality to manifest divine goodness.  God is merciful because the 
ordering to divine goodness is far better than an ordering to created goodness.
79
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 As rooted in the comparison of created effects:  The comparison of created effects 
among themselves is based on the distinction between proportionate and non-
proportionate effects.  The former issues forth from God’s justice, while the latter from 
God’s generosity or mercy.80  
 As rooted in the relationship of God to creatures:  This consideration coincides 
with the first if God is taken as the foundation of the relation, but it coincides with the 
second if the interrelated effects are taken as the foundation.  No new element arises from 
the conjunction of these two unless a fallacy arises.  Unfortunately, the fallacy is not that 
rare.  God assigns an end to every creature.  As such, each creature is “owed” a means to 
the end.  The fallacy understands this in a context of God owing something to human 
beings, rather than a context in which God owes it to himself, for his Name’s sake, to 
fulfill the order of his own justice.
81
 
 Lonergan ends the chapter noting that the cross of Christ reveals another 
dimension of divine justice: 
Finally, as will be shown, a special facet of divine justice appears in the cross of our 
Lord; but it seems best to defer an explanation of this to Chapter 4.
82
 
 
 
3.3 Lonergan’s Understanding of Divine Justice 
 
In the tenth article, the “Just Order of Reality,” Lonergan makes two key 
statements on the nature of divine justice.  The first statement asserts that the order of the 
universe is the proper effect of God produced through secondary causes: 
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Moreover, since that which is best in all creation is the good of order of the universe, this 
order must necessarily be in itself directly intended by God, the cause of all things.  In the 
divine mind, therefore, there is the idea of the order of the universe, which idea contains 
in its unity the ideas of all other created things.
83
 
 
Moreover - to move a step closer to the notion of divine justice - this common course of 
things and order of the universe is (1) the proper effect of God, and (2) produced through 
secondary causes.  That effect is said to be proper to God which only God can produce;
84
 
 
The second is Lonergan’s general statement on the nature of divine justice: 
In the light of all this [Lonergan’s prior discussion on the order of the universe], we can 
make a general statement on the nature of divine justice.  First of all, it is universally 
agreed that the ultimate end to which all things are to be directed is the manifestation of 
the divine goodness.  Secondly, we have determined the means used by divine wisdom to 
attain this end, namely, the nature of things and the laws of nature or natural laws.  
Thirdly, it is obvious that divine wisdom does not learn by experience or by trial and 
error, but rather in one immediate intuition has foreseen, ordered, and commissioned all 
things from the very first beginnings of the universe right down to the end.  Fourthly, we 
have determined the purpose of this one plan, namely, so to arrange and connect things as 
to result in either serial or circular patterns of operations, and so to order these patterns 
both in the course of time and in a co-temporal hierarchic order that the common course 
of events and order of the universe results.
85
 
 
Three major themes stand out in these two statements.  The first is Lonergan’s 
judgment that the common course of things and the order of the universe is the proper 
effect of God produced through secondary causes.  The second is Lonergan’s thought on 
the nature of things, laws of nature, and the common course of events and the order of the 
universe in which the nature of things and the laws of nature are operative.  The third is 
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Lonergan’s concern about anthropomorphism.  I will interpret each of these themes 
individually in the following sub-sections:  (1) World Order as the Proper Effect of God 
Produced through Secondary Causes, (2) World Order and Divine Justice, and (3) 
Dispelling Anthropomorphic Understandings of Divine Justice. 
 
3.3.1 World Order as the Proper Effect of God Produced Through Secondary 
Causes 
 
 
 Lonergan’s judgment that the common course of things and the order of the 
universe is the proper effect of God (effectus Deo proprius), produced through secondary 
causes, is essentially an appropriation of Aquinas’s concept of universal 
instrumentality.
86
  Lonergan had addressed this in his dissertation: 
...for an instrument is a lower cause moved by a higher so as to produce an effect within 
the category of proportionate to the higher;  but in the cosmic hierarchy all causes are 
moved except the highest, and every effect is at least in the category of being;  therefore, 
all causes except the highest are instruments.
87
 
 
 For Lonergan, the fact that all causes except the highest are instruments represents 
the meaning of “proprius effectus Dei.”88  Any secondary cause is an instrumental cause.  
Since the whole universe is the proper effect of God, then all causes in the universe other 
than God are instrumental (secondary) causes.  So we have universal instrumentality. 
 To state that the order of the universe is directly intended by God, or is the proper 
effect of God, reveals a fundamental aspect of Lonergan’s thought regarding the 
relationship between order and essence on the one hand, and divine wisdom on the other.  
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A proper effect of God cannot be a compound of the logically necessary and/or arbitrary, 
but must be directly willed by God in accordance with divine wisdom.  And since divine 
justice is grounded in the fact that the divine will follows divine wisdom, then divine 
wisdom intends world order prior to essences.
89
  The common course of things and the 
order of the universe are indeed produced through secondary causes, but these secondary 
causes could not operate in the first place without a prior order conceived by divine 
wisdom.  It is clear that one of Lonergan’s principal aims is to convince the reader to 
reject any notion of a voluntaristically conceived divine will as well as any notion that 
would attempt to understand the order of the universe as a coincidental, arbitrary 
byproduct of individual essences. 
 
3.3.2   World Order and Divine Justice 
 
 
 Understanding world order is a means to understand divine justice because of the 
prior judgment that there is no higher rule for divine justice than divine wisdom, and 
divine wisdom has conceived this world order.  Lonergan’s understanding of world order 
                                                 
89
 In the ninth and tenth articles Lonergan makes at least twenty explicit references to the teachings of 
Aquinas.  The vast majority relate in one way or another to the order of the universe.  De ratione 
convenientiae, written previous to the Supplement, references many of the same doctrines.  De ratione 
convenientiae does however explicitly reference a doctrine of Aquinas not mentioned explicitly in the 
Supplement, but is nevertheless operative in Lonergan’s thought.  Lonergan states this doctrine as follows:  
“In God’s intention, the order of the universe is prior” [order universi est prior in intentione divina].  See 
Lonergan, De ratione convenientiae, 4.  This is Lonergan’s interpretation of Aquinas’s argument in Summa 
contra Gentiles that the first cause of the distinction and diversity of things in this universe is not caused by 
secondary agents (SCG, II, c. 42).  In other words, Aquinas teaches that the distinction and order of things 
in the universe is not a result of the actions of secondary causes, but the inverse is true:  the actions of 
secondary causes are on account of the order and the distinction established in things.  This doctrine was 
also operative as a fundamental presupposition in Lonergan’s thesis in “The Natural Desire to See God.”  
Lonergan’s thesis affirmed the existence of a natural desire to see God, but my purpose here is not to enter 
into the debate about this disputed question in Catholic theology.  This is outside the scope of the 
dissertation.  My point is an interpretive judgment that when Lonergan speaks of world order as a “proper 
effect” of God, this is equivalent to his thought, explicitly mentioned in other works, that divine wisdom 
conceives world order prior to finite natures, down to the smallest historical detail.  Only consequently, in 
as much as God knows a world order, does God know its component parts such as his free gifts, finite 
natures, their properties, exigencies, and so on.  See Lonergan, “The Natural Desire to See God,” 83-85.   
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is articulated primarily in the tenth article titled “The Just Order of Reality.”  In this 
article, his method of arriving at a concrete understanding of reality is very similar to the 
manner in which he arrived at a theological understanding of history:  through the use of 
successive “approximations.”  Lonergan builds up to a concrete understanding of the 
universe in a step-by-step fashion, where each step is an approximation toward reality. 
The first approximation is the insight that within the order of this universe there 
are innate forms and laws of nature.  This is a consideration of individual, abstract laws, 
isolated from the concrete fulfillment of any conditions necessary for that law to be 
operative.  This approximation is hypothetical, prescinding from concrete conditions.  
 The second approximation includes two insights.  First, beings are interrelated 
and interconnected resulting in a concatenation of several laws in mutual, interconnected 
operation.
90
  Second, there must be a particular combination or conjunction of factors to 
fulfill the conditions necessary for a complex of laws to be operative.
91
  With this insight, 
Lonergan is introducing the notion of probability we associate with statistical laws.   
The third approximation is the insight that there is not a single complex of laws 
operative in the universe, but many.  These complexes are often interconnected.  
Consider Lonergan’s example:  
Without a sun and its planetary system, the earth's moisture would not circulate; without 
this circulation of moisture there would be no plant life, and without plants, none of the 
many species of animals.  Again, every animal has within it several systems that are not 
only distinct from one another but marvelously interrelated and interdependent: the 
digestive system, the respiratory, the vascular, the skeletal system and musculature, the 
nervous system and sensory apparatus.
92
 
                                                 
90
 This is what Lonergan calls a “complex” or “series” of laws.   
91
 Lonergan, DBM, 70 [Supplement, 29]. 
92
 “Nisi enim prius exsistit systema solis et planetarum, haud circumferuntur aquae;  nisi circumeunt aquae, 
non vivunt plantae;  sine plantis, tot animalium species esse non possunt;  et in singulis animalibus non 
solum distinguuntur sed mirabiliter etiam inter se coniunguntur atque dependent systemata digestivum, 
respirativum, vasculare, ossium et musculorum, nervosum, et sensitivum.”  Lonergan, DBM, 72 
[Supplement, 30]. 
 95 
 
Lonergan’s three approximations clearly depend on the complementary 
intelligibility of natural and statistical laws.  In fact, this intelligibility expressed through 
the complementary use of natural and statistical laws equates to what in Insight Lonergan 
calls emergent probability. 
 
3.3.2.1  Emergent Probability 
 
 
In Insight, emergent probability is defined as “the successive realization in accord 
with successive schedules of probability of a conditioned series of schemes of 
recurrence.”93  It is a complex theory, and I made reference to it in the previous chapter.  
To give a full explanation of emergent probability is not warranted here and would take 
us too far afield of our purpose.  Nevertheless, we need to address some of the basics. 
World process reveals an order, a design, an intelligibility.
94
  Emergent 
probability is essentially Lonergan’s “world-view.”95  It is the articulation of the 
intelligibility of world process through the complementary employment of classical and 
statistical laws.
96
  Classical laws are hypothetical in the sense that they are ideal 
formulations, observable in concrete reality if the conditions for their operation are 
fulfilled.  Charles Hefling explains: 
There are always ifs, and the ifs keep fanning out like branches on a tree.  Consequently 
there neither is nor could be a combination of classical laws that grasps all of them in a 
single explanatory system.
97
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 Thus classical laws on their own cannot fully account for the intelligibility of 
world process.  There is needed an explanation of how often the conditions are fulfilled in 
which classical laws become operative in concrete events.  This calls for the employment 
of statistical laws.  As with a classical law, a statistical law also expresses a particular 
type of intelligibility.
98
 
 Next we need to briefly consider what Lonergan means by a “conditioned series 
of schemes of recurrence.”  A single scheme of recurrence refers to a series of events that 
are related in such a way that the fulfillment of the condition of any particular event in 
the series allows the other events to occur.
99
  For example, consider a scheme represented 
as a series of conditioned events named A, B, and C.  If A occurs, B will occur; if B 
occurs, C will occur; if C occurs, A will recur; and the cycle starts over. 
 Now imagine a world process where multiple schemes of recurrence are 
operative, and these schemes themselves are interrelated.  In Insight, Lonergan calls this a 
conditioned series of schemes of recurrence.  A conditioned series means that a series is 
not operative automatically, but only if the conditions for its operation are fulfilled.  
Statistical laws govern whether or not the conditions for operation are fulfilled. 
Essentially a single scheme of recurrence equates to what in the Supplement is 
Lonergan’s second approximation to the order of reality, a pattern of operations resulting 
from a single complex or series of laws.  For example, the circulation of moisture over 
the earth can be considered a scheme of recurrence.  A series of schemes of recurrence 
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equates to what in the Supplement is Lonergan’s third approximation, a pattern of 
operations resulting from many complexes linked together in a reflexive pattern.
100
 
 In brief, emergent probability is an explanatory idea combining the notion of a 
conditioned series of schemes with respective probabilities of emergence and survival. 
 What Lonergan means by “emergence” is not limited to the emergence of 
schemes at the same “level” of reality.  Lonergan’s notion of emergent probability also 
implies the emergence of “higher” schemes from “lower” schemes.  The emergence and 
survival of higher schemes are more or less probable, but given enough time and space, 
they become highly probable.  The emergence of higher schemes from lower schemes is 
the “directed dynamism” of emergent probability. 
 
3.3.2.2  The Directed Dynamism of Emergent Probability 
 
 
 The emergence of higher schemes from lower schemes implies that the universe is 
not at rest, not static, not fixed in the present, but is in process.  Specifically, there is what 
Lonergan calls a “directed dynamism” in this universe, an upthrust if you will, from 
lower to higher entities.
101
  In Insight this directed dynamism also goes by the name of 
“finality,”102 and in other works “vertical finality.”103  Sub-atoms unite into atoms, atoms 
into compounds, compounds into organisms, and organisms to organic evolution within 
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limited ranges.
104
  Vertical finality escapes the limitations of an isolated essence through 
the fertility that is possible when a plurality of essences is conjoined in space and time.  
Vertical finality is integral to Lonergan’s world-view: 
Still, though accidental to the isolated object or the abstract essence, vertical finality is of 
the very idea of our hierarchic universe, of the ordination of things devised and exploited 
by the divine Artisan.  For the cosmos is not an aggregate of isolated objects 
hierarchically arranged on isolated levels, but a dynamic whole...The interconnections are 
endless and manifest.  Vertical finality would seem beyond dispute.
105
 
 
As Lonergan notes, vertical finality is the very reason we have a hierarchical 
universe.  Specifically, to state that we have a hierarchical universe means that there are 
successive levels of intelligibility in the universe.
106
  Each level represents a more 
comprehensive scheme compared to the immediate lower level.  Each level is able to 
relate events in a systematically intelligible way that could not otherwise be 
systematically related at the lower level.  Another way of stating this is that through the 
directed dynamism of emergent probability, what are otherwise coincidental manifolds at 
one level are taken up into a higher integration, a higher intelligibility.
107
  Charles Hefling 
explains: 
...in such a world process [a world process characterized by emergent probability] there 
are successive levels of intelligibility.  Events that defy any systematic explanation in 
themselves become intelligible at a “higher” level, that is, within a more comprehensive 
scheme.  There is no reason why the methods proper to chemistry could not eventually 
get around to explaining, one by one, each and every molecular event that goes on in an 
amoeba.  But the only result would be a very long list of explanations, none of them 
related to any other in a systematically intelligible way.  Move up to the organic level, 
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though, and there is a systematic pattern to be grasped, and grasping its intelligibility 
compensates for the lack of system at the molecular level.
108
 
 
 The term “vertical finality” is not found explicitly in the Supplement.  The 
concept is nevertheless operative in Lonergan’s thought when he judges that the common 
course of things and the order of the universe results from a “co-temporal hierarchic 
order” (simultanea hierarchia ordinare),109 or from a “hierarchy of schemes” 
(hierarchiam schematum).
110
  The common course of things and the order of the universe 
would not have hierarchical schemes or levels of intelligibility were it not for this 
directed dynamism.  Furthermore, the “directedness” of this dynamism does not originate 
from chance, but is grounded in divine wisdom and providence: 
Hence these schematic arrangements of things and complexes of laws are all brought 
together under one more concrete and more universal order.  This order of reality is 
surely that of divine wisdom and providence, which embraces all things down to the 
smallest detail of each being, arranges and directs all things and brings each one to its 
proper end.
111
 
 
Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice through his use of his notion of 
emergent probability exemplifies his adoption of the Leonine injunction vetera novis 
augere et perficere – to enlarge and enrich the old with the new.  In the Christian 
tradition, redemption and divine justice have always been closely linked, and the category 
of divine justice took on a particular emphasis in the tradition with the emergence of 
Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo?  Lonergan, however, enlarges and enriches our understanding 
of divine justice.  He is faithful to the tradition,
112
 yet incorporates knowledge from 
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contemporary natural and human sciences.
113
  What Lonergan is doing in this chapter, 
from a methodological perspective, parallels what Aquinas did in the thirteenth century.  
Whereas Aquinas sought a synthesis with the best available scientific knowledge of his 
time, which for him was found in the thought of Aristotle, Lonergan in the late 1950s 
develops an understanding of divine justice that incorporates the best available scientific 
knowledge of his time.  In Insight, Lonergan’s incorporation of contemporary knowledge 
from the natural and human sciences resulted in this theory of emergent probability, and 
although the Supplement does not explicitly use the term “emergent probability” there is 
no doubt Lonergan is using his thought on emergent probability to advance our 
understanding of divine justice by advancing our understanding of how our actual world 
operates through natural and statistical laws. 
 
3.3.3   Dispelling Anthropomorphic Understandings of Divine Justice  
 
 
Our English word “justice” originates from the Latin justitia, where the Latin root 
is jus or juris, meaning “right,” “rightness of order,” or “law.”  Traditionally the word is 
associated with legal rights.  In the traditional sense the meaning of justice is essentially 
retributive justice (vindication):  making things right through the assignment of reward or 
punishment (just deserts).   
                                                 
113
 Lonergan’s use of analogy, understood through natural knowledge in accordance with the vision of the 
First Vatican Council, is the use of what later in Method in Theology would be called general theological 
categories.  See Doran, “The First Chapter of De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica:  The Issues,” 41.  General 
theological categories are those categories theology shares with other disciplines.  Categories strictly 
peculiar to theology are special theological categories.  A point to be made is that analogical understanding 
of the mysteries of faith intended by the First Vatican Council cannot be content only with special 
theological categories.  We could say that here Lonergan is solidly within the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition 
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reluctant to incorporate knowledge from natural and human sciences.  See Doran, “The First Chapter of De 
Deo Trino, Pars Systematica:  The Issues,” 41.  See also Lonergan, “Method in Catholic Theology,” 
Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, 45-46. 
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It is obvious Lonergan’s purpose is not only to develop an understanding of 
divine justice, but specifically an understanding that dispels anthropomorphic 
understandings based exclusively on legal analogies.  We can too easily conceive God’s 
justice as only retributive (legal) justice.  Divine justice does include retributive justice, 
but retributive justice does not exhaust the meaning of divine justice.  The cross of Christ 
reveals another aspect of divine justice, the transformation of evil into good through self-
sacrificing love, which Lonergan considers the highest principle in the whole economy of 
salvation.  We will interpret this aspect of divine justice revealed in the cross of Christ 
when we come to chapter 4 of the Supplement, but the point here is that this highest 
principle in the economy of salvation is an aspect of divine justice, but it is not retributive 
justice.  Retributive justice is essentially rendering to each his own in equal measure, 
meaning that good is returned to good and the evil is returned to evil.  The transformation 
of good from evil fits neither of these “sub-orderings” of divine justice; hence it is not 
retributive justice.
114
 
Thus one of Lonergan’s intents is to free the reader from the anthropomorphic 
tendency to limit the understanding of God’s justice to retributive justice.  What 
                                                 
114
 Lonergan does not explicitly speak of “sub-orders” in his chapter on the justice of God.  However, this 
is implicit in his understanding through his argument that divine wisdom orders intelligibles and non-
intelligibles, and from the non-intelligible brings forth the intelligible, which is simply to say that the order 
of divine justice includes a sub-order in which evil is transformed into good.  Furthermore, Lonergan 
discussed these sub-orderings explicitly in DVI, written only a few years after the Supplement.  In DVI, 
where Lonergan includes a note on the justice of God, he states that the orderings to be found within the 
one justice of God can be divided into four:  (1) good follows good, (2) evil follows evil, (3) evil follows 
good, and (4) good follows evil.  See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 514.  The first two sub-orderings, 
which represent retributive justice, are especially relevant to Lonergan’s twelfth article on the personal 
order of justice where he discusses that death brings each person to the day of judgment.  The third sub-
ordering (evil follows good) reflects the Scholastic doctrine that there is always a consequence to sin:  
malum poenae always follows malum culpae.  This third ordering presupposes God’s permitting (but not 
willing) of sin, which in itself is irrational and non-intelligible.  The fourth sub-ordering is redemption, the 
transformation of evil into good.  The fourth sub-ordering, in order to be faithful to the sixth article in the 
first chapter of the Supplement, should be understood in the broader sense of “restoration,” and within this 
fourth sub-order we must make a distinction between natural and supernatural restoration. 
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Lonergan is doing in this chapter is redeeming the notion of divine justice itself, 
challenging us to reject anthropomorphic understandings based exclusively on analogies 
of law codes and lawyers, judges and juries, prisons and prison guards.  Such notions of 
God’s justice on their own are inadequate for understanding the justice of God.   
 
3.4 The Function of the Chapter in the Wider Context of the Supplement 
 
 
We recall Lonergan’s hermeneutical principle that the part is understood through 
the whole, and the whole through the part.  As we noted in the previous chapter, 
Lonergan’s consideration of the justice of God functions primarily as a theology, 
background material for the remaining chapters of the Supplement.  Our purpose here is 
to understand this assertion.   
In the introduction to this dissertation, I noted the importance of Insight as a 
heuristic to guide the interpretation of the Supplement.  Chapter 20 of Insight includes 
Lonergan’s heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil.  The foundational 
antecedent determination giving rise to Lonergan’s heuristic structure has a strong 
correlation to the material in the Supplement’s chapter on the justice of God.  This 
foundational antecedent determination can be expressed as follows:   there is an 
intelligible unity of the actual world order.
115
 And, since there are no divine 
afterthoughts, one of the key elements in Lonergan’s heuristic structure is the following:  
the solution to the problem of evil (redemption) will be in harmonious continuation with 
the order of this universe.
116
  I consider this to be perhaps the fundamental point in 
Lonergan’s entire heuristic structure. 
                                                 
115
 Lonergan, Insight, 718. 
116
 Lonergan, Insight, 718. 
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It is my intent to use this fundamental point in Lonergan’s heuristic structure as a 
tool to interpret the function of Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice in the wider 
context of the Supplement.  I will do this in two steps.  First, I will consider the question 
of the function of this chapter in the wider context of the Supplement through the lens of 
Lonergan’s heuristic that redemption will be in harmonious continuation with the 
intelligible unity of the order of this universe.  Second, based on that consideration, I will 
conclude with a section which interprets Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice as a 
theological principle of his soteriology. 
 
3.4.1 Redemption as Harmonious Continuation with the Order of the Universe 
 
 
In chapter 20 of Insight Lonergan states that “...the solution [to the problem of 
evil] will be in harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe.  For there are 
no divine afterthoughts.”117  This means that the existing world order, as we currently 
understand it, already has the potential for the solution.  To state otherwise would be to 
suggest that God changes his mind as humans do, which is an anthropomorphic error. 
Next we may ask, what grounds this heuristic element?  As we noted earlier, 
Lonergan’s antecedent determination grounding this specific element (including the 
entire heuristic structure) is his judgment that there is an intelligible unity to the order of 
this universe.  We may further ask, how does he reach this judgment?  The answer to this 
question is found in chapter 19 of Insight.  There Lonergan discusses God’s “unrestricted 
act of understanding” and judges that this must be one act, not multiple acts of 
understanding: 
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 Lonergan, Insight, 718. 
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Again, the unrestricted act of understanding is one act.  Otherwise, it would be an 
aggregate or a succession of acts.  If none of these acts was the understanding of 
everything about everything, then the denial of unity would be the denial of unrestricted 
understanding.  If any of these acts was the understanding of everything about 
everything, then at least that unrestricted act would be a single act.
118
 
 
Since God understands the order of this universe in one unrestricted act of 
understanding, then there is logically an intelligible unity in the order of this universe.  
To deny this intelligible unity is a denial that God’s unrestricted act of understanding is 
one act.  Such a denial is an anthropomorphic conception of God’s wisdom.  Here 
Lonergan’s thought in Insight clearly anticipates his judgment in the Supplement that 
God’s wisdom conceives the order of the universe in one immediate intuition, not by trial 
and error.  
Thus the problem of evil and its solution are both related to divine wisdom and 
goodness that has conceived and chosen the existing world order.  The world order as it 
currently exists is good and already has the potency for the solution to the problem of 
evil.  This potency is not dictated by finite natures but by the intelligible unity of world 
order conceived by divine wisdom.  H. Daniel Monsour explains: 
If finite natures are derivative possibilities of world-order mirroring forth the glory of 
God, world-order, the intelligible unity of the whole, not the finite natures, dictates what 
is possible within that order.  If the actual world-order that God brings about is such that 
there is a natural orientation or order among lower strata for the reception of a fulfilling 
term from some higher strata, one cannot exclude it as impossible by arguing from finite 
natures and their exigencies...The fulfillment occurs in accord with the actual order of 
this universe that mirrors forth the glory of God.
119
 
 
It is therefore not only possible but expected that redemption will be in 
harmonious continuation with the actual order of this universe.  Stated otherwise, the 
intelligibility of redemption is intelligibly subsumed under the one, intelligible unity of 
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 Lonergan, Insight, 688. 
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 H. Daniel Monsour, “Harmonious Continuation of the Actual Order of the Universe in God’s Self-
Communication,” (unpublished paper delivered at the Lonergan Research Institute Seminar, Toronto, 
November 13, 2003), 31. 
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the actual order of the universe.  This is the cardinal point.  And this point, this 
fundamental theological principle if you will, is arrived at when human wisdom seeks to 
first understand divine wisdom and to judge that divine wisdom functions as the ground 
of divine justice and in one immediate intuition has foreseen, ordered, and commissioned 
all things from the very first beginnings of the universe right down to the end, including 
salvation history.  There are no divine afterthoughts.  As such, our redemption and 
therefore the historical causality of Christ is to be understood as harmonious with our 
understanding of the just and wise order of this universe conceived by divine wisdom. 
 Now that I have introduced the term “theological principle,” my purpose in the 
next section is to explain what I mean by this term, and how Lonergan’s chapter on the 
justice of God functions as a theological principle in the wider context of the Supplement.  
 
3.4.2 Divine Justice as a Theological Principle 
 
 
 Near the time Lonergan wrote the Supplement, his articulation of the means used 
by the systematic theologian to reach theological understanding considered the 
relationship between understanding and principles.  In the Triune God: Systematics, 
Lonergan states that “understanding is about principles.”120  What Lonergan means is that 
understanding depends on principles, and so understanding is only as good as the 
principles to which they are connected.
121
  In that text Lonergan defines a principle as 
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 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 23. 
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 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 25-27; See also Robert Doran, “Intelligentia Fidei in De Deo 
Trino, Pars Systematica:  A Commentary on the First Three Sections of Chapter One,” Method: Journal of 
Lonergan Studies 19 (2001), 80-81. 
 106 
“what is first in some order.”122  And it is the function of wisdom itself to put things in 
their right order.
123
     
 If understanding is about principles, and principles are first in the order proposed 
by wisdom, then we should interpret Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice as a 
theological principle for his understanding of redemption.  This is why, along with 
Frederick Crowe, I would judge Lonergan’s chapter on divine justice to function as 
“background material” for the explicit Christology presented in the subsequent chapters 
of the Supplement.
124
  My point here is not to suggest that Lonergan’s question on the 
nature of divine justice is the absolute first question of the Supplement.  Obviously it is 
not, for we have already treated his first chapter on good and evil, and there the principal 
question or problem is anthropological in nature.  That first chapter establishes the 
problem of evil in human affairs, the impotence of purely human solutions, and thus the 
need for a supernatural solution to the problem of evil.  On the other hand, Lonergan’s 
understanding of divine justice is a theology, and as a theology it functions as a principle 
for working out his understanding of redemption and in particular the historical causality 
of Christ.  For Lonergan, if divine justice is misunderstood, redemption will be 
misunderstood. 
Now let us reflect deeper on why it is necessary for Lonergan to understand divine 
justice prior to understanding this or that aspect of redemption.  In my interpretation, 
Lonergan’s chapter on divine justice takes up what is perhaps the first question or 
problem one needs to answer if one wants to understand salvation history, and 
specifically the historical causality of Christ.  In my own words, I would express this 
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question as follows:  In general, how does God operate in our world?  If we cannot 
answer this question, how can we possibly understand the historical causality of Christ? 
For Lonergan, the answer to this question is grounded in his understanding of divine 
justice:  there is an intelligible unity in the common course of things and the order of the 
universe, and this common course and order are the proper effects of God produced 
through secondary causes.  Any aspect of redemption will be in harmonious continuation 
with this common course and order, this intelligible unity, because divine justice has no 
higher rule than divine wisdom which has conceived the order of this universe in one 
intuitional act.  If one follows this principle, one’s soteriology will find its ground in 
intelligibility, not necessity.  This intelligibility ultimately originates from divine 
wisdom, the rule of divine justice.  It is important to note that Lonergan wants his reader 
to understand that the theologian’s wisdom must not lose sight of divine wisdom.  
Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice is grounded in an understanding of this world 
conceived by divine wisdom, and not some other possible world God could have created 
that human wisdom is tempted to contemplate.
125
 
If Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice establishes the theological principle 
that there is an intelligible unity in the order of the universe, then any subsequent 
question about the intelligibility of a proper effect of God must be intelligibly related to 
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 In the 1957 Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism, Lonergan stated the 
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the order of the universe, otherwise there would be no intelligible unity to the universe, 
amounting to a notion of a voluntaristically conceived divine will, an error Lonergan 
refutes.  The redemption is not necessary, but it is intelligible.  However, voluntarism has 
a too superficial understanding of intelligibility to sufficiently grasp the intelligibility of 
redemption.  And the root cause of this problem is a failure to judge that divine wisdom 
intelligibly orders those things that are contingent, those things freely chosen by God.  In 
short, there is an aspect of voluntarism which ignores the significance of intelligibility, 
exaggerates accordingly the role of the will, and obscures the notion of divine justice.
126
 
Let us dwell for the moment on the significance of intelligibility, because it is 
critical to interpreting Lonergan.  The justice of God is not limited to the events we 
associate with salvation history.  Every event in history directly willed by God is related 
to God in exactly the same way, because anything directly willed by God is 
intelligible.
127
 Charles Hefling explains: 
In the universe that actually exists, every event that actually occurs is related to God in 
exactly the same way.  That is what it means to affirm that God is the First Agent.  The 
Big Bang, biological evolution, my writing this chapter and your understanding it – if any 
of these is occurring or has occurred, it is intelligible, and God is the reason why it is 
intelligible.  But the same thing is true, in the same way, of miracles, revelation, religious 
conversion, and the Incarnation.  The sense in which these are acts of God is no different 
from the sense in which falling sparrows and lilies of the field are acts of God.  Even 
“salvation history,” in other words, belongs to the intelligible, emergently probable 
universe.
128
 
 
 The cardinal point here is that anything in the created order, including salvation 
history, belongs to the intelligible unity of the one order of the universe conceived, 
chosen, and effected by God.  Therefore the cross of Christ, the satisfaction of Christ, and 
the historical causality of Christ, as with anything else in the created order, are intelligible 
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in themselves and intelligibly related to the intelligible unity of this universe.  Why?  
Because the cross of Christ, the satisfaction made by Christ, and the historical causality 
of Christ are part of God’s choice of a wise order, they are part of the course of things 
and the order of the universe, and as such they are the proper effects of God.  As such, 
they are intelligible.  If they were not intelligible, they would not be just.   
Even though the Supplement is a text on redemption, and certainly Lonergan 
includes material that is not explicitly required to understand the historical causality of 
Christ, we recall that Lonergan still had the special intent to understand the historical 
causality of Christ.  We also mentioned in our introduction that we would attend 
particularly to the question of Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of 
Christ based on his own stated purpose.  I will explain how this theological principle is at 
work in Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ. 
First, recall how Lonergan understands the intelligible unity of world process.  He 
understands this intelligible unity in terms of emergent probability.  Now emergent 
probability includes the intelligibility of statistical laws, and statistical laws imply that if 
an event is to take place, the conditions which enable that event to take place must be 
fulfilled.  Statistical laws attempt to identify the probability that the relevant conditions 
will be fulfilled for the event to take place.  Well, if the historical causality of Christ is an 
aspect of redemption, and if redemption is in harmonious continuation with the actual 
order of this universe, then the historical causality of Christ will certainly involve the 
fulfillment of conditions not only with respect to Christ as historical agent, but also with 
respect to human agents who cooperate in Christ’s redemptive mission.   
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In fact, when Lonergan discusses agency in the final chapter of the Supplement, 
he will distinguish between agents acting through nature and agents acting through 
intellect.
129
  Persons who choose to cooperate with Christ in God’s plan of redemption 
are ministerial agents acting through intellect.  As such, they not only intend specific 
effects, but they can also come to knowledge of the requisite conditions that must be 
fulfilled if their intended effect is to be actualized.   
Furthermore, in the final chapter of the Supplement where Lonergan discusses 
“Christ the Historical Agent,”130 he will explain why the effect of Christ’s historical 
action as a whole is the total human good of order, both external and cultural, past, 
present, and future.
131
  He will explain that Christ’s actions are mediated socially and 
historically, which means that Christ’s actions are adapted to human persons.  Humans 
communicate through expressive signs, and human knowledge begins from the senses.  
The Word, in becoming flesh, through his whole ministry on earth involving word and 
deed, made perceptible the Word of God to human beings.  In my interpretation, this is a 
judgment that Christ’s historical actions are in harmonious continuation with the actual 
order of the universe because Christ’s actions are adapted to human beings as we actually 
exist in this world order.  God is certainly the absolute, first historical agent.  But as 
Lonergan’s article on the “Just Order of Reality” asserts, it is God's way to act through 
secondary causes and in accordance with their natures. 
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This is particularly important to acknowledge when it comes to human 
communication, since communication is required for the transmission of beliefs.  And the 
transmission of beliefs is fundamental to the historical causality of Christ, since the 
proclamation of the solution to the problem of evil is required if the solution is to be in 
harmonious continuation with the actual order of the universe.
132
  This is why in the 
article on the “Just Order of Reality,” Lonergan states that God himself became man that 
he might be a secondary and proportionate cause in restoring all things (Eph 1:10) and 
making all things new (1 Cor 5:17),
133
 and that the kingdom is proclaimed and 
propagated through secondary causes, namely, human beings.
134
 
It is quite clear then that when it comes to understanding the historical causality of 
Christ, this historical causality is not exempt from Lonergan’s assertion that the requisite 
conditions need to be fulfilled for a cause to have an effect.  Now why do requisite 
conditions need to be fulfilled?  The answer again goes back to Lonergan’s understanding 
of the intelligible unity of world process, understood according to the theory of emergent 
probability in which higher schemes emerge from lower schemes.  As such, in Insight 
Lonergan conceives redemption as a “higher integration” of human living (a higher 
scheme if you will).
135
  Like any higher integration, the solution to the problem of evil 
comes about only when the requisite conditions for its fulfillment are actually fulfilled.  
This applies equally to the historical causality of Christ.  To deny that the historical 
causality of Christ is in harmonious continuation with the actual order of the universe is 
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equivalent to denying that the historical causality of Christ is in harmonious continuation 
with divine justice, since divine wisdom which has conceived the intelligible unity of 
world order is the norm, the ground of divine justice.   
 In summary, we can state that the intelligibility of divine justice discerned in the 
intelligible unity of world order is a theological principle of the Supplement.  It is clear 
that for Lonergan, understanding redemption presupposes an understanding of divine 
justice.  In other words, it is a fundamental theological principle operative in Lonergan’s 
soteriology, whether he is seeking to understand the meaning of the cross, the meaning of 
Christ’s satisfaction, or the meaning of the historical causality of Christ.  A principle is 
what is first in some order.  Every aspect of Lonergan’s understanding of redemption is 
influenced by this principle, meaning that the explanatory, systematic conclusions he 
reaches regarding redemption are ordered to his understanding of divine justice, as 
conclusions are ordered to principles. 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
 
 The focus of Lonergan’s chapter is clearly on divine wisdom, since God’s 
wisdom is the law of God’s justice.  Lonergan inherited this understanding of divine 
justice from Aquinas, and through Lonergan’s adoption of the Leonine injunction of 
vetera novis augere et perficere Lonergan has synthesized Aquinas’s understanding of 
divine justice with contemporary knowledge from the natural and human sciences.  For 
Lonergan, knowledge from the natural and human sciences, which is integral to his 
worldview of emergent probability developed in Insight, advances our understanding of 
divine justice by advancing our understanding of how God operates in this world through 
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secondary (instrumental) causes according to the nature of things and natural laws.  And 
since divine wisdom does not learn by trial and error, redemption in general and the 
historical causality of Christ in particular are in harmonious continuation with the 
intelligible unity of the order of this universe conceived by divine wisdom.  As Lonergan 
states in Insight, there are no divine afterthoughts.   
 This understanding of divine justice functions as a theological principle in the 
Supplement.  The cross of Christ, the satisfaction of Christ, and the historical causality of 
Christ are directly willed by God.  Therefore they are most just.  And if just, they are 
intelligible.  And if they are intelligible, they must be intelligently related to the 
intelligible unity of the actual order of this universe.  Redemption is not necessary, but it 
is intelligible.  If the theological principle of divine justice is misunderstood, a 
misunderstanding of redemption is sure to follow.  This chapter on divine justice clearly 
shows Lonergan’s concern to conceive divine justice correctly, evidenced by his repeated 
emphasis on the problem of anthropomorphic conceptions of divine justice based on legal 
analogies. 
Finally we should note that this chapter on the justice of God is not Lonergan’s 
final word on divine justice.  As he notes at the beginning and end of the chapter, he is 
leaving room for further development.  This further development will appeal to a much 
loftier analogy: the cross of Christ. 
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CHAPTER 4: ON THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CHRIST 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Our purpose here is to interpret the third chapter of the Supplement titled “On the 
Death and Resurrection of Christ.”1   The chapter includes articles 16-21 of the 
Supplement:  (16) The Death of Christ, (17) The Payment of the Price, (18) The New 
Testament Sacrifice, (19) Meritorious Obedience, (20) Vicarious Suffering, and (21) The 
Power of the Resurrection. 
 Lonergan begins with an introductory paragraph: 
No Christian doctrine has received a clearer or fuller treatment in the New Testament 
than the dogma of the Redemption.  Accordingly, it seems best to collect and set forth 
first of all whatever teachings are communicated in the primary sources of revelation.  
The next six articles, therefore -- on the death of Christ (16), the payment of a price (17), 
the sacrifice of the new covenant (18), meritorious obedience (19), vicarious suffering 
(20), and the power of the resurrection (21) -- will simply express what is to be found in 
scripture.
2
 
 
  
4.2 A Brief Description of Articles 16 - 21 
 
4.2.1 Article 16:  The Death of Christ
3
 
 
 
 The article is divided into six sub-sections:  (1) Proximate causes, (2) Underlying 
principles, (3) God’s intention, (4) Distinctions, (5) Immanent effects, and (6) Universal 
effect. 
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leguntur.”  DBM, 118 [Supplement, 48-49].  As we noted in the previous chapter, although Lonergan uses 
the word “dogma,” no specific definition of the doctrine of the redemption has been given dogmatic status 
by the Catholic Church. 
3
 “Articulus XVI.  De Morte Christi,” DBM, 120-123 [Supplement, 49-50]. 
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 Proximate causes:  Lonergan identifies four and possibly a fifth proximate cause 
of Christ’s death:  (1) Judas, his betrayer; (2) the High Priests; (3) the Jerusalem mob 
stirred up by the priests; (4) the soldiers; and (5) if one adds those who consented, the 
passers-by who jeered at him.  Although Lonergan states that these causes are “according 
to the gospel narratives” (secundum narrationem evangelicam), Lonergan’s scriptural 
references are almost exclusively from the gospel of Mark.
4
 
 Underlying principles:  Lonergan notes that John’s gospel continually points out 
the opposition of the Jews,
5
 but the same gospel points out general principles of human 
nature suggesting that the opposition to Christ was almost inevitable in the normal course 
of human events.
6
  To substantiate this judgment, Lonergan cites many passages, all from 
John’s gospel.7 The fundamental opposition Lonergan discusses can be summed up as 
follows:  Christ was the light of the world (Jn 8:12); the light came into the world but 
humans preferred darkness to light, for their deeds were evil (Jn 3:19).
8
 
 God’s intention:  Lonergan cites Acts 2:23 which teaches that Christ was 
delivered up by the deliberate intention and foreknowledge of God.
9
  The sufferings of 
Christ were mandatory (Lk 24:26, 46) and in accordance with the Scriptures (1 Cor 
15:13; Acts 3:18).
10
 
To the above references we may add what is said about the command of the Father (Jn 
10:18), Christ's own predictions about his passion and death (Mk 9:12, 31, 10:33 ff.), his 
                                                 
4
 The article includes six scriptural references.  Regarding Judas, Lonergan cites Mk 14:21, 43.  Regarding 
the High Priest, Mk. 14:55, 64.  Regarding the Jerusalem mob, Mk 15:11, 14.  Regarding the soldiers, Mk 
15:16, 21, 24.  Regarding the passers-by who consented, Rom 1:32 and Mk 15:29, 31. 
5
 Lonergan references the following passages from John:  Jn 5:16, 18; 6:53, 60, 66, 70; 7:12-13, 20, 31-32,  
43-44, 51-52; 8:48, 59; 9:16, 22, 30-34; 10:19-21, 31, 39; 11:46-53, 56; 12:19, 42-43. 
6
 Lonergan, DBM, 120 [Supplement, 49]. 
7
 Jn 3:19-21; 7:7; 8:37-47; 9:41; 12: 39 ff.; 19:11. 
8
 Lonergan, DBM, 120 [Supplement, 49]. 
9
 Lonergan, DBM, 121 [Supplement, 49]. 
10
 Lonergan, DBM, 121 [Supplement, 49]. 
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voluntary acceptance of his passion and death (Mk 14:36, Mt 26:33), and his obedience 
so often mentioned by the apostles (Rom 5:19; Phil 2:8; Heb 5:8, 10:5-7).
11
 
 
 Distinctions:  As a physical event the death of Christ is both an action and a 
passion.  Christ’s death is an action considered as proceeding from the agents who caused 
his death, and this same event is a passion as produced in the recipient.
12
  Distinctions 
must be made regarding the wills involved.  God in no way wills the evil of sin, so God 
in no way willed the sin of those culpable for Christ’s death.  God only indirectly wills 
the consequences of sin, so God only indirectly willed the evils inflicted upon Christ.  
God directly wills the good, so God directly willed the acceptance of suffering and death 
on the part of the obedient Christ.
13
  Lonergan explains why God directly willed this: 
Moreover, actions that are in accordance with the precepts of the Gospels are virtuous.  
Now the Gospel rejects the law of retaliation, lex talionis, commands love of one's 
enemies (Mt 5:38-48), and extols the suffering of evil for the sake of justice (Mt 5:10 
ff)...The whole of Christ's passion and death, therefore, inasmuch as it proceeded from 
the gentle and humble Christ, was directly willed by God.
14
 
 
 Immanent effects:  Lonergan notes that the Epistle to the Hebrews teaches that 
Christ was perfected through his sufferings (Heb 2:10; 5:8-9), and St. Paul teaches that 
Christ’s exaltation was due to his becoming obedient unto death, even death on a cross 
(Phil 2:7 ff.).
15
  Lonergan notes St. Paul’s teaching that the purpose of Christ’s death and 
resurrection is that Christ might be Lord of both the dead and the living (Rom 14:9).
16
 
                                                 
11
 “Quibus accedunt quae de mandato Patris narrantur (Jn 10:18), propriae passionis et mortis praedictiones 
a Christo factae (Mk 9:12, 31, 10:33 ff.), voluntaria eiusdem passionis et mortis acceptatio (Mk 14:36, Mt 
26:33), et ab apostolis celebrata Christi obedientia (Rom 5:19; Phil 2:8; Heb 5:8, 10:5-7).”  DBM, 121 
[Supplement, 49]. 
12
 Lonergan, DBM, 121 [Supplement, 49].  Lonergan references ST, I-II, q. 20, a. 6, 2um; Lombard, 3, d. 
20, c. 5-7. 
13
 Lonergan, DBM, 122 [Supplement, 50]. 
14
 “Praeterea, bonae sunt actiones quae secundum praecepta evangelica fiunt; sed evangelium reprobat 
legem talionis, inimicorum dilectionem praecipit (Mt 5:38-48), et malorum perpessionem propter iustitiam 
summopere laudat (Mt 5:10 ff.)...et ideo totam Christi passionem eiusque mortem, quatenus a voluntate 
Christi mitis et humilis processit, directe voluit Deus.”  DBM, 122 [Supplement, 50]. 
15
 Lonergan, DBM, 123 [Supplement, 50]. 
16
 Lonergan, DBM, 123 [Supplement, 50]. 
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 Universal effect:  The universal effect of Christ’s death is our redemption.  
Lonergan cites a number of passages from Scripture: 
Scripture teaches above all that Christ died for our sins (1 Cor 15:3; 1 Pet 3:18), on behalf 
of sinners (Rom 5:6), for the whole human race (2 Cor 5:15; Heb 2:9), for each individual 
(Rom 14:15; 1 Cor 8:11; Gal 2:20), for us (Rom 5:8; 1 Thes 5:10); that we were baptized 
in the death of Christ (Rom 6:3), that the Eucharist proclaims the death of the Lord (1 Cor 
11:26), a death undergone for redemption from transgressions (Heb 9:15); that he died in 
order to gather together the scattered children of God (Jn 11:51-52), and so that all living 
men should live no longer for themselves but for him who died and was raised to life for 
them (2 Cor 5:15); that he died in order that, alive or dead, we should still live united to 
him (1 Thes 5:10); in order to lead us to God (1 Pet 3:18), to bring about a universal 
reconciliation (2 Cor 5:19; Rom 5:10; Eph 2:16; Col 1:20-22), and to destroy by his death 
him who had power over death, that is, the devil, and set free all those who had been held 
in slavery all their lives by the fear of death (Heb 2:14). To all this we may add 
everything that Scripture says about the blood and the cross of the Lord, about his 
sacrifice, his love and his self-surrender.
17
 
 
 
4.2.2 Article 17:  The Payment of the Price
18
 
 
 
 There are two basic parts to this article.  In the first, Lonergan considers the literal 
meaning of the New Testament word “redemption.”  He surveys various Greek words 
translated into the Latin as redimere (to redeem) or redemptio (redemption).  Some refer 
strictly to a commercial transaction, “while others have such a reference but in a much 
more general and sometimes remote sense.”19  He considers the latter group first.  The 
                                                 
17
 “Praecipue vero docet scriptura Christum mortuum esse pro peccatis nostris (1 Cor 15:3; 1 Pet 3:18), pro 
impiis (Rom 5:6), pro omnibus (2 Cor 5:15; Heb 2:9) et singulis (Rom 14:15; 1 Cor 8:11; Gal 2:20), pro 
nobis (Rom 5:8; 1 Thes 5:10);  in morte Christi nos baptizari (Rom 6:3), Eucharistiam mortem Domini 
annuntiare (1 Cor 11:26); quam praeterea mortem fuisse in redemptionem praevaricationum (Heb 9:15); ut 
filios Dei, qui erant dispersi, congregaret in unum (Jn 11:51-52); ut et qui vivunt, iam non sibi vivant, sed ei 
qui pro ipsis mortuus est et resurrexit (2 Cor 5:15); ut sive vigilemus sive dormiamus simul cum illo 
vivamus (1 Thes 5:10); ut nos offerret Deo (1 Pet 3:18); in reconciliationem universalem (2 Cor 5:19; Rom 
5:10; Eph 2:16; Col 1:20-22); ut per mortem destrueret eum qui habebat mortis imperium, id est diabolum, 
et liberaret eos qui timore mortis per totam vitam obnoxii erant servituti (Heb 2:14).  Quibus accedunt 
omnia quae de sanguine et cruce Domini dicuntur, de eius sacrificio, de eius dilectione, suique traditione.”  
DBM, 123 [Supplement, 50]. 
18
 “Articulus XVII.  De Pretii Solutione,” DBM, 124-128 [Supplement, 51-53]. 
19
 “...aliae autem connexum quidem sed longe generaliorem sensum eumque interdum remotum habent.” 
DBM, 124 [Supplement, 51].  Based on a comparison to Lonergan’s 1958 lecture on redemption, this 
somewhat enigmatic statement likely refers to the Hebrew meaning of redemption in the Old Testament 
carried forward into the New Testament.  The Hebrew understanding of redemption was primarily 
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Greek words refer to redemption in various contexts.
20
  Then he examines specific 
passages which speak of redemption using metaphors related to commercial transactions, 
such as the Greek lytron, which can be translated “ransom.”  Lonergan notes a number of 
examples from the New Testament.
21
 From the New Testament teachings he draws five 
conclusions.  First, there is a distinction between the means and end of redemption: 
Redemption as end is that state in which we are freed from the power of darkness, from 
sin, from punishment, from the fear of death, by which we have received the promise, are 
reconciled to God, are justified, enjoy the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and adoptive 
sonship, are saved in hope, are able to approach God with confidence; by which we await 
or will one day enjoy the resurrection of the flesh, life with Christ, and the crown of 
glory.  Redemption as means refers to that process by which this state arises or is brought 
about, not only by causality but also and especially under that condition most 
burdensome to Christ, namely, death on the cross.  The Word of God could have saved us 
without coming down from heaven; the incarnate Word could have saved us without 
going through his passion and death; but in actual fact it was through his passion and 
death that he did save us.
22
 
                                                                                                                                                 
liberation or deliverance, and not primarily a meaning expressed in terms of a financial transaction using 
metaphors taken from the pagan marketplace and the ancient practice of buying and selling slaves and 
captives.  The Hebrew meaning is exemplified through the words pâdâh (primarily understood as liberation 
from Egypt), gâ’al (primarily understood as liberation from Babylon), and kipper (liberation from sin).  
The Hebrew understanding of redemption as liberation or deliverance is especially present in the canticle of 
Zachariah (Lk 1:68-79).  See Lonergan, “The Redemption,” 17. 
20
 As liberation expected by devout Jews:  lytrōsis (Lk 1:68, 2:38; Heb 9:12).  As the remission of sins:  
apolytrōsis (Eph 1:7, Col 1:14; Heb 9:15) and lytrousthai (Tit 2:14).  As the redemption hoped for on the 
last day:  apolytrōsis (Lk 21:28; Rom 8:23; Eph 1:14, 4:30).  As Christ himself and as Christ having won 
an eternal redemption: apolytrōsis (1 Cor 1:30) and lytrōsis (Heb 9:12), respectively.  In connection with 
grace and the gratuitous justification:  apolytrōsis (Rom 3:24).  Lonergan, DBM, 122 [Supplement, 51]. 
21
 Lonergan organizes these examples into five groups: (1) The Son of Man came not to serve, but to give 
his life as a ransom (lytron) for many (Mk 10:45; Mt. 20:28).  Lonergan notes that “to give one’s life” 
would seem to be a Semitism, as “to lay down one’s life” in Jn 10:11, 15, 17, and the meaning of 
“redemption” (redemptio) associated with the metaphor lytron indicates a means of liberation; (2) Christ 
sacrificed himself as a ransom (antilytron) for all (1 Tim 2:6); (3) We were ransomed (elytrōthête) not with 
gold or silver, but in the precious blood of Christ (1 Pet 1:18); (4) There are a number of passages where 
we find the Greek timê [price], agorazein [to buy], exagorazein [to buy up, buy from].  For example, Paul 
tells the Corinthians that they have been bought at a price (1 Cor 6:20); (5) A number of passages speak of 
the Lord giving himself up for our sins (Gal 1:4), giving himself up for me (Gal 2:20), for us (Eph 5:2), for 
the Church (Eph 5:25), for our sins (Rom 4:25), and for us all (Rom 8:32).  Lonergan, DBM, 125-127 
[Supplement, 51-52]. 
22
 “Redemptio ut finis est status ille quo liberamur a potestate tenebrarum, a peccatis, a poenis, a timore 
mortis, quo repromissionem accipimus, Deo reconciliamur, iustificamur, inhabitationem Spiritus et 
filiorum adoptionem habemus, spe salvati sumus, cum fiducia ad Deum accedere possumus, resurrectionem 
carnis, vitam cum Christo, gloriae coronam vel adhuc exspectamus vel quandoque possidebimus.  
Redemptio autem ut medium dicit id quo hic status oritur et producitur, non solum causalitate, sed etiam et 
praecipue sub illa conditione Christo onerosa, quae erat mors crucis.  Potuit enim Dei Verbum de caelis nos 
salvare; potuit Verbum caro factum praeter passionem et mortem nos salvare; sed de facto passione et 
morte nos salvos fecit.”  DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52].  Lonergan references ST, III, q. 46, a. 2. 
 119 
 
Second, Christ “wrought the salvation of all mankind” (salutem omnium hominum esse 
operatum) under the burdensome condition of “giving his life” (dandi animam suam).23  
Lonergan makes this conclusion on the basis of New Testament exegesis, particularly 
those passages which understand Christ’s “giving his life” for our redemption 
metaphorically as “paying the price” (pretii solutio).24  Lonergan states that “paying the 
price” is no doubt a metaphor, but it is a real operation and signifies an exchange 
inasmuch as the death of Christ was real, our salvation is real, and a connection between 
them is affirmed.
25
  Third, Christ gave his earthly life in exchange for the eternal life of 
humanity.
26
  Fourth, if one asks to whom the price was paid, this pushes the metaphor too 
far.  Lonergan notes that the once-widespread opinion that Christ paid the price to the 
devil has for a long time been discarded.
27
  Fifth, as to why God required a price for our 
salvation, the reason is a mystery in the fullest sense and we can only understand it 
imperfectly and analogically.  For Lonergan, such an understanding would be most 
fruitful, perhaps more fruitful than any other theological understanding,
28
 but the means 
to this end is to first determine just what is to be understood so that subsequently one 
might try to attain some understanding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Lonergan, DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52]. 
24
 Lonergan, DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52]. 
25
 Lonergan, DBM, 127-128 [Supplement, 52]. 
26
 Lonergan, DBM, 128 [Supplement, 53]. 
27
 Lonergan, DBM, 128 [Supplement, 53]. 
28
 Lonergan, DBM, 128 [Supplement, 53]. 
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4.2.3 Article 18:  The New Testament Sacrifice
29
 
 
  
 First, Lonergan distinguishes six elements in the New Testament’s notion of a 
sacrifice:  (1)  the effect of the sacrifice, which is the forgiveness of sin, sanctification, 
and confident access to God; (2) the recipient of the effect; (3) the agent, the priest; (4) 
the sufferer or victim sacrificed; (5) the action of the priest offering the sacrifice; and (6) 
the foundation of the sacrificial system, the covenant or testament by virtue of which that 
social group, in which priests are appointed to offer sacrifice for the people, is constituted 
as holy.
30
 
 In the remainder of the article Lonergan explains that the new covenant divinely 
instituted by Christ is superior to the Mosaic covenant, and his explanation relies heavily 
on an exegesis of the Epistle to the Hebrews.  The Epistle to the Hebrews brings out this 
theme through its contrasts of (1) the mediator Moses and the mediator Christ, (2) the 
priesthood of Levi and the priesthood of Melchisedech, and (3) sacrifices meant to purify 
the flesh and sacrifices meant to purify the inner self.
31
  Lonergan summarizes that Christ 
has been made the guarantor, mediator, priest, and victim of the new covenant. 
 
4.2.4 Article 19:  Meritorious Obedience
32
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins with an explanation of what constitutes the mission of the Son.  
As it regards the person of the Son, mission refers to his eternal procession from the 
                                                 
29
 “Articulus XVIII.  De sacrificio novi testamenti,” DBM, 129-132 [Supplement, 53-55]. 
30
 Lonergan, DBM, 129 [Supplement, 53]. 
31
 Lonergan, DBM, 130 [Supplement, 53]. 
32
 “Articulus XIX.  De obedientia meritoria,” DBM, 133-137 [Supplement, 55-56]. 
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Father, with the appropriate extrinsic (created) term.
33
  With regard to the human acts 
performed by the Son, mission refers to dependence upon the Father which Lonergan 
names obedience.  To command is to move another through reason and will, and to obey 
is to be moved by another through reason and will.
34
 
 The remainder of the article is essentially a compilation of scriptural passages 
which speak of the command of the Father to the Son (for example, Jn 10:17-18; 12:49; 
15:10), and the Son’s obedient response to the Father’s command (for example, Jn 4:34; 
5:30; 6:38; 8:29; 15:10; 19:30).
35
  Now Christ’s obedience did not only include 
submission of his reason and will, but his bodily obedience as well.  Submission of 
reason and will are interior acts.  But a human act, in the fullest sense, consists not only 
of these interior acts, but the addition of an external act that is bodily and perceptible by 
the senses.
36
  This is an important point, since Lonergan will make use of this in his 
reflection on Christ’s satisfaction in chapter 5 of the Supplement. 
 Lonergan ends the article stating that there is no doubt that Christ’s obedience 
unto death was free and meritorious.  And correlative to Christ’s obedience is the merit or 
reward conferred upon his obedience, spoken of by St. Paul in Philippians 2:9 and 
Romans 5:19.  The same idea is found in Hebrews 2:9.  Finally, the Council of Trent 
confirmed this New Testament witness, teaching that the meritorious cause of our 
                                                 
33
 Lonergan, DBM, 133 [Supplement, 55].  In Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology, the mission of a divine 
person is contingent, meaning that it can be or not be.  As contingent, a divine mission is constituted by a 
divine relation of origin itself;  second, although such a mission is constituted by a relation of origin alone, 
nevertheless an appropriate external (created) term is required if there is to be a correspondence of truth (a 
correspondence with reality).  There is no correspondence of truth that there is a mission without an 
appropriate external term, although nothing real and intrinsic is added to a divine person as divine on 
account of the external term.  See Lonergan, The Triune God : Systematics, 457.  With respect to the 
mission of the Son, the appropriate external term is a secondary act of existence by which Christ assumes a 
nonsubsistent human nature.  See Lonergan, The Triune God : Systematics, 471. 
34
 Lonergan, DBM, 133 [Supplement, 55].  On the meaning of “to command” (praecipere) Lonergan cites 
ST, II-II, q. 104, a. 1.  On the meaning of “to obey” (obedire) Lonergan cites ST, III, q. 47, a. 2, 1um. 
35
 Lonergan, DBM, 133-134 [Supplement, 55]. 
36
 Lonergan, DBM, 135 [Supplement, 55]. 
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justification was Christ’s holy suffering on the wood of the cross (DB 799; DS 1529; ND 
1932).
37
 
 
4.2.5 Article 20:  Vicarious Suffering
38
 
  
  
 “Vicarious” (vicarium) refers to that which someone does or suffers in the place 
of another.
39
  A person acting vicariously is a substitute or surrogate.  Christ’s vicarious 
suffering included an active and passive aspect, and these two should not be separated.  
Christ was a surrogate in the active sense, since it is he and not us who paid the price of 
our redemption.  It was his obedience, and not ours, that was meritorious.
40
  The passive 
aspect included his obedient acceptance of death.  The unbreakable relationship between 
the passive and active aspects of Christ’s vicarious suffering implies that it was 
impossible for Christ to act vicariously on our behalf, without by the same token 
suffering vicariously for us.  The words “for us” (pro nobis) have a two-sense meaning.  
In one sense, Christ’s suffered vicariously to take away our sins.  In another sense, Christ 
suffered vicariously because we are sinners.  In other words, Lonergan distinguishes end 
and motive. 
 Lonergan proceeds to explore the antecedent cause or reason that Christ’s 
vicarious suffering was in accordance with the intention of God: 
Now if the passion and death of Christ occurred according to the divine intention, it 
surely was not without reason.  This is the reason we seek, and we declare it to be that 
Christ came to redeem us; and he came, not on clouds of glory and sitting at the right 
hand of the Power, but in flesh that could suffer and would suffer on account of sin.  
                                                 
37
 Lonergan, DBM, 137 [Supplement, 56].  Lonergan includes a footnote referring the reader to DB 790: “If 
anyone asserts that this sin of Adam …is taken away by any other remedy than through the merits of the 
unique mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ, who has reconciled us with the Father in his own blood …let him 
be anathema.”  Cf. DS 1513, ND 510. 
38
 “Articulus XX.  De vicaria passione,” DBM, 138-141 [Supplement, 56-58]. 
39
 Lonergan, DBM, 138 [Supplement, 56]. 
40
 Lonergan, DBM, 138 [Supplement, 56]. 
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Christ, therefore, not only acted vicariously on our behalf but also suffered and died, 
because he not only had eternal life to impart to us, but also the task of taking away our 
sins and reconciling sinners with God.
41
 
 
 Lonergan cites a number of New Testament passages to support the authority of 
his claim.  We should note that even though the New Testament witness is sufficient to 
ground the affirmation that Christ’s vicarious suffering is for us and for our sins, 
Lonergan also appeals to the Old Testament, namely the servant song of Isaiah 53:4-12.  
For Lonergan, Jesus himself interpreted his own life as the suffering servant foretold in 
Isaiah.
42
  Lonergan substantiates his judgment by stating that the Catholic tradition has at 
all times understood this passage (Isaiah 53:4-12) as referring to the death of the Lord.
43
 
 
4.2.6 Article 21:  The Power of the Resurrection
44
 
 
 
 Lonergan states that redemption is brought about by a mediator more than by a 
means, and is established upon the death and resurrection of Christ rather than upon the 
fact of his death alone.
45
  For example, Lonergan notes that Christ has become a life-
giving Spirit (1 Cor 15:45; Jn 6:62-63), and that Christ is not only our Priest in his death 
on the cross, but he has also been made an eternal High Priest (Heb 6:20; 7:28), has been 
allotted a “far higher ministry” (melius sortitus ministerium), and now sits at the right 
hand of God.
46
  In his consideration of the power of the resurrection, Lonergan is careful 
                                                 
41
 “Quod si passio morsque Christi secundum divinam intentionem facta est, sane sine ratione non est facta.  
Quam rationem quaerimus et dicimus Christum ad nos redimendos, non in nubibus caeli et sedentem a 
dextris virtutis venisse, sed in carne passibili atque passura propter peccata.  Ideo ergo Christus pro nobis 
vicarius non solum egit et fecit sed etiam passus et mortuus est, quia non solum vitam aeternam nobis 
communicandam habuit sed etiam peccata auferenda et peccatores Deo Patri reconciliandos.”  DBM, 139-
140 [Supplement, 57]. 
42
 Lonergan, DBM, 141 [Supplement, 58]. 
43
 Lonergan, DBM, 141 [Supplement, 58]. 
44
 “Articulus XXI.  De virtute resurrectionis,” DBM, 142-145 [Supplement, 58-60]. 
45
 Lonergan, DBM, 142 [Supplement, 58].  As scriptural evidence that Christ remains a mediator, even after 
his death, Lonergan cites 1 Tim 2:5; Heb 8:6, 9:15, 12:24. 
46
 Lonergan, DBM, 143 [Supplement, 59]. 
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not to downplay the power of Christ’s death.  Lonergan’s point is that Christ is not only a 
means, but a mediator of our salvation.
47
 
 At the end of the article, Lonergan links the power of the resurrection to its 
pneumatological implications.  Before Jesus’ glorification the Spirit was not given (Jn. 
7:39).  We are washed clean, sanctified, and justified in the Spirit of God (1 Cor. 6:11), 
and have become children of God by adoption because God has sent into our hearts the 
Spirit of his Son crying out, “Abba, Father” (Gal 4:6; Rom 8:15).48  Lonergan ends the 
article interpreting that Hebrews 5:9 implies that Christ is the cause of our salvation not 
by his death alone, but by his death and resurrection, and his giving of the Spirit: 
Besides, the phrase “the source [Gk. αίτιος, ‘cause’] of salvation for all who obey him” 
seems to indicate a mode of causality.  For from the person of the Father there is sent the 
person of the Son to us persons in the work of reconciliation, so that the very same love 
with which the Father loves his own Son is given to us, that is, the Holy Spirit, who is 
Love proceeding from Father and Son.
49
 
 
 
4.3 Lonergan on the Means of Redemption 
 
 
 Our purpose here is to interpret how Lonergan has organized the teachings of the 
New Testament on redemption as means.  Recall that he makes the distinction between 
redemption as end and redemption as means in article 17 (The Payment of the Price).  He 
made the same distinction in Thesis 15 of DVI.  Thesis 15 formally states: 
Redemption denotes not only an end but also a mediation: a price that has been paid, 
Christ the Mediator’s vicarious suffering and death for sinners and on account of sins, the 
sacrifice offered by our High Priest in his own blood, meritorious obedience, the power 
of the risen Lord, and the eternal Priest’s intercession.50 
                                                 
47
 Lonergan, DBM, 142 [Supplement, 58]. 
48
 Lonergan, DBM, 144 [Supplement, 59]. 
49
 “Praeterea, cum addatur ‘causa omnibus obtemperantibus sibi,’ causalitatis modus innui videtur.  Nam a 
Patre persona mittitur Filius persona ad nos personas in opus reconciliationis, ut dilectio, qua Filium 
proprium dilexit, etiam nobis detur, ipse nempe Spiritus, qui est Amor a Patre Filioque procedens.”  DBM, 
145 [Supplement, 59-60]. 
50
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 446. 
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 In DVI, in the section titled “The Meaning of the Thesis,” Lonergan explains the 
meaning of the thesis according to three assertions: 1) the thesis affirms redemption as an 
end, (2) the thesis affirms redemption not only as an end but also a mediation, and (3) the 
thesis affirms mediation on the part of the one who not only acts, but also suffers, 
vicariously.
51
  Immediately following this Lonergan states the following: 
The three assertions made in the thesis will not be given equal attention. 
 
The various aspects of redemption as an end are considered more fully in other 
theological treatises dealing with the church, original sin, the moral impotence of the 
sinner, grace and virtues, the last things, and the sacraments.  Here, all these will be 
presupposed rather than repeated. 
 
Our main concern is with the fact of mediation as scripture clearly and explicitly sets it 
out; and since it is easy to understand this from the standpoint of vicarious activity, more 
attention should in some way be given to the vicarious sufferer.
52
 
 
Lonergan’s emphasis in the Supplement is the same as in Thesis 15 of DVI:  not 
on redemption as end, but redemption as means.  Redemption as means refers to a 
process, and it quite clear that the focus of the present chapter is on that process.  After 
Lonergan considers the death of Christ, in article 16, he organizes the remainder of the 
chapter into the articles on the payment of the price, sacrifice, meritorious obedience, 
vicarious suffering, and the power of the resurrection.  These are the same categories 
listed in Thesis 15 of DVI, although there Lonergan makes a distinction between the 
power of the risen Lord and the eternal Priest’s intercession.  In the Supplement, these 
two categories are combined.   
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4.3.1 Lonergan’s Categorizations and Aquinas’s Five Ways 
 
 
 In the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae, question 48 is an inquiry into how 
Christ’s passion brings about our salvation.  Aquinas constructs a nexus of five ways or 
modes:  merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, redemption (ransom), and efficiency.  Although 
Anselm tried, in a somewhat misguided effort, to unite all these modes into his theory of 
satisfaction, it is apparent from a simple reading of Aquinas’s text that Aquinas was more 
cautious and content to articulate his understanding of the efficacy of Christ’s passion in 
five complementary aspects.
53
 
 We must also note that in Aquinas’s five ways, “redemption” is considered not in 
the wider sense of salvation itself, but in the restricted sense of the literal meaning of 
redemptionis, which derives its meaning from commercial metaphors: “ransom” or 
“payment of the price.” 
 Furthermore, in q. 48 Aquinas’s purpose is not exactly the same as Lonergan’s.  
In q. 48, Aquinas is offering explanations.  His purpose is not simply to collect and 
categorize evidence of the New Testament.  In terms of Lonergan’s methodology, 
Aquinas is doing systematics, since Aquinas’s aim is to promote understanding rather 
than to promote certitude that Christ’s passion and death has wrought our salvation.  The 
latter is already taken on faith by Aquinas. 
 In the Supplement, Lonergan has organized the teachings of the New Testament 
on “redemption as means” around the same categories Aquinas used in ST, III, q. 48, 
though not in the same order as Aquinas.  This is the tradition Lonergan inherited.  He 
did the same type of organization in both his 1958 lecture on redemption at the Thomas 
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More Institute in Montreal, and as well in Thesis 15 of DVI.  And although the third 
chapter of the Supplement neither mentions Aquinas’s five ways nor makes any reference 
to ST, III, q. 48, there is no doubt that Aquinas’s thought has influenced Lonergan’s 
approach to categorizing the teachings of the New Testament.  Finally we should note 
that Lonergan’s first article on the death of Christ is not part of Aquinas’s consideration 
in q. 48.  We will consider this article specifically. 
 
4.3.2 The Function of Lonergan’s Article on the Death of Christ 
 
 
Lonergan’s first article on the death of Christ functions as a foundation for the 
subsequent articles which, as we have noted, mirror Aquinas’s five ways.  Lonergan 
followed the same method in DVI where he considered the death of Christ prior to the 
categorizations corresponding to Aquinas’s five ways.  In other words, before Lonergan 
collects the New Testament teachings on how the death and resurrection of Christ has 
wrought our salvation, he first considers the death of Christ himself, much like Aquinas 
did in the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae.
54
 
Now if this article functions as a foundation for the subsequent articles, then what 
is the principal aim of this article?  In my interpretation the principal aim is to establish 
with certitude the New Testament teaching that not only did Christ voluntarily die for our 
sins and on behalf of sinners, but Christ’s passion and death were  “directly willed by 
God” (directe voluit Deus).55   
To state that the passion and death of Christ was directly willed by God means 
that the passion and death of Christ must be related (connected) to some good.  The good 
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 Lonergan, DBM, 122 [Supplement, 50]. 
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is always intelligible.  In other words, the passion and death of Christ must involve an 
intelligibility that is harmonious with the just and intelligible world order conceived by 
divine wisdom, though in the present chapter Lonergan is not concerned with explaining 
what that intelligibility is per se, but rather with the certitude that there is an intelligibility 
to be grasped.  God does not directly will the unintelligible.  To state otherwise 
contradicts the theological principle Lonergan established in the previous chapter.   
In fact, Lonergan uses this theological principle in the present chapter to establish 
critical distinctions between the different wills involved in Christ’s passion and death.  
Since God in no way wills the evil of sin, the cause of Christ’s death by the actions of 
those directly involved in his crucifixion constitutes a reprehensible sin (malum culpae).  
Since God only indirectly wills the consequences of sin, then God only indirectly willed 
the evils inflicted upon Christ (malum poenae).  Finally, since God directly wills the 
good, God directly willed the acceptance of the suffering and death on the part of the 
obedient Christ.  So the death of Christ involved at the same time a great good and a most 
hideous evil.  Lonergan stated the same conclusion in Thesis 15 of DVI:   
Yet granted secondary causes, and granted historical causality, it is still almighty God 
who nevertheless rules and governs all things through the secondary causes and in 
accordance with the historical laws...In itself the suffering and death of Christ is the 
series of events narrated in the four gospels...Physically regarded, the same event is both 
an acting and a being acted upon...This physical identity does not, however, rule out 
diversity of wills.  The will of the agent is not the same thing as the will of one who is 
acted upon.  Thus in the same event there may be both the gravest of crimes and the most 
excellent of deeds.
56
 
 
Furthermore, Lonergan qualifies his language when he states that God directly 
willed the passion and death of Christ.  We need to understand this qualification to 
interpret his understanding of what it means to state that God “directly willed” this event.  
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Lonergan’s qualification is meant to dispel an anthropomorphic understanding of God’s 
will in relation to Christ’s passion and death that would suggest an image of a vindictive 
God who takes pleasure in evils inflicted upon innocent persons.  Christ was innocent, 
with no fault of his own.  God is just.  Since God is just, God does not punish innocent 
persons.
57
  Yet God directly willed Christ’s suffering and death.  How does one reconcile 
the first three propositions with the New Testament teaching that God directly willed 
Christ’s passion and death? 
The answer is found in how Lonergan qualifies his language with respect to 
God’s direct willing of Christ’s passion and death.  When Lonergan states that Christ’s 
passion and death were directly willed by God, he qualifies the statement, and he does so 
twice.  First, he states that “God does directly will a good and holy will, and so God 
directly willed the acceptance of suffering and death on the part of the obedient Christ.”58  
A few sentences later he states “The whole of Christ's passion and death, therefore, 
inasmuch as it proceeded from the will of the gentle and humble Christ, was directly 
willed by God.”59  In my interpretation the important thing to note here is that with 
respect to the object of God’s direct willing, Lonergan’s thought reveals that this object is 
not so much the suffering and death of Christ simply qua suffering and death, but rather 
the goodness related to Christ’s will, to his internal disposition of obedient acceptance.  
Stated otherwise, in terms of the theological principle we identified in the previous 
chapter, God directly willed Christ’s obedient acceptance of God’s plan for this world 
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order, which includes the divine plan of redemption, conceived by divine wisdom and 
chosen by the divine goodness in harmonious continuation with this world’s order. 
 
4.3.3 Some Specific Comments on Lonergan’s Categorizations 
 
 
 In this section my purpose is to note a few significant differences between 
Lonergan’s categorizations of the New Testament teachings as compared to Aquinas’s 
categorizations as well as to two of Lonergan’s other works on redemption, specifically 
the 1958 lecture and Thesis 15 of DVI. 
 The first comment applies to Lonergan’s category of “vicarious suffering” in 
article 20.  In ST, III, q.48, a. 2, the question Aquinas addresses is whether or not Christ’s 
passion brought about our salvation per modum satisfactionis (by way of satisfaction).
60
  
Now in the present chapter, nowhere in the Latin text does Lonergan mention the noun 
satisfactio or its genitive satisfactionis.  However, article 20 on “Vicarious Suffering” is 
meant to correspond to the category of satisfaction (or atonement) in Aquinas’s five 
ways.  That Christ suffered vicariously is clearly evident in Aquinas’s argument in q. 48, 
a. 2.
61
  Furthermore, in Thesis 15 of DVI, Lonergan clearly establishes the link between 
vicarious suffering and satisfaction.
62
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The same correlation between vicarious suffering and the doctrine of Christ’s 
satisfaction is explicit in Lonergan’s 1958 lecture on redemption.  There, rather than 
titling the category “vicarious suffering,” he uses the category “vicarious satisfaction,” 
since his purpose in the lecture is to explain the various aspects of redemption.
63
  In the 
lecture he notes that “vicarious suffering” is very clear in the New Testament and has 
been interpreted in the Church, particularly through the influence of St. Anselm, as 
“vicarious satisfaction.”64  Lonergan chooses to use the language of “vicarious suffering,” 
rather than “vicarious satisfaction,” because his intent in the chapter is to collect the 
evidence of the New Testament.  In the New Testament, there is indeed found the notion 
of vicarious suffering, but not the notion of vicarious satisfaction per se.  That notion is a 
later development in the Christian tradition. 
The second comment is related to the metaphors of “ransom” or “paying the 
price.”  Lonergan differs slightly with Aquinas in how far one takes these metaphors.  We 
recall that these metaphors are taken from the marketplace.  As Lonergan noted in article 
17, “paying the price” is no doubt a metaphor, but it does signify a real operation, a real 
exchange inasmuch as there is a real connection between our salvation and the death of 
Christ.  Now at least since Anselm, the once widespread opinion that the price was paid 
to the devil has been discarded.  Lonergan and Aquinas are in full agreement here.  The 
devil has no rights deserving such a payment.  However, where Aquinas states that the 
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price was paid to God, and not to the devil,
65
 Lonergan explicitly states that to ask the 
question of to whom the price was paid is pushing the metaphor too far.   
 Finally, and perhaps most significant given Lonergan’s purpose to explain the 
historical causality of Christ, is a development Lonergan makes related to the fifth of 
Aquinas’s five ways.  For Aquinas, the fifth category in ST, III, q. 48, is “efficient 
causality.”  In that question (q. 48, a. 6), Aquinas considers whether or not Christ’s 
passion brought about our salvation by means of efficient causality.  Aquinas answers in 
the affirmative, and his answer depends on a twofold distinction in efficient causality 
(agency), namely the principal cause and the instrumental cause.  Since Christ’s humanity 
is an instrument of the Godhead, then all of Christ’s actions and sufferings operate 
instrumentally.  So Aquinas concludes that Christ accomplishes our salvation through 
efficient causality.  The point here is that Aquinas’s focus is on Christ’s earthly actions 
and in particular Christ’s passion and death. 
 Now in the Supplement, as well as in DVI, Lonergan’s discussion of the New 
Testament witness correlating to Aquinas’s category of efficient causality focuses on the 
power of the resurrection, which is not an emphasis in Aquinas’s discussion of efficient 
causality.  And perhaps we should not expect this of Aquinas, for q. 48 does not ask how 
Christ’s resurrection saves us, but rather how Christ’s passion saves us.  In q. 53, a. 1, 
Aquinas explicitly takes up the question of whether it was necessary for Christ to rise 
again.  Aquinas answers in the affirmative and in his response he clearly correlates 
Christ’s resurrection to the completion of our salvation. 
In the Supplement, Lonergan does not explicitly use any Latin term that could be 
translated as “efficient causality” in his article on the power of the resurrection.  Nor did 
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he use this terminology in DVI, yet in DVI he states that Aquinas’s category of efficient 
causality corresponds to his (Lonergan’s) section on the power of the risen Lord and the 
intercession of the eternal Priest.
66
  If in DVI Lonergan makes this explicit correlation 
between Aquinas’s mode of efficient causality and Lonergan’s own discussion of the 
power of the resurrection, it is almost certain he has the same intent in the Supplement.  
Lonergan’s understanding of Christ’s efficient causality as mediator of redemption 
intends to establish the fact that our redemption does not come about by the fact of 
Christ’s death alone, but comes about through Christ’s death and resurrection. 
 Furthermore, in that same article, Lonergan correlates Christ’s resurrection to the 
teaching in Hebrews that Christ has become for us not only our Priest in his death on the 
cross, but an eternal High Priest (Heb 6:20; 7:28), and has been allotted a far higher 
ministry (Heb 8:6) sitting at the right hand of God.
67
  The emphasis of the article is that 
Christ was, is, and remains forever the mediator of salvation not only because of his 
death, but because of his resurrection.  In that same article, Lonergan also describes the 
resurrection as a condition for Christ’s sending of the Spirit.68 
We may ask the following:  what basic point is Lonergan trying to make in 
discerning from the New Testament the certitude that our redemption is not brought 
about by Christ’s death alone, but by his death and resurrection?   
In my interpretation, given Lonergan’s stated purpose to explain the historical 
causality of Christ, I believe the answer to this question is found in the last paragraph of 
the chapter.  Here Lonergan refers to the passage in Hebrews 5:9 which states that Christ 
became the source of salvation for all who obey him.  Lonergan notes that this passage 
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seems to indicate a “causality” (causalitatis) between Christ and those who “obey” 
(obtemperantibus) him.
69
  Lonergan is indicating a causality between Christ and those 
who obey him because, as he indicated in article 19 (Meritorious Obedience), to 
command is to move another through reason and will, and to obey is to be moved by 
another through reason and will.  Now these two linked concepts of commanding and 
obeying are central to Lonergan’s understanding of agency, and in particular to Christ’s 
agency.  In chapter 6, article 39, where Lonergan will discuss “Christ as Agent,” 
Lonergan will state Christ acts both as God and as man, and so Christ’s agency involves 
two principles of operation, divine and human.  Lonergan states:  
The ordering of these operations is had through divine command and human obedience.  
To command is to move another through reason and will; to obey is to be moved in 
accordance with the reason and will of another [ref. to ST, II-II, q. 104, a.1.c.].
70
 
 
This reference to Aquinas in the above quotation is also found in article 19 of the 
present chapter.  Lonergan understands agency, in this case the causality of agents acting 
through intellect, in terms of command and obedience.  This applies to Christ as man, as 
well as to human agents who cooperate with Christ.  What Lonergan is doing in this 
chapter, particularly in article 21 on the “Power of the Resurrection” is laying the 
groundwork for understanding the historical causality of Christ not just through the 
means of Christ’s passion and death, but also through Christ’s ongoing role as Mediator 
of salvation through the course of history, and this emphasis on Mediator rather than 
means must take into account the resurrection of Christ.  The contrast between means and 
mediator is Lonergan’s own distinction made in article 21 on the “Power of the 
                                                 
69
 Lonergan, DBM, 144-145 [Supplement, 59-60]. 
70
 “Quae duarum operationum ordinatio per divinum mandatum et obedientiam humanam habetur.  
Praecipere enim est per rationem et voluntatem alium movere;  obedire autem est secundum rationem et 
voluntatem alterius moveri.”  DBM, *249 [Supplement, 105, emphasis mine]. 
 135 
Resurrection.”  Recall in the first paragraph of the article, which we quoted earlier, 
Lonergan states that our redemption is brought about by a mediator more than by a means 
and is established upon the death and resurrection of Christ rather than upon the fact of 
his death alone.
71
   
Hence it follows that “if Christ has not risen, your faith is pointless, and you are still in 
your sins” (1 Cor 15:17).  Of course, this is not to be understood in the sense that the 
death of Christ was insufficient to take away sin; the purpose of these statements is to 
bring to mind not only the means but also the Mediator of our salvation.
72
 
 
It is clear Lonergan is making an intelligible connection between the power of the 
resurrection and Christ as mediator.  Through the power of the resurrection, Christ 
becomes an ongoing mediator of redemption in history.  It is no coincidence that in 
chapter 6, where Lonergan will explicitly develop an understanding of the historical 
causality of Christ, he will not limit Christ’s historical causality to the actions of Christ 
the man during his life on earth.  Christ’s historical causality continues as he sits at the 
right hand of the Father.  Lonergan will consider this specific aspect of Christ’s historical 
causality in article 43 titled “The Mediator in Heaven.”  In my interpretation we have 
here a development of the mode of salvation that Aquinas had termed “efficient 
causality” that takes into account the New Testament teaching that Christ has wrought 
our salvation not only by means of giving his life, but also as ongoing mediator of 
redemption in history because of the influence he continues to exert as our eternal high 
Priest, a life-giving Spirit, seated at the right hand of the Father. 
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4.4 The Function of the Chapter in the Wider Context of the Supplement 
 
 
4.4.1 Lonergan’s Purpose:  Collecting the Teachings on Redemption 
 
 
 As Frederick Crowe has noted, according to Lonergan’s own introductory 
statement the purpose of the chapter is to do little more than collect the relevant passages 
of scripture which function as authoritative teachings on redemption.
73
  As Crowe also 
notes, Lonergan may have already collected these passages in his class lectures of the 
Christology courses he taught at the Gregorian.
74
  As to why Lonergan collects the 
relevant New Testament teachings at this point in the Supplement, the reason is based on 
his method.  We will examine this in the next sub-section. 
 Also, Lonergan’s introductory statement that no doctrine in the New Testament 
has received a clearer or fuller treatment than the “dogma” of the Redemption is not an 
isolated statement found only in the Supplement.  He maintained this position in his later 
years.  In the 1973 Christology lectures in Toronto, he emphasized the same fact: that the 
New Testament witness is much more concerned with the work of Christ than the 
ontological constitution of Christ.
75
  The early Church assumed Christ was truly the Son 
of God.  Its emphasis was to proclaim the good news of Christ’s saving deeds, not to 
explain how a divine person could assume a human nature. 
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4.4.2 Lonergan’s Method:  Doctrines Precede Systematics 
 
 
 If Lonergan’s purpose in the chapter is to do little more than collect the 
authoritative teachings of the New Testament on redemption, we might ask the following:  
why is Lonergan’s chapter restricted to this purpose?  The answer to this question is 
found in Lonergan’s theological methodology. 
 In Lonergan’s theological methodology, he distinguishes between dogmatic 
(doctrinal) theology and systematic theology.
76
  The basis for this distinction is his 
judgment (which he inherited from Aristotle) that ultimately human inquiry and wonder 
comes down to two fundamental questions:  what is it?  (quid sit) and is it so?  (an sit).  
In human cognitional processes, the former precedes the latter.  We experience, then we 
attempt to understand, then we attempt to judge whether our understanding is true.  In 
theological method, specifically with respect to the relationship between doctrines and 
systematics, the reverse is true.  The natural light of human reason, on its own, cannot 
reach certitude about the mysteries of faith.  We must depend on revelation of scripture 
and the teaching authority of the Church.  Then, presuming an acceptance of these 
teachings (doctrines) through faith, we then attempt understanding (systematics).  Here 
the an sit precedes the quid sit.  Lonergan appeals to this method explicitly in article 17: 
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A further question may be asked, however, as to why God required a price for our 
salvation.  Even though there certainly must be a fully sufficient reason for this, one that 
is most just, it is also quite certain that we can only understand it imperfectly and by 
analogy.  Therefore, although such an understanding might be more fruitful than any 
other theological understanding, it would be more prudent to determine first just what is 
to be understood, so that subsequently one might try to attain some understanding of it.
77
 
 
 The relationship of Thesis 15 to Theses 16-17 of DVI reveals the same 
methodology.  Thesis 15 is only interested in establishing the certitude, the various facts 
associated with the mystery of redemption as revealed in the New Testament.  Lonergan 
explicitly states in Thesis 15 that there is no intent on theological speculation.  He makes 
this statement with respect to the New Testament’s notion of Christ’s vicarious suffering: 
For the present, however, the point is not to understand vicarious suffering but to arrive at 
certitude as to the fact of vicarious suffering drawn from the scriptural text.  For this 
reason, theological speculation is kept out of this thesis [Thesis 15]...
78
 
 
 Although this statement specifically refers to the category of vicarious suffering, the 
distinction between establishing facts (truths) and subsequent speculation applies to the 
whole of Thesis 15.  In brief, then, Lonergan’s purpose in chapter 3 of the Supplement is 
to establish theological certitude, from the New Testament witness, of the doctrine of 
redemption, just as in DVI his purpose in Thesis 15 was to establish the truths (facts) of 
the New Testament’s teaching on redemption before proceeding to speculate on the 
meaning of those truths in Theses 16 and 17. 
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4.5 Summary 
 
 
 Lonergan’s chapter on the death and resurrection of Christ has one major purpose: 
to collect the New Testament teachings on Christ’s death and resurrection as means of 
our redemption.  His purpose, methodologically, is to establish doctrines before 
proceeding to systematics.  His methodology also reflects his inheritance of the tradition 
of Aquinas, who was content to understand the efficacy of Christ’s passion according to 
five different ways or modes in q. 48 of the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae.  In 
addition to the Supplement, q. 48 provides the framework in which Lonergan categorized 
the means of redemption in two other works:  the 1958 lecture on redemption, and Thesis 
15 of DVI. 
 Perhaps the most significant development in Lonergan’s thought, compared to 
Aquinas’s five ways, is Lonergan’s emphasis on the power of Christ’s resurrection.  This 
is not to suggest that the power of the resurrection was ignored by Aquinas.  It was not, 
but it was treated in a separate question of the Summa Theologiae.  The New Testament 
teaches that Christ is the ongoing Mediator of redemption in history because, through the 
power of the resurrection, he has become a life-giving Spirit and an eternal high Priest, 
living forever to intercede on our behalf.  Lonergan has integrated this teaching to expand 
our notion of “efficient causality” beyond Christ’s earthly actions and sufferings.  When 
we come to chapter 6 of the Supplement which deals with the historical causality of 
Christ, Lonergan includes an article titled “The Mediator in Heaven.”  The present 
chapter, by establishing the certitude that our redemption is established upon the death 
and resurrection of Christ rather than upon his death alone, establishes a doctrinal 
foundation for this later systematic development in chapter 6 of the Supplement.   
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CHAPTER 5: THE CROSS OF CHRIST 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Our purpose here is to interpret the fourth chapter of the Supplement titled “The 
Cross of Christ.”1  The fourth chapter includes articles 22-25 of the Supplement:  (22) 
The Idea of the Cross, (23) The Law of the Cross, (24) The Mystery of the Cross, and 
(25) The Justice of the Cross. 
The fourth chapter begins with a brief introduction: 
The doctrines of the Christian faith are usually contained explicitly in the New Testament 
as to their factual basis, while a fuller understanding of these facts is to be found 
explicitly only in the writings of the Church Fathers and the theologians.  But the dogma 
of our redemption is not only very fully expounded in the inspired word of God, but is 
also further elucidated by a law so that there can be no doubt as to how it is to be 
understood.  For the cross of Christ is not only a fact, but also a precept and an example 
for us to follow: we are to be conformed to and associated with Christ crucified.  In the 
whole economy of salvation there is no higher principle than the transformation of evil 
into good.  For this reason we have judged it best to treat of the meaning, the law, the 
mystery, and the justice of the cross before going on to other theological questions.
2
 
 
 
5.2 A Brief Description of Articles 22 - 25 
 
 
5.2.1 Article 22:  The Meaning of the Cross
3
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins by identifying the fundamental meaning (ratio) of the cross:  
 
The fundamental meaning of the cross is the transformation of evil into good: “Do not let 
evil defeat you; instead overcome evil with good” (Rom 12:21).  Thus there are three 
                                                 
1
 “Caput Quartum.  DE CRUCE CHRISTI,” DBM, 146-179 [Supplement, 60-74]. 
2
 “Alias christianae fidei doctrinas saepius contingit quoad ipsum factum in novo testamento explicite 
contineri sed quoad pleniorem facti intelligentiam nisi a Patribus et theologis non explicite proponi.  Sed 
nostrae redemptionis dogma, sicut abundantius in verbo Dei inspirato exponitur, ita etiam ea lege declaratur 
ut, quemadmodum sit intelligendum, haud dubitari possit.  Crux enim Christi non solum factum quoddam 
est sed etiam praeceptum atque exemplum; Christo crucifixo conformari eique consociari debemus; neque 
aliud principium in tota nostrae salutis oeconomia altius iacet quam malorum in bonum transformatio.  
Quam ob causam, prius de ratione, lege, mysterio, iustitia crucis agendum esse duximus, quam alias et 
theologicas quaestiones adgrederemur.”  DBM, 146 [Supplement, 60]. 
3
 “Articulus XXII.  De ratione crucis,” DBM, 147-150 [Supplement, 60-62].   
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elements here: (1) evil to be overcome, (2) a victory of the will, and (3) good that 
emerges from evil through this victory.
4
 
 
 The article is organized around these three elements. 
 Evil to be Overcome:  Lonergan makes the distinction between the evil of sin 
(malum culpae) and the consequent evil of punishment (malum poenae).  The 
consequences of sin incline individuals and society to further sin.  Both types of evil are 
to be overcome according to the meaning of the cross through a victory of the will.
5
 
 Victory of the Will:  Things are cured by their contraries.
6
  Since the evil to be 
overcome includes both the evil of sin and the consequent evil of punishment, there are 
two senses in which Lonergan conceives the victory of the will.  The evil of sin arises 
through a defect in rational consciousness and aversion to God, so the victory of the will 
is a conversion to God and restoration of rational consciousness.
7
  The consequences of 
sin result in evils within the human good of order, both interior (the cultural good of 
order) and exterior (the external good of order), so the victory of the will is a painful 
absorption of the evil consequences of sin for the sake of a more difficult good.
8
  A 
victory of the will in the transformation of evil into good is not a triumph of justice in the 
sense of legal, retributive justice.  It is a triumph grounded in a superabundant generosity 
of the humble of heart.
9
 
 Good that Emerges from this Victory:  The good is twofold.  The first is the 
perfection of the one who wins the victory of the will.  The second is the improved 
                                                 
4
 “Ratio crucis est mali in bonum transformatio, secundum illud, ‘Noli vinci a malo, sed vince in bono 
malum’ (Rom 12, 21).  Dicit ergo (1) malum vincendum, (2) victoriam voluntariam, et (3) bonum e malo 
per victoriam ortum.”  DBM, 147 [Supplement, 60].   
5
 Lonergan, DBM, 149 [Supplement, 61]. 
6
 Lonergan, DBM, 149 [Supplement, 61]. 
7
 Lonergan, DBM, 149 [Supplement, 61].   
8
 Lonergan, DBM, 149 [Supplement, 61]. 
9
 Lonergan, DBM, 150 [Supplement, 61-62]. 
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human situation.  Lonergan ends the article noting that the transformation bringing good 
out of evil is grounded in divine providence:  divine providence brings it about that for 
those who love God all things work unto good (Rom 8:28).
10
 
 
5.2.2 Article 23:  The Law of the Cross
11
 
 
 
 The law of the cross is an understanding of how the meaning of the cross 
functions concretely in the total context of the Christian life: 
The law of the cross is the notion of the cross as it pertains to the new covenant.  This it 
does by way of precept, by way of example, conformation, and association, and by way 
of the economy of salvation.
12
 
 
Lonergan organizes the article by discussing the law of the cross as (1) precept, 
(2) precept and example, (3) conformation to and association with Christ, and (4) the 
basic law governing the economy of salvation. 
As precept, the law of the cross is proclaimed in many different ways.  He gives 
three examples:  Matthew 5:38-48, Matthew 8:34-35, and John 12:24-25.
13
 Matthew 
5:38-48 is the first scripture passage quoted in the article, and the longest in the 
Supplement.  This passage is from the Sermon on the Mount, where Christ instructs his 
disciples to not resist evil, to turn the other cheek, to give to anyone who asks, to love 
their enemies and to do good to those who hate them, so that they will be true children of 
their heavenly Father who makes his sun shine on the good and bad alike and his rain to 
fall on both the virtuous and the wicked. 
As precept and example, Christ’s teaching found in Mark 10:42-45 and Matthew 
                                                 
10
 Lonergan, DBM, 150 [Supplement, 62]. 
11
 “Articulus XXIII.  De lege crucis,”  DBM, 151-157 [Supplement, 62-65]. 
12
 “Lex crucis est ratio crucis prout ad novum testamentum pertinet.  Pertinet autem per modum praecepti, 
per modum exempli, conformationis, et consociationis, et per modum oeconomiae.”  DBM, 151 
[Supplement, 62].   
13
 Lonergan, DBM, 151-152 [Supplement, 62]. 
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20:25-28 instructs the disciples that any among them who wants to be great must be a 
servant to all: 
“Jesus called [the Twelve] to him and said to them, ‘You know that among the Gentiles 
their so-called rulers lord it over them, and their great men make their authority felt.  This 
is not to happen among you.  No; anyone who wants to be great among you must be your 
servant, and anyone who wants to be first among you must be slave to all.  For the Son of 
Man himself did not come to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for 
many.’”14 
 
As conformation to and association with Christ, we are called to imitate Christ 
and thus to share in Christ’s sufferings.  Lonergan appeals to a number of New Testament 
passages (Jn 10:17-18; Rom 8:17; Phil 3:10-11; 1 Pet 4:13; Jn 17:14; Col 1:24; Rom 
8:29).  He notes that the New Testament passages that teach love for Christ crucified, 
imitation of Christ, conformation to Christ, and association with Christ are almost too 
numerous to mention.
15
  
As the basic law governing the economy of salvation, Christ and the law of the 
cross were neither the type of savior nor the means of salvation expected by the disciples.  
The wisdom of this world desired salvation through a destruction of the present order and 
expected a kingdom of justice in which there would be no injustices to be patiently borne 
by good people.  But the wisdom of God discerned in Christ crucified, which seems folly 
to human wisdom, reveals a God who has chosen the law of the cross as the basic law 
governing the economy of salvation.  The revelation of this divine wisdom cannot be 
grasped by the unspiritual person, but only by the spiritual person who has received the 
                                                 
14
 “ ‘Iesus autem vocans eos ait illis:  Scitis quia hi qui videntur principiari gentibus, dominantur eis, et 
principes eorum potestatem habent ipsorum.  Non ita est autem in vobis, sed quicumque voluerit fieri 
maior, erit omnium minister;  et quicumque voluerit in vobis primus esse, erit omnium servus.  Nam et 
Filius hominis non venit ut ministraretur ei, sed ut ministraret et daret animam suam redemptionem pro 
multis.’  ” DBM, 152 [Supplement, 62].  Lonergan includes a footnote referencing Mk 10:42-45; Mt 20:25-
28; cf. 1 Pet 5, 3.  Lonergan calls to mind two other teachings in 1 Peter 2:19-24 and Philippians 2:3, 7-8.  
Lonergan, DBM, 152-153 [Supplement, 63]. 
15
 Lonergan, DBM, 151 [Supplement, 63].  Lonergan does however list a number of passages:  Rom 8:35 
ff., 12:2, 13:13 f.; 1 Cor 15:49; 2 Cor 4:7-14, 5:14 f.; Gal 2:19 f., 3:26-28, 4:19; Eph 4:22-24; Phil 3:20 f.; 
Col 3:9-11. 
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mind of Christ through the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit.
16
 
 Lonergan then states that the pervasiveness of the law of the cross in the whole 
economy of salvation is clear from the three elements within the meaning of the cross 
itself.  First, the law of the cross presupposes evil to be overcome, the evils all-pervasive 
in the human race.  Second, evil is overcome by a victory of the will.  The victory 
belongs first to Christ, but we imitate Christ’s victory sacramentally, morally, and 
physically.  We imitate Christ’s victory sacramentally through our baptism.  We imitate 
Christ’s victory morally inasmuch as we become obedient to Christ, rather than slaves to 
sin.  We imitate Christ’s victory physically when Christ will transfigure our bodies into 
copies of his own glorious body (Phil 3:20-21).
17
  Third, there is the good that emerges 
from the victory of the will.  Here Lonergan contrasts the true good that results from the 
law of the cross against evils that the wisdom of the world misconstrues as good.
18
 
Lonergan speaks of the true good using the metaphor of the fruits of the good tree.  The 
first fruit is seen in the risen Lord himself, who is now eternal High Priest, and secondly 
in his followers who conform themselves to the image of the Son.
19
  This conformation is 
possible through the free gift of the Father’s love, the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit 
which makes us adopted children of God.
20
 
  
 
 
                                                 
16
 Lonergan, DBM, 154 [Supplement, 63]. 
17
 Lonergan, DBM, 155 [Supplement, 64]. 
18
 Lonergan gives the example of Nietzsche, who according to Lonergan ridiculed the idea of divine 
wisdom being manifested in the cross on the grounds that the cross expresses a servile mentality more 
deserving to be called cowardice than virtue.  Lonergan also uses the example of Marx to describe a 
widespread attitude which rejects the law of the cross and advocates class struggle and violent revolution.  
See Lonergan, DBM, 156 [Supplement, 64-65]. 
19
 Lonergan, DBM, 157 [Supplement, 65]. 
20
 Lonergan, DBM, 157 [Supplement, 65]. 
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5.2.3 Article 24:  The Mystery of the Cross
21
 
 
 
 Lonergan states that the fact that the human race is redeemed from sin by way of 
the cross is hardly a mystery in itself, but that it is a great mystery that the Son of God 
himself shared so completely in our humanity (Heb 2:14) that he himself through the 
cross brought us out of sin to live the life of God.  This mystery is that all things be 
brought together in Christ (Eph 1:9-10), the mystery Paul says has been kept secret for 
endless ages but now so clear it must be proclaimed to all nations according to the decree 
of the eternal God (Rom 16:25-26).
22
  God’s hidden plan, kept secret for ages, is revealed 
to us through God’s Spirit (1 Cor 2:10-16).23 In brief then, the New Testament’s 
conception of “mystery” is the first way Lonergan considers the mystery of the cross, and 
according to the exegetes Lonergan cites, this mystery is to be understood as the hidden 
plan of God’s will.24 
 Lonergan then transitions to a more specific consideration of the mystery of the 
cross.  He states that the work of our redemption involves mysteries in the strict sense of 
the word:  the mercy of the Father, the incarnation of the Son, the sanctifying work of the 
Spirit, and our absolutely supernatural end.
25
  There is also general agreement that in the 
work of our redemption God is made known to us in a way that we could never know by 
natural knowledge.  By the natural light of human reason we can come to judge that God 
                                                 
21
 “Articulus XXIV.  De mysterio crucis,”  DBM, 158-167 [Supplement, 65-69]. 
22
 Lonergan, DBM, 158 [Supplement, 65]. 
23
 Lonergan, DBM, 158-159 [Supplement, 66]. 
24
 Lonergan cites Deden, Vogt, and Prümm, but gives no textual references.  However, based on reference 
to the same three authors in De Verbo Incarnato, where he establishes the same general conclusion that in 
the New Testament “mystery” in its primary sense refers to the hidden plan of God, we may judge that 
Lonergan is using the following texts:  D. Deden, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis 13 (1936): 414; E. 
Vogt, Biblica 37 (1956): 247-257; K. Prümm, Biblica 37 (1956): 135-161 and “Mystère,” Dictionnaire de 
la Bible, Supplément, 6: 151-225.  See Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 583. 
25
 Lonergan, DBM, 160 [Supplement, 66]. 
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is wise, free, loving, merciful, and just, but these judgments are made by way of analogy 
from creatures.  However, the Son’s incarnation, death, and resurrection provide “another 
and much loftier analogy” (aliam longeque altiorem analogiam) to understand God as he 
is in himself, and both the authors of the New Testament and the whole Catholic tradition 
have marveled at this new revelation of divine mercy and love.
26
 
 Lonergan then considers three additional ways in which we can consider the 
meaning of the word mystery.  First, in the sense that we speak of the mysteries of 
Christ’s life or the mysteries of the Rosary.  In this way the material body of the Lord in 
its suffering, dying, and rising gives expression to his human mind and heart, translating 
for us his divinity into human terms.
27
  Second, there is the mystery of iniquity.  Here 
Lonergan repeats material from his chapter on divine justice.  Sin is irrational, the absurd, 
the non-intelligible.  There is nothing about sin to be understood other than to understand 
that there is nothing to be understood.
28
  Third, there is the mystery of death.  Scripture 
reveals that death has the element of penalty of sin (Gen 2:15, 3:19; Wis 2:24; Rom 5:12; 
Rom 6:22-23).  All of these passages speak of the justice of God in which retribution and 
punishment are consequences of sin.
29
  However, Christ has transformed death into a 
means of salvation through the divine wisdom of the cross which deemed it better not to 
wipe out past evil and create a brand-new good, as Jewish eschatological expectations 
would have it, but rather that through Christ evil should be transformed into good.
30
 
 Lonergan ends the article listing five aspects of the mystery of the cross:  (1) 
                                                 
26
 Lonergan, DBM, 160 [Supplement, 66]. 
27
 Lonergan DBM, 161 [Supplement, 67]. 
28
 Lonergan DBM, 161 [Supplement, 67].  This equates to what in Insight Lonergan calls an “inverse 
insight.”  An inverse insight apprehends that there is no intelligibility to be grasped where one expected to 
find it.  See Lonergan, Insight, 43-50. 
29
 Lonergan, DBM, 163 [Supplement, 68].   
30
 Lonergan, DBM, 162 [Supplement, 67].   
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symbolic, (2) intellectual, (3) volitional, (4) providential, and (5) divine. 
 Symbolically, the sensible depiction of the body of Christ, and the shedding of his 
blood, express outwardly Christ’s interior acts of his mind and heart.31 
 Intellectually, the cross of Christ expresses some intelligible meaning.  For the 
human intellect this poses two limitations.  First, although the meaning of the cross is 
intelligible within the order conceived by divine wisdom, this meaning still presupposes 
the non-intelligibility of sin.  Second, the intelligibility of the cross involves an infinite 
intelligibility which in this life we can only understand imperfectly and analogically.
32
 
 Volitionally, the cross of Christ represents a diversity of wills.  Physically, it was 
one event.  Morally, it represents two volitions.  As willed by Pilate, the priests, and the 
mob, the cross represents a most heinous sin.  As willed by an accepting Christ, the cross 
represents a most excellent deed in which evil is transformed into good.
33
 
 Providentially, the cross of Christ is meant to overcome evil with a victory of the 
will.  Christ’s followers are meant to embrace the law of the cross as precept and 
example.  But there is a difference between Christ and his followers.  Christ atoned not 
for his own sins, but for those of others.  He won resurrection not for himself alone, but 
for the whole human race.  He offered himself as a sacrificial victim on behalf of others.  
He gave his life as a ransom for many.  As such, in accordance with the divine plan and 
because of the dignity of the Son, Christ’s victory stands as the cause, the exemplar, and 
the motive of every other such victory.
34
 
 Divinely, the cross of Christ is a revelation of God.  One who grasps the wisdom 
                                                 
31
 Lonergan, DBM, 164 [Supplement, 68].   
32
 Lonergan, DBM, 164-165 [Supplement, 68].   
33
 Lonergan, DBM, 165 [Supplement, 68].   
34
 Lonergan, DBM 166, [Supplement, 69]. 
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and goodness of God not by analogy from creatures but from the man Christ Jesus and 
his death and resurrection has a far more profound knowledge of God.
35
 
 
5.2.4 Article 25:  The Justice of the Cross
36
 
 
 
 In this article Lonergan reviews the general principles of divine justice developed 
in his second chapter, and then applies these principles to the meaning of the cross. 
 Lonergan recalls five principles:  (1)  God can do anything that does not involve 
an intrinsic contradiction; (2) since God’s wisdom is manifold, it comprehends the entire 
range of divine power and directs absolutely everything that God can do; (3) God’s will 
is just in that it chooses to put into effect any order of reality determined by divine 
wisdom; (4) thus the actual order of things is most fitting because it is ordained by divine 
wisdom and most just because God’s choice follows God’s wisdom; and (5) God’s 
choice of the order of things is most free since with equally infinite wisdom and equally 
infinite goodness God can do whatever absolutely speaking He can do.
37
 
 Before applying these principles to the cross, Lonergan lists five elements 
discerned in the meaning, law, and mystery of the cross: 
These are: (1) God's salvific intention and activity; (2) the meaning and the law of the 
cross according to which this activity unfolds; (3) the intervention of a mediator through 
whom this salvific activity is carried out; (4) this mediator himself as accomplishing his 
work according to the meaning of the cross; (5) the manifestation of divine goodness in 
letting evils happen in such a way that good may be drawn out of them.
38
 
 
                                                 
35
 Lonergan, DBM, 167 [Supplement, 69]. 
36
 “Articulus XXV.  De iustitia crucis,”  DBM, 168-179 [Supplement, 69-74]. 
37
 Lonergan, DBM, 168 [Supplement, 69-70].   
38
 “Quorum prima est ipsa divina intentio salvifica atque activitas;  altera est ratio atque lex crucis 
secundum quam evolvitur haec activitas;  tertia est mediatoris interventio per quem activitas salvifica 
procedit;  quartum est ipsum mediatorem secundum rationem crucis opus suum peragere;  quinta denique 
est ea divinae bonitatis manifestatio quae mala fieri permittit ut de malis efficiat bonum.”  DBM, 170 
[Supplement, 70].   
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 Lonergan then applies the basic principles of divine justice to these five elements.  
First, God’s salvific intention and activity is to restore goods lost and to offer the free gift 
of justification to those who believe.  Lonergan states that this salvific activity is what 
Paul speaks of as the “justice of God” (Dei iustitiam).39   
 Second, God’s salvific activity is done in accordance with the meaning of the 
cross.  With respect to God’s salvific intent, God could (1) destroy the corrupted good 
and create an entirely new good in its place, (2) transform evil into good without human 
cooperation, or (3) transform evil into good with human cooperation.  The third 
alternative embodies the meaning of the cross and is more fitting than the first two.
40
  The 
first alternative does not redeem the corrupted good but simply replaces it.  The second 
alternative is not fitting because evil would be transformed into good without human 
consent to conversion.  Lonergan then includes a lengthy quote from Augustine’s De 
Trinitate
41
 to make the point that the Fathers of the Church understood God’s justice and 
insisted that the devil had to be defeated not by power but by justice.
42
 
 Third, the work of salvation was carried out through a mediator, God’s own Son.  
Again, Lonergan uses the argument of fittingness.  It would not be fitting to inaugurate 
the Kingdom of God all at once through the immediate conversion of all, nor through 
some group of believers who in turn would convert others.  The former has the weakness 
that not all human beings are in existence at the same time as well as the fact that the 
common course of events and the order of the universe would not be maintained if all 
                                                 
39
 Lonergan, DBM, 170 [Supplement, 70].  Lonergan includes reference to Rom 3:21-22, 25-26.  Lonergan 
also includes reference to the exegesis of S. Lyonnet, “De ‘Iustitia Dei’ in Epistola ad Romanos 3, 25-26,” 
Verbum Domini 25 (1947). 
40
 Lonergan, DBM, 170-171[Supplement, 70] 
41
 St. Augustine, De Trinitate XIII, xiii, 17; PL 42:1026 f. 
42
 Lonergan, DBM, 171 [Supplement, 71].   
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people living at one given time were miraculously converted.  The latter has the 
weakness that there is no fitting reason why one group of persons, as opposed to an 
individual, should have the privilege of being the first to have the power and authority to 
convert others.  So Lonergan concludes that it is fitting that the Kingdom of God be 
inaugurated by one person, and the most fitting person would be the one who is most 
likely to be able to bring others into the kingdom.
43
  
 Fourth, the Son as mediator brings us to salvation according to the meaning of the 
cross through a twofold assimilation.
44
  The first assimilation (that of the Son to us) is 
effected through the Incarnation and the love of the Incarnate Word.  The second 
assimilation (that of us to the Son) is a union, almost an identification, which is the effect 
of love.  This is possible because a friend regards his or her friends as a “second self” (ut 
alterum se).  A person desires the same good for her friend as she does for herself.  The 
notion of a “second self” comes from Aristotle’s notion that a friend is one’s “alter ego” 
(alter ipse), and from Augustine’s notion that a friend regards another friend as “half of 
his soul” (dimidium animae suae).45 
Fifth, in the order of reality established by divine wisdom, God’s goodness is 
manifested in that God in no way would permit evil in his works unless He was also 
omnipotent to draw good out of evil.
46
  And in no other way does God draw good out of 
evil than according to the meaning, the law, the mystery, and justice of the cross.  God 
does not ask others to do what He has not done first.
47
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 Lonergan, DBM, 173 [Supplement, 72].   
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 Lonergan, DBM, 174 [Supplement, 72].   
45
 Lonergan, DBM, 175 [Supplement, 73].  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IX, 1166a 31;  Augustine, 
Confessions, IV, 6; PL 32:698. 
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5.3 Lonergan on the Meaning, Law, and Mystery of the Cross 
 
 
 In the previous chapter Lonergan stated that his purpose was simply to collect and 
express the relevant teachings found in scripture regarding the doctrine of redemption.  In 
the present chapter, based on the introductory paragraph alone, we can rightly judge that 
Lonergan’s purpose is now to offer an explanation as to how the doctrine of redemption 
is to be understood.  In other words, he is now shifting to systematic theology.  And in 
the introductory paragraph, he does not hesitate in getting to the heart of the matter.  He 
states upfront that within the whole economy of salvation there is no higher principle than 
the transformation of evil into good.  He equates this principle to the “fundamental idea” 
or “notion” of the cross, and in the first article titled “The Idea of the Cross” he states that 
this notion can be considered in three different ways:  
analytically, by examining the meaning itself; in general, by looking at the meaning of 
the cross in the total context of the Christian life; and specifically, by contemplating the 
wisdom of God in Christ crucified (1 Cor. 1:23-24).
48
 
 
 The analytical consideration corresponds to article 22.  The general consideration 
corresponds to article 23.  The specific consideration corresponds to article 24.  The three 
subsections below interpret each of these three considerations. 
 
5.3.1 An Analytical Consideration:  The Meaning of the Cross 
 
 
When Lonergan “analyzes” the threefold process by which evil is transformed 
into good, he is specifying an intelligibility to be grasped through the terms and relations 
                                                 
48
 “...nam prima est analytica consideratio quae ipsam rationem examinat; altera est generalis consideratio 
quae eamdem rationem in tota vita christiana perspicit atque observat; tertia est specialis consideratio quae 
in Christo crucifixo Dei sapientiam contemplatur (1 Cor 1, 23.24).”  DBM, 147 [Supplement, 60].   
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expressed in the following process:  (1) evil to be overcome, (2) a victory of the will, and 
(3) good that emerges from evil through this victory.
49
   
However, as an analytical consideration per se, Lonergan’s consideration 
abstracts from concrete instances of evil, concrete instances of a victory of the will, and 
concrete instances of the good that emerges from evil through this victory.  In this sense, 
each element of the process could be considered as what in Insight Lonergan terms a 
“heuristic notion.”  A heuristic notion is an anticipation of an unknown content.50  For 
example, an analytic consideration of the first element, as a heuristic notion, does not 
specify any particular evil of sin, any particular consequence of sin.  Again, the second 
element identifies a victory of the will but does not specify what specific form the victory 
of the will might be expressed in a concrete situation.  And again, an analytic 
consideration of the third element abstracts from any concrete specification of the good 
which emerges.  For example, the good could be an improvement in the human situation, 
and this improvement could take any number of concrete forms:  improvements in the 
economy, in technology, in the polity, or changes in the meanings and values of a culture 
which enhance the common good resulting in a more equitable distribution of particular 
goods. 
Now I will consider each element in the process in more detail.  First, regarding 
the evil to be overcome.  I interpret this evil as both the evil of sin (malum culpae) and 
the evil consequences of sin (malum poenae) because Lonergan explicitly includes both 
in the first element.
51
  I emphasize what might seem obvious because readers familiar 
with Thesis 17 of DVI may miss this detail and assume that in the Supplement the evil to 
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 Lonergan, DBM, 147 [Supplement, 60]. 
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 Lonergan, Insight, 417. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, 149 [Supplement, 61].  
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be overcome is solely malum poenae, since in DVI Lonergan is explicit that the evil to be 
overcome is malum poenae, not malum culpae.
52
  
Lonergan includes both malum culpae and malum poenae in the evil to be 
overcome based on the reinforcing influence between the two evils.  Lonergan dedicates 
two paragraphs to explaining this reinforcing influence.  The evil of punishment not only 
results from the evil of sin but strongly inclines one to the evil of sin as well because the 
evil of punishment, considered internally to the sinner, distorts the rational consciousness 
of the individual.  And the external, social consequences of sin incline everyone in that 
social order to further sin because individuals within that social order must live and 
work.
53
  This reinforcing influence creates what Lonergan calls the “kingdom of sin” 
(regnum peccati).
54
  In Insight, he names this kingdom of sin the “social surd,”55 a 
cumulative deterioration of the social situation which he equates to the “longer cycle” of 
decline in human history.
56
 
 The pivot point in the process is a “victory of the will” (victoriam voluntariam), 
and to understand Lonergan we should begin with what a victory of the will is not: 
This victory does not mean that sinners are wiped out so that no traces of guilt or 
punishment remain.  Nor does it involve the suspension of the laws of nature, 
psychological, social, religious, or historical, according to which the private sin of one 
individual can inflict all sorts of evil consequences upon us and incite us to further evil 
acts.  Rather, while sin and its consequences remain, their evil is overcome by good 
through the victory of the will.
57
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Lonergan’s understanding is consistent with the theological principle he 
established in the chapter on divine justice.  Since divine wisdom has conceived both the 
world order itself and the redemption of this order in one intuitive act, then redemption 
will be in harmonious continuation with the order of this universe.  Thus a victory of the 
will does not involve the suspension of laws which govern human living.
58
 
The notion of the victory of the will also explains how evil is overcome.  The evil 
of sin, since it arises through a defect in rational consciousness
59
 and aversion to God, is 
overcome through conversion to God and the restoration of rational consciousness.  The 
evil consequences of sin are overcome by painfully absorbing the evil to bring forth 
good.
60
   
It is also important to note that the victory of the will is not merely the 
transformation of the evil consequences of sin.  The victory of the will, since it also 
involves overcoming malum culpae, can be a victory in which a person refuses to sin in 
the first place despite the temptation to sin.  This of course does not mean that we will 
always succeed.  The Catholic doctrine of original sin grounds the doctrine of human 
                                                                                                                                                 
religiosae, historicae, quibus ex privato et individuali malo culpae per innumera poenae mala premimur 
atque urgemur in mala culpae multiplicanda.  Sed manentibus malo culpae et malo poenae, vincitur malum 
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simply mean physical pain, though that could be a component.  In my interpretation of Lonergan, mental 
anguish in the victory of the will, with or without any physical outward expression, would qualify as 
painful absorption of evil. 
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powerlessness.  Ultimately we cannot avoid sinning.  But victories of the will can reduce 
the occurrence of sin by overcoming the temptation to sin in a given situation.  In brief, 
then, to correctly interpret Lonergan, a victory of the will in overcoming evil is (1) 
avoiding sin in the first place and doing the good, and (2) lovingly absorbing the evil 
consequences of sin and returning good in the process.
61
 
Furthermore, the victory of the will is not retributive justice: 
This victory of the will, therefore, does not directly bear upon justice itself but upon the 
possibility of justice among sinners.  Human justice renders “to each his own” and “in 
equal measure.”  ...After the sin has been committed, just tribunals or a just war seek to 
redress the situation and restore it to the state in which it was before the seizure...The 
triumph of justice is one thing, however, and the meaning of the cross is quite another.  
Those who win the victory of the cross are not judges or military leaders but the gentle 
and humble of heart.  The cross triumphs over the law of rapine, “another's for me,” by 
its law, “mine for the other.”62 
 
 The first sentence is somewhat enigmatic:  “This victory of the will, therefore, 
does not directly bear upon justice itself but upon the possibility of justice among 
sinners.”  The sentence, interpreted in the context of the paragraph, means that the victory 
of the will is not related to the type of justice we equate with retributive justice.  What 
Lonergan means by “the possibility of justice among sinners” is not simply the possibility 
of righting wrongs by restoring things to the way they were before.  What he means is 
that the kingdom of sin is a potential good that can be actualized, but only according to 
the method of the cross rather than retributive justice.  As an example of the latter he 
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refers to just tribunals or just war.  In my interpretation Lonergan is not refuting the 
validity of just tribunals or just war.  His point is to contrast the results of retributive 
justice against the results of a victory of the will that transforms the potential good into 
actual good.  Retributive justice does not transform situations.  Retributive justice 
intends, to the degree possible, equality, meaning a restoration of the situation to the state 
it was before.  The meaning of the cross, on the other hand, is meant to transform the 
situation itself.  I believe this is the cardinal point Lonergan is making.  He made the 
same point in De ratione convenientiae:  
When the objective situation is intelligible, the rule of right reason suffices to perpetuate 
this intelligibility.  But when the objective situation has already been corrupted through 
accumulated wrongs and deep-rooted errors, right reason calling for justice hardly 
suffices to eradicate the irrational element.  For justice is directed towards equality, and 
unless transformed by charity it will not wipe out enmity and hatred.  When individuals 
suffering under wretched conditions, or oppressed classes of society, or subjugated 
nations have to be raised up again, I know of no other remedy than that charity that does 
not insist on its rights, that voluntarily does good when that is feasible, and that is ready 
to love its enemies and to lay down its life for those whom it loves.
63
 
 
 In and of itself, juridical or retributive justice is not evil.  Lonergan’s point in De 
ratione convenientiae and here in the Supplement is that this type of justice is inadequate 
as an ultimate remedy to the problem of evil.  What is needed is the method of the cross, 
and the pivot point in this method, the victory of the will, is motivated by charity.  The 
victory of the will is a cure because it is contrarian to the actual problem.
64
 
Lonergan’s reference in the Supplement to the “humble of heart” who win the 
victory of the cross raises an interpretive question of what constitutes an appropriate 
Christian response to social injustice.  I do not interpret Lonergan’s understanding of 
victoriam voluntariam as merely passive submission to evil.  The proliferation of evil 
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means that we are going to suffer, and suffering is not easily tolerated.  The victory of the 
will refers to voluntary action that refuses to shrink from this suffering.  I do not interpret 
Lonergan as suggesting we remain passive victims of abuse amidst the evils of unjust 
social structures.  In my interpretation it is inconceivable that Lonergan would not agree 
that self-sacrificing love may need to take the form of nonviolent resistance.
65
 
 Finally, regarding the good drawn out of evil.  This good is twofold:  a 
contribution to the perfection of the individual and an improvement in the “human 
situation” (situationem humanam).66  The “human situation” should be interpreted as the 
human good of order, both external and cultural, given that in the first chapter Lonergan 
provides us an understanding of the human situation in terms of the human good of 
order.
67
  The human good of order, external and cultural, is Lonergan’s category for 
expressing the earthly realities that are to be brought together under Christ. 
 
5.3.2 A General Consideration:  The Law of the Cross 
 
 
 When Lonergan states that the meaning of the cross pertains to the new covenant 
by way of precept, by way of example, by conformation to and association with Christ, 
and by way of the economy of salvation, he is essentially considering the meaning of the 
cross in the total context of the Christian life.  Thus Lonergan’s general consideration of 
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the meaning of the cross takes the form of a “law” because of the complete generality the 
meaning of the cross has in the economy of salvation.
68
   
 We can also understand why the idea of the cross is also a “law” through the 
insights Lonergan provides in DVI: 
‘Law’ can be understood as a link that cannot be otherwise, as it is in logic and 
metaphysics.  Again, ‘law’ can be understood as a link which can be otherwise, but which 
in itself is positively intelligible or fitting and is, as a matter of fact, always verified in 
every particular instance.  The natural laws investigated by the empirical sciences are 
laws of this second kind.  Thirdly, ‘law’ can pertain to the spiritual order in a way that is 
neither absolutely necessary nor verified in every particular instance.  And this third 
sense has three subdivisions.  (1) Law in the spiritual order can be just a precept and 
nothing more.  There is nothing fitting about it; what it expresses is the will and the 
exercise of power, rather than wisdom and right reason.  (2) Law in the spiritual order can 
be a precept that is altogether good and appropriate, yet remains ineffective since it is not 
observed.  Finally (3) law in the spiritual order can be a precept that is good and effective 
and universal even though it does not exclude the possibility of sin.  And such is the Law 
of the Cross.
69
 
 
 In the Supplement, Lonergan does not provide a contrast between natural laws 
(here meaning laws investigated by the empirical sciences) and laws in the spiritual order 
to explain why the law of the cross is a “law.”  But his explanation in DVI is applicable to 
what he means in the Supplement.  The law of the cross is a spiritual, universal law.  The 
universal dimension is grounded on the universal nature of the human spirit.  The human 
spirit is not moved toward its goals by the blind forces of nature, but by laws in the 
spiritual order, or what in DVI Lonergan identifies as “laws that lead free spirit toward its 
goal.”70  And according to the theological principle Lonergan established in his chapter 
on divine justice, in order for redemption to be in harmonious continuation with the 
actual order of the universe divine wisdom has conceived, redemption will be in 
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harmonious continuation not only with the laws we associate with the empirical sciences, 
but also the laws we associate with the human sciences, laws which govern the human 
spirit.  So the law of the cross does not abrogate the psychological, social, religious, or 
historical laws which govern the human spirit.  Otherwise, if these laws were violated, 
then the law of the cross would seem to be a divine afterthought of a voluntaristically 
conceived divine will.  But for Lonergan there are no divine afterthoughts. 
 This complete generality of the meaning of the cross is also evident if we consider 
what the meaning of the cross presupposes.  Recall that in his analytical consideration of 
the meaning of the cross, Lonergan discusses the “kingdom of sin.”  The kingdom of sin 
itself has a complete generality:  it has spread through the whole human race.
71
  The 
problem is all-pervasive.  So the law of the cross is an all-pervasive solution to an all-
pervasive problem. 
 We should also note that in Lonergan’s general consideration of the meaning of 
the cross he returns to a consideration of the good that emerges from a victory of the will.  
He does so through the analogy of the fruits of the good tree.  The fruits of the good tree 
are first to be seen in the risen Lord.
72
  The fruits of the good tree are seen secondly in 
those who become true images of God’s Son, through adoption as children of God made 
possible by the free gift of the Father’s love, the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit.73  
Lonergan does not specifically use the term “Body of Christ” to name this relationship 
between Christ and the adopted children of God, but I interpret his meaning as such.  This 
interpretation is supported by statements in the final article of the chapter on the justice of 
the cross.  There Lonergan states that through Christ’s vicarious suffering, sacrifice, and 
                                                 
71
 Lonergan, DBM, 154 [Supplement, 63-64]. 
72
 Lonergan, DBM, 157 [Supplement, 65]. 
73
 Lonergan, DBM, 157 [Supplement, 65]. 
 160 
giving of his life, the Church, according to ancient symbolism, was born from the side of 
Christ.  And there Lonergan correlates the Church to the union of Head and members.
74
  
Thus in my interpretation this good resulting from a victory of the will is not just a 
natural improvement of the human situation, but the creation of a new community, a 
supernatural human good of order that is the whole Christ, Head and members.
75
   
 Next I will consider Lonergan’s criteria for judging that the meaning of the cross 
is also a law governing the entire economy of salvation.  The criteria are overwhelmingly 
based on the witness of the New Testament.
76
  Lonergan includes approximately sixty-
eight references to passages from the New Testament.  The first passage quoted captures 
perhaps for Lonergan the essence of the New Testament witness:  Matthew 5:38-48 from 
Christ’s Sermon on the Mount.77  His method of arriving at this judgment is the method 
that in Divinarum personarum
78
 Lonergan calls “systematic exegesis,” which is an 
abstraction from all of the relevant passages in scripture to find the systematic 
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understanding common to all of the passages.
79
  The systematic understanding common 
to all of the passages is the meaning of the cross.  Again, this helps to understand why 
Lonergan would consider the meaning of the cross as a “law.”  The meaning of the cross, 
as law, is for Lonergan an inescapable practical conclusion from the New Testament.   
 Given Lonergan’s overwhelming reliance on scripture and my interpretation that 
he considers the law of the cross as an inescapable practical conclusion from the New 
Testament, I interpret that for Lonergan the law of the cross becomes a doctrine.  This 
does not mean that the law of the cross is only a doctrine.  In the present chapter, there is 
no doubt that the law of the cross is the systematic intelligibility associated with the 
meaning of the cross considered in its complete generality to the entire economy of 
salvation.  But the law of the cross, even though it is a systematic theological 
achievement, also takes on a doctrinal status.  To help explain this I will rely on the work 
of Robert Doran. 
 In What is Systematic Theology, Doran discusses the meaning of theological 
doctrines that systematics attempts to understand, based on his interpretation of 
Lonergan’s methodology.  In Lonergan’s methodology, “doctrines” are not limited to 
mysteries of faith that can only be known through revelation.  As Doran notes, there are 
also doctrines, both theological and ecclesial, that do not directly express mysteries of 
faith, but nevertheless that systematic theologians attempt to work into a synthetic 
construction.
80
  Doran asks the following question: What would qualify theological 
achievements with a certain doctrinal status?  Here he is not limiting doctrinal status to 
ecclesial doctrines, but includes those judgments of fact or value in which a theologian 
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confers something of a doctrinal status for his or her own theological reflection.
81
  
Doran’s basis for this inclusion is grounded on Lonergan’s methodology, where doctrines 
correspond to judgments of fact or value.  Systematics attempts to understand those 
judgments.  Doran lists three criteria that would qualify a theological achievement with a 
certain doctrinal status.
82
  The first is that the achievement has brought definitive closure 
to a particular theological debate.  The second is that the achievement provides the only 
analogy of nature yet discovered and developed useful for understanding a particular 
divine mystery.  The third is that the achievement is an inescapable practical conclusion 
of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.
83
   
 As I have noted, Lonergan’s criteria for interpreting the meaning of the cross as 
“law” is overwhelmingly based on the witness of the New Testament.  In terms of 
Doran’s criteria, the law of the cross is for Lonergan an inescapable practical conclusion 
of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.  Lonergan’s inescapable practical conclusion is a judgment 
of fact, and this judgment is supported by Lonergan’s own words in the introductory 
paragraph of the chapter.  He states that doctrines of the Christian faith are typically 
contained explicitly in the New Testament with respect to their factual basis while a fuller 
understanding is found only in the writings of the Church Fathers and the theologians.  
But he states that the dogma of our redemption is not only fully expounded in scripture 
but is also further elucidated by a “law” so that there can be no doubt as to how it is to be 
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understood.
84
  Lonergan is making a judgment of fact regarding how this law is to be 
understood, and judgments of fact in his methodology correspond to doctrines.  Thus I 
interpret that for Lonergan, the law of the cross is not only a systematic theological 
achievement, but it is also a doctrine within a doctrine, where the latter is the wider 
doctrine of redemption.  And as I will note later, the law of the cross qua doctrine 
functions in the remaining chapters of the Supplement to help control the systematic 
meaning Lonergan develops with respect to the further theological questions he will take 
up, specifically the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction and the historical causality of Christ.  
 
5.3.3 A Specific Consideration:  The Mystery of the Cross 
 
 
 In the article “The Mystery of the Cross,” Lonergan moves from an analytical and 
general consideration of the meaning of the cross to a specific consideration of Christ 
crucified.  For Lonergan, the fact that the Son of God made the law of the cross his own 
to bring us out of sin to live the life of God is a great mystery.
85
  He clearly correlates this 
mystery to what the New Testament terms the “hidden plan of his [God’s] will” 
(sacramentum voluntatis suae) which Paul speaks of in Ephesians 1:9.
86
  It is the mystery 
that all things be brought together in Christ (Eph 1:9-10).
87
 Lonergan made the same 
correlation between “mystery” and the hidden plan of God’s will in his 1958 lecture on 
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redemption,
88
 as well as in Thesis 17 of DVI.
89
  God’s hidden plan of redemption is still a 
mystery, but a revealed mystery.  And although there are a number of mysteries involved 
in the work of our redemption, the cross of Christ holds a special place not only in terms 
of the revelation of God’s plan, but as the analogy par excellence in which to understand 
the wisdom, the will, the love, the mercy, and the justice of God.
90
  
 Thus in the Supplement when Lonergan speaks of the “mystery” of the cross he is 
referring to a supernatural reality.  But at the beginning of the article on the mystery of 
the cross he states that the fact that the human race is redeemed from sin by way of the 
cross is hardly a mystery in itself.
91
  This statement is enigmatic, a seeming contradiction.  
We can reconcile this apparent contradiction by considering the contrast Lonergan makes 
in the same paragraph where this statement appears.  The contrast is between the way or 
law of the cross in itself, as opposed to the fact that the Son of God made the cross his 
own as the means of our redemption.  Considered analytically (abstractly), the law of the 
cross as a threefold process of transforming evil into good can be understood by the 
natural light of human reason.  I believe this is why Lonergan states that it is hardly a 
mystery in itself.  But the fact that the Son of God made the cross his own is a revelation 
of God’s wisdom that cannot be known by the natural light of human reason.  This is why 
the revelation of the Holy Spirit is required to discern the wisdom of God in Christ 
crucified.  Without this revelation, the law of the cross as God’s solution to the problem 
of evil (as opposed to an abstract understanding of the law of the cross in itself) seems 
like folly, irrationality, a stumbling-block. 
                                                 
88
 Lonergan, “The Redemption,” 24. 
89
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 583-584. 
90
 Lonergan, DBM, 159 [Supplement, 66]. 
91
 Lonergan, DBM, 158 [Supplement, 65]. 
 165 
Next, we recall from Lonergan’s chapter on divine justice that he hinted there was 
a special facet of divine justice revealed in the cross of our Lord, and that he would defer 
an explanation of this to chapter 4.  In article 24 we find his explanation: 
There is likewise general agreement that in the work of our redemption God is made 
known to us in a way that we could never know by our natural knowledge.  Even if by the 
natural light of human reason we were able to show that God is wise, free, loving, 
merciful, and just, we could only draw these conclusions by way of analogy from 
creatures.  But from the Son's incarnation, death, and resurrection we have another and 
much loftier analogy for coming to know God as he is in himself.  St. Paul often speaks 
of this new knowledge of God's wisdom (1 Cor 1:18-2:16, 3:18-19; Rom 11:33, 
16:2)...We know what his justice is like, no longer only on the analogy of law courts and 
prisons and gallows, but also from the crucifixion of his own Son.
92
 
 
 The cross of Christ not only reveals divine justice, but it is the loftier analogy for 
coming to know God as he is in himself.  Lonergan reiterates this in the last paragraph of 
the article on “The Mystery of the Cross” where he states that the death and resurrection 
of Christ allows us to grasp the wisdom and goodness of God not by analogy from 
creatures but from the man Christ Jesus, providing us a far more profound knowledge of 
God.
93
 
 Lonergan’s conviction that Christ Jesus is the loftier analogy is expounded when 
we consider his Trinitarian theology.  The Incarnation is a supernatural reality, yet 
because the mission of the Son involves a contingent, created external term which is the 
esse secundarium of the human nature assumed by the Son, God has entered into human 
history as intimately as God can, to take part in what Lonergan later called “man’s 
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making of man.”94  Essential to Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology is his understanding that 
the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation (the esse of the assumed human nature 
of the Incarnate Word) is a created participation of paternity.
95
  Thus Jesus Christ, as the 
Word made flesh, reveals the Father.  Therefore since the esse of the assumed human 
nature of the Word is a created participation of paternity, any aspect of the life of Christ 
can be an analogy for understanding God as he is in himself. 
 We also recall that Lonergan listed five modes in which the mystery of the cross 
may be considered.
96
  We have already touched on the last mode where Lonergan 
considers the cross of Christ as a revelation of God, the loftier analogy for coming to 
know God as he is in himself.  For reasons of space I will not consider all of the other 
modes, but I do want to briefly consider the first where Lonergan considers the mystery 
of the cross through the category of “symbol.”  This aspect of the mystery of the cross 
will show up again in the next chapter in Lonergan’s understanding of what it means to 
state that Christ has made satisfaction for our sins. 
 Readers familiar with Insight may recall Lonergan’s discussion of the relationship 
between mystery and symbol in that text.  Let us consider this discussion because it will 
aid our interpretation of what Lonergan means when he states that “symbol” is an aspect 
of the mystery of the cross.  In Insight, Lonergan’s definition of “mystery” is the 
paradoxical category of the “known unknown.”97  The very fact that we are cognizant of 
a mystery, and that we ask questions regarding a mystery, means that there is a “known” 
element in the unknown.  If there were no “known” element, the mystery would be 
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completely outside our horizon of awareness and we would not even have the ability to 
ask questions of the mystery in the first place.  In Insight Lonergan also states that “some 
sensitive awareness and response, symbolic of the known unknown, must be regarded as 
a generally and permanently recurring feature of human living.”98   
This is the same point Lonergan is making in the Supplement.  He describes the 
symbol of the cross as an expression of mystery, giving rise to sensitive awareness and 
response: 
The sensible depiction of the body and the shed blood of Christ on the cross represents 
and expresses outwardly the interior acts of his mind and heart; it forcefully strikes our 
senses and deeply moves our emotions, so that we receive spiritual benefit from the very 
act of gazing at the crucifix and from the consequent affections of our will.
99
 
 
 Lonergan stated essentially the same insight in article 19 (Meritorious Obedience) 
of the prior chapter of the Supplement.  There he stated that since a human being not only 
has a soul but a body as well, then a human act in the fullest sense consists not only of the 
interior acts of knowing and willing, but also an external act, bodily and perceptible by 
the senses, which gives expression to the interior acts of knowing and willing.
100
 
 
5.4 The Justice of the Cross 
 
 
 In article 25 Lonergan takes the general principles of divine justice, developed in 
chapter 2 of the Supplement, and applies these principles to five elements he discerns in 
the meaning, law, and mystery of the cross.  Lonergan’s statement below captures the 
essence of the general principles of divine justice: 
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From this [Lonergan’s prior consideration of the general principles of divine justice] we 
conclude that the actual order of things is most fitting because ordained by divine wisdom 
and most just because God's choice follows his wisdom, and also is most free since with 
equally infinite wisdom and equally infinite goodness God can do whatever absolutely 
speaking he can do.
101
 
 
Let us also recall the five elements Lonergan discerns in the meaning, law, and 
mystery of the cross:  (1) God's salvific intention and activity to restore goods lost, (2) the 
meaning and the law of the cross according to which this activity unfolds, (3) the 
presence of a mediator through whom this salvific activity unfolds, (4) this mediator 
himself as accomplishing his work according to the meaning of the cross, and (5) the 
manifestation of divine goodness in letting evils happen in such a way that good may be 
drawn out of them.
102
 
In my interpretation, the first thing we should attempt to understand is the basis 
from which Lonergan can state that there is “little difficulty” (facillima) in applying the 
general principles of divine justice to the meaning, law, and mystery of the cross.
103
  Why 
little difficulty?  The reason is based on the fundamental principle of divine justice itself.  
Whatever God does is done in accordance with the supremely free, wise, fitting, right and 
just divine plan.
104
  Lonergan is reiterating his fundamental position that there is no such 
thing as a voluntaristically conceived divine will.  There are no divine afterthoughts.  So 
if God has willed our salvation through the mediation of Christ Jesus by way of the 
meaning, law, and mystery of the cross, then God’s “willing” of this mediation must be in 
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accord with divine wisdom, since divine wisdom is the rule of divine justice.  The 
application of the general principles of divine justice to the meaning, law, and mystery of 
the cross are just as reasonable and straightforward as are the application of these general 
principles to absolutely any other thing that God wills in the order of this universe, 
whether natural or supernatural.  The principles of divine justice apply to absolutely 
everything that God wills, the cross included.
105
 
Next we can turn to the substance of the article.  What this article intends is to 
explain the fittingness of whatever God does with respect to the economy of salvation.  I 
will consider four basic points Lonergan makes. 
The first is closely related to what we have just stated.  Lonergan desires to 
impress upon his reader that the meaning, law, and mystery of the cross is not 
contradictory to God’s justice.  The first general principle of divine justice is that God 
can do anything that does not involve an intrinsic contradiction.
106
  Whatever God does is 
just and often our human wisdom has trouble accepting this.  For example, it is evident 
that by the time of Aquinas a question arose as to whether God’s mercy conflicts with 
God’s justice.107 Aquinas rejected this conclusion.  Whatever God does is both merciful 
and just.
108
  Lonergan himself refers to the mercy of God on six occasions in the article 
on the mystery of the cross,
109
 and there he also states how the mystery of the cross, as 
revelation, caused both the authors of the New Testament and the whole Catholic 
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tradition to marvel at this new revelation of divine mercy and love.
110
  Nowhere in the 
present chapter is divine mercy pitted against divine justice.  But the objection 
exemplified in the question taken up by Aquinas, whether raised in the thirteenth century 
or today, reveals an anthropomorphic tendency to see mercy and justice as contradictory 
rather than complementary, and to conceive God in such a way that if God is too merciful 
then God is irrational, that God is contradicting God’s own justice.  And since God is not 
irrational, this anthropomorphic tendency comes down on the side of justice, but justice 
conceived by human wisdom.  Human wisdom with its anthropomorphic bias tries to 
control what is possible and not possible for God.  Lonergan’s point is that God is not 
bound by God’s own justice to provide us a solution to the problem of evil according to 
retributive justice. 
Of course this is not to deny the fact that human sin incurs a debt of penalty 
according to God’s own justice.  For Lonergan, following Aquinas, sin does incur a debt 
of penalty.  So God would not be unjust if God were to exact retributive justice on the 
whole human race by destroying the corrupted good and creating a completely new good 
in its place.  Nor would God be unjust if God chose to transform evil into good without 
human cooperation.  But by God’s own justice, God is not obliged to choose either of 
these options.  For Lonergan, it is clear from the New Testament that God chose the 
option to convert evil into good through a victory of the will, and that the mystery of the 
cross in this drama is not to be understood in the context of retributive justice.  For 
Lonergan, God’s choosing of this option is more fitting than the others and there is no 
intrinsic contradiction if God chooses this option. 
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 Second, Lonergan recalls the Patristic understanding that the devil had to be 
defeated not by power but by justice.
111
  Power and domination are not evils in 
themselves, but as a solution to the problem of evil, they are an illusion.
112
  As Lonergan 
stated previously in article 22, those who win the victory of the cross are not judges or 
military leaders but the gentle and humble of heart.  The justice of the cross is grounded 
not in power and domination, but in superabundant generosity.  This is not to be 
understood as if there is no “power” in the justice of the cross.  The justice of the cross is 
a power, but power properly conceived, a power grounded in generosity rather than force. 
 Third, the justice of the cross reveals that we are saved by a Mediator.  If all the 
people living at one given time were by some miraculous divine intervention successfully 
converted from a multitude of evils to one true good, then this would not be in keeping 
with the common course of events in the order of this universe established by divine 
wisdom.
113
  We see at work here Lonergan’s theological principle he established in the 
chapter on divine justice.  Thus having a Mediator is in harmonious continuation with the 
common course of events and the order of the universe established by divine wisdom.  
For Lonergan it is fitting that the kingdom of God be inaugurated by one person, the 
Mediator Jesus Christ, the foundation and head of the whole economy of salvation.
114
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 Fourth, to understand the justice of the cross we must also understand how the 
Son of God brings us to salvation according to the meaning, law, and mystery of the 
cross.  Again, Lonergan’s focus is on fittingness.  A key statement he makes captures the 
essence of this fourth point: 
It is fitting for the Father to love us with the same love with which he loves his Son, to 
the extent that we and the Son are one.  But we and the Son are one inasmuch as the Son 
is assimilated and joined to us and we in turn are assimilated and joined to the Son.
115
 
 
 For Lonergan we are assimilated to Christ in two ways.  First, through the effect 
of the Incarnation.  The Word has assumed a human nature, and assimilates Himself to all 
humanity.
116
  Second, there is what Lonergan calls a “union” (coniunctio) or “almost an 
identification” (quasi identificatio) with Christ that is the effect of love:117 
A friend regards his friend as a ‘second self’ in that he wants the same good for his friend 
as he does for himself.  So it is that a friend is said to be one's alter ego;
118
 and Augustine 
in the Confessions exclaims, “Well has someone said of his friend that he is half of his 
soul.”119 As to the greatness and excellence of Christ's love for us, he himself has given 
ample testimony by his deeds and also in his words: “A man can have no greater love 
than to lay down his life for his friends” (Jn 15:13).120 
 
 This notion of the “union of love” is fundamental to Lonergan’s understanding of 
how Christ, as Head of the Body, is united to His members thus allowing the members to 
appropriate the work of the Head.  In the next chapter where Lonergan considers the 
doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction, his argument will include the judgment that those who 
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are unequal in guilt are one in will through their union in love.  For Lonergan, the union 
of wills through love is the foundation of vicarious satisfaction.
121
  Lonergan will thus 
use this notion of the union of wills through love to explain how Christ, as Head, can 
make satisfaction for Christ’s members. 
 
5.5 The Function of the Chapter in the Wider Context of the Supplement 
 
 
 In the present section I will interpret the function of the current chapter within the 
wider context of the Supplement.  There are three considerations here.  The first considers 
the present chapter in relation to Lonergan’s summarization of the New Testament 
teachings on redemption (chapter 3 of the Supplement).  The second and third 
considerations interpret the present chapter in relation to Lonergan’s understanding of the 
satisfaction given by Christ (chapter 5 of the Supplement) and the historical causality of 
Christ (chapter 6 of the Supplement).  
 
5.5.1 Lonergan’s Understanding of the Cross of Christ in Relation to the 
Teachings of the New Testament 
 
 
 We recall that in Lonergan’s chapter on the death and resurrection of Christ his 
purpose was to collect the New Testament teachings relevant to the doctrine of 
redemption.  We also recall that Lonergan’s methodology in that chapter reflects his 
inheritance of the tradition of Aquinas, who was content to explain the salvific efficacy of 
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Christ’s passion in five complementary aspects rather than in some single, unified 
viewpoint.
122
   
 In Lonergan’s 1958 lecture on redemption, given only a few months after he had 
completed a draft of the Supplement,
123
 he discussed the various aspects of redemption 
according to Aquinas’s five ways.  In the same lecture he stated that the mystery of 
redemption is not an intelligibility that can be put in a single formula, then later in the 
lecture suggested how one might move toward a “total view” to synthesize Aquinas’s 
five ways.
124
  There is an apparent conflict in these statements.  With respect to the 
apparent conflict, an editorial comment was inserted in the published transcript of the 
lecture.  The editorial note states “it is more of a conflict between aspects of thought 
growing toward unity than between two positions already taken and fixed for life.”125  
The editorial note goes on to state: “Three factors are involved here:  the understanding 
of the redemption Lonergan inherited, his own habitual orientation toward a unified 
understanding, and the unity he was able to achieve by further thought.”126  The editorial 
note equates the unity Lonergan was able to achieve to the “Law of the Cross” articulated 
in Thesis 17 of DVI.
127
  Much of the material in the present chapter of the Supplement 
was later synthesized by Lonergan into Thesis 17 of DVI.  Thus the editorial note in the 
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transcript of the 1958 lecture correlating Lonergan’s achievement in Thesis 17 of DVI to 
a synthesis of the tradition Lonergan inherited raises an interpretive question of how the 
present chapter relates to the previous chapter.  Should we interpret Lonergan’s 
understanding of the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross as a synthesis of 
Aquinas’s five ways? 
 In my interpretation the answer to this question is that it is highly probable that in 
the Supplement Lonergan did consider his understanding of the meaning, law, mystery, 
and justice of the cross as a synthesis of Aquinas’s five ways, but not as a “unified view” 
of redemption.  Let me first explain why I believe Lonergan considered his understanding 
to be a synthesis of Aquinas’s five ways.  There are two basic reasons. 
 The first reason is that the Supplement itself exhibits the methodology that in the 
1958 lecture Lonergan indicated was the clue to a unified view of the traditional five 
aspects (ways) enumerated by Aquinas.  In the 1958 lecture Lonergan did not offer a 
unified view, but he did state that in his opinion the key to such a total view is the 
fundamental category of mystery.  What Lonergan meant by mystery is not the 
theologian’s sense of a truth we cannot fully understand in this life, nor in the sense of 
Christian piety that meditates on the mysteries of the life of Christ.  Lonergan was 
referring to mystery as the writers of the New Testament would have understood this 
word.  In the 1958 lecture he stated that the New Testament’s understanding of mystery 
refers to the secret counsel of God, the hidden plan of God’s will.128  In the present 
chapter, by progressing from an analytical and general understanding of the fundamental 
meaning of the cross to the specific consideration of the cross as mystery, Lonergan is 
sublating the meaning and law of the cross into the mystery of redemption, God’s hidden 
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plan now revealed, to gather all things together under Christ.  He is doing what he hinted 
was the key to a unified view of the tradition he inherited from Aquinas.  The meaning of 
the cross, whether considered in itself, as law, as mystery, or as divine justice is at its 
core the systematic understanding of what Lonergan considers the highest principle in the 
economy of salvation: the transformation of evil into good.  The four articles in the 
present chapter are simply different considerations of this fundamental principle.  But at 
its core, it is a systematic intelligibility expressed in a set of terms and relations where the 
terms are (1) evil to be overcome, (2) a victory of the will that overcomes this evil, and 
(3) good that emerges from evil through this victory.  In my interpretation, this systematic 
intelligibility is for Lonergan the common intelligibility to be found in the traditional 
images and theories of redemption he inherited from Aquinas.  In other words, in each of 
Aquinas’s five ways Lonergan discerns a common denominator whether the image is 
“price paid” (ransom), sacrifice, meritorious obedience, vicarious suffering, or efficient 
causality.
129
  That common denominator, the unity that is found in all the images, is the 
transformation of evil into good through a victory of the will. 
 The second reason is based on Lonergan’s statements in DVI.  In Thesis 17 he 
states that the law of the cross is the “intrinsic intelligibility of redemption” (intrinseca 
redemptionis intelligibilitas),
130
 and the “essence of redemption” (essentia 
redemptionis).
131
  Thesis 17 represents a unified, systematic viewpoint of the teachings of 
the New Testament Lonergan presented in Thesis 15 of the same text.  In Thesis 15 he 
also categorized the teachings of the New Testament according to the traditional five 
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aspects enumerated by Aquinas.  The organization of the Supplement shows the same 
pattern.  Chapter 3 of the Supplement is to Thesis 15 of DVI as the present chapter of the 
Supplement is to Thesis 17 of DVI.  Given the short time span between the two texts, it is 
highly probable that Lonergan had this same understanding in mind in the Supplement, 
that is, that his articles on the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross provide a 
systematic unification of the teachings of the previous chapter which are organized 
according to the traditional five aspects enumerated by Aquinas. 
 Now the question of whether Lonergan understands this synthesis to be a “unified 
view” of redemption is a different matter.  The question relies on a distinction between 
the meanings of “intrinsic intelligibility” and “unified view.”  In my judgment the 
meanings are not the same.  In DVI, when Lonergan identifies the “Law of the Cross” as 
the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption, he explains what he means by contrasting the 
four Aristotelian causes to make a distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” 
intelligibility: 
The Law of the Cross is the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption.  Intelligibility is either 
intrinsic or extrinsic.  The extrinsic intelligibility of a thing is always sought in something 
else—in the final, the exemplary, or the efficient cause.  But intrinsic intelligibility is 
grasped in and through the thing itself, as the definition is grasped in that which is 
defined, or an invariant relationship of things in the very things that are invariably and 
cogently connected.
132
 
 
 Thus for Lonergan, “intrinsic intelligibility” does not exhaust the full meaning of 
intelligibility.  Logically then, the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption does not exhaust 
the full intelligibility of redemption.   
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 Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, in my interpretation Lonergan would 
not consider any view of redemption as a unified view without an explanatory account of 
how the economy of salvation evolves historically.
133
  Such a consideration would 
include the intelligibility of Christ’s historical causality on human development, which is 
the theological question Lonergan takes up in the last chapter of the Supplement.  At the 
time of Aquinas, the question of history was not on the table, so Aquinas’s five ways do 
not address the efficacy of Christ’s salvific action from a historical perspective.134  Thus 
if one synthesizes Aquinas’s five aspects without introducing historical categories, then 
one may have a synthesis of Aquinas, but not a unified view of redemption.   
To support this interpretation I will offer three additional pieces of evidence, all 
from Lonergan’s works.  I will do so chronologically.135  First, there is a statement 
Lonergan makes in his epilogue to Insight.  He states that with regard to any individual 
who has embraced God’s solution, there is to be added the consideration of cumulative 
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the following: “When we were studying theology in Rome, David Tracy and I would occasionally go to see 
Fr. Lonergan and pester him with questions...In one of those conversations I asked him about redemption, 
phrasing my question, as I recall it, in terms of Aristotle’s four causes.  In reply, Fr. Lonergan suggested 
that redemption was one of those realities that could not be adequately dealt with in Aristotelian categories, 
that it required a theory of history and historical categories.”  Joseph Komonchak, “The Church,” The 
Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan, 222.  See also Joseph 
Komonchak, “Lonergan’s Early Essays on the Redemption of History,” Lonergan Workshop 10: The 
Legacy of Lonergan, ed. Frederick Lawrence (Chestnut Hill: Boston College, 1994), 160. 
134
 In “The Future of Thomism,” Lonergan states: “A contemporary theology must take and has taken the 
fact of history into account.  Inasmuch as it does so, St. Thomas ceases to be the arbiter to whom all can 
appeal for the solution of contemporary questions; for, by and large, contemporary questions are not the 
same as the questions he treated, and the contemporary context is not the context in which he treated them.  
But he remains a magnificent and venerable figure in the history of Catholic thought.  He stands before us 
as a model, inviting us to do for our age what he did for his.”  Lonergan, “The Future of Thomism,” Second 
Collection, 49.  And again:  “St. Thomas did not have the modern concern for history and man’s 
historicity...and if one wishes to evade history and historicity, one wishes to live in a world that no longer 
exists.”  Lonergan, “The Future of Thomism,” 53. 
135
 The chronology is based on the following: (1) the dating of Insight, written between 1949 and 1953, 
published in 1957; (2) the dating of Divinarum personarum, 1957; (3) the dating of De Verbo Incarnato, 
first published in 1960. 
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historical development.
136
  Lonergan suggests that this historical aspect possesses a 
peculiar relevance to the treatise on the mystical body of Christ and states that such a 
treatise remains incomplete as long as it fails to draw upon a theory of history.
137
 
 Second, there is a relevant statement Lonergan makes in Divinarum personarum.  
In that text Lonergan explains the notion of systematic exegesis we discussed previously.  
He also discusses a new step in theological comprehension complementing this exegesis: 
According to Aristotle, science has two meanings:  it is science in potency when it is 
merely of universals; it is science in act when it is applied to particular things.  Besides 
systematic exegesis, therefore, there is historical exegesis, which, far from omitting the 
accidentals, includes them synthetically.  Besides systematic theology, there is a theology 
that is more concrete and more comprehensive, which deals with and seeks to understand 
the economy of salvation as it evolves historically.  This new step in comprehension has 
over a lengthy period of time been gradually prepared by copious studies in the biblical, 
conciliar, patristic, medieval, liturgical, ascetical, and other areas of research, but in such 
a way that its synthetic character is not yet clearly apparent, since today’s scholars seem 
to resemble more the twelfth-century compilers than they do the thirteenth-century 
theologians in the proper sense.
138
 
 
 Finally, there is a statement in DVI.  In Thesis 12 titled “Christ’s Knowledge,” 
Lonergan includes two scholions at the end of the thesis.  The second scholion is titled 
“The Power of Christ the Man.”  The scholion is extremely brief, but the second sentence 
states the following: “There is need for further consideration of the historical causality 
that Christ the man manifestly exercises.”139  Lonergan would not add this comment to 
DVI if he thought the Law of the Cross in Thesis 17 of that same text addressed this need.  
Thesis 17 on the “Law of the Cross” does not address Christ’s historical causality. 
                                                 
136
 Lonergan, Insight, 763. 
137
 Lonergan, Insight, 764. 
138
 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 753, emphasis mine.  As Robert Doran notes, Lonergan’s 
statement about twelfth-century compilers was not meant as a criticism, but a factual comment on the 
historical situation Lonergan found himself in 1957 when this text was published.  See Doran, What is 
Systematic Theology, 146-147. 
139
 “Ulterius desideratur consideratio de causalitate historica quam Christus homo manifeste exercet.”  De 
Verbo Incarnato, 416 (trans. Hefling). 
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 In summary then, I interpret that Lonergan’s understanding of the meaning, law, 
mystery, and justice of the cross represents for Lonergan a synthesis of the traditional 
five aspects enumerated by Aquinas, but I do not interpret that Lonergan himself 
considered this synthesis as a unified view of redemption.  Otherwise there would be no 
need for Lonergan to take up the theological question of Christ’s historical causality in 
the final chapter of the Supplement. 
 
5.5.2 Lonergan’s Understanding of the Cross of Christ in Relation to the 
Satisfaction Given by Christ 
 
 
 In chapter 5 on the “The Satisfaction Given by Christ,” Lonergan will make four 
specific references to “the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the Cross.”140  At other 
times he will simply refer to the “meaning of the Cross,” again on four specific 
occasions.
141
 All eight of these references are found in article 29, “The Punishment of 
Christ.”  What Lonergan is doing in this article is attempting to clear away what he 
considers false interpretations of Christ’s experience of “punishment” and lay a firm 
foundation for determining the truth of the matter.
142
  The punishment involved in the 
satisfaction given by Christ is part of the mystery of the cross, but in order to understand 
the nature of this punishment in its proper theological context, Lonergan will correlate the 
punishment of Christ to the threefold process of the law of the cross.  As inflicted on 
Christ, the punishment was unjust.  As accepted by Christ, the punishment was 
                                                 
140
 Lonergan, DBM, *196, *198, *199, *202 [Supplement, 83, 84 (2x), 85]. 
141
 Lonergan, DBM, *197 (3x), *199 [Supplement, 83 (3x) 84]. 
142
 Lonergan, DBM, *199[Supplement, 84].  The context of the question is that with Anselm, there was the 
disjunction aut satisfactio aut poena (either satisfaction or punishment).  But since Christ did indeed die on 
the cross, and according to scripture death is a consequence of sin, then it would seem that Christ suffered 
punishment.  As Lonergan will state in the next chapter, Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, and Aquinas 
reintroduced the word poena with respect to the notion of Christ’s satisfaction.  This is the context of 
Lonergan’s article on the punishment of Christ.  The question, however, is how to understand what the 
“punishment of Christ” means. 
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transformed from an unjust evil inflicted upon Christ to a voluntary sacrifice (a victory of 
the will).  As rewarded by the Father, Christ’s victory of the will becomes the source of 
eternal salvation to all who obey him.
143
  Lonergan states that this divine plan was 
realized in the meaning, the law, the mystery, and the justice of the cross, by reason of 
which Christ crucified is acknowledged to be the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1: 23 f.).
144
 
 Then, in article 30 on “The Transference of Punishment to Christ,” Lonergan will 
begin to use the term “the justice of the cross” in contrast to what he terms “the justice of 
a judge” (iustitia iudicis).145  The justice of a judge refers to retributive justice.  Lonergan 
will argue that Christ’s passion and death, as punishment, is to be understood in the 
context of the justice of the cross, not the justice of a judge.  Lonergan’s purpose is to 
refute the error that Christ received punishment in the strict sense of retributive justice.  
And he refutes this error by appealing to his prior judgment, found in the current chapter, 
that Christ suffered, died, and was raised up in accordance with the divine wisdom and 
justice of the cross, which is not retributive justice. 
 Lonergan is not only developing a systematic understanding of the cross of Christ 
in terms of its meaning, law, mystery, and justice, but as I stated earlier the law of the 
cross functions as a doctrine.  In the next chapter, this law, as doctrine, will provide a 
framework for Lonergan to control meaning in a systematic explanation of the doctrine of 
Christ’s satisfaction. 
 
 
                                                 
143
 Lonergan, DBM, *202 [Supplement, 85].  
144
 Lonergan, DBM, *202 [Supplement, 85]. 
145
 Lonergan, DBM, *223, *226, *228, *230, *230, *231, *231, *233 [Supplement, 85, 86, 88, 88, 89, 89, 
89, 90]. 
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5.5.3 Lonergan’s Understanding of the Cross of Christ in Relation to the 
Historical Causality of Christ 
 
 
 In the last chapter of the Supplement Lonergan takes up the theological question 
of the historical causality of Christ.  He does so from a number of different 
understandings of Christ’s agency.  Lonergan does not explicitly mention the meaning, 
law, mystery, or justice of the cross until the last article where he takes up Anselm’s 
question Cur Deus homo.  This does not mean that the meaning, law, mystery, or justice 
of the cross is not operative implicitly in other articles of the last chapter.  My 
interpretation is based on Lonergan’s understanding that one of the purposes of Christ’s 
historical action is to advance the total human good of order, both external and cultural.   
 Specifically, in Lonergan’s discussion of Christ as historical agent (article 42), he 
will state that (1) Christ’s historical action is directly aimed at ordering human life on 
earth to the future life in heaven; and (2) since this ordering liberates human beings from 
evils and turns them towards true good with the result that the human good of order is 
greatly improved, this improvement itself is necessarily intended indirectly by Christ as 
an historical agent.
146
  Thus Christ’s historical action as a whole is for the total human 
good of order both external and cultural, past, present, and future.  Implicitly then, 
advancement of the human good of order implies the law of the cross since advancing the 
human good of order means that Christ’s historical causality liberates persons from evils 
and turns them toward the good. 
 As I previously noted, Lonergan’s reference to the law of the cross is most 
explicit in the final article of the Supplement.  His purpose there is to explain why a God-
                                                 
146
 Lonergan, DBM, *269 [Supplement, 114]. 
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man was required to achieve the secondary end of redemption.
147
  But how is this 
secondary end achieved?  Lonergan will state that unless psychological and social laws 
are suspended, contradictory to what he calls the “principle of continuity,” humans 
cannot be turned from evil to good except according to the method (law) of the cross and 
as such it is fitting that the God-man not only teach and prescribe the law of the cross but 
also perform his work according to the mystery of the cross.
148
   
 Once again, the law of the cross is functioning as a doctrine.  It is also functioning 
as a systematic component in Lonergan’s understanding of Christ’s historical causality, 
since he states that it is fitting that the God-man teach and prescribe the law of the cross.  
The ground for this insight is the prior judgment, the doctrine, that in no other way does 
God draw good out of evil than according to the law of the cross. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
 
 In the introduction to his chapter “The Cross of Christ,” Lonergan states that in 
the whole economy of salvation there is no higher principle than the transformation of 
evil into good.
149
  And in the first sentence of the first article he equates the fundamental 
idea of the cross to this principle of transformation.
150
  This principle of transformation 
presupposes evil to be overcome, then overcomes this evil through a victory of the will, 
such that good emerges from evil.  This principle of transformation is discerned in the 
event of the cross itself, but from the New Testament witness this principle of 
transformation becomes a precept and example to follow, a law governing the entire 
                                                 
147
 Lonergan, DBM, *285 [Supplement, 121]. 
148
 Lonergan, DBM, *292 [Supplement, 124]. 
149
 Lonergan, DBM, 146 [Supplement, 60]. 
150
 Lonergan, DBM, 147 [Supplement, 60]. 
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economy of salvation.  For Lonergan, the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross 
is not only a synthesis of the traditional five aspects of redemption enumerated by 
Aquinas, but the law of the cross in particular takes on for Lonergan himself a doctrinal 
status because it is an inescapable practical conclusion of the New Testament. 
 Much of the material in this chapter was later synthesized by Lonergan into 
Thesis 17 of DVI, titled “Understanding the Mystery:  The Law of the Cross.”  As Robert 
Doran has correctly noted, Lonergan’s position on the Law of the Cross “has been 
acknowledged as one of his most profound theological achievements.”151  Since our 
working hypothesis is that Lonergan completed a draft of the Supplement prior to DVI, 
then this chapter of the Supplement may be the earliest extant writing on what is one of 
Lonergan’s most profound theological achievements. 
                                                 
151
 Doran, “The Nonviolent Cross:  Lonergan and Girard on Redemption,” 49. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE SATISFACTION GIVEN BY CHRIST 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Here we will interpret the Supplement’s fifth chapter titled “The Satisfaction 
Given by Christ.”1  The chapter includes articles 26-34:  (26) Division of the Question, 
(27) The Meaning of Necessity, (28) The Meaning of Punishment, (29) The Punishment 
of Christ, (30) The Transference of Punishment to Christ, (31) The Sacramental Analogy, 
(32) The Sorrows of Christ, (33) The Satisfaction Given by Christ, and (34) The 
Superabundant Satisfaction Given by Christ. 
The fifth chapter begins with a one-paragraph introduction: 
Since the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction draws some of its basic elements from Scripture 
and tradition and others from St. Anselm's speculation about the reason for the God-man, 
we shall first divide the question itself (Art. 26), then seek to understand the meaning of 
the Anselmian disjunction, “either satisfaction or punishment” (aut satisfactio aut poena).  
To this end, we first of all deny that a third member besides satisfaction and punishment 
is absolutely impossible (Art. 27), next we likewise deny that satisfaction has to be 
understood in such a way as to exclude per se any notion of punishment (Art. 28 and 29), 
and thirdly we deny that the punishments of sinners, as such, have been transferred to the 
sinless Christ (Art. 30).  Having established these premises, we go on to determine that 
Christ's satisfaction is to be understood according to the analogy of sacramental 
satisfaction (Art. 31), that the man Christ grieved for our sins (Art. 32), and that as an 
expression of this sorrow he accepted his passion and death so that through this passion 
and this death satisfaction might be truly (Art. 33) and indeed superabundantly (Art. 34) 
given.
2
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 “CAPUT QUINTUM.  DE SATISFACTIONE CHRISTI,” DBM, *180-228 [Supplement, 74-97]. 
2
 Cum doctrina de satisfactione Christi elementa alia ex scripturis et traditione ducat, alia autem ex 
speculatione S. Anselmi cur Deus homo, primo ipsam quaestionem dividimus (art.  XXVI), et deinde 
anselmianae disiunctionis intelligentiam quaerimus, quonam scilicet sensu dicatur aut satisfactio aut poena.  
Quem in finem, primo negamus absolute fieri non potuisse ut tertium praeter satisfactionem et poenam 
daretur (art. XXVII), deinde pariter negamus ita intelligendam esse satisfactionem ut ab ea per se omnis 
ratio poenae excludatur (art. XXVIII et XXIX), tertio denique negamus ipsas peccatorum poenas 
simpliciter dictas esse in Christum innocentem translatas (art. XXX).  Quibus stabilitis, determinatur 
satisfactionem Christi esse intelligendam secundum analogiam satisfactionis sacramentalis (art. XXXI), 
Christum hominem de nostris peccatis doluisse (art. XXXII) et in expressionem huius doloris passionem 
mortemque suam acceptasse ut haec passio haecque mors satisfactionis rationem haberent (art. XXXIII) et 
quidem superabundantius (art.  XXXIV).”  DBM, *180 [Supplement, 74-75]. 
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6.2 A Brief Description of Articles 26 - 34 
 
 
6.2.1 Article 26:  Division of the Question
3
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins noting the different meanings of the noun “satisfaction” 
(satisfactio).
 4
  For example, in law courts there is the distinction between the payment of 
a debt and satisfaction:  satisfaction is made when the creditor freely agrees that the debt 
may be extinguished in some other manner.  There is also the meaning associated with 
the sacrament of penance.  The sacrament includes three acts:  contrition, confession, and 
satisfaction (DB 896, 904; DS 1673, 1689; ND 1620, 1630).  Ecclesial doctrine states that 
Christ has given satisfaction for our sins (DB 799, 904; DS 1529, 1689; ND 1932, 1630).  
Lonergan states that what this doctrine means, since there are several opinions, cannot be 
stated briefly.
5
  So he begins with a distinction between dogmatic and speculative 
meanings of Christ’s satisfaction. 
 In the dogmatic sense, Christ’s satisfaction means (1) the redemption, as a means, 
carried out by our Lord; (2) Christ’s vicarious suffering and death for us and for our sins 
in accordance with the intention of God; (3) the payment of a certain price through his 
death; (4) a sacrifice that efficaciously takes away sins and provides access to God, as 
shown by God's appeasement; and (5) Christ's obedience unto death meriting our 
justification, which through baptism removes all guilt and liability to punishment.6 
                                                 
3
 “Articulus XXVI.  Dividitur quaestio,”  DBM, *181-184 [Supplement, 75-76]. 
4
 Lonergan, DBM, *181[Supplement, 75]. 
5
 Lonergan, DBM, *181 [Supplement, 75]. 
6
 Lonergan, DBM, *181-182 [Supplement, 75]. 
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 Anselm was virtually the first to treat the satisfaction of Christ, but he had a 
speculative interest in mind.  Anselm was looking for a necessary reason to Cur Deus 
homo?  For Lonergan, Anselm’s argument boils down to the following: 
It is therefore necessary that either the dishonoring [of God by sin] be redressed, or that 
punishment be meted out.  Otherwise God would not be just towards himself, or else 
powerless to do either - which is utterly unthinkable.
7
 
 
 For Lonergan, this argument grounds the rest of Anselm’s theory, a theory 
Lonergan summarizes as follows:  (1) a mere human being owes absolutely everything to 
God and therefore cannot give supererogatory satisfaction for sins, (2) but a God-man is 
not liable to death and thus by dying can give satisfaction, and (3) such satisfaction is 
greater than all sins whatsoever and merits the remission of all sins.
8
  Lonergan, noting 
that every theory gives rise to further questions, ends with questions of his own: 
The question arises, why was it necessary for Christ to die, and why did his death 
necessarily call for the remission of sins?  Secondly, was the death of Christ in some way 
a punishment, and if so by what sort of justice was Christ punished?  Thirdly, in what 
precisely does the satisfaction made by Christ consist?  Was it superabundant?  How 
could it have been vicarious, and how could vicarious satisfaction remove the aftermath 
of sin and restore the order of reality?  Fourthly, must the whole work of Christ be 
deduced from Anselm's necessary reason, or is there some other way to come to a 
theological understanding of this matter?
9
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 “Necesse est ergo ut aut sublatus honor solvatur aut poena sequatur.  Alioquin aut sibi deus iustus non erit 
aut ad utrumque impotens erit;  quod nefas est vel cogitare.”  DBM, *183 [Supplement, 76].  This is a direct 
quote of the Latin text from Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, I, 13.  See S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi 
Opera Omnia, vol. 2, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Edinburgh:  Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946), 71.  Lonergan notes 
that Anselm sometimes used arguments of appropriateness and distinguished between compelling and non-
compelling necessity.  Lonergan nonetheless judges that Anselm’s theory is based on a necessary reason. 
8
 Lonergan, DBM, *183 [Supplement, 76].  
9
 “Quaeritur enim qua necessitate mortuus sit Christus et qua necessitate propter eius mortem concedatur 
peccatorum remissio.  Quaeritur deinde utrum mors Christi rationem poenae habuerit et qua iustitia haec 
poena a Christo sit sumpta.  Quaeritur tertio in quonam praecise consistat satisfactio Christi, utrum fuerit 
superabundans, quemadmodum vicaria esse potuerit, quemadmodum per vicariam satisfactionem reliquiae 
peccatorum tollantur et rerum ordo restauretur.  Quaeritur quarto utrum totum Christi opus deduci oporteat 
ex ratione anselmiana necessaria, an alia via ad intelligentiam theologicam procedendum sit.”  DBM, *183-
184 [Supplement, 76]. 
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6.2.2 Article 27:  The Meaning of Necessity
10
 
 
 
 Lonergan notes that Anselm’s argument is based on the disjunction aut satisfactio 
aut poena.  Is there a third possibility where neither satisfaction is given nor punishment 
undergone?  Hypothetically the answer is yes.  God can do anything that does not involve 
an intrinsic contradiction, and God is not bound by any stricture of justice to require 
satisfaction.
11
  Furthermore, God could have gratuitously pardoned all sins, or even if 
God had wanted satisfaction the slightest suffering on the part of Christ would have 
sufficed.
12
  However, in the present order of reality the answer is no since we have the  
ecclesial doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction.  Lonergan notes that theologians ask the further 
question, why did Christ suffer such great pain?  Lonergan quotes Aquinas: 
“Christ wanted to free mankind from sin not only by exerting his power but also by 
fulfilling the requirements of justice.  Therefore he not only considered the value his 
sorrow would have by virtue of his divine nature, but also how far his pain would go by 
virtue of his human nature towards giving so great a satisfaction as was needed for sin.”13 
 
 Aquinas understood this in terms of fittingness, but later theologians took a 
voluntaristic or hypothetical approach to understand this in terms of necessity.  The 
former appealed to a divine decree of acceptance.  The latter concocted supersubtle 
distinctions to show that Christ gave condign satisfaction according to the full rigor of 
justice.
14
 
                                                 
10
 “Articulus XXVII.  De Ratione Necessitatis,”  DBM, *185-186 [Supplement, 76-77]. 
11
 Lonergan, DBM, *185-186 [Supplement, 77].   
12
 Lonergan, DBM, *186 [Supplement, 77].  Lonergan cites Aquinas as the authoritative source of this 
doctrine (ST, III, q. 46, a. 5, 3um).  He also notes this is the teaching of Pope Clement VI (DB 550). 
13
 “‘Christus voluit genus humanum a peccatis liberare non sola potestate sed etiam iustitia.  Et ideo non 
solum attendit quantam virtutem dolor eius haberet ex divinitate unita:  sed etiam quantum dolor eius 
sufficeret secundum naturam humanam ad tantam satisfactionem.’”  DBM, *186 [Supplement, 77].  This 
quotation is from ST, III, q.46, a. 6, 6um. 
14
 Lonergan, DBM, *186 [Supplement, 77].  Lonergan does not identify any particular theologian.  
However, in Thesis 16 of DVI he gives the same illustrations of voluntaristic and hypothetical approaches.  
Scotus and Suarez are named explicitly, the former to the error of voluntarism and the latter to solutions 
based on hypothetical legal contracts.  De Verbo Incarnato, 493. 
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6.2.3 Article 28:  The Meaning of Punishment
15
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins with the question of whether Anselm’s disjunction means, in the 
real sense, either punishment undergone by Christ or punishment undergone by sinners.
16
   
Christ did die, and according to scripture death is a punishment for sin.  Logically, then, 
Christ suffered punishment. 
 Aside from scripture Lonergan also considers the pre-Anselmian and post-
Anselmian traditions.  Representing the pre-Anselmian tradition, Lonergan notes the 
teaching of Augustine.  Augustine understood death as a penalty for sin but declared that 
Christ, in undergoing punishment and yet not accepting guilt, wiped away both guilt and 
punishment.
17
  Representing the post-Anselmian tradition, Lonergan begins with Catholic 
thinkers.  He notes the positions of Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, and Thomas 
Aquinas, all of whom retrieved the pre-Anselmian tradition that Christ suffered 
punishment.
18
  Aquinas held that in matters pertaining to human volition, evil is divided 
into sin and punishment (penalty).
19
  Aquinas distinguished three types of punishment:  
(1) simple or punitive, (2) medicinal or remedial, and (3) satisfactory or expiatory.
20
  
Christ’s punishment is to be understood as satisfactory, or expiatory.21 
                                                 
15
 “Articulus XXVIII.  De Ratione Poenae,” DBM, *187-193 [Supplement, 77-81]. 
16
 Lonergan, DBM, *187 [Supplement, 77]. 
17
 Lonergan, DBM, *187 [Supplement, 77].  Lonergan references Serm.  171, 3; PL 38:934. 
18
 Lonergan, DBM, *189 [Supplement, 77-78]. 
19
 ST, I, q. 48, a. 5. 
20
 Simple punishment means that each person is punished for his or her own sin (ST, I-II, q. 87, a. 8 c).  
Medicinal punishment is suffering the loss of a lesser good for a greater good (ST, I-II, q. 87, a. 7 c).  
Satisfactory punishment is undergone voluntarily when one person who has not committed a fault willingly 
undergoes punishment in place of another, because in some cases, persons unequal in guilt are one in will 
through their union in love (ST, I-II, q. 87, a. 7 c).  Lonergan, DBM, *189 [Supplement, 79]. 
21
 Lonergan, DBM, *189 [Supplement, 79].  Lonergan recalls Aquinas’s teaching that to inflict punishment 
without regard to guilt or innocence is brutality, while to punish beyond the proportion of fault is cruelty.  
Lonergan references ST, II-II, q. 159, a. 2. 
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 Lonergan then transitions to a consideration of the sixteenth-century reformers.
22
  
Their denial of sacramental satisfaction removed the basis of the analogy for 
understanding Christ’s satisfaction.  By bringing in the notion of fiduciary faith and the 
notion that the righteousness of Christ has been imputed to us, the door was opened to the 
notion that our unrighteousness was imputed to Christ.
23
  The opinion was fully 
developed through Quenstedt (1617-1688), who taught that by reason of God’s justice 
God was obliged to require full payment of the debt incurred by sin.  Without this 
payment God could not remit sins.  So Christ voluntarily had our sins charged to 
himself.
24
  Based on scripture and tradition (Catholic and Protestant), Lonergan judges 
that Anselm’s disjunction cannot be maintained.25 
The remainder of the article primarily considers the opinion of Jacques Rivière.
26
 
Rivière distinguished three possible modes for explaining Christ’s satisfaction:  (1) 
chastisement, (2) expiation, or (3) reparation.  Rivière opted for reparation understood 
along the lines of how Aquinas understood satisfaction.
27
  Rivière acknowledged the 
added element of expiation in Christ’s sufferings but understood Christ’s submission to 
evil as subordinate, secondary, and external.  Others view Rivière’s opinion as doubtful, 
such as Xiberta who held that Christ’s sufferings were by divine ordination, suggesting 
another alternative to Anselm’s disjunction:  either punitive expiation or punishment.28 
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 Lonergan notes the positions of Melanchton, Calvin, F. Socinus (1534-1604), H. Grotius (1583-1645), 
and Quenstedt (1617-1688). 
23
 Lonergan, DBM, *189 [Supplement, 79]. 
24
 Lonergan, DBM, *189-191 [Supplement, 79-80]. 
25
 Lonergan, DBM, *191 [Supplement, 80]. 
26
 Rivière authored the entry “Redemptionis” in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (DTC), vol. 13. 
27
 Lonergan, DBM, *192 [Supplement, 80].  For Aquinas, one satisfies (atones) for an offence when he or 
she displays to the offended person something which pleases that person as much or more than what 
displeased the person by the offense.  ST, III, q. 48, a. 2. 
28
 Lonergan, DBM, *192 [Supplement, 81].  
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6.2.4 Article 29:  The Punishment of Christ
29
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins with the statement that the Latin word poena (“punishment” or 
“penalty”) cannot be separated from Christ’s redemptive work.  He notes how Peter 
Lombard, Alexander of Hales, and Aquinas reintroduced the word poena, but his 
emphasis is on Aquinas.  Aquinas understood satisfaction in the proper sense as not 
having an intrinsic connection with undergoing evil,
30
 but at the same time Aquinas 
spoke of “satisfactory punishment.”31  Lonergan comes to the following judgment: 
Granted that one can put forth a coherent theory according to which satisfaction would 
not necessarily and of itself include suffering evil, nevertheless in our opinion such a 
theory would contribute little to the present discussion, since it is universally 
acknowledged that Christ, in accordance with God's will, suffered and died for us and for 
our sins.
32
 
 
 For Lonergan, elements of a coherent theory must affirm the compatibility of the 
following judgments, which Lonergan appropriates from Rivière:  (1) God does not 
directly will evil; (2) Christ’s passion and death was not simply good, nor a simple 
absence of good, but a privation of good and indeed a privation of the most painful and 
severe kind; and (3) God did directly will Christ's atonement, and so that satisfaction 
given by Christ cannot simply be identified with the suffering of evil.
33
 
 He then states that an objection to this position may be raised, based on the 
assumption that the following three elements are incompatible:  (1) Christ made 
atonement by suffering, (2) God directly willed Christ’s atonement, and (3) God did not 
                                                 
29
 “Articulus XXIX.  De Poena Christi,” DBM, *194-202 [Supplement, 81-85]. 
30
 Lonergan, DBM, *194 [Supplement, 81].  Lonergan references ST, III, q. 48, a. 2. 
31
 Lonergan, DBM, *194 [Supplement, 81].  Lonergan references ST, I-II, q. 87, a. 7, 3um. 
32
 “Quapropter etsi concedamus theoriam sibi cohaerentem ita excogitari posse ut satisfactio mali 
perpessionem per se non includat, credimus tamen theoriam eiusmodi ad nostram materiam parum facere, 
cum constet Christum Deo volente pro nobis nostrisque peccatis esse passum atque mortuum.”  DBM, *194 
[Supplement, 81]. 
33
 Lonergan, DBM, *194 [Supplement, 82].  Lonergan references DTC 13, pp. 1970, 1973.  Lonergan 
qualifies his agreement with Rivière by stating that the element in Rivière’s opinion that Christ’s sufferings 
are subordinate or incidental to Christ’s satisfaction warrants correction. 
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directly will Christ’s passion.34  Lonergan argues that these elements are quite 
compatible, and on two levels.  On the first level, he uses the terminology of scripture 
and the Church Fathers.  On the second level, he uses scholastic terminology. 
 Lonergan summarizes the scriptural and Patristic witness as an interplay of three 
roles: (1) the role of the devil perpetrating Christ’s passion and death, where this passion 
and death, as inflicted on Christ, was a most grave sin;
35
 (2) the role of Christ who 
voluntarily submitted to his passion and death, while at the same time never in the least 
indicated that the ridicule heaped upon him and the scourging and crucifixion he suffered 
were being inflicted upon him by his Father;
36
 and (3) the role of the Father resurrecting 
and exalting his beloved Son, making the Son Lord and Christ and giving to the Son the 
promise of the Father, the Holy Spirit.
37
  Lonergan then relates these roles to his 
speculative work from the previous chapter: 
It is not difficult to discern in these three roles the meaning, the law, the mystery, and the 
justice of the cross.  For the cross presupposes evil, it includes the notion of the triumph 
of the will over evil, and leads to superabundant good lavished by God the Father. 
 
Besides, these three aspects all converge in the meaning of the cross.  However divergent 
these three roles are among themselves, they come together in the single meaning of the 
cross which presupposes evil to be overcome, transforms that evil into good, and through 
that transformation leads us to understand the meaning of the text, “In all things God 
works for good with those who love him” (Rom 8:28).38 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *195 [Supplement, 82]. 
35
 Lonergan, DBM, *195 [Supplement, 82].  Lonergan references ST, III, q. 46, a. 3, 3um; q. 48, a. 4, 2um, 
3um; q. 49, a. 2 c., 1um. 
36
 Lonergan, DBM, *196 [Supplement, 82]. 
37
 Lonergan, DBM, *196 [Supplement, 83]. 
38
 Neque difficile in istis tribus est perspicere rationem, legem, mysterium, iustitiam crucis.  Haec enim 
et malum praesupponit, et malum per victoriam voluntariam victum dicit, et in bonum superabundans a 
Deo Patre collatum conducit. 
Praeterea, per rationem crucis eadem tria in unum conflantur.  Quamvis enim inter se maxime sint diversae 
partes diaboli et partes Christi et partes Dei Patris, in tribus simul sumptis una est crucis ratio, quae et 
malum vincendum praesupponit, et ipsum hoc malum in bonum transformat, et per malum in bonum 
transformatum eo pervenit ut sciat quid sit illud, ‘diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum’ (Rom 8, 
28).”  DBM, *196-197 [Supplement, 83]. 
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 Lonergan then begins his argument using a scholastic mode of expression.  The 
argument is mediated by replying to the following questions:  Why would an all-powerful 
God have dealings with the devil?  Why did God not spare his own Son but instead 
handed him over on behalf of us all?  Lonergan’s reply is that human reason can go no 
farther than Augustine’s dictum that God judged it better to draw good out of evil than to 
allow no evils to exist.
39
  Despite the existence of evil, divine wisdom did not ordain that 
evils should exist.  God neither directly nor indirectly wills sin, but allows sin and the evil 
consequences of sin and arranges for good to be drawn out of this evil.  God’s absolute 
and universal dominion remains intact without God being in any way the cause or author 
of sin.  Sin cannot be attributed to God as if it were intelligible, because sin is the non-
intelligible, the absurd, the irrational.
40
 
Accordingly, since the evil of sin truly exists and is not from God and only exists by his 
permission, we now know what is represented by the devil in the above-mentioned 
picture, and in a way lies hidden under the name of devil.  Ours is not to ask why an 
omnipotent God should be condescend to deal with the devil, but rather to humbly accept 
the fact that God who alone is wise (Rom 16:27) lets the evil of sin happen.
41
 
 
 Once God’s allowance of evil was granted, there was nothing to do but draw good 
out of evil through the meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross.
42
  Lonergan 
acknowledges that this does not fully explain what is meant by Christ’s satisfaction, “but 
it does serve the useful purpose of clearing away false opinions and laying a firm 
foundation for determining the truth of the matter.”43  He states that we can also see this 
                                                 
39
 Lonergan, DBM, *197 [Supplement, 83].  Lonergan references Augustine’s Enchiridion, 27, PL 40:245. 
40
 Lonergan, DBM, *197-198 [Supplement, 83]. 
41
 “Proinde, cum malum culpae et vere sit, et a Deo non sit, et nisi Deo permittente non fiat, illud iam 
habemus quod in dicta pictura per diabolum repraesentatur et sub nomine diaboli quodammodo latet.  Non 
ergo est quaerendum cur Deus omnipotens Dominus ita cum diabolo tractare dignatus sit, sed illud potius 
est humiliter acceptandum quod Deus solus sapiens (Rom 16, 27) malum culpae esse permisit.”  DBM, 
*198 [Supplement, 83]. 
42
 Lonergan, DBM, *198 [Supplement, 84]. 
43
 “...sed hanc utilitatem eamque haud parvam habent ut et falsas opiniones amoveant et solidum praebeant 
fundamentum ad veritatem determinandam.”  DBM, *199 [Supplement, 84]. 
 194 
foundation by examining the notion of Christ’s punishment.  Punishment was involved in 
the passion and death of Christ because (1) passion and death are evils in themselves, and 
(2) these evils resulted from the sins of others.  Christ’s passion and death were a 
privation of the good, and privation of the good is the definition of evil. 
 Furthermore, since punishment is evil that results from sin, there are going to be 
as many species of punishment as there are connections according to God’s manifold 
wisdom by which evil is linked to sin.
44
  Since divine wisdom regulates divine justice, all 
these kinds of punishment are just according to the wisdom and justice of God.  Lonergan 
reiterates the three types of punishment he already covered in article 28:  simple 
punishment, medicinal punishment, and satisfactory punishment.  Simple punishment is 
not applicable to Christ, since Christ’s sinlessness is frequently mentioned in scripture.  
Medicinal punishment is not applicable to Christ, since theologians agree that Christ was 
incapable of sinning and needed no such remedy.  The punishment of Christ is to be 
understood as satisfactory punishment.
45
  The nature of satisfactory punishment is to be 
found in the mystery of the cross wherein Christ crucified is the wisdom of God.
46
 
 Lonergan concludes with four distinctions with respect to Christ’s punishment.  
As inflicted, it was unjust.  As accepted, it was transformed.  As rewarded by the Father, 
it made Christ the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him.  Finally, inasmuch as 
God in his eternal decree allowed this punishment to be inflicted, accepted, and rewarded, 
we can discern with Augustine the plan of divine wisdom that judged it better to draw 
good out of evil than to allow no evils to exist.
47
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 Lonergan, DBM, *199 [Supplement, 84].  Lonergan references ST, I, q. 21, a. 1, 2um. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *200 [Supplement, 84]. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *201 [Supplement, 85]. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *202 [Supplement, 85].  
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6.2.5 Article 30:  The Transference of Punishment to Christ
48
 
 
 
 In this article Lonergan rejects any theory that Christ was in some way 
condemned or chastised by the Father according to retributive justice.  Christ did suffer 
punishment, so there is a penal element to understand.  But what are the possible contexts 
to understand this?  Here is Lonergan’s answer: 
For Christ's satisfaction or atonement, although it may be referred to as punishment, is 
made according to the divine wisdom and justice of the cross; but simple punishment, 
punishment as such, is imposed upon sinners themselves according to the wisdom and 
justice of a divine judge.  And so the disjunction, “either satisfaction or punishment,” 
comes back in a fourth form -- the correct one -- that in the actual order of reality this is 
the operative disjunction, “either the justice of the cross or the justice of a judge.”49 
 
 Lonergan provides five arguments why Christ’s punishment is to be understood 
according to the justice of the cross, not the justice of a judge. 
 First, a just judge does not punish twice for the same offence.  If Christ was 
punished for all sins via the justice of a judge, hell and purgatory would be empty.
50
 
 Second, due punishment in the strict sense for mortal sin is eternal damnation.  If 
Christ was duly punished for sin then he received this form of punishment.  But this is 
obviously false since Christ is now exalted at the right hand of the Father.
51
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 “Articulus XXX.  De poenis in Christum translatis,”  DBM, *203-210 [Supplement, 85-89]. 
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 “Satisfactio enim Christi, etsi poenae nomen habeat, secundum divinam crucis sapientiam atque iustitiam 
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Christ’s merits are applied equally to all; or (2) Christ’s merits are certainly applied to those forgiven in the 
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51
 Lonergan, DBM, *204-205 [Supplement, 86].  Lonergan notes and refutes a possible objection.  One 
could object that it would have been sufficient for Christ to undergo the pains of hell only for a very short 
time.  Lonergan counters that (1) this objection abandons the opinion that Christ suffered the very 
punishment due to sin, and (2) to suggest that Christ suffered the pains of hell does not contribute to 
determining the truth of the matter because such assertion has no serious ground. 
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 Third, it is contrary to the teaching of the New Testament to state that the anger of 
God was directed against his Son.  Christ is not a child of God’s wrath but the Son that 
the Father loves.
52
  God is not unjust and does not condemn one without sin.
53
       
 Fourth, those who interpret the passion and death of Christ in the context of the 
justice of a judge do an injustice to God the Father, to Christ himself, and to Christ’s 
example and precept.
54
  For Lonergan, these injustices stem from mixing fact with fiction 
(fictitious anger of the Father towards Christ, fictitious imputation of guilt to Christ, 
fictitious condemnation of Christ, fictitious punishment of Christ).
55
  Even though Christ 
repudiated the law of retaliation and preached the wisdom of the Cross, the Father would 
seem to have ignored his own wisdom and followed the law of retaliation.
56
  This is a 
contradiction and an injustice to the Father, since scripture is clear that the Father first 
loved us (1 Jn 4:9), and being rich in mercy, because of this love for us sent his Son 
reconciling the world to himself (2 Cor 5:19) proving his love for us (Rom 5:8).
57
  
Furthermore, according to the opinion that Christ was punished according to the justice of 
a judge, one is equating Christ with the First Adam and this is an injustice to Christ since 
Christ is not the head of sinful humanity but Head of the Church which he loves.
58
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Finally, if Christ’s example and precept is the justice of the cross, we contradict Christ’s 
example and precept if we interpret his passion and death in the context of the justice of a 
judge because such an interpretation suggests to us to ignore Christ and follow a precept 
of retributive justice instead.
59
 
 Fifth, there is a distinction between the condemnation of sin and the 
condemnation of a person.  The latter changes a person's status in society and concludes 
that the condemned is guilty of sin and to be punished.  Lonergan does not deny that in 
Christ crucified we see an extreme condemnation of sin.  But this is condemnation of sin, 
not condemnation of Christ.  To condemn Christ is to condemn the second person of the 
Trinity.  A suggestion that one person of the Trinity condemns another is blasphemous.
60
   
 
6.2.6 Article 31:  The Sacramental Analogy
61
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins by noting three assertions from previous articles:  (1) Christ’s 
satisfaction was not absolutely necessary; (2) this satisfaction did not necessarily rule out 
Christ’s physical passion and death; and (3) this satisfaction was not punishment for the 
sins of others in accordance with the justice of a judge.
62
 
 Lonergan then recalls two teachings of Trent.  First, our Lord Jesus Christ merited 
justification for us by his most holy passion and cross, and made atonement (satisfecit) to 
God the father on our behalf (DB 799; DS 1529; ND 1932).
63
  Second, as we suffer 
something in making atonement for sin we become like Christ who atoned for our sins 
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(DB 904; DS 1689; ND 1630).
64
  Based on these teachings, Lonergan concludes that 
Christ’s satisfaction is to be understood by way of analogy to the sacrament of penance.  
 Theological tradition
65
 and sacramental theology
66
 support this conclusion.  
Lonergan also appeals to the argument he developed previously that Christ's satisfaction 
was not a matter of juridical justice, but the justice of the cross.  Satisfaction understood 
from an analogy from jurisprudence must be rejected.
67
  Also, a theory which 
understands Christ’s physical sufferings as “un élément de fait,” “un trait secondaire et 
superficiel” expound a theory contributing little to understanding the vicarious suffering 
of Christ.
68
  Lonergan ends the article noting that the satisfaction given by Christ and the 
satisfaction given by penitents is not a univocal predication but an analogous 
predication.
69
  Christ offered satisfaction not for his own sins, but for the sins of others, 
and not according to the justice of a judge but according to the justice of the cross.  A 
penitent however atones for his or her own sins which by a judicial act of absolution fully 
remits the guilt but not as to the punishment due.  Christ never had a sinful past life 
needing renewal, nor the guilt associated with sins, nor the punishment due to sins which 
would have required retributive chastisement. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *211 [Supplement, 89]. 
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6.2.7 Article 32:  The Sorrows of Christ
70
 
 
 
 In this article Lonergan explains that although satisfaction consists in an external 
act in such a way that one person can make satisfaction on behalf of another, the external 
act springs from an interior source or principle.
71
  In the case of Christ, the interior source 
or principle was the sorrow Christ had for our sins.  Lonergan grounds this judgment on 
the authority of Aquinas and also on theological reasoning. 
 Regarding the authority of Aquinas, Lonergan notes four points.  First, the cause 
of Christ’s interior pain or sorrow was the sins of the whole human race.72 Second, 
Aquinas, drawing on Augustine, states that there is a type of sadness that is praiseworthy 
when it stems from a holy love.  This sadness can be of help towards atoning for sin.  
Thus Christ in atoning for all sins experienced the most profound sadness though not as 
much as to go beyond the bounds of reason.
73
  Third, this sorrow surpassed any sorrow 
ever felt by a repentant sinner because it proceeded from a greater wisdom and love and 
because Christ grieved for all sins at once.
74
  Fourth, since Christ wished to free us from 
sin not only through his power but also in accordance with justice, Christ not only 
considered the value his pain would have by virtue of his own divine nature but also the 
value his pain would have by virtue of his humanity towards giving as much satisfaction 
as was called for by sin.
75
 
 Lonergan also provides an argument from theological reasoning.  He makes five 
points.  First, the Son’s will was not different from the Father’s will.  Therefore it was the 
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Son’s own will to suffer and die for sins.  Second, if this was the Son’s intention he 
would not do this without detesting sins, grieving for sins, and resolving to take away 
sins.  Third, Christ certainly detested sins because Christ had the immediate vision of the 
divine goodness.  As such, he had a more profound understanding of sin than any other 
person could have.  Christ also loved the Father with the utmost love and so regarded 
offenses against the Father with the utmost detestation.  Fourth, Christ grieved over sins.  
The greater one’s love for God, the greater one’s love for his or her neighbor.  Since 
Christ had the greatest love of God and the greatest love of neighbor, our sins were the 
cause of the most intense grief for Christ.  Christ’s great love for the Father, and his love 
for us who were at enmity with God, is what makes Christ the mediator between God and 
humanity.  The juxtaposition between the good Christ loved and the greatest of evils was 
the root, source, and cause of Christ’s sorrow.  Fifth, the more we detest evil and grieve 
over it, the more firmly we resolve to get rid of it.  Christ had the greatest possible 
detestation of sin and sorrow because of sins, so Christ had the most resolute 
determination to take away the sins of the world.
76
  In brief, then, the interior source of 
Christ’s satisfaction is his detestation of sin, his sorrow and grief for our sins, and his 
firm determination to take away sins.
77
 
 
6.2.8 Article 33:  The Satisfaction Given by Christ
78
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins by recalling the conclusion of the previous article.  Christ had a 
love for God the Father and for us, and knowledge of the seriousness of sin.  As such he 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *216-217[Supplement, 91-92].  On the fourth point Lonergan references ST, I-II, q. 35, 
a. 1. 
77
 Lonergan, DBM, *217 [Supplement, 92]. 
78
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had a detestation for sin and sorrow for our sins together with a firm resolve to take away 
sin and prevent future sin.  This interior source can be referred to as an “interior act” 
(actum interiorem).
79
  Christ could have exercised this act in three ways.  First, through 
his immediate knowledge of God and consequent volition, neither of which depend on 
sentient operations.  Second, through acquired knowledge and “interior sensibility” 
(sensibilitatem interiorem) added to his immediate knowledge of God.  This second way 
presupposes sentient operations.  Third, through an expression of the interior act via 
exterior senses and physical movements.  This includes the first two but it makes the 
interior act a more completely human act.
80
  Since Christ’s satisfaction did indeed involve 
an outward expression of his inward detestation and sorrow for our sins, this third way is 
the way Christ actually exercised his interior act.
81
  Outward expressions manifest human 
interior acts into the public realm, and this is fitting since humans are, by nature, political 
and social beings who need the cooperation and contributions of others.  Furthermore, 
signs are divided principally into denotative and expressive.  The former cause others to 
perceive and understand.  The latter add to this understanding an affectivity such that 
others are moved to will and act accordingly.
82
  Christ’s outward act was the latter. 
 Having laid down these premises Lonergan comes to four conclusions.  First, it 
was appropriate for our Lord to outwardly express his interior sorrow.  The Word 
assumed a human nature in its totality, and it is fitting that complete human operations 
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are performed not only in the intellectual part of a person, but also through external 
expression.  It is also fitting that Christ should express publicly what he was doing for our 
benefit and what he desired for our imitation.
83
  Second, it was appropriate that Christ 
accept his passion and death to express his interior sorrow, because only a supreme act 
would be proportionate to his sorrow.
84
  Third, Christ’s expression of his interior sorrow 
is rightly understood as vicarious suffering, and this vicarious suffering and death was not 
only for the purpose of taking away sin but it was also the result of sin.
85
  Fourth, Christ’s 
vicarious suffering, accepted as an expression of his interior sorrow, is rightly understood 
as vicarious satisfaction because it fulfills the definition of vicarious satisfaction: a penal 
work undertaken out of detestation for sin, sorrow for sin, and intent of wiping away sins 
and guarding against future sins.
86
 
 
6.2.9 Article 34:  The Superabundant Satisfaction Given by Christ
87
 
 
 
 In this article Lonergan explains why Christ’s satisfaction was superabundant, a 
common doctrine among theologians.
88
  Christ’s satisfaction is not to be measured in 
terms of sin, but in terms of grace:  like other graces the satisfaction given by Christ was 
superabundant.
89
  Lonergan makes seven points supporting this judgment. 
 First, the ontological and psychological subject making satisfaction was the Word 
of God, one of the Persons of the Trinity, and the Lord of Glory.  Second, the formal 
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element of Christ’s satisfaction is his interior act flowing from his immediate vision of 
God and love for the Father.  This interior act includes a commensurate detestation of sin, 
sorrow over sins, and resolve to redeem us from sin.  In each is the formality of 
supernaturality since Christ is a divine person operating in an assumed human nature.  
Third, since the interior act informs the exterior act, it is through Christ’s exterior act that 
we can apprehend the humility, obedience, and love of a divine person as well as a 
detestation of sin, sorrow for our sins, and resolve to take away sins.  Fourth, all of 
Christ’s acts, interior and exterior, were positively and directly offered to the service and 
honor of God the Father.  Fifth, Christ’s satisfaction is far greater than the heinousness of 
all sins.  Sin has a note of infinity since it offends God, but it is nevertheless an act of a 
creature and an ontological privation.  Christ’s satisfaction is a positive reality with an 
infinite quality because of the Father to whom it was offered and from the Son who 
offered it.  Sixth, Christ’s satisfaction did not go beyond God’s intention, the obedience 
Christ owed to the Father, or the mode of operation proper to a divine person.  Seventh, 
the satisfaction made by Christ and offered by us are analogical terms, and although 
satisfaction has been made by the Head there remains satisfaction to be made by the 
members.
90
 
 
6.3 Lonergan’s Understanding of the Doctrine of Christ’s Satisfaction 
 
 
 In April of 1959, Lonergan gave a lecture titled “Method in Catholic Theology.”91  
The content of that lecture corresponded very closely to the course De intellectu et 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *225-228 [Supplement, 95-97].  
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 Delivered to the Society for Theological Studies, Nottingham University.  Originally published in 
Method: Journal of Lonergan studies 10:1 (Spring 1992), 3-26.  Recently published as “Method in Catholic 
Theology,” Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, 29-53. 
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methedo Lonergan was teaching in the Gregorian University from February to June 
1959.
92
  In the lecture Lonergan discussed five precepts of method in Catholic Theology:  
(1) Understand, (2) Understand Systematically, (3) Develop Positions, (4) Reverse 
Counterpositions, (5) Accept the Responsibility of Judgment.  All are evident in 
Lonergan’s speculative understanding of Christ’s satisfaction.  However, his work is 
perhaps one of the clearest examples in his entire Latin theology of two of these five 
precepts:  develop positions and reverse counterpositions.  The precepts of developing 
positions and reversing counterpositions were previously worked out in Insight, then 
subsequently applied to the field of theology.
93
   
 The formulation of theological discoveries can be divided into two classes:  
positions and counterpositions.
94
  Positions are the result of intelligent inquiry and critical 
reflection, of what Lonergan calls “intellectual conversion.”95 Counterpositions are 
contradictory to positions and rooted in the lack of intellectual conversion.  Positions 
head for development and counterpositions head for reversal.  Counterpositions can be 
coherent with other counterpositions, providing a mask of authenticity, but once the 
contradiction of the counterposition is revealed the counterposition heads for its own 
reversal.  Since the precepts of developing positions and reversing counterpositions are so 
clearly apparent in this chapter, my interpretation will identify where Lonergan is either 
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 See editorial note in Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, 29, n. 1. 
93
 On the basic distinction between philosophical positions and counterpositions, see chapter 14 of Insight 
titled “The Method of Metaphysics,” 413-414.  In a 1962 lecture that was part of an institute on method, 
given at Regis College in Toronto, Lonergan explicitly stated that the same method applies to the field of 
theology.  See Bernard Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method 1, vol. 22 of the Collected Works of 
Bernard Lonergan, eds. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2010), 141. 
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 Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, 37. 
95
 Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, 37-38.  The later Lonergan, in Method in 
Theology, includes the lack of religious or moral conversion.  Method in Theology, 249.  The meaning of 
“intellectual conversion” is the appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness, eliminating the 
myth that knowing is like looking.  It is the self-appropriation in the knower that one’s knowledge is a 
compound of experiencing, understanding (intelligent inquiry), and judging (critical reflection). 
 205 
developing a position or reversing a counterposition as I consider the major elements in 
his speculative understanding of Christ’s satisfaction. 
 I will focus on four major elements:  (1) The integration of satisfactio and poena; 
(2) Christ’s poena understood in terms of fittingness, not necessity; (3) The intelligible 
context to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work; and (4) The 
analogy to understand Christ’s satisfaction. 
 This is certainly not to suggest that Lonergan’s speculative understanding of 
Christ’s satisfaction includes only these four elements.  More could always be said in any 
interpretation, but there is not room to say everything.  For reasons of space and 
relevancy to Lonergan’s stated purpose to explain the historical causality of Christ, I have 
chosen these four.
96
 
 
6.3.1 The Integration of Satisfactio and Poena 
 
 
 For Lonergan, the Latin word poena can hardly be separated from any speculative 
(systematic) understanding of Christ’s redemptive work.97  But Anselm’s disjunction aut 
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 For example, another element is Lonergan’s understanding of how Christ’s satisfaction is superabundant, 
and this is a development of Anselm’s position.  The theorem of the supernatural had not yet been 
developed in Anselm’s time.  As such, he conceived superabundancy in terms of supererogation.  Christ’s 
giving of his life was meritorious because it was excessive, in other words, essentially an overpayment.  
There is a difficulty with this approach.  As Charles Hefling notes, the difficulty with such an argument is 
that excess implies that what exceeds and what is exceeded share a common measure.  The implication is 
that merit before God does not depend on grace, since there is no distinction between the natural and the 
supernatural.  For Lonergan, Christ’s satisfaction is superabundant not because it was supererogatory in the 
Anselmian sense, but because Christ’s satisfaction is to be measured in relation to grace, which is a 
judgment ultimately grounded in the Christological affirmation that Christ is a divine person operating in 
an assumed human nature.  For an interpretation of this development see Hefling, “Lonergan’s Cur Deus 
Homo,” 148. 
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 Lonergan understands poena, punishment, in the technical sense used in medieval theology.  In the order 
of divine justice, the punishment consequent upon sin is the privation of a good, and the privation of a good 
is the definition of evil.  So Christ’s suffering of poena is the suffering of evil.  In the technical sense one 
can suffer the evil consequences of sin even though one is not guilty of the sin that gave rise to the 
consequences.  The contemporary meaning of the English word “punishment” does not adequately convey 
this technical meaning.  For example, as Charles Hefling points out, “We do not ordinarily think of all the 
ills [of societies, nations, world] that are consequent upon basic sin as punishments in quite the same sense 
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satisfactio aut poena implies that satisfaction and punishment are mutually exclusive.  
Does Lonergan consider Anselm’s disjunction a counterposition?   
 In my interpretation the answer is no.  We would not have the doctrine of Christ’s 
satisfaction had it not been for Anselm’s speculative theory.  Lonergan is not outright 
rejecting Anselm’s disjunction.  It is a position, but it is incomplete.  Lonergan is 
advancing that position, not in the sense that he is the first to retrieve the notion of poena, 
but in the sense that his chapter demonstrates intelligent inquiry and critical reflection as 
to why poena cannot be separated from Christ’s redemptive work.  Although Lonergan 
appeals to the pre-Anselmian and post-Anselmian tradition, I interpret that the ultimate 
ground of why he judges that poena cannot be separated from Christ’s redemptive work 
is based on his previous work in the third chapter of the Supplement, where he 
categorized certain teachings of the New Testament under the heading “Vicarious 
Suffering” (article 20).  For Lonergan, the fact that scripture witnesses to the vicarious 
suffering of Christ is the authoritative reason why satisfaction and poena must be 
integrated in a speculative understanding of Christ’s satisfaction.  This is why Lonergan 
states that even though one could put forth a theory in which satisfaction would not 
necessarily include the suffering of evil, that theory would contribute little to a 
speculative understanding given that it is universally acknowledged that Christ, in 
accordance with God’s will, suffered and died for us and for our sins.98 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
as we think of imprisonment as the punishment for tax-evasion.”  Hefling, “A Perhaps Permanently Valid 
Achievement,” 57. 
98
 Lonergan, DBM, *194 [Supplement, 81]. 
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6.3.2 Christ’s Poena Understood in terms of Fittingness, not Necessity 
 
 
 That Christ suffered punishment is, for Lonergan, a true judgment.  For Lonergan 
there is a deeper question:  if the slightest sufferings of Christ would have sufficed to 
make satisfaction for us to God the Father, which is a common and certain doctrine, then 
why did Christ suffer such great pain?  To ask why is to anticipate an intelligibility.  For 
Lonergan, there must be an intelligibility as to why Christ suffered such great pain.  Why 
must there an intelligibility?  Christ’s great pain is the suffering of an evil, and evil has no 
intrinsic intelligibility.  So why is there an expected intelligibility?    
 To answer this let us start with a conviction Lonergan repeatedly recalls from 
scripture:  the wisdom of God is revealed in Christ crucified.  If Christ crucified was 
simply a matter of divine free choice, without any regard to divine wisdom, then there 
would be no “why,” no “reason” in answer to the question, “Why did Christ suffer such 
great pain?”  For Lonergan, if a contingent truth is not ordained by divine wisdom, then 
that contingent truth has no “why,” no “reason.”99  Contingent truths simply become 
arbitrary facts.  The fact that Christ suffered great pain is not a necessary truth, but a 
contingent truth ordained by divine wisdom.  Contingent truths ordained by divine 
wisdom do have an intelligibility, but a non-necessary intelligibility, which is the 
                                                 
99
 In the Lonergan archives there is a set of notes dating back to the 1940s.  In these notes Lonergan 
explicitly treats the problem of voluntarism.  These notes are helpful for us to understand why Lonergan 
states that voluntarism ignores the significance of intelligibility.  In these notes Lonergan states that 
contingent truth conceived as a product of free choice cannot be an object of scientific knowledge.  If a 
contingent truth is grounded merely in a matter of divine free choice, without any connection to divine 
wisdom, then that contingent truth is a pure matter of fact, but there is no “why,” no “reason” for that pure 
matter of fact.  As such, there is no intelligibility, not even the non-necessary intelligibility that is 
convenientiae.  The archival material is 6 pages treating voluntarism and the root of voluntarism, available 
in pdf file 32300DTE040/A323 at www.bernardlonergan.com.  The remarks of Lonergan to which I refer 
are found on pg. 2. 
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meaning of convenientia.
100
  And the reason there must be an intelligibility is grounded in 
Lonergan’s position that in the order of this universe created by God, there is a reason (an 
intelligibility) for everything that exists or happens if it is ordained by divine wisdom.
101
 
Since the wisdom of God is revealed in Christ crucified, there must be a reason, a non-
necessary intelligibility as to why Christ suffered such great pain.  This is why Lonergan 
is critical of voluntaristic and hypothetical approaches that try to explain Christ’s great 
pain in terms of necessity.  As Lonergan mentions in his notes from the 1940s on the 
problem of voluntarism, necessity is one thing and intelligibility another.
102
  This is why 
voluntarism, since it denies a link between contingent truth and divine wisdom, answers 
the question of why Christ suffered such great pain by resorting to what Lonergan calls 
“a divine decree of acceptance” (beneplacitum divinae acceptationis).103  In my 
interpretation what this means is a conception of divine causality in the created order 
where such causality is linked to divine will without union to divine wisdom.
104
  In other 
words, there is a difference between a “divine decree” and a “divine decree of 
acceptance.”  In the former, there is a union of intellect and will in God.  In the latter it is 
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 Lonergan, De ratione convenientiae, 16. 
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 In Lonergan’s chapter on divine justice he stated that inasmuch as everything that exists or happens is 
ordained by divine wisdom a reason for its being can be assigned to it.  DBM, 69 [Supplement, 29]. 
102
 32300DTE040/A323, p. 3. 
103
 Lonergan, DBM, *186 [Supplement, 77].   
104
 I am borrowing the language of “union” from John H. Wright, S.J.  Wright states: “The union of 
intellect and will in God, this actual conjunction of the intention of the divine will with the divine goodness 
known as shareable, is sometimes called ‘an eternal divine decree,’ the infallibly efficacious determination 
of divine causality to produce a definite effect.”  Wright also defines a “divine decree” as “the intentional 
union of the divine will with the divine goodness , inasmuch as God is willing this creature as acting and as 
ordered to Himself –actual causative knowledge.”  What Wright means by “shareable” is the divine idea, 
proceeding from divine wisdom, to order creation to a final cause in which creation “shares” in the very 
goodness of God.  See John H. Wright, S.J., “Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom:  The God Who 
Dialogues,” Theological Studies 38 (1977), 462, 469. 
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only a matter of divine will, contrary to Aquinas’s doctrine that the knowledge of God is 
the cause of all things.
105
 
The hypothetical approach prescinds from the actual order of reality and seeks 
intelligibility in some hypothetical world so as to accord to this intelligibility the status of 
“necessity.”  For Lonergan, to seek intelligibility in a hypothetical world is an intrinsic 
contradiction.  We know nothing of other possible worlds other than that these worlds are 
possible.  But the divine will has chosen this world conceived by divine wisdom.  So the 
intelligibility we grasp must attend to the present order of reality.  This explains why 
Lonergan states, in his article on the notion of necessity, that later theologians (after 
Aquinas), rather than seeking understanding of Christ’s suffering in terms of fittingness 
related to the actual order of reality “concocted supersubtle distinctions to show that 
Christ gave condign satisfaction in accordance with the full rigor of justice.”106  The “full 
rigor of justice” means retributive justice.  But hypothetical concoctions are not based on 
reality.  They fail to grasp any intelligibility because the only intelligibility we can grasp 
is the intelligibility in the actual, present order of reality.
107
 Each of these approaches 
(voluntarism and hypothetical) is a counterposition in terms of methodology.  Lonergan 
reverses the counterposition by arguing intelligently and critically that Christ’s great pain 
is to be understood in terms of fittingness, not necessity. 
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 ST, I, q. 14, a. 8.  In ST, I, q. 19, a. 4. 
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 “...subtilissimas inveniebant distinctiones ut demonstrarent Christum ex condigno et secundum rigorem 
iustitiae satisfacisse.”  DBM, *186 [Supplement, 77]. 
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 This can also be understood if one considers Lonergan’s cognitional theory, generally known as “critical 
realism.”  For Lonergan, as a critical realist, human beings can know reality.  There is an isomorphism 
between the knower and the known, and the knower comes to know the known through the cognitional 
operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging.  Stated in a form familiar to students of Lonergan, 
knowing is not “taking a good look.”  But since knowledge begins with the operation of experience, then 
sentient operations are required, and those operations must have corresponding objects.  But in a 
hypothetical world, there are no such corresponding objects.  Hence there is no knowledge of a 
hypothetical world, other than that it is possible.  Such knowledge of a hypothetical world would need to be 
revealed.  But we have no such revelation. 
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6.3.3 The Intelligible Context to Interpret the Poena Associated with Christ’s 
Redemptive Work 
 
 
 Once one judges that poena can hardly be separated from Christ’s redemptive 
work, and that this poena must be understood in terms of fittingness and not necessity, 
there arises the problem of understanding how this poena is intelligibly connected with 
Christ’s redemptive work.  This understanding, in and of itself, is not equivalent to an 
understanding of Christ’s satisfaction.  Lonergan will not get to that point until he takes 
up the sacramental analogy.  But a starting point is to understand how poena fits in the 
picture.  This problem is the same problem that later in DVI Lonergan calls the “problem 
of integration.”108  The problem of integration is clearly present in the Supplement, 
though Lonergan does not use this explicit phrase.  The problem of integration involves 
choosing what in DVI Lonergan calls the correct “intelligible context” to interpret 
Christ’s punishment.109 
 My understanding of “intelligible context,” in using this term to interpret 
Lonergan, is the meaning associated to a notion Lonergan introduced later in 1962 in a 
set of lectures on “The Method of Theology” delivered at Regis College in Toronto.110  In 
those lectures, Lonergan introduced the notion of the “dogmatic-theological context.”  
Lonergan calls the dogmatic-theological context a “remainder concept,” meaning all the 
rest that is relevant to understanding a topic.  Therefore, the dogmatic-theological context 
refers to all of the other remaining factors that must be taken into account if a specific 
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 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 520. 
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 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 488. 
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 The lectures are available in mp3 audio format at www.bernardlonergan.com, beginning with audio file 
30200A0E060.  A transcription of the lectures has been recently published in part 1 of Early Works on 
Theological Method 1. 
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theological conclusion is to be understood correctly.
111
  In the first lecture, Lonergan 
underscores the importance of the dogmatic-theological context through the general 
example of heresy.  He raises the following question:  what is wrong with heretics?  His 
answer is that a heretic may be saying something true from a factual context, yet at the 
same time the statement may be incompatible with the dogmatic-theological context, thus 
denying elements which implicitly or explicitly pertain to that context.
112
 
 Lonergan’s judgment that the Latin word poena can hardly be separated from 
Christ’s redemptive work is a theological conclusion grounded in the teaching of the New 
Testament.  That theological conclusion, in order to be understood correctly, needs a 
proper intelligible context, what Lonergan later called a dogmatic-theological context.
113
  
The intelligible context needs to account for remaining factors essential to properly 
interpreting the meaning of the poena associated with Christ’s’ redemptive work.  What 
are the factors involved? 
 Let us begin with a statement Lonergan makes in DVI and then relate this to the 
Supplement.  In Thesis 16 of DVI, on Christ’s Satisfaction, Lonergan states that 
satisfaction, regarded formally, is the vicarious suffering and death of Christ understood 
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 See specifically audio file 30200A0E060 / CD/ mp3 302.  Lonergan’s notion of the dogmatic-
theological context is certainly consistent with one of his tenets of what Catholic systematic theology 
involves, as defined by the First Vatican Council.  Reason illuminated by faith, when it inquires diligently, 
reverently, and soberly, can reach with God’s help an imperfect but extremely fruitful understanding of the 
mysteries of faith both from the analogy of what it [reason] naturally knows and from the interconnection 
of the mysteries with one another and with man’s last end (DB 1796).  A dogmatic-theological context is 
necessary if a mystery is to be understood through the interconnection of the mysteries with one another 
and with our last end. 
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referring to the dogmatic-theological context of the Catholic tradition. 
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 Though Lonergan does not explicitly refer to an “intelligible context” in the Supplement, it is clear that 
his consideration of various disjunctions (for example, “either the justice of the cross or the justice of a 
judge”) is in fact a consideration of various intelligible contexts.  The proper intelligible context will 
include “all the rests” relevant to understanding a particular topic.  The methodology is operative in the 
Supplement, though not adverted to explicitly. 
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according to some interpretation, some intelligible context.  He identifies three elements 
in the intelligible context: 
Now such an interpretation or intelligible context is a systematic theology, nothing else, 
and theology is not made systematic by fits and starts.  The theology of sin and 
punishment is involved; likewise the theology of God’s justice; and finally the theology 
of redemption should not be left out.
114
 
 
 The three elements identified in DVI are thus (1) the theology of sin and 
punishment, (2) the theology of God’s justice, and (3) the theology of redemption.  In the 
Supplement, Lonergan’s methodology in arguing that the “justice of the cross” is the 
correct context in which to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work 
includes consideration of all three of these elements. 
 The first element, the theology of sin and punishment, is found in Lonergan’s 
argument that there are distinctions that must be made in the relationship between sin and 
punishment.  Here he follows Aquinas in identifying three types of punishment related to 
sin:  simple, medicinal, and satisfactory.  Christ was without fault, and he neither took on 
nor incurred fault.  But he did voluntarily take on poena.  Since Christ’s poena was 
voluntarily taken on, and not imputed to him, then this poena cannot be interpreted as 
simple punishment.  Medicinal punishment can also be ruled out.  Christ neither sinned 
nor could sin.  To speak of medicinal punishment for one who never sinned and cannot 
sin makes no sense.  Therefore we are left with satisfactory punishment.  In my 
interpretation, this whole discussion on the types of punishment is essentially Lonergan’s 
integration of the theology of sin and punishment into the intelligible context. 
 The second element, the theology of God’s justice, is found in Lonergan’s 
argument that the following are compatible:  (1) Christ made satisfaction by suffering, (2) 
                                                 
114
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 488 
 213 
God directly willed Christ's satisfaction, and (3) God did not directly will Christ's 
passion.  The first is a true judgment based on ecclesial doctrine.  The second is a true 
judgment based on revelation.
115
  The third is a true judgment based on Lonergan’s 
theological principle of divine justice.  Anything directly willed by God must be a good.  
The passion represents the poena suffered by Christ, and since poena is an evil, it cannot 
be directly willed by God.  What God directly wills must be a good, not evil.  In short, 
the judgments are compatible due to Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice. 
 The third element, the theology of redemption, is found in Lonergan’s argument 
that in the suffering and death of Christ we can discern the meaning, mystery, law, and 
justice of the cross.  In other words, Lonergan is introducing into the intelligible context 
the theology of redemption developed in the previous chapter.  As we noted in that 
chapter, when the meaning of the cross is generalized with respect to the entire economy 
of salvation, we have the “law of the cross,” what later in DVI Lonergan called the 
“intrinsic intelligibility” of redemption and whose essential meaning is the transformation 
of evil into a greater good through a victory of the will in self-sacrificing love.  There are 
no less than eight references in article 29 (“The Punishment of Christ”) to the “meaning 
of the cross”116 and/or the “meaning, law, mystery, and justice of the cross.”117  The 
purpose of these references is to convince the reader that the poena associated with 
Christ’s redemptive work is nothing other than the evil presupposed, voluntarily taken on, 
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 Lonergan knows that scripture does not use the word “satisfaction,” but scripture is clear that God 
directly willed Christ’s saving work through his passion and death, and for Lonergan “satisfaction” is 
simply a concept employed in a speculative effort to understand how Christ’s suffering and death are 
salvific.  Logically then, God directly willed Christ’s satisfaction.   
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 Lonergan, DBM, *197 (3x), *199 [Supplement, 83 (3x) 84]. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *196, *198, *199, *202 [Supplement, 83, 84 (2x), 85]. 
 214 
and transformed into a greater good through the law of the cross.  What Lonergan is 
doing here is bringing into the intelligible context the theology of redemption. 
 Through a consideration of these three elements, Lonergan judges that that proper 
intelligible context to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work is the 
“justice of the cross.”  The meaning and law of the cross are grounded in divine wisdom.  
Understood in the context of divine justice, the meaning and law of the cross becomes the 
“justice of the cross.”  This intelligible context also aids our understanding of how 
Christ’s redemptive work is related to sinners.  Lonergan states that Christ’s satisfaction 
merits the remission (remissionem; remissio; auferenda) of all sins and punishment 
alike.
118
  But the remission of sins is the definition of pardon.  In the Supplement, 
Lonergan does not explicitly state that the remission of sins is the definition of pardon, 
but the notion of pardon is without doubt part of the intelligible context Lonergan is 
calling the “justice of the cross” given Lonergan’s emphasis that Christ’s satisfaction 
merits the remission of all sins and punishment alike.  In DVI, Lonergan does explicitly 
state that the definition of pardon (venia) is the remission of an offense,
119
 and explains 
the intelligible context for interpreting Christ’s vicarious suffering and death is “pardon 
being sought and granted, detestation and sorrow regarding the offense, remission of fault 
and punishment alike.”120  Therefore the “justice of the cross” means that the poena 
associated with Christ’s redemptive work is to be understood as suffering and death 
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 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 490.   
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willingly taken on in the context of pardon sought and granted for the remission of both 
the guilt and punishment of sinners. 
 Lonergan’s intelligent inquiry and critical reflection into the intelligible context in 
which to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work represents a 
development of the position Lonergan has already established:  that satisfaction and 
poena must be integrated.  The development is a response to the new question that arises 
once the position is established that Anselm’s disjunction cannot be maintained.  But 
Lonergan’s intelligent inquiry and critical reflection into the intelligible context is not 
simply the development of a position.  It also includes reversal of a counterposition. 
 The counterposition is the judgment that the poena associated with Christ’s 
redemptive work is to be interpreted in the context of the “justice of a judge.”  This is an 
intelligible context taken from the world of jurisprudence, meaning retributive justice.  
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the counterposition is the image of the Father 
suggested by the counterposition.  The image is that of a vindictive Father who demands 
retributive justice for the sins of the human race, even if this means inflicting suffering 
and death on an innocent person.  For Lonergan, such an image of the Father does an 
injustice to the image of the Father revealed by scripture. 
 Lonergan’s reversal of the counterposition is found principally in article 30, “The 
Transference of Punishment to Christ.”  The title reflects what Lonergan considers the 
ground of the counterposition.  The counterposition is only coherent if the one punished 
is in some way guilty of the sins committed.  But Christ was without sin.  So the way the 
counterposition gets around this problem is the judgment that our guilt, our liability for 
punishment, has been “transferred” (our “imputed”) to Christ.  Without a notion of this 
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transference, the counterposition does not have the cloak of coherence.  Without a cloak 
of coherence, the counterposition would not survive. 
In that article, Lonergan sets up his argument to reverse the counterposition by 
coming to what he states is the operative disjunction in the actual order of reality:  either 
the justice of the cross or the justice of a judge.  Lonergan’s reference to the actual order 
of reality reveals his fidelity to a theological method that in Insight he describes as “the 
sobriety of Aquinas,” referring to Aquinas’s concern to come to knowledge of the actual 
world conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness, not a concern with 
hypothetical worlds.
121
  In the previous section we spoke of Lonergan’s focus on the 
actual order of reality.  Lonergan emphasized this in the Boston College Lectures on 
Mathematical Logic and Existentialism, as we noted in his chapter on divine justice.  He 
emphasized this again in the 1958 Halifax lectures on Insight, where he stated the 
following in response to a question during an evening Q&A session: 
With Scotus, unless you are asking about possible worlds, you are not doing science, 
because Scotus was concerned with necessary propositions that would be true in any 
possible world, and consequently, his discussions become scientific insofar as he is 
talking about any possible world.  But you have an entirely different slant in Thomas.  
What Thomas is doing is seeking the intelligibility of this world, trying to see the wisdom 
of the divine plan and counsel in this world – just as the empirical scientist is not 
concerned with what the law of gravity might be, but with what de facto that intelligible 
law is in this world.
122
 
 
 What Lonergan is implying in the Supplement is the following:  if we attend to the 
actual order of reality conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine will, then there 
are two and only two possible intelligible contexts in the actual order of reality to 
interpret the poena associated with Christ’s redemptive work.  The reason why there are 
only two intelligible contexts goes back to Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice.  
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Divine wisdom has conceived a world order in which human works can be reduced to 
one of two categories:  good or evil.  Logically then there are four possible relationships 
between good and evil, four suborders if you will within the one order of divine justice: 
(1) good follows good, (2) evil follows evil, (3) evil follows good, and (4) good follows 
evil.  The first two suborders represent retributive justice, but the very first is not relevant 
here because Lonergan’s purpose is to interpret the poena associated with Christ’s 
redemptive work.  The second suborder represents retributive justice, what Lonergan 
calls the “justice of a judge.”  The third suborder represents God’s allowing of sin, and 
the evil consequences of sin, because it is good that there exist rational creatures that are 
truly free.  The forth suborder is restoration, natural or supernatural.  Supernatural 
restoration is redemption in the proper theological sense.  In this context, the “justice of 
the cross” is the third suborder linked to the fourth suborder (supernatural, not natural 
restoration). 
 All of the other three disjunctions fail in one way or another to harmonize with 
the actual order of reality.  The original Anselmian disjunction “either satisfaction or 
punishment” cannot be maintained since the pre-Anselmian tradition, in their reading of 
scripture, always maintained that Christ suffered punishment.  That Christ suffered and 
died implies that Christ suffered punishment.  This is a fact of history.  Facts of history 
are part of the actual order of reality.  This rules out the first disjunction.  The second 
disjunction, “either punishment undergone by Christ or punishment undergone by 
sinners,” lacks precision.  In the actual order of reality there are different types of 
punishment.  This disjunction invites misinterpretation of Christ’s punishment in the 
actual order of reality, hence Lonergan’s desire to transpose this into the categories of 
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justice.  So this rules out the second disjunction.  The third disjunction, “either punitive 
expiation or punishment,” suggests that the suffering of evil itself is directly willed by 
God, contradicting Lonergan’s theological principle of divine justice.123  God never 
directly wills evil, so the disjunction contradicts the actual order of reality conceived by 
divine wisdom.  This rules out the third disjunction. 
The problem of the counterposition is not a failure to recognize the contingent 
truth of Christ’s vicarious suffering, but choosing the wrong intelligible context to 
interpret this truth.  If the context is wrong, an incorrect understanding is sure to follow.  
Each of Lonergan’s five arguments against the counterposition, in its own way, reverses 
the counterposition by exposing the counterposition’s lack of coherence with the Catholic 
dogmatic-theological context.  Consider a specific example.  In article 30, on “The 
Transference of Punishment to Christ,” we reviewed Lonergan’s five arguments.  In the 
fourth argument he states that those who see in the passion and death of Christ the justice 
of a judge, and not the justice of the cross, do an injustice to God the Father, to Christ 
himself, and to Christ’s example and precept.  My focus here is on injustice to the Father:   
Furthermore, according to this opinion [the counterposition], even though Christ himself 
repudiated the law of retaliation and preached the wisdom of the cross, God the Father 
would seem to have ignored this wisdom and followed that discredited law instead.
124
 
 
 The counterposition suggests that the Father does not follow His own precept 
spoken through the Son.  Why would Lonergan point out this contradiction?  First, notice 
that there is a presupposition here that Christ’s spoken precept is the Father’s wisdom.  
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What is the basis of this presupposition?  It is Lonergan’s Catholic dogmatic-theological 
context, specifically the relationship between two mysteries:  the mystery of the Trinity 
and the mystery of the Incarnation.  In Lonergan’s understanding of the immanent 
Trinitarian relations, the Word does not speak:  the Word is spoken by the Father.
125
  And 
the Son is sent to the world by the Father, not to teach his own doctrine (the Son’s), but 
that of the Father.
126
  It is a counterposition, a contradiction with Lonergan’s dogmatic-
theological context, to suggest that the Father ignores the wisdom of Christ’s example 
and precept, since that very example and precept is to be interpreted as the Father’s 
doctrine spoken through the Son.  This is the cardinal point.  Lonergan makes the same 
point in Thesis 12 of DVI, titled “The Knowledge of Christ:” 
The reason why Christ ought to be believed in is that no discontinuity is acknowledged 
between God the Father and the words that Jesus the man speaks.  ‘For he whom God has 
sent utters the words of God’ (Jn 3:34).127   
 
 In exposing the counterposition’s implication that the Father is unjust, Lonergan 
is freeing the meaning of Christ’s satisfaction from what Charles Hefling terms extrinsic 
legalism and questionable morality.
128
  Consider the following statement from DVI.  
What Lonergan states there reflects accurately his thought in the Supplement: 
To put it very briefly, then, those who say it was under God’s retributive justice that God 
the Son was flogged and crucified and died are assuming one of two things: either (1) 
that the Son had fault or took on fault, or else (2) that God’s retributive justice proceeds 
on the sole basis that wrongdoing exists, leaving out any consideration of fault, original 
or actual or taken on, in the one who is punished.  The first assumption is not catholic.  
The second is either immoral or amoral.  Hence it is not easy to see how the conclusion 
differs from blasphemy.
129
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 Given Lonergan’s desire to counter conclusions which are immoral or amoral, one 
might ask why Lonergan sticks to the language of poena in the first place, since this 
language would seem to invite the very misinterpretations he abhors, such as the theories 
of penal substitution and satispassion.  We need to remember that Lonergan, as he later 
stated in Method, understood himself to be a Roman Catholic with “quite conservative 
views on religious and church doctrines.”130  His conservative orientation is evident in the 
Supplement.  He accepts the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction and he sticks to the 
traditional language of “punishment.”  On the other hand he is trying to redeem the 
interpretation of that language from aberrations.
131
 
 For Lonergan, these aberrations are not the product of intelligent inquiry and 
critical reflection (judgment), but the product of a symbolic apprehension where images 
and feelings predominate.  When feelings predominate, the speculative theologian may 
arrive at an interpretation of Christ’s poena faithful to the theologian’s own psychic 
experience but not faithful to the Catholic dogmatic-theological context.  In DVI, he 
states that a conception of the Lord’s suffering and death in terms of substitution and 
satispassion is, in itself, a symbolic apprehension and nothing else.
132
  In my 
interpretation, the symbolic apprehension is the root of the “fictions” Lonergan mentions 
in his fourth argument in article 30, where he criticizes those who try to “explain realities 
by means of fictions” (realissima per fictiones explicare).133  The symbolic apprehension 
in and of itself is not the problem.  Every person and every culture cannot escape the 
                                                 
130
 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 332. 
131
 Associating the language of “punishment” to Christ’s redemptive work may be repugnant to the 
sensibilities of some contemporary readers.  The purpose of this dissertation is not to make a judgment 
whether Lonergan should stick to such language, but to understand his use of such language. 
132
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 535.   
133
 Lonergan, DBM, *207 [Supplement, 88]. 
 221 
reality of symbolic apprehension.  It may surprise some readers that in DVI Lonergan 
even states that this symbolic apprehension which sometimes conceives Christ’s physical 
sufferings in terms of substitution or satispassion can be praiseworthy if it produces fruit 
in the concrete context of Catholic life.
134
  The problem is to confuse symbolic 
apprehension as theory.  For Lonergan, the notions of penal substitution and satispassion 
are not counterpositions at the level of symbolic apprehension.  They become 
counterpositions when these notions are passed off as theory. 
 
6.3.4 The Analogy to Understand Christ’s Satisfaction 
 
 
 The Council of Trent compared Christ’s satisfaction to the satisfaction a penitent 
makes in the sacrament of penance.  But Trent did not develop this analogy.  Lonergan 
adopts and develops this analogy.  In doing so Lonergan is developing a position.   
 To develop the sacramental analogy Lonergan makes a distinction between the 
interior and exterior acts of Christ’s satisfaction, analogous to the distinction between 
contrition and penance (satisfaction) in the sacrament.  Satisfaction given by a penitent 
stems from contrition as exterior act stems from interior act. 
 Lonergan understands Christ’s interior act as Christ’s detestation of sin, his 
sorrow and grief for our sins, and his firm determination to take away sin.  Lonergan 
gives most attention to the sorrows of Christ and uses the authority of Aquinas to defend 
his position that Christ grieved for the sins of all people.  But Lonergan also defends his 
position through theological reasoning.  And this theological reasoning is very much 
dependent on positions Lonergan developed prior to the Supplement regarding the 
ontological and psychological constitution of Christ.  The principal site of that 
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development is found in De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica, now 
published in English as The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ.
135
   
 Chalcedon’s definition that Christ is one person operating in two natures, divine 
and human, is an ontological explanation of the Incarnation.  But for Lonergan, 
correlative to the ontological constitution of Christ is the psychological constitution of 
Christ.  Just as Christ is one subject, ontologically of two natures, Christ is also one 
subject, psychologically of two consciousnesses, one divine and one human.
136
 
 In The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, Lonergan makes the 
following assertion with respect to the human consciousness of Christ:  “Christ as man, 
through his human consciousness and his beatific knowledge, clearly understands, and 
with certainty judges, himself to be the natural Son of God and true God.”137  The 
statement applies to Christ as man, that is, prescinding from the divine nature.138  But 
Christ as man also acquired knowledge through the operations of experiencing, 
understanding, and judging, like any other human being.  Therefore Christ as man had 
two types of knowledge.  In DVI Lonergan introduced two terms for these two types: 
Living on this earth, Christ had human knowledge both effable and ineffable, besides his 
divine knowledge.  As a beholder, he immediately knew God by that ineffable knowledge 
which is also called beatific, and in the same act, though mediately, he also knew 
everything else that pertained to his work.  As a pilgrim, however, he elicited by effable 
knowledge those natural and supernatural cognitional acts which constituted his human 
and historical life.
139
 
 
                                                 
135
 Bernard Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, vol. 7 of the Collected 
Works of Bernard Lonergan, eds.  Michael G. Shields, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran, trans. 
Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).  De constitutione Christi was originally 
published in 1956 ad usum auditorium. 
136
 Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 7.  See also “The Dehellenization 
of Dogma,” Second Collection, 25.   
137
 Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 205. 
138
 Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 205. 
139
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 332 [emphasis mine].  The statement is found in Thesis 12 titled 
“Christ’s Knowledge.” 
 223 
 In DVI Lonergan states that effable knowledge can, in itself, be manifested in a 
human way.  Ineffable knowledge on the other hand cannot in itself be manifested in a 
human way.
140
  Ineffable or beatific knowledge is not mediated by anything sensible.  
Knowledge that was never mediated in the first place is not capable of being expressed, 
because expression is itself a mediation through the sensible.
141
  If this were all that we 
could say on the matter, we would seem to find ourselves in a contradiction.  Christian 
theology affirms that Christ is the definitive source of revelation.  As Charles Hefling 
notes, “revelation is the passage, as it were, from hiddenness to communicability.”142  
Therefore revelation implies that Christ’s ineffable knowledge is communicated, but it 
cannot be communicated directly.  How is it then communicated?  It is communicated 
through effable knowledge.  Christ needed effable knowledge to reveal, manifest, and 
communicate his ineffable knowledge in an incarnate way.
143
  This does not mean that 
Christ needed effable knowledge to detest sin, grieve over our sins, and know that his 
work involved taking away our sins.
144
   In the Supplement Lonergan clearly links 
Christ’s detestation, sorrow, and resolve to his immediate knowledge of God.  This 
judgment is also supported by the passage quoted above, where Lonergan notes that 
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Christ’s ineffable knowledge not only includes beatific knowledge, but also knowledge of 
everything else pertaining to his work.  But Christ did need to learn, over time, how to 
express what he knew, how to express his interior act.  For Lonergan, Christ’s voluntary 
acceptance of his suffering and death represents this expression, analogous to how in the 
sacrament of penance one does penance to concretely express one’s contrition. 
   Even though Lonergan does not explicitly use the words ineffable and effable 
knowledge in the Supplement, these notions are implicit.
145
  How so?  Recall that for 
Lonergan, Christ could have exercised this interior act in three ways:  (1) through his 
immediate knowledge of God and consequent volition, neither of which depend upon 
sentient operations; (2) through acquired knowledge and “interior sensibility” 
(sensibilitatem interiorem) added to his immediate knowledge of God, both of which do 
depend on sentient operations; or (3) through an expression of the interior act via exterior 
senses and physical movements.  This third way includes the first two but makes the 
interior act a more completely human act.
146
 
In my interpretation, the first way corresponds to “ineffable” knowledge.  
Ineffable knowledge is beatific knowledge, and such knowledge does not depend on any 
sensitive operations.  This meaning is implicit in the first way.  The second way 
corresponds to “effable” knowledge since it refers to acquired knowledge dependent 
upon sentient operations.  The third way corresponds to Christ’s outward expression of 
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his effable knowledge because the expression depends on exterior senses and physical 
movements. 
 There is further evidence in the Supplement that what Lonergan means is what he 
later meant using the terminology of ineffable and effable knowledge.  This is found in 
his explanation of why it was appropriate for our Lord to accept his passion and death as 
an outward expression of his interior sorrow: 
The more deeply one plumbs the depths of the human spirit, the more difficult it is to find 
nouns and verbs and other commonly used signs to give correct and adequate expression 
to one's interior mind and heart.  And if this is true of ordinary men it is all the more so in 
the case of Christ, when we touch upon his love for the Father and for us, his detestation 
of sin, his sorrow for our sins, and his intention of redeeming us.  So immense and so 
excellent were these realities that they could not even be intimated, let alone fully 
expressed, except by some supreme act.
147
 
 
 I interpret realities that “could not even be intimated” to Christ’s ineffable 
knowledge.  I interpret “some supreme act” to Christ’s voluntary acceptance of his 
suffering and death.  That supreme act is Christ’s effable knowledge given concrete, 
outward, and proportionate expression. 
 Next we will consider Lonergan’s understanding of Christ’s exterior act.  Again, 
Christ’s exterior act stands to his interior act as penance stands to contrition: 
Thus, just as the satisfaction given by a penitent stems from contrition which is defined as 
“interior sorrow and detestation for sin together with the intention of not sinning in the 
future” (DB 897), so in a similar way Christ's satisfaction stemmed from his detestation 
of sin, his sorrow and grief for our sins, and his firm determination to take away sin.
148
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 What Lonergan means here is that satisfaction is not just a feeling, not just the 
state of one’s interior mind and heart.  Satisfaction involves a concrete act that flows 
from one’s interior mind and heart.  As act, satisfaction gives concrete expression to 
contrition.  For Lonergan, the exterior act is not to be confused as the interior source or 
principle of Christ’s satisfaction.  But Christ’s satisfaction would not be satisfaction in 
the proper sense without this concrete expression. 
 Lonergan’s understanding of the exterior act is also what Charles Hefling calls an 
expression of meaning and value incarnately conveyed.
149
  Hefling is referring to what 
the later Lonergan termed “incarnate meaning.”150  “Incarnate meaning” is one of many 
different carriers of meaning (others being linguistic, intersubjective, symbolic, and 
artistic).  It is the meaning of a person, of his way of life, of his words, or of his deeds.
151
 
In Lonergan’s notes for an institute given in 1964 at Georgetown University, there is an 
explicit correlation of Christ’s passion to incarnate meaning.152  The meaning and value 
Christ incarnately conveyed flowed from his immediate knowledge of God, his great love 
of God, and his great love of neighbor.  The greater one’s love of God the greater is one’s 
love of neighbor.
153
  So the entire context in which to understand Christ’s exterior act is 
meaningless unless we understand the intensity of Christ’s interpersonal relationships 
with both God the Father and with humanity.  This is why we should interpret Lonergan’s 
understanding of Christ’s satisfaction along the lines of interpersonal relations rather than 
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commercial transactions.  This notion of understanding Christ’s satisfaction along the 
lines of interpersonal relations is explicit in DVI, yet clearly implicit in the Supplement.
154
 
 
6.4 The Function of the Chapter in the Wider Context of the Supplement 
 
 
 In the Supplement, why does Lonergan develop a speculative understanding of the 
doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction?  In DVI his justification for adding a separate thesis on 
Christ’s satisfaction was the fact that in his opinion Catholic thought on Aquinas’s five 
ways was so deeply settled that there was no need for further elaboration than what he 
had already presented in Thesis 15.  But then he stated that when it comes to satisfaction, 
opinions differ, and accordingly he presents a separate thesis.
155
  Although one could 
argue that in this era of Lonergan’s career, Catholic theologians gave “pride of place” to 
the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction,156 I take Lonergan at his word that in DVI his 
principal reason for including a separate thesis on Christ’s satisfaction is grounded in his 
concern over conflicting interpretations.  In my interpretation this is also the case with the 
Supplement.  Lonergan is clearly sensitive to the fact that the doctrine of Christ’s 
satisfaction has wildly varying interpretations, some of which he considers blasphemous.  
It seems reasonable that Lonergan would want to take up the challenge to “redeem” the 
understanding of Christ’s satisfaction. 
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 Given that Lonergan includes a chapter on Christ’s satisfaction, an interpretive 
question is the following:   how does this chapter advance Lonergan’s stated purpose to 
explain the historical causality of Christ?  I will begin with a brief consideration of the 
location of the chapter.  I judge that given Lonergan’s decision to include a chapter on 
Christ’s satisfaction, he located that chapter in such a way as to also make the chapter 
relevant to his stated purpose of explaining the historical causality of Christ.  I base this 
interpretation on the location and content of two statements which bracket the present 
chapter.  The first statement concludes the previous chapter: 
There is a third step.  In no other way does God draw good out of evil than according to 
the meaning, the law, the mystery, and the justice of the cross.  Nor does God himself 
impose this voluntary transformation of evil into good upon others without himself, “who 
should be first in every way” (cf. Col 1:18), doing first what he requires of others for the 
sake of his glory.
157
 
 
Prior to this “third step” Lonergan described two other steps in the same article.158  
Lonergan’s description of the third step is extremely brief.  I interpret the brevity to a 
judgment that the statement functions as a transition to the next chapter.  The second 
statement is found in the last paragraph of the present chapter: 
Seventh, although Christ superabundantly atoned for all the world's sins, it by no means 
follows that we are relieved of the duty of offering satisfaction for our sins.  The 
satisfaction made by Christ and that offered by us are not univocal, but analogical terms; 
hence while satisfaction has been made by the Head, there still remains satisfaction to be 
made by the members.  How this is to be understood will be explained later when we 
come to treat of the effects of the redemption.
159
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 There is a common theme in both statements:  the correlation between what God 
has done first through Christ and what we are asked to do in cooperation with Christ.  In 
the first statement we find the first instance in the Supplement where Lonergan introduces 
the notion that God does not ask us to do what God himself is unwilling to do first.  This 
is consistent with a judgment he makes in the next chapter:  we have been justified by 
Christ but we have not yet wholly appropriated salvation.
160
  Redemption is an ongoing 
historical process involving human cooperation.  The second statement takes the same 
theme and applies it to the concrete example of offering satisfaction.  The two statements 
reveal an intent to make the chapter relevant to Lonergan’s stated purpose. 
 That intent is concretely realized in the next chapter.  As we will see, Lonergan’s 
understanding of the historical causality of Christ derives in part from his understanding 
of the Body of Christ, Head and members.  Lonergan will use the example of satisfaction 
as a “work” that is shared by the Head and the members, though it is done first by the 
Head.  To avoid a Pelagian interpretation he will state that Christ's satisfaction is an 
efficient cause of both our willing to make satisfaction and our act of making 
satisfaction.
161
  In addition to the “work” of satisfaction, he will discuss our cooperation 
with Christ in terms of sacrifice, meritorious obedience, and intercessory prayer.  In 
summary, Lonergan uses the category of satisfaction to explain the historical causality of 
Christ, but not to carry the full weight of that explanation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
160
 Lonergan, DBM, *230 [Supplement, 97]. 
161
 Lonergan, DBM, *259 [Supplement, 110]. 
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6.5 Summary 
 
 
For Lonergan, the passion of Christ, qua satisfaction, is the outward expression of 
an interior act where that interior act is Christ’s detestation for sin, sorrow because of our 
sins, and resolute determination to take away the sins of the world.  Lonergan has 
retrieved the pre-Anselmian tradition that Christ did indeed suffer punishment, but 
understands that poena as an outward expression of an interior act, of what grieved 
Christ.  As such, Lonergan grounds his understanding of Christ’s satisfaction in the realm 
of interiority, that is, in Christ’s conscious intentionality and meaning flowing from his 
love for the Father and his love for sinners.  In other words, Lonergan understands 
Christ’s satisfaction in terms of interpersonal relationships, not commercial transactions.     
 Lonergan also reverses the counterposition which interprets Christ’s satisfaction 
in the context of retributive justice.  As an orthodox theologian, Lonergan accepts the 
doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction and the traditional language of poena.  But it is clear he is 
motivated to redeem the meaning of that doctrine, and language, from disturbing 
aberrations, some which he is not hesitant to label blasphemous.  I find his interpretation 
both orthodox and yet reasonable to modern sensibilities regarding the violence of the 
cross, even though the language of “punishment” may be repugnant to contemporary 
readers.  We have to remember that Lonergan was writing in the late 1950s.  If he were 
writing today, perhaps he would avoid such language given his understanding of Christ’s 
satisfaction.  Or perhaps he would not.  But I do believe that Lonergan’s speculative 
understanding of the poena associated with the satisfaction Christ offered to God the 
Father on our behalf is a brilliant achievement and example of his commitment to the 
Leonine injunction vetera novis augere et perficere.
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Chapter 7: The Work of Christ in History
1
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
 Lonergan’s final chapter explicitly addresses the historical causality of Christ.  
The chapter has no title in the Latin typescript.  Our interpretation will recall material 
from previous chapters since each of those chapters contributes, in the ordo doctrinae, to 
Lonergan’s explicit treatment of the historical causality of Christ.  The chapter includes 
articles 35-45:  (35) The Work of Christ, (36) Agents Acting Through Intellect, (37) The 
Social Agent, (38) The Historical Agent, (39) Christ the Agent, (40) Christ the Exemplar, 
(41) Christ the Head, (42) Christ the Historical Agent, (43) The Mediator in Heaven, (44) 
The Purpose of the Incarnation, and (45) Why the God-man? 
  
7.2 A Brief Description of Articles 35 – 45 
 
 
7.2.1 Article 35:  The Work of Christ
2
 
 
 
 Lonergan begins the article recalling a Lucan conception of redemption: 
The redemption hoped for and waited for by devout Jews (Lk 2:38, 24:21) was a light for 
revelation to the Gentiles and for the glory of his people (Lk 2:32), because the blessed 
Lord God of Israel in his tender mercy and in accordance with his covenant and his oath 
to Abraham visited and redeemed his people, so that, delivered from the hands of their 
enemies, they might without fear serve God in holiness and justice in his presence all 
their days (Lk 1:68-78)
 
.
3
 
 
                                                 
1
 Lonergan, DBM, *229-294 [Supplement, 97-125].  This title reflects that of the author, not Lonergan.  
Lonergan did not provide a chapter title for articles 35-45. 
2
 “Articulus XXXV.  De Opere Christi,” DBM, *229-235 [Supplement, 97-100]. 
3
 “Quam pii Iudaei sperabant exspectabantque redemptionem (Lc 2, 38; 24, 21), lumen erat ad revelationem 
gentium et gloria plebis suae (Lc 2, 32), cum benedictus Dominus Deus Israel per viscera misericordiae 
suae secundum testamentum suum et iusiurandum Abrahae factum visitaret redemptionemque faceret 
plebis suae ut, de manu inimicorum liberati, sine timore Deo servirent in sanctitate et iustitia coram ipso 
omnibus diebus suis (Lc 2, 68-78).”  DBM, *229 [Supplement, 97]. 
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 He then makes a distinction between the means and the end of redemption.  
Payment of the price, sacrifice, meritorious obedience, and vicarious suffering refer only 
to redemption as a means (medium) or, better yet, as a principle (principium).
4
  In terms 
of end, he makes two points.  First, there is redemption already achieved through the 
remission of sins, the gratuitous justification by God’s grace through the redemption that 
is in Christ Jesus.  Second, there is the redemption still hoped for:  namely, the heavenly 
prize, the beatific vision, and ultimately the second coming of the Lord and redemption of 
our bodies.
5
  Therefore, since the redemption is ongoing, Lonergan argues that a further 
study of the work of the Lord is necessary: 
If, therefore, we consider the word redemption itself, or if we reflect that in neglecting the 
end we have a poor knowledge of the means, and that ignoring the effect we have a poor 
knowledge of its cause, we must now undertake a broader and fuller survey of the work 
of the Lord.
 6
 
 
The broader and fuller survey is left for subsequent articles.  The aim of the 
present article is to provide a foundation for that survey.  This foundation amounts to a 
biblical synthesis of the end or purpose correlative to the work of the Lord: 
...(1) the kingdom of God and (2) salvation in Christ, whereby being freed from (3) sins 
and (4) the Jewish Law and worship, we have access to (5) God who is faithful and just 
(6) with confidence, since (7) through our personal acts (8) we are incorporated into 
Christ and the People of God.
7 
 
 Lonergan describes each of these aspects through extensive references to 
scripture.  First, from a New Testament perspective, Christ’s purpose is first and foremost 
the kingdom of God.  Arriving in this kingdom is what salvation means.  Before arriving 
                                                 
4
 Lonergan, DBM, *229 [Supplement, 97]. 
5
 Lonergan, DBM, *229-230 [Supplement, 97]. 
6
 “Sive ergo ipsam vocem redemptionis respicimus, sive ratiocinamur parum cognosci vel medium neglecto 
fine vel causam praetermisso effectu, et latius et plenius iam oportet opus Domini considerari.”  DBM, 
*230 [Supplement, 97-98]. 
7
 “...(1) regnum Dei (2) salutemque in Christo positam, unde (3) a peccatis et (4) a lege cultuque iudaico 
liberati, (5) ad Deum fidelem iustumque (6) cum fiducia accessum habemus, si quidem (7) per actus 
personales (8) Christo populoque Dei incorporamur.”  DBM, *230 [Supplement, 98]. 
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in this kingdom, we are sinners, enemies of God.  Through this kingdom, we are liberated 
from sin, from the power of darkness, and from the body itself.
8
  Second, God is both 
faithful and just.  The blessing promised to Abraham is to be realized.  There is now also 
the promised Holy Spirit and the future promise of the parousia, eternal life, participation 
in the divine nature, a new heaven and earth.  God is also the justifier of the one who has 
faith in Christ.  Justified by faith, we are both at peace with God and can approach God 
with confidence.  Finally, through Christ, we become adopted children of God and 
receive the Holy Spirit as a pledge of our inheritance.  We are not enrolled in Christ 
without personal repentance and faith.  Once enrolled, we are one body in Christ and 
ought to love one another as Christ has loved us.  This Body of Christ is the Church.
9
 
 
7.2.2 Article 36:  Agents Acting Through Intellect
10
 
 
 
 A cause is whatever influences another in its existence.  An effect is whatever 
depends upon another in its existence.  As cause and effect are correlative, so are 
influence and dependence: 
Such influence or dependence is not perceptible but intelligible.  Therefore one who has a 
picture of oxen huffing and puffing as they strain at pulling a plow does not know what 
causal influence is; but one who makes a true affirmation that there is an intelligible 
relation of dependence in the plow as moved does know this influence in its true reality.
11
 
 
 Furthermore, one must not confuse the intelligible with the necessary.  Non-
necessary causality is no less true, real causality.  The reality of causality is based on 
                                                 
8
 Lonergan, DBM, *231-233 [Supplement, 98-99].  Lonergan adds that the Jewish Law, though good in 
itself, was unable to liberate those enslaved to sin.  The Law gave knowledge of sin but it was impossible 
for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sin.  Only through the blood of Christ are we freed of sin that 
we may then serve the living God. 
9
 Lonergan, DBM, *233-235 [Supplement, 99-100]. 
10
 “Articulus XXXVI.  De Agente per Intellectum,” DBM, *236-239 [Supplement, 100-101]. 
11
 “Qui influxus vel dependentia non sensibilis est sed intelligibilis.  Quare influxum causalem nescit qui 
boves aratrum trahentes imaginatur nitentes atque anhelantes; et eumdem influxum cognoscit verum et 
realem qui in aratro moto intelligibilem dependentiae relationem vere affirmat.”  DBM, *236 [Supplement, 
100]. 
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intelligibility, not necessity.  An example is human cooperation.  Mutual understanding 
and agreement is the foundation of this cooperation.  In fact, cooperation is virtually the 
whole of what is human causality.  It is causality because mutual understanding is 
intelligible and mutual agreement is reasonable.  However, it is not necessary causality.
12
 
 Lonergan then distinguishes three kinds of causality:  (1) an intrinsic cause 
influences that by reason of which (ut quo) something is what it is, (2) a final cause 
influences for the sake of which (ut cuius gratia) it is, and (3) an agent cause is that by 
which (ut a quo) a thing is produced.
13
 
 The remainder of the article focuses on the agent cause.  Agents are subdivided 
into agents acting through nature and agents acting through intellect.  The agent acting 
through nature (1) acts in accordance with either an innate or naturally acquired form, (2) 
is at the mercy of nature to fulfill any requisite conditions for the cause to produce the 
effect, (3) is limited to producing effects proportionate to its form, and (4) can only 
influence objects in spatiotemporal proximity.  The agent acting through intellect (1) acts 
in accordance with an intentional form (formam intentionalem) to produce an effect, (2) 
can understand requisite conditions and thus has the potential to fulfill those conditions, 
(3) is limited only to the extent it lacks a perfect intellect, and (4) can influence other 
agents beyond its own spatiotemporal proximity if it understands the conditions for 
extending its influence and sees to their fulfillment.  Causal influence extended through 
others is real causality predicated of the originating agent since there remains an 
intelligible relation of dependence in the created effect on the originating agent.
14
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 Lonergan, DBM, *236 [Supplement, 100]. 
13
 Lonergan, DBM, *237 [Supplement, 100]. 
14
 Lonergan, DBM, *237-238 [Supplement, 100-101]. 
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7.2.3 Article 37:  The Social Agent
15
 
 
 
 Virtually everything we produce is produced through and for others.
16
  We are 
proportionate causes inasmuch as have in our minds the idea to produce an effect.  We 
are actual causes when we have the power to actually produce the effect.  Actual causes 
are more commonly found in persons linked together than in a single individual.
17
  
 Therefore, effective human agency is based primarily on social agency.  Social 
agency is based on common understanding of the situation, common willingness to fulfill 
requisite conditions, and common assistance in actually fulfilling those conditions.  The 
effect of social agency is preservation, improvement, or worsening of the external and/or 
cultural levels of an existing human good of order.
18
   
 Since a social agent is comprised of many persons linked together with common 
understanding and agreement about a possible course of action, this common 
understanding and agreement precedes any effects produced by the social agent.  For 
Lonergan, this common understanding and agreement is already a human good of order.  
By implication, a social agent is always working from an existing human good of order.  
This means that a social agent is de facto a historical agent.  It also means that even 
though social agency freely determines the future, this agency depends very greatly on 
the past.
19
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 “Articulus XXXVII.  De Agente Sociali,” DBM, *240-243 [Supplement, 101-103]. 
16
 Lonergan, DBM, *240 [Supplement, 101]. 
17
 Lonergan, DBM, *241-242 [Supplement, 102]. 
18
 Lonergan, DBM, *242 [Supplement, 102]. 
19
 Lonergan, DBM, *243 [Supplement, 103]. 
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7.2.4 Article 38:  The Historical Agent
20
 
 
  
 A historical agent is one who causally influences the external or cultural level of a 
human good of order.
21
  A historical agent is (1) more or less historical, depending on the 
duration of the effect; (2) partial or total, depending on whether the effect is part or whole 
of the good of order; (3) an agent per se or per accidens, depending on whether the effect 
occurs according to or beyond the agent’s intention; (4) a proportionate or actual cause, 
depending on whether the agent conceives an idea or also implements it; (5) an 
originating or conservative cause, depending on whether the agent is the first to conceive 
and implement an idea or only safeguards implementation; (6) a restorative or destructive 
cause, depending on whether the effect improves or worsens the good of order.
22
   
 The absolute first historical agent is God.  God infallibly orders, chooses, and 
affects the divine plan.  God does not impose necessity upon things, but conditioned 
necessity.  Conditioned necessity does not take away freedom.  This plan of divine 
wisdom governs the course of events through secondary causes and in accordance with 
their natures (cf. Articles 10-11).  This implies a role for human beings in the divine plan: 
What divine wisdom has ordered and divine goodness has chosen comes into existence 
through human beings who understand, judge, and agree.  Since, then, God is the 
principal agent, man is only an instrumental agent; but because man is an instrument that 
acts through intellect, he is called ministerial.
23
 
 
    Among originating agents, some are more historical because they have a more 
lasting influence on future action.  The greatest historical agent is the Incarnate Word.
24
 
                                                 
20
 “Articulus XXXVIII.  De Agente Historico,” DBM, *244-248 [Supplement, 103-105]. 
21
 Lonergan, DBM, *244 [Supplement, 103]. 
22
 Lonergan, DBM, *244 [Supplement, 103]. 
23
 “Quod ergo ordinat divina sapientia eligitque divina bonitas, hoc per homines intelligentes, iudicantes, 
consentientes fit.  Quia ergo Deus agens principale est, homo non est nisi instrumentale; quia autem homo 
instrumentum est quod per intellectum agit, ministeriale dicitur.”  DBM, *246 [Supplement, 104]. 
24
 Lonergan, DBM, *248 [Supplement, 105]. 
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7.2.5 Article 39:  Christ the Agent
25
 
 
 
 Christ acts as both God and man.  As God, he does what the Father and the Spirit 
do.  As man, he acted during his earthly life and continues to do so from heaven.
26
 
He who acts in two different ways has two principles of action, divine and human, so that 
as God he acts in one way and as man in another.  As God he does some things that he 
does not do as man, since man has not created a man.  Other things he does both as God 
and as man, in such a way that there are two operations ordered to each other, but one 
effect produced.
27
  
 
 These two operations are ordered to each other through divine command and 
human obedience.  To command is to move another through reason and will.  To obey is 
to be moved in accordance with the reason and will of another.  God commands 
inasmuch as in his goodness he chooses what his wisdom ordains.  Christ as man obeys 
inasmuch as he knows the actual order of reality in the secondary object of his beatific 
vision and wills this same order to be carried out.  Christ’s obedience is true and genuine 
obedience.  The divine command was simultaneous with Christ’s obedience, though prior 
to that obedience in nature, causality, and precept.
28
 
 Lonergan then refutes possible objections.  Among these objections is the notion 
that the divine command imposed necessity on Christ’s obedience.  Lonergan counters 
that God’s knowledge and wisdom impose only conditioned necessity.  However, 
conditioned necessity does not eliminate freedom.  As such, Christ’s knowledge had 
                                                 
25
 “Articulus XXXIX.  De Christo Agente,” DBM, *249-253 [Supplement, 105-107]. 
26
 Lonergan, DBM, *249 [Supplement, 105]. 
27
 “Dupliciter ergo agentis duplex est agendi principium, divinum et humanum, ut aliter ut Deus agat et 
aliter ut homo.  Et aliqua facit ut Deus quae ut homo non fecit, si quidem homo hominem non creavit.  Alia 
autem facit tum ut Deus tum ut homo, ut duae sint operationes inter se ordinatae sed unus sit effectus 
productus.”  DBM, *249 [Supplement, 105]. 
28
 Lonergan, DBM, *249-251 [Supplement, 105-106].  On the nature of command and obedience, Lonergan 
references ST, II-II, q.104, a. 1 c.  On the nature of Christ’s obedience, Lonergan references ST, III, q. 47, a. 
2, 1m. 
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through his beatific vision did not force his will.  In fact, his impeccable will was already 
willing to obey whatever specification Christ obtained through his beatific knowledge.
29
 
 Finally, since Christ freely obeyed, he was a ministerial instrument for carrying 
out the ordinations of God’s wisdom and the decision of God’s will.  Because Christ was 
an agent acting through intellect, he acted by commanding and exercised his influence 
through others (for example, the ministers of the sacraments).
30
   
 
7.2.6 Article 40:  Christ the Exemplar
31
 
 
 
 An exemplar can be understood in two ways:  (1) as what an agent looks at when 
operating through intellect; or (2) as belonging to a dispensation, an ordering of reality, 
such that the exemplar is to be imitated by others in the same dispensation.  In the first 
way, Christ is an exemplar when we look to him to imitate him.  In the second way, 
Christ has wrought our salvation by way of an exemplar.
32
 
 Lonergan’s focus is on understanding this second way, through (1) the principle 
of the dispensation itself, (2) the determination of this principle as realized in Christ, and 
(3) the application of this determination as realized in us.
33
 
 The principle of the dispensation itself comes from God’s ordination and decision 
that what is done in Christ ought to be done in others.  The determination of this principle 
is derived from Christ’s life.  The principle, as realized in Christ, is grounded on his 
knowledge of all actual reality.
34
  Christ knew this principle, accepted this principle, and 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *252 [Supplement, 106-107].  Lonergan references ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 6, 3m. 
30
 Lonergan, DBM, *253 [Supplement, 107]. 
31
 “Articulus XL.  De Christo Exemplari,” DBM, *254-257 [Supplement, 107-109]. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *254 [Supplement, 107].  Lonergan references ST, III, q. 56, a. 1, 3m; q. 49, a. 2, 2m. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *254 [Supplement, 107]. 
34
 Lonergan references ST, III, q. 10, a. 2. 
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understood its consequences.  In accordance with this principle, it was impossible for 
Christ to determine anything in regards to himself without determining the same with 
regard to us.  This principle governed all Christ’s activity such that he might be a fitting 
exemplar for all.
35
 
 The application of this determination as realized in us is grounded on divine 
intention and is confirmed by example.  For example, we are loved with a similar love in 
which the Father loves the Son.  The Father’s love for the Son is proceeding Love itself, 
the Holy Spirit.  According to the principle of exemplarity, this same love has us as its 
term:  we receive sanctifying grace, are made adopted children of God, and have dwelling 
within us the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit.
36
  Likewise, the ontological constitution of 
Christ is an exemplar.  Christ operates according to the pattern of a divine person 
operating in a lower nature.  We operate in a similar manner:  we receive sanctifying 
grace, the infused virtues, gifts and movements of the Spirit.  Finally, we are called to 
imitate Christ; in particular, to complete what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ.
37
  
Lonergan concludes by affirming that Christ’s exemplary causality is true causality:  
...there are two kinds of causality: one that is merely apparent, as in the case of the oxen 
pulling a plow, in which causality is known only inasmuch as the effort of the oxen is 
imagined; then there is the other causality that is real and true, which is known in those 
same oxen inasmuch as the movement of the plow is understood and affirmed to be 
dependent upon them.  Now in Christ there is no such merely apparent causality, but only 
this real and true causality that is grasped by those who are intelligent and truly affirmed 
by those who are rational.
38
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 Lonergan, DBM, *254-255 [Supplement, 107-108]. 
36
 Lonergan, DBM, *255-256 [Supplement, 108]. 
37
 Lonergan, DBM, *257 [Supplement, 108-109]. 
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 “...duplicem esse causalitatem: aliam mere apparentem, quae v. g. in bobus aratrum trahentibus eatenus 
cognoscitur quatenus ipsum bovum nisum imaginamur; aliam autem veram et realem, quae in iisdem bobus 
cognoscitur quatenus motus aratri a bobus dependere et intelligitur et vere affirmatur.  Iam vero in Christo 
exemplari illa causalitas mere apparens non habetur, sed haec vera et realis et ab intelligentibus perspicitur 
et a rationalibus vere affirmatur.  Et hoc ad nostrum propositum sufficit prorsus.”  DBM, *257 [Supplement, 
109]. 
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7.2.7 Article 41:  Christ the Head
39
 
 
 
 The members of the Body of Christ are members of one another.  The principal 
member is Christ the head, and what is done in Christ is now done in and for the whole 
body.
40
  This causal aspect proper to the head is not to be confused with efficient or 
exemplary causality.  Lonergan uses Christ’s satisfaction to make the point: 
Because Christ has made satisfaction for sins, he is an exemplar of what ought to occur in 
his members.  Besides, Christ’s satisfaction itself is in different ways an efficient cause of 
our willing to make satisfaction and of our act of making satisfaction.  And there is 
nothing to prevent us from attributing this exemplarity and efficient causality to Christ 
the head, so long as we do not exclude that third aspect that is proper to the head alone, 
namely, that through Christ’s satisfaction we have already made satisfaction.41 
 
 Though Christ as head exercises causality proper to the head, and though this 
work is done in and for the whole body, this fact does not exclude work on our part.
42
 
 Lonergan makes several points to obviate misunderstandings of this causality 
proper to the head.  First, the union between head and body must not be exaggerated as to 
turn it into a substantial union.  Second, Christ’s work on our behalf does not exclude 
work on our part.  Third, we must rule out an exaggerated distinction that would repeat 
Pelagianism or deny the redemption as means, that is, denying what is sometimes called 
objective redemption (redemptio obiectiva) since objective redemption refers to the work 
of Christ done for the sake of the members.  Fourth, we must reject rationalism that tries 
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 “Articulus XLI.  De Christo Capite,” DBM, *258-266 [Supplement, 109-113]. 
40
 Lonergan, DBM, *258 [Supplement, 109].   
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 “Quia ergo Christus pro peccatis satisfecit, exemplar est eius quod in membris ideo fieri oportet.  
Praeterea, ipsa Christi satisfactio diversis modis est causa efficiens ut ipsi satisfacere velimus et actu 
satisfaciamus.  Neque quidquam prohibet quominus etiam haec exemplaritas et efficientia Christo capiti 
attribuantur, modo non excludatur tertium quod propriam capitis rationem dicit, nempe, per ipsam Christi 
satisfactionem nos iam satisfecisse.”  DBM, *259 [Supplement, 110]. 
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 Though Christ made satisfaction for the body, penitents ought to make satisfaction for themselves (DB 
904, 905, 922, 924; DS 1689, 1692, 1712, 1714 ; ND 1630, 1633, 1652, 1654).  Though Christ merited for 
us, we also should merit (DB 809, 843; DS 1545, 1583  ; ND 1946, 1983).  Though Christ offered sacrifice 
once and for all, the sacrifice of the Mass is truly expiatory (DB 940, 950; DS 1743, 1753; ND 1548, 1557).  
And though Christ lives forever to make intercession on our behalf, we also ought to pray.  Lonergan, 
DBM, *260 [Supplement, 110].   
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to prove the causality of Christ as head through necessary reasons or by the light of 
reason alone.  Fifth, we must also reject semi-rationalism that argues that if we 
presuppose the fact that the mystery of redemption has been revealed by God we can then 
produce proofs.  Sixth, God could have forgiven all sins without Christ’s vicarious 
satisfaction.  Seventh, Christ’s death was not simply a matter of God’s will since God’s 
will follows God’s wisdom as the norm of divine justice.43  
 Now divine wisdom ordains that necessary effects result from necessary causes 
and contingent effects from contingent causes.  The causality proper to the head is 
contingent causality.  Therefore, the causality proper to the head cannot be understood 
according to necessary reasons, but only according to reasons of fittingness:   
This being the case, we do not follow those theologians who are entirely preoccupied 
with deducing necessary conclusions from an hypothesis of condign satisfaction or any 
other hypothesis; rather we subscribe to the method of St. Thomas who looked at the 
concrete work of Christ and put down as many reasons for it as he could, whether reasons 
of necessity or of appropriateness.  This method can be easily seen both in a lengthy 
series of articles and in a single outstanding article.
44
 
 
Having treated doctrinal and methodological errors, Lonergan turns to 
understanding the causality proper to the head.  He offers six elements.  First, as the 
members of a body work not for themselves alone but for the whole body, Christ made 
satisfaction not for himself but for us, did not merit primarily for himself but for us, did 
not offer sacrifice for himself but for us, and lives forever interceding not for himself but 
for us.  Second, these actions are vicarious because the head and members are unified by 
love.  Third, as individuals achieve objectives through cooperation, it is in keeping with 
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 DBM, *260-263 [Supplement, 110-112]. 
44
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articulorum serie tum in uno solo articulo eoque eximio.”  DBM, *263 [Supplement, 112].  The series of 
articles is ST, III, qq. 46-56.  The outstanding article is ST, III, q. 1, a. 2. 
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human nature that individuals attain salvation through others.  Fourth, as we are often 
involved in sin by reason of the sins of others, it is appropriate we are restored through 
the good offices of another.  Fifth, since through one person sin and death entered the 
world, it is appropriate that through one person grace and justification is offered.  Finally, 
just as in the realm of the secular we go to the person most skilled in what we need, the 
same is appropriate in the realm of the sacred.  Among all people there is no one who can 
more appropriately bring us back to God than the Word-made-flesh.  It is appropriate 
therefore that Christ be the one to acquire the merit of obedience for us, to make 
satisfaction for our sins, and to offer for us an expiatory sacrifice.
45
 
 
7.2.8 Article 42:  Christ the Historical Agent
46
 
 
 
 In this article Lonergan explains the causality related to Christ as historical 
person.  Christ influenced history while he was alive and continues to do so to the end of 
time.  Christ’s agency, as a historical person, is in the category of efficient causality.  
Through this agency Christ brings members into the body so as to apply to them his 
merit, the freedom resulting from satisfaction for sin, the fruits of his sacrifice, and the 
benefit of his intercession.  Through this agency, Christ also perfects those members by 
enabling similar operations of merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, and intercession.
47
 
 Lonergan distinguishes three aspects of Christ’s agency as a historical person:  (1) 
the effect of the agency as a whole, (2) the effect directly intended by Christ, and (3) the 
effect indirectly intended by Christ. 
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 The effect as a whole is the total human good of order, past, present, and future.
48
  
This effect is part of the order of the universe produced by God as prime agent according 
to divine wisdom and justice.  There is, however, a distinction between the historical 
order of justice and the personal order of justice (cf. articles 11-12).  The distinction is the 
basis for a related distinction between what Christ directly and indirectly intends: 
Accordingly, the total historical effect, considered in itself, is good inasmuch as it is 
ordered to the future life in heaven; and therefore one who directly intends to effect this 
right ordering, by that very fact indirectly intends the advancement of the total historical 
effect... 
 
Christ’s action is directly aimed at ordering human life on earth to the future life in 
heaven.  Since, however, this ordering liberates man from evils and turns him towards 
true good with the result that the human good of order in itself is greatly improved, this 
improvement itself is necessarily intended indirectly by Christ as an historical agent.
49
 
 
 Lonergan then explains the qualities of Christ’s historical agency.  Christ is the 
most historical agent since his intended effect perdures to the end of the world.  Christ is 
a total historical agent not because he directly controls the total human good, but rather 
because he directly influences it in principle.  Christ is an historical agent per se because 
he knows all actual reality and produces a total historical effect commensurate with that 
knowledge.  Nothing produced by Christ is beyond his intention.  Finally, Christ is a 
restorative historical agent.  He directly intends restoration of the image of God.
50
 
 The article ends with a consideration of the means Christ uses as historical agent.  
First, all social or historical action presupposes an existing good of order.  In the case of 
Christ, this is the lengthy preparation of the Jewish people, their expectation of a 
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Messiah, the cultural achievement of the Gentiles, and their recognition of human 
impotence.
51
  Second, all social or historical action is achieved through others who 
understand and agree.  Thus Christ’s kingdom is propagated through others, specifically 
through preaching of the gospel, through faith, and through repentance.  The preaching of 
the gospel itself is another example of social and historical action since the gospel is 
preached through the apostolic mission, succession, and tradition.
52
  Third, Christ acts 
specifically through his members.
53
  Fourth, Christ acts socially and historically through 
his members not as isolated individuals, but as one body.
54
  Fifth, although Christ’s 
actions are mediated socially and historically, his actions are nevertheless personal:  
adapted to how human persons actually communicate.  As such, his words and deeds 
make perceptible to us the Word of God.
55
  Sixth, Christ’s actions mediated through his 
body extend not only to instructing our minds and drawing our hearts to Christ but also to 
bringing about and deepening the interior renewal of the person through the grace of the 
sacraments.  The sacraments trace their origin to Christ and confer grace ex opere 
operato (DB 844, 851; DS 1601, 1608; ND 1311, 1318).
56
  Finally, there is a distinction 
between Christ’s human power qua human, and this human power as an instrument of his 
divinity.  Christ’s human power qua human works contingently and produces contingent 
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effects.  However, as an instrument of divinity, this human power effects what God 
infallibly knows, effectively wills to be done, and irresistibly causes to be done.
57
 
 
7.2.9 Article 43:  The Mediator in Heaven
58
 
 
 
 Christ’s agency as a historical person is agency as efficient causality.  So is 
Christ’s agency now performed from heaven seated at the right hand of the Father.  The 
purpose of the article is to explain this second aspect of Christ’s efficient causality.   
 Lonergan begins by citing a number of scriptural passages to categorize the nature 
of the ongoing work of Christ now originating from heaven.  First, Christ is the one 
mediator between God and humanity (1 Tim 2:5), the mediator of a new and better 
covenant (Heb 8:6, 9:15, 12:24).  Second, having risen, Christ lives on interceding on our 
behalf (Heb 7:25; Rom 8:34; 1 Jn 2:7).  Third, Christ maintains his priesthood forever 
(Heb 7:24).  He offered one sacrifice for all sins, and by this single offering perfected for 
all time those who are sanctified (Heb 10:12, 14).  He entered into heaven, where he now 
shows himself in the presence of God on our behalf (Heb 9:24) as the Lamb that was 
slain (Rev 5:6-12, 13:8).
59
  In brief, then, Lonergan frames this ongoing work of Christ in 
terms of mediation, intercession, and everlasting sacrifice. 
 This celestial mediation, intercession, and everlasting sacrifice finds its true image 
(cf. Heb 10:1), not merely its shadow, in the Eucharist.
60
  Through participation in the 
Eucharistic mystery the members of Christ’s body draw near to God with confidence. 
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 Lonergan explains that this drawing near expresses in a spatial metaphor what 
scripture refers to as reconciliation.  Reconciliation is the mission of Christ through 
whom all are reconciled to God and to one another.  This work of reconciliation comes 
from the Father through the Son and is accomplished in the Holy Spirit.
61
  Lonergan ends 
the article by further elaborating on the meaning of reconciliation: 
The entire work of Christ is summed up in this reconciliation.  Just as the human good of 
order refers to the steady stream of particular goods, coordinated operations, and interior 
habits and external institutions as all being closely knit together and vivified in a concrete 
synthesis through interpersonal relationships, so also is the kingdom of God, the Church, 
Christ's body and pleroma.  For this kingdom, this body, is a supernatural good of order 
in which are found the particular goods of grace and glory, the operations by which we 
do everything in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ (Col 3:17), the infused virtues and 
gifts of the Holy Spirit, and all the institutions of the Church.  All of this is held together 
through interpersonal relationships, since to be in this body and a member of this 
kingdom is nothing other than what St. Paul so often calls being “in Christ” or “in the 
Spirit.”62 
 
 
7.2.10 Article 44:  The Purpose of the Incarnation
63
 
 
 
 The purpose of the incarnation is to redeem the human race.  In the Nicene Creed 
the Son is said to become incarnate for us and for our salvation.  Since Christ is the head 
of the Church and is said to have first place in everything (Col 1:18), Lonergan asks 
whether this contradicts “for us and for our salvation.”  In other words, is Christ ordered 
to us or are we ordered to him?  Lonergan’s answer is based on the principle that what is 
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said to belong to another is for the other.  Since we belong to Christ, we are ordered to 
him as our end, not the other way around.
64
 
 Lonergan then explains how one can understand this judgment.  He begins with a 
distinction between a means and an end.  A means is a relative good.  If the means shares 
in or communicates the very goodness of the end then it qualifies as a secondary end.  If 
it does not, it is merely a means and is relinquished once the end is produced.  If a means 
is also a secondary end, it is loved for its own sake out of superabundant love for the 
primary end.  Furthermore, a secondary end can consist of many related parts.  If so, one 
who wills a secondary end also wills its parts and its ordering.
65
 
The primary end of redemption is the divine goodness itself.  The secondary end 
includes all created things in their ordering to one another as conceived by divine 
wisdom.  Christ loves this secondary end out of superabundant love for the primary end.  
This secondary end goes by more than one name: 
Again, this secondary end is also called the external glory of God, or the order of the 
universe, which is the most excellent thing in creation and shares more perfectly in the 
divine goodness and more perfectly reflects it than any other creature whatsoever. 
 
Besides, according to sacred Scripture this same secondary end is the Body of Christ, 
head and members, as all things in heaven and on earth are brought together and 
reconciled in him (Eph 1:10; Col 1:20).
66
 
 
 Since Christ loves the secondary end out of superabundant love for the primary 
end, he not only loves both head and members as parts of his body, but also wills them 
duly ordered such that the members are subordinate to the head.
67
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7.2.11 Article 45:  Why the God-man?
68
 
 
 
 Lonergan states that to ask “why?” is to ask about a cause.69  Causes are intrinsic 
or extrinsic.  Extrinsic causes are both the agent and the end.  With regard to Christ, the 
intrinsic causes are dealt with in his ontological constitution.  His extrinsic cause, the 
agent, is the triune God in God’s external operation.70  A final cause is divided into 
primary and secondary.  The primary end is the divine goodness itself.  The secondary 
end is the external glory of God, the order of the universe, and the Body of Christ 
wherein all things are restored and reconciled in Christ.71 
Lonergan then asks the following question:  why was a divine person subsisting in 
a human nature required to accomplish this end?  His answer is that the Son of God 
became man “...to communicate God’s friendship to his enemies in due order.”72  
Friendship is mutual benevolent love in the sharing of some good.  To love is to will 
good to someone.  Benevolent love is to will good to another.  Mutual benevolent love is 
had when many will some common good, each to the others.  Divine friendship is mutual 
benevolent love with respect to that which is good by its very essence.  This friendship is 
communicated to intellectual creatures contingently and in time: first in hope, in 
possessing the indwelling Holy Spirit as a pledge of their inheritance; then in the beatific 
vision.  Sinners are enemies of God since they are tainted by either original or mortal sin.  
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God’s friendship is communicated to these enemies in due order, according to the plan 
conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness.
73
 
He then explains the theological principles he will use to deduce reasons for the 
God-man:  (1) the principle of cause, (2) the principle of continuity, and (3) the principle 
of the extension of friendship.  The principle of cause is that God customarily acts 
through secondary causes.  The principle of continuity is that God customarily acts 
according to the nature of things and the laws of nature, physical or human.  The 
principle of the extension of friendship is that a friend loves his or her friend’s friends, 
even so far as to love one’s enemies for the sake of one’s friend.74 
Lonergan applies these principles to the economy of salvation.  He understands 
this economy as a movement away from evil (the terminus a quo) to the state of 
friendship with God (the terminus ad quem).  With respect to the terminus ad quem, he 
applies both the principle of cause and the principle of the extension of friendship.  Only 
a divine person is a friend of God according to divine friendship.  A divine person, in and 
of itself, is not a secondary cause.  To preserve both principles, it is fitting to have a 
divine person subsisting in a human nature.  One who in his own right enjoys God’s 
friendship, if he is human, also enjoys all the supernatural gifts.  This leads to the second 
reason.  Such a person is a proportionate exemplary cause according to which these gifts 
can be communicated to others.
75
  The third reason is to have an intermediary through 
which God’s enemies, once they are turned into friends, come to have love for God.  If 
they have love for the man who is God then they have love for God himself.
76
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 Lonergan then turns his attention to how the intermediary turns enemies into 
friends.  Unless human psychological and social laws are suspended, contrary to the 
principle of continuity, humans cannot be turned from evil to good except according to 
the law of the cross.  It is thus appropriate that the God-man prescribe the law of the cross 
and exemplify the law by performing his proper work according to this same law.
77
 
 Finally, in accordance with the teaching that no one comes to the Father except 
through Christ (Jn 6:44), in addition to the God-man’s display of love and inducement in 
others to return this love, he must enable them to actually do so.  This requires the 
supernatural gifts of grace.
78
  
 Lonergan begins to explain how the God-man produces these supernatural gifts.  
The God-man is a divine person, and so communicates grace abundantly.  Where sin 
abounded, grace was all the more abundant (Rom 5:20).  Lonergan begins to explain why 
grace is superabundant.  His explanation, though likely unfinished, ends the Supplement:   
But grace is above all superabundant if a divine person brings it about that men work for 
themselves but also himself works for them, as the head working for the members, a 
priest working for his people, a shepherd for his sheep, a king for his subjects, a deputy 
for those whom he represents, a friend for his friends.  It is appropriate that it be so, 
because men ordinarily do not act by themselves but through others, because they fall 
into sin not only through their own vices but also through those of others, and because, 
even when elevated and assisted by grace, their actions on their own behalf fall short of 
perfection. 
  
It is appropriate, therefore, that an intermediary friend should make superabundant 
satisfaction for sin.
79
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7.3 Lonergan’s General Understanding of Historical Causality 
 
 
Before we interpret Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ, 
it is appropriate to begin with an interpretation of his general understanding of historical 
causality itself.  We will treat his general understanding of history, then his general 
understanding of causality.  Then we will bring these two together. 
 
7.3.1 History 
 
 
 Throughout his career, Lonergan made the distinction between the history that is 
written (Historie) and the history that is lived and written about (Geschichte).  He 
appropriated this distinction from the German Historical School.
80
  In the Supplement, his 
concern is with the latter:  the history lived, the world of human affairs.  The history 
lived, from an empirical level, is the totality of human thoughts, words, and deeds.  In an 
early essay he equated this empirical level to the material object of history.
81
  
 Lonergan’s understanding of history is not strictly equivalent to the empirical 
level of history.  Just as there is a difference between empirical data as data and empirical 
data as intelligible, Lonergan anticipates a particular intelligibility in the empirical data of 
history.  His heuristic structure to anticipate this intelligibility is the human good of order. 
 Let us recall the structure of the human good of order.  The human good of order 
is simply the good of order as it pertains to human affairs.  The human good of order is 
comprised of (1) the cultural good, which is essentially the interior roots of human 
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activity located in the human intellect and will but understood in its social context; (2) the 
social good, or what Lonergan calls the “external good of order,” which includes the 
external institutions and coordinated operations which order particular goods and aim at 
securing these goods on a continuous basis; and (3) the continuous and secure flow of 
particular goods. 
 The cultural level is superior and the most influential level.  In culture one finds 
the intrinsic principle of human development:  the desires of the human mind to make 
and to become all things.  At the level of culture one also finds the common meanings 
and values governing a way of life.  The cultural level influences the external good of 
order, and the external good of order determines the particular goods produced, how they 
are produced, and how they are obtained.  On the other hand, human beings are impotent 
to heal evils at the cultural level.  As cultural good is superior, cultural evil is the most 
hideous of all evils.  Since cultural good is ultimately rooted in interiority, human beings 
are impotent against such evil through their own powers.  This is why Lonergan stated in 
his first chapter that it is precisely cultural evil that calls for a heaven-sent redeemer.
82
 
 No doubt then that for Lonergan, culture is the basic unit in thinking about 
history.  He appropriated this from Christopher Dawson.
83
  Dawson once remarked that 
culture is the fundamental social unit upon which all other social phenomena depend.
84
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Lonergan’s heuristic structure amounts to a structure that anticipates the intelligibility of 
any culture.  As a heuristic structure, it does not specify the particular meanings and 
values of a culture, what social institutions are in place there, nor the particular goods 
valued by that culture.  Nevertheless, the human good of order, as a heuristic structure, is 
an intelligible set of terms and relations anticipating the intelligibility of the history that is 
lived, the world of human affairs, where the basic unit of history is culture.  This 
structure functions as Lonergan’s formal object of history.  Using the human good of 
order as a formal object, he abstracts from the empirical level of history to grasp the 
intelligibility of the history that is lived within human cultures.  
 However, the intelligibility anticipated is not simply the static structure of a given 
culture at a given place and time in history.  On one hand, we can think of a human good 
of order as a snapshot of a culture at any given place and time.  But cultures develop and 
cultures decline.  So history is a flow, a process.  To explain this dynamic element, 
Lonergan developed his threefold approximation of progress, decline, and redemption, as 
we interpreted from his first chapter.  Without redemption, historical decline would win 
out due to moral impotence.  With redemption, the line of progress is restored. 
 Lonergan considers all three approximations as always operative in history.  Since 
the redemptive vector is operative, the net effect in history is progress.  This does not 
mean that every culture at every given point in history is necessarily progressing.  The 
judgment is a theological one.  Through Christ, God has introduced a redemptive vector 
into human history according to the divine plan.  The divine plan cannot be frustrated.  So 
from a theological perspective, Lonergan holds the general view that history is one of net 
progress.  So when he refers to progress in the “total” human good of order, he is 
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referring to a net process and is not suggesting that every culture at every point in time in 
history is progressing. 
 Let us name this progress human development.  Human development is a matter 
of fact that can be verified empirically through the study of cultural development.
85
  This 
could be verified at particular places and times in history even prescinding from the 
redemptive vector.  But given that God’s redemptive vector has entered into human 
history, Lonergan holds the theological position that the net effect in history is ongoing 
human development.  This is a long-range view.  In specific cultures, and specific times, 
there may still be decline.  But in the long-range view, he affirms that there is human 
development because there is a redemptive vector operative in history which has restored 
the net line of progress.  So to understand history is to understand human development.  
As such, Lonergan’s general understanding of history amounts to an answer to the 
following question:  what makes human development what it is? 
 To understand human development, one does not need to account for every single 
human thought, word, or deed in history.  Just as the intelligibility of the circle does not 
depend on the empirical accidents of radius, color, or thickness, the intelligibility of 
human development does not depend on every thought, word, or deed.  For Lonergan, 
data not relevant to a specific intelligibility one is seeking is called the “empirical 
residue.”86  To grasp the intelligible from the empirical one abstracts from the incidental.  
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This abstraction is the selectivity of intelligence.  The same method applies to Lonergan’s 
approach to understanding human development.  What makes human development what 
it is is not based on every thought, word, or deed.  What makes human development what 
it is is based on the intelligible relations of thoughts, words, and deeds producing effects 
in history where those effects amount to improvements in the human good of order. 
 Although Lonergan understands history through a social structure, the human 
good of order, he does not ignore individual human development.  Quite the opposite.  He 
understands individual development as mediated through social development.  No person 
lives in a metaphorical vacuum.  It is through community that one comes to appropriate 
one’s self, to know one’s self.87  As we noted in our interpretation of Lonergan’s first 
chapter, there is indeed such a thing as constant human nature.  But there is also variable 
human history, and this historical dimension is also constitutive of persons as persons. 
 This historical dimension is what Lonergan later meant by the term “historicity.”88  
The notion of historicity affirms that (1) meaning plays a constitutive role in human 
living, and (2) meaning develops in history because meaning develops in cultures.  So 
meaning itself is a function of historical process.  Human beings are embedded in this 
process.  As Lonergan noted in his second chapter, with the possible exception of the 
mystics, no person is so individual as not to be related essentially to the historical 
process.
89
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7.3.2 Causality 
 
 
  Lonergan stated that a cause is whatever influences another in its existence and 
an effect is whatever depends upon another in its existence.
90
  Causality is an intelligible 
relation of dependence of a created effect as influenced by a cause.  The change is in the 
effect, not the cause.  There is no change in the cause qua cause.
91
  
In his explanation of causality, it is clear that Lonergan wants to refute the error of 
understanding causality through picture-thinking.  Causality is a reality and is therefore 
intelligible.  However, to know causality is not had merely by the cognitional operation 
of experience (perception).  Knowledge of causality is had through the further operations 
of understanding and judgment.  Picture-thinking is a misunderstanding that knowledge is 
perception and so it fails to grasp the reality of causality.  In explaining how one knows 
causality, Lonergan is simply adhering to his own cognitional theory.
92
  
Among Aristotle’s four causes, the efficient cause is perhaps most open to 
misunderstanding.  Efficient causality is known not because one “sees” physical contact.  
Efficient causality is known because (1) one grasps an intelligible relation of dependence 
in an effect as “moved” by a cause, and (2) one subsequently judges this intelligible 
relation to be true.  Efficient causality may involve physical contact.  However, the reality 
of efficient causality is not exclusively physical.
93
 
                                                 
90
 Lonergan, DBM, *236 [Supplement, 100].   
91
 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 90. 
92
 In Lonergan’s cognitional theory one does not come to a true knowledge of any reality by what he often 
referred to as “taking a good look.”  Objective knowledge is the fruit of authentic experiencing, 
understanding, and judgment.  The same holds true for knowledge of causality.  As he later stated in 
Method, “genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.”  See Method in Theology, 292, 265. 
93
 A misinterpretation of efficient causality is that it must be physical or corporeal.  Aquinas counters this 
by teaching that in addition to corporeal contact there is also “spiritual” contact.  See ST, q. 48, a. 6, ad 2. 
 257 
Lonergan’s explanation of what causality is applies to any form of causality.  
Furthermore, any effect is not dependent on a single cause.  Near the time he wrote the 
Supplement, Lonergan often appealed to the classical Aristotelian definition of science as 
“a certain knowledge of things through their causes” (certa rerum per causas cognitio).94  
To know things through their causes is obtained by analysis, by resolving a thing into its 
causes.  This resolution applies only to created realities.  There are no causes in God.   
Furthermore, since in created realities there is distinction between essence and 
existence, there is a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic causality.  An intrinsic 
cause is that by reason of which a thing is what it is.  It is the formal cause.  It is 
intelligible in itself.  So intrinsic causality is a means of knowing why a thing is what it 
is, prescinding from extrinsic causality.  Extrinsic causality applies when there is a 
distinction between the essence of a thing and its existence.  This distinction is 
constitutive of every created being.  However, no created being can activate its own 
existence.  One needs recourse to extrinsic causality to grasp the intelligibility of the 
being’s existence.  This is equivalent to the metaphysical principles that potency and act 
are not intelligible in themselves.
95
  They are intelligible in the other, in the extrinsic 
causes.  Extrinsic causes are final, efficient, and exemplary cause.  So although one can 
speak of intrinsic causality or intrinsic intelligibility, this does not exhaust the 
intelligibility of created realities. 
Turning back to efficient causality, an agent acting through intellect can exert this 
type of causality without physical contact by moving another agent acting through 
intellect, specifically through the other agent’s reason and will.  This movement can be 
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extended through space and time in a causal series.  If the agent’s influence is extended 
through space and time in a causal series, then human cooperation is constitutive of this 
causal series.  Even if an agent’s ability to produce an effect depends on the free consent 
of others, the causality is no less real.  There is still an intelligible relation of dependence 
in the created effect on the originating agent. 
Since we have introduced the notion of a causal series it is appropriate we explain 
this in more detail.  Lonergan distinguishes two types of causal series:  accidental and 
proper.  An example of the former is Abraham (A) begetting Isaac (B), and Isaac (B) 
begetting Jacob (C).  In this accidental causal series there are only two real relations of 
dependence:  B depends on A, and C depends on B.  The relation of C to A is not a real 
relation of dependence.  The relation of C to A is of a conditioned to a condition.  
Abraham is not a cause but a condition of begetting Jacob.  Furthermore, in an accidental 
causal series there is no reality of mediate efficient causality since the relation of C to A 
is not a real relation of dependence.   
  An example of the latter is the typist (A), the typewriter (B), and the typescript 
(C).  In this causal series there are three real relations of dependence:  B depends on A, C 
depends on B, and C depends on A even more than on B.
96
  C depends on A even more 
than on B because only A is by nature proportionate to creating the effect even though A 
uses a secondary (instrumental) cause (B).
97
  A is the mediate efficient cause of C. 
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7.3.3 Historical Causality 
 
 
 In one of Lonergan’s early essays on history he understood the relationship 
between human causality and human development as “the making and unmaking of man 
by man.”98  The essence of the phrase would stay with him throughout his career.  In one 
of his later essays he stated that it is in history that “man’s making of man” occurs.99  
Each person does not make himself or herself in an individual sense of “making.”  Even 
though each of us has the use of free will, we do not make ourselves out of ourselves.  
This is a metaphysical impossibility because of the principle that anything moved is 
moved by something else, quidquid movetur ab alio movetur.  This is a familiar 
scholastic tag that Lonergan appropriated from Aquinas.  It is explicitly employed in his 
early theory of history and implicit in his view of history offered in the Supplement.
100
  
No contingent effect is its own cause.
101
     
 Lonergan’s understanding of human solidarity, developed in his first chapter, 
exemplifies the principle that anything moved is moved by something else.  Any person’s 
thought, original or otherwise, depends upon external experience and beliefs handed on 
from previous generations.  Since action follows thought, everything we do is to some 
degree based on the influence of the past, for better or for worse.  This is the ground of 
Lonergan’s notion of human solidarity.  Human progress is progress of the whole, not 
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progress of the individual.
102
  As Lonergan explained in his first chapter, the human good 
of order is an immense accumulation of insights, discoveries, and decisions of the past.
103
  
This explains why in his last chapter he judges that even though social agents freely 
determine the future, this very determination, to the extent that it is common and 
effective, depends very greatly upon the past.
104
  Thus, historical causality depends very 
greatly on the past even though it can freely determine the future. 
 How does historical causality freely determine the future?  The answer ultimately 
depends on the fact that there are creatures who are agents acting through intellect.  In his 
first chapter, Lonergan laid the foundation for his explanation of such an agent.  There he 
discussed human nature, specifically the human mind, as that which can make and 
become all things.
105
  In the last chapter this agency is explained in a more systematic 
fashion:  according to the category of the agent acting through intellect who can 
understand the requisite conditions needed to be fulfilled for an effect to be produced and 
who can see to the fulfillment of those conditions.  Of course, it is much more likely that 
conditions are fulfilled through human cooperation than by a single individual. 
 The requisite conditions governing the production of an effect are to be 
understood in accordance with Lonergan’s theory of emergent probability.  Lonergan’s 
second chapter provides an explanation why there are conditions in the first place and 
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why these conditions can be understood.  Conditions are regulated by innate laws which 
govern the operation of each individual thing according to its nature, as well as the whole 
complex or series of natural laws, both classic and statistical, which govern the universal 
order of reality.  An agent acting through intellect can understand these conditions 
precisely because they are intelligible.  The conditions are intelligible because they are 
intelligently related to the intelligible operation of this universe conceived by divine 
wisdom.  Since they are intelligible they can be known.  And if they can be known it is 
possible they can be fulfilled through intentional human agency. 
 Just as emergent probability governs events in the natural world, it does as well in 
the world of human affairs.  At the heart of emergent probability is the notion of the 
scheme of recurrence.  The human good of order itself is a scheme of recurrence.  The 
external situation influences the members of the order, each of which is an agent acting 
through intellect.  This in turn influences the human will of the agent to change the 
situation for the better.  As Lonergan noted in his second chapter, there would not be 
improvement if the human intellect looked only at the present order and could not 
imagine an improved, yet future, human good of order.  If others can be persuaded by the 
new ideas originated by the individual agent, there can then be mutual understanding and 
agreement on a future course of action.  If this is realized, the situation is improved.  
When this change is complete, the cycle starts over.  We have a scheme of recurrence.  
Since the human mind wants to become and make all things, there is no reason why this 
scheme of recurrence, this progressive cycle if you will, should come to an end.
106
   
Given the foregoing, let us summarize Lonergan’s general understanding of 
historical causality.  The “historical” in historical causality refers to the developing 
                                                 
106
 Lonergan, DBM, 9 [Supplement, 5].   
 262 
human good of order.  The “causality” in historical causality refers to an intelligible 
relationship of dependence in the developing human good of order (the historical effect) 
on any and all influences (historical causes).  Historical influences can and often do 
originate from a single agent.  This is the originating agent, an agent as potential cause.  
However, in the vast majority of cases an agent becomes an actual cause through the free 
consent of others, through human cooperation, because no single person can fulfill all of 
the requisite conditions to produce the intended effect. 
Since historical causality involves more than one cause, to understand historical 
causality amounts to resolving the development of the human good of order into its 
causes.  Resolving this development into its causes would explain how the human good 
of order develops.  Since to know causality in the general sense is to make a true 
affirmation that there is an intelligible relation of dependence in an effect as influenced 
by a cause, then to know a historical cause is to make a true affirmation that there is an 
intelligible relation of dependence in an improvement within the human good of order on 
a particular historical influence.   
As we noted earlier, the category of efficient causality is particularly problematic 
if one does not explain the nature of the agency involved.  Efficient causality, as with any 
of the Aristotelian causes, is a metaphysical category.  It is abstract and necessarily 
vague.  But human history is concrete.  To grasp a concrete understanding of historical 
causality one needs an explanation commensurate with the concrete nature of history 
itself.  Lonergan’s categories of individual, social, and historical agency serve this 
purpose.  These categories add further specification to the Aristotelian categories, 
bringing these vague metaphysical categories down to earth.  These categories of agency 
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amount to a sociology, both of knowledge and of action.  Of knowledge, because of the 
social nature of human thought.  Of action, because virtually everything we do is done 
either through others or for others.  So historical causality is essentially a social dynamic.  
It is fundamentally communitarian since the vast majority of actual causes are had 
through mutual understanding and agreement.  The key here is actual causality.  
Certainly there is the causality related to the individual agent.  At a minimum, the 
individual agent is a potential cause.  However, to become an actual cause is a different 
matter.  When it comes to improving the human good of order, actual causes are in the 
vast majority of times the product of social agency. 
 
7.4 The Historical Causality of Christ:  Preliminary Remarks 
 
 
Lonergan’s approach to understanding the historical causality of Christ is by way 
of analysis.  He resolves Christ’s work in history into its causes.  The articles “Christ the 
Exemplar,” “Christ the Head,” “Christ the Historical Agent,” and “The Mediator in 
Heaven” are Lonergan’s way of resolving the work of Christ into its causes.  
The triune God is, of course, the absolute first historical cause of every historical 
effect.  This simply reflects the ad extra doctrine.  The judgment also proceeds from the 
metaphysical distinction between the effectiveness of God and God’s instruments:  “the 
cause of a cause is a cause of the effect” (causa causae est causa causati).107  Since God 
is the cause of every other cause, God is the cause of the effect.  So God is the first and 
principal efficient cause of any created effect.  But why is God the cause of all created 
causes?  Because a created being cannot move from potency to act by its own resources.  
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Act is greater than potency.
108
  The created being must be moved from potency to act by 
another cause in order to actually produce an effect.  God is the only efficient cause 
proportionate to producing action itself.  Hence the fundamental theorem of divine 
concurrence:  “God operates in everything that operates” (Deus operature in omni 
operante).
109
   
Now we turn to Christ.  Christ acts as both God and man.  As God, Christ shares 
in this divine agency of God.  Whenever Lonergan speaks of Christ acting as God, he is 
referring to the divine knowledge, will, and power through which Christ acts and where 
these attributes of knowledge, will, and power are common to the three divine persons.  
At this point we have yet entered into any causal series.  There is no causal series 
between God as first cause and Christ acting as God.  They are the same. 
We enter into a proper causal series, with respect to divine causality, the moment 
we begin speaking of Christ acting as man.  Christ, acting as man, is a secondary cause.  
There may or may not be additional secondary causes, that is, human agents through 
which Christ as man mediates his work.  If not, the work is proper to Christ.  In this case 
the causal series is (1) God as first cause, which includes Christ acting as God; (2) Christ 
acting as man, as a secondary cause; and (2) the created effect.   
If there are additional secondary causes, the work is not proper to Christ alone but 
the effect is proportionate only to Christ.  In this case the causal series is (1) God as first 
cause, which includes Christ acting as God; (2) Christ acting as man, as a secondary 
cause; (3) other secondary causes who are ministerial agents of Christ; and (4) the created 
effect.  Here Christ is mediate efficient cause in relation to his ministerial agents.  The 
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work is not strictly proper to Christ since Christ is mediating his work through other 
secondary causes.  But the created effect is proportionate only to Christ.  His ministerial 
agents exert true causality, but only instrumental causality.  So there is a proper causal 
series here.  Nevertheless, Christ is more the cause of the effect than his agents. 
In Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ, there is always 
operative some causal series.  Which one depends on the context.  To explain this I will 
use the notion of stages in the work of Christ in history.  The work of Christ in history of 
course presupposes the Incarnation, and Lonergan’s final article on cur Deus homo 
addresses this specifically.  For now I intend to focus on Christ’s work in history.   
There is an implicit structure operative in Lonergan’s thought of how Christ’s 
work in history unfolds.  This structure is one of stages.  There are three basic stages 
implicit in Lonergan’s thought.  The first is what Catholic dogmatic theology 
traditionally understands as objective redemption:  the work proper to Christ alone, yet 
done for the sake of all.  The second is the first stage of subjective redemption:  the work 
of Christ to apply to his members the fruits of his objective redemption.  The third is the 
unfolding of subjective redemption:  the ongoing work of Christ in history mediated 
through the members of his body.  This third element can also be understood as the 
perfection of the members through the production of similar operations in the members, 
as are produced in the head, according to exemplary causality. 
In all three stages, the work is the work of Christ.  The first is the principle of the 
second, since objective redemption is the principle of subjective redemption.  The second 
is the principle of the third, since the application of Christ’s objective redemption is the 
principle of the unfolding of subjective redemption. 
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Lonergan’s final chapter is, for the most part, an explanation of this third element: 
the unfolding of subjective redemption in history.  Lonergan’s motive is evident from the 
very beginning of the chapter.  He stated that what was said in his third chapter about the 
price paid, sacrifice, meritorious obedience, and the vicarious suffering of Christ refers 
only to redemption as means (ut medium), or, better, as a principle (ut principium).  
Lonergan prefers the term principium since what he said in his third chapter, considered 
in itself, corresponds to objective redemption.  However, redemption as means cannot be 
reduced to objective redemption.  Christ’s objective work is better understood as a 
principium, since a principle is what is first in some order.  Lonergan’s primary objective 
in his final chapter is to understand what follows from this principium.  Hence his call for 
a broader and fuller survey of the work of the Lord.   
Let us take our bearings.  Lonergan understands the historical causality of Christ 
in terms of objective and subjective redemption.  He rarely uses this explicit language.  In 
fact, he never mentions subjective redemption and he mentions objective redemption only 
one time.  But the distinction is implicit and it is a practical way to frame our 
interpretation.  Furthermore, in this chapter Lonergan understands subjective redemption 
primarily in terms of Christ’s extrinsic causality in history.  Christ’s intrinsic causality 
refers to his ontological constitution.  This is not his focus.  He had already treated this in 
De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica (1956). 
Now we will turn to specific aspects of Lonergan’s understanding of the historical 
causality of Christ.  It is appropriate to begin with final causality.   
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7.5 The Historical Causality of Christ:  Final Causality 
 
 
 The end for the sake of which Christ acts in history is the historical effect 
intended by Christ in accordance with the divine plan of redemption.  When any end is 
for the sake of which an agent acts, the end is not simply an end but a final cause.  The 
primary end of redemption is the divine goodness itself, the good by essence.  Lonergan 
does not explicitly correlate this primary end with the beatific vision but this is what he 
means.
110
  This end lies outside the field of history and is not our direct concern.  Our 
concern is with the secondary end of redemption as final cause, since this end is found 
within the field of history.  Our interpretation here will include (1) references to the 
secondary end whether implicit or explicit, (2) an interpretive synthesis of these 
references, and (3) an interpretation of how this secondary end is a final cause in 
Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ.   
 
7.5.1 References to the Secondary End of Redemption 
 
 
 References to the secondary end are found in the first, second, third, and sixth 
chapters of the Supplement.  The references are implicit until the final chapter.  In the 
introduction of the first chapter Lonergan follows scripture in judging that the hidden 
plan of God’s will is to gather all creation in heaven and earth under one head, Christ.  
The end in history is equated to the gathering up of earthly realities.
111
  Lonergan 
appropriates Aquinas’s teaching that “...the purpose of the universe is a good existing in 
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it, namely, the order of the universe itself.”112  In the first chapter he also states that the 
end of creation is to manifest divine goodness.
113
 
 In the second chapter he states that the order of the universe is a good of order and 
the intrinsic end of the universe.
114
  He reiterates that the justice of God is grounded in 
divine wisdom, in its exercise to the just choice of a wise order, and in its effects is found 
in created things inasmuch as they are wisely and justly ordered among themselves and in 
relation to their ultimate end which is God himself.
115
  There is again a judgment that the 
ultimate end to which all things are directed is to manifest the divine goodness.
116
 
 In the third chapter, redemption as end is described as that state in which we are 
freed from the power of darkness, from sin, from punishment, from the fear of death, by 
which we have received the promise, are reconciled to God, are justified, enjoy the 
indwelling of the Holy Spirit and adoptive sonship, are saved in hope, and are able to 
approach God with confidence.
117
  Here there are no references to eschatological effects.  
Lonergan is describing redemptive effects in history.  He goes on to explain the 
distinction between redemption as end and redemption as means.  As end, it is to restore 
all things in Christ.  As means, it is the payment of the price, sacrifice, meritorious 
obedience, and Christ’s vicarious suffering and death.118 
 At the beginning of the final chapter Lonergan provides a biblical synthesis of the 
historical effect correlative to the work of the Lord.  The effect is described as the 
Kingdom of God, the Body of Christ, and the specific salvific effects which are had 
                                                 
112
 “...‘finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso exsistens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi.’”  DBM, 6 
[Supplement, 3].  This is a citation from ST I, q. 103, a. 2 ad 3m.   
113
 Lonergan, DBM, 24 [Supplement, 11]. 
114
 Lonergan, DBM, 68 [Supplement, 28].  Lonergan references ST, I, q. 47, a. 3; q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m. 
115
 Lonergan, DBM, 69 [Supplement, 29]. 
116
 Lonergan, DBM, 77 [Supplement, 31]. 
117
 Lonergan, DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52].  
118
 Lonergan, DBM, 142 [Supplement, 58]. 
 269 
through incorporation into this body.  Then he states:  “The reader of the New Testament 
understands that Christ’s end or purpose is first and foremost the kingdom of God...To 
arrive in this kingdom is what salvation means...”119  Later he makes the distinction 
between the effects directly and indirectly intended by Christ.  Christ directly intends to 
order human life on earth to the future life in heaven.  This ordering liberates us from evil 
to the good such that the total human good of order is greatly improved.  Christ indirectly 
intends this improvement.  He then explains the secondary end of redemption in terms of 
reconciliation, expressed through the spatial metaphor of drawing near to God.  The 
entire work of Christ is summed up in this reconciliation which is had within the Body of 
Christ.
120
  Next we come to his explanation of the purpose of the Incarnation.  There he 
describes the secondary end as all created things in their due order to one another, the 
external glory of God, and the order of the universe.  This same end is the Body of Christ, 
head and members, as all things in heaven and on earth are brought together and 
reconciled in him.
121
  In the final article he reiterates that the end is divided into primary 
and secondary.  The secondary end is the external glory of God, the order of the universe, 
and the Body of Christ wherein all things are brought together and reconciled in him.
122
 
 
7.5.2 Toward a Synthesis 
 
 
 References to the secondary end of redemption reveal three contexts.  The first is 
anthropological from an individualistic perspective.  The second is anthropological from 
a social perspective.  The third is cosmological. 
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 Anthropological and Individual:  The secondary end is a new state (status) of the 
human person:  liberation from darkness, from sin, from punishment, from fear of death, 
and by which the person receives the promise of eternal redemption, justification, the gift 
of the Holy Spirit, adoptive sonship, salvation in hope, reconciliation, and interior 
renewal which includes restoration of the image of God.  
 Anthropological and Social:  The secondary end is the Kingdom of God, the Body 
of Christ, the Church.
123
  Through the Body of Christ we are reconciled to God and to 
one another.  This context includes improvement in the total human good of order since 
the members of the body, now converted from enemies of God into friends of God, 
perform good works which improve the overall human situation. 
 Cosmological:  The secondary end is the order of the universe, the external glory 
of God, all created things in their ordering to one another, the restoration and 
reconciliation of all things in Christ, and the manifestation of divine goodness. 
 Now we move towards a synthesis.  The notion of order is common to all three 
contexts.  The secondary end of redemption can thus be understood through the following 
synthesis.  In terms of order, the secondary end refers to a restoration of (1) the interior 
order of the human person, (2) the order of human history, and (3) the order of the 
universe itself.  The Body of Christ, which is a supernatural human good of order, is an 
end in itself through which these restorations are obtained.  I argue that for Lonergan the 
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secondary end is the Body of Christ, the Church, and I will explain how the end 
understood in this way synthesizes all of these contexts. 
Within Lonergan’s notion of order, a part exists for the whole and the whole for 
the part.  In his first chapter he cited Aquinas’s teaching that the universe as a whole is 
not only a good of order but as a whole is a more perfect participation in and reflection of 
the divine goodness than any individual creature.  His second chapter made the teaching 
even more explicit.  Since what is best in creation is the good of order of the universe, 
this order is itself directly intended by God.
124
  The order of the universe encompasses all 
created realities in their ordered relationship to one another.  The key here is relationality.  
The order of the universe is not simply an aggregate of parts where intelligibility is found 
only in each separate part.  The ordering itself is intelligible.  This ordering is understood 
by Lonergan as a hierarchical order in which vertical finality is operative, as we 
explained in our interpretation of his second chapter.  The point is that each part of the 
universe does not exist for its own sake.  Each part is related to the whole for the sake of 
the whole.  As Lonergan stated in Insight, the actual order of the universe includes the 
excellence of every other good within the universe.  To will any good is to will the order 
of the universe.
125
   
The order of the universe includes the world of human affairs, the total human 
good of order.  In De ratione convenientiae, this is the “historical order of the universe” 
(ordine universi historico).
126
 In the Supplement, it is the “historical order of justice.”  
Thus history itself can be understood as an order within the order of the universe.  
History is related to the universe as a part to the whole. 
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Individuals are inherently part of this historical order.  Individuals can also be 
understood in terms of their own intrinsic ordering.  In Lonergan’s first chapter, he 
explained that if wisdom and goodness are for each individual most valuable by reason of 
their intrinsic excellence, then in addition to the external order and its progressive 
development there is another, “...an interior order, in which our sensitive part is 
subordinated to reason, and weak human reason is in turn subordinated to the supreme 
being, supreme truth, and supreme good.”127  Without this right ordering the sensitive 
element is in control.  If the sensitive element is in control an animal is in control. 
We come now to the heart of the matter.  Because of sin, human beings, qua 
individuals, are disordered.  For now we are prescinding from the healing effect of grace.  
This disorder can be understood as corruption of the intrinsic order of the individual.  Sin 
gives rise to the evil consequences of sin which then corrupt and disorder the order of 
history itself.  Since a part exists for the sake of the whole, when one part is corrupted the 
whole is corrupted.  Since the historical order of the universe has been corrupted by the 
evil consequences of sin, the whole universe has been corrupted.  But if one corrupted 
part leads to the corruption of the whole, then restoration of that part leads to restoration 
of the whole.  Through the Body of Christ, which restores the individual as well as the 
historical order, the universe itself is restored.  Understanding this relationship between 
the individual, historical, and cosmological order is critical to understanding why 
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 “...ordo homini interior ut pars sensitiva rationi subdatur et debilis humana ratio summo enti, summo 
vero, summo bono subordinetur.”  DBM, 27 [Supplement, 12].  Lonergan is describing his understanding of 
that aspect of interior renewal Aquinas understood as “justification.”  Aquinas explains that the inner 
change implied in the notion of justification borrows its name not from charity or faith, but from justice 
since the word implies a general rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a human being:  ST I-II, q. 
113, a. 1, ad 2.  In Lonergan’s own dissertation we find an appropriation of this same teaching:  “The 
justice of justification is the rectitude and the order of the internal disposition of man; it involves the 
subordination of the rational element to God and of the irrational element to the rational.  The process of 
justification is a transition from the state of injustice or disorder to the state of justice.”  See Grace and 
Freedom, 394; Lonergan cites ST I-II, q. 113, a. 1. 
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Lonergan can mention, in the same breath, that the secondary end of redemption is the 
external glory of God, the order of the universe, and the Body of Christ wherein all things 
are brought together and reconciled in him. 
We can now focus more specifically on the Body of Christ in itself.  This body is 
a supernatural human good of order.  Like any human good of order we can expect to 
find in this body the following levels:  (1) particular goods, (2) the social or external good 
of order, and (3) the cultural good.  The supernatural gifts of grace, the infused virtues, 
the gifts and movements of the Spirit correspond to particular goods.  The external 
institutions of the Church and the operations of its members correspond to the external 
good of order.  The interpersonal relationships as well as the shared meanings and values 
of the members correspond to the cultural good.  Shared meanings refer to mutual 
understandings and judgments on reality.  Shared values refers to mutual judgments on 
what ends are truly good and worthy to be chosen. 
Through these interpersonal relationships the members are reconciled to one 
another and to Christ.  As Lonergan explained in his answer to cur Deus homo, through 
loving the God-man one comes to have love for God.  Through loving Christ the 
members are reconciled to God.  Lonergan stated that the entire work of Christ is 
summed up in this reconciliation.  The secondary end of redemption, interpreted as the 
Body of Christ, is consistent with this statement.  The Body of Christ is a supernatural 
community reconciling the members to God and to one another.
128
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 This supernatural human good of order is what in De Verbo Incarnato Lonergan describes as the 
“supreme good” into which human evils are transformed.  This supreme good is “the whole Christ, head 
and members, in this life as well as in the life to come...”  Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 553.  In 
Lonergan’s most developed systematics of the Trinity, he understands this supreme good as a “state or 
situation of grace” (statum seu situationem gratiae) referring to many distinct subjects together in a divine-
human interpersonal situation in which the divine persons and the just are in one another as those who are 
known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them.  Thus in 
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Since the Body of Christ is the end for the sake of which Christ acts in history, 
there is no doubt that Lonergan would judge it as God’s will that all become members of 
Christ’s body.129  However, this does not mean that the Body of Christ, as end, is meant 
to replace what Lonergan understands as the total human good of order.  The Body of 
Christ is not meant to eliminate or replace the total human good of order, but to transform 
that order, to transform human history through the leavening of human history.
130
   
This leavening of human history is indirectly intended by Christ.  Recall that the 
Body of Christ, as end, is directly intended to prepare members of the body for the future 
life in heaven.  But it is also intended, albeit indirectly, to improve the overall human 
situation.  Through the good works of the members, the Body of Christ introduces and 
propagates a redemptive vector into human history to leaven human history.  This vector 
is redemptive and absolutely supernatural because it is conceived by divine wisdom, is 
chosen by divine goodness, and is affected by divine causality with the intent to 
transform cultural evil into cultural good.  The redemptive vector leavens human history 
by transforming cultural meanings and values operative in history to more closely 
approximate God’s meanings and values revealed in Christ.   
 
7.5.3 Final Causality and Christ’s Intentionality 
 
 
 The secondary end of redemption, as final cause, is the end for the sake of which 
Christ acts in history.  The key here is “for the sake of.”  We are not interested in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lonergan’s theology he makes a distinction between the habit of grace and the state of grace.  The former 
is a physical accident received in the soul of the just.  The latter is a social, interpersonal reality between 
human persons, qua community, and the divine persons of the Trinity.  See The Triune God: Systematics, 
517. 
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 In “Finality, Love, Marriage,” he describes this in terms of the mystical body’s “intussusception” of 
human personalities.  What he means is that Christ, as head of the mystical body, operates with the 
intention of taking into his body all persons.  See “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 22. 
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 Lonergan, “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 22. 
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secondary end as end, but as final cause.  There is a difference.  Any end, in and of itself, 
is not a final cause.  It is simply an end.  In and of itself an end is what Lonergan once 
termed the end in ordo executionis, the end in the order of execution.
131
  We are 
interested in how Lonergan understands the secondary end of redemption not simply as 
an end but an end qua final cause, the end in ordo intentionis.
132
  To interpret him on this 
aspect of the historical causality of Christ, three points are particularly relevant. 
 First, a final cause is not simply an end as cause.  A final cause is the good as 
cause.
133
  In other words, there is final causality in the strict sense if and only if that for 
the sake of which the agent acts is truly a good end.  Second, the end must be an 
apprehended end.  Without the end as apprehended, there would be no such thing as final 
causality.  Third, the end as apprehended is the efficient cause of the act of appetition.
134
  
This third point is important because one can easily confuse final causality with efficient 
causality in the effort to understand the intentionality of the agent.  The point here is that 
there is a difference between (1) the relationship of the good as cause to the end as 
apprehended, and (2) the relationship of the end as apprehended to the willingness to 
attain the end.  The former is understood by Lonergan according to final causality.  The 
latter to efficient causality.  We can apply these general elements to interpret how final 
causality operates in Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ. 
 First, there is no difficulty with judging that the secondary end of redemption is a 
good.  The secondary end is a supernatural good, and this is in fact why it is an end and 
not merely a means.  Second, this secondary end is apprehended by Christ.  Christ 
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apprehends the secondary end of redemption because he apprehends the divine plan as 
part of his apprehension of the actual order of reality.  He apprehends the actual order of 
reality as a secondary object of his beatific knowledge.
135
  This end as apprehended is 
perhaps the key element to understanding the historical causality of Christ under the 
aspect of final causality.  Since a final cause is a real cause, then according to Lonergan’s 
own definition we should anticipate an intelligible relation of dependence in a created 
effect as influenced by the end as cause.  If this were not the case, Lonergan’s general 
understanding of causality would not apply to final causality, but this is inadmissible.  
Final causality refers to an intelligible relation of dependence in an effect as influenced 
by a cause, as with any type of causality.  
 The third element helps us to interpret what this created effect is.  The created 
effect is the end as apprehended by Christ.  Recall that an agent acting through intellect 
acts in accordance with an intentional form (formam intentionalem).
136
  Here the forman 
intentionalem is not the likeness of the thing understood, since the thing (the effect) is not 
yet produced.  It is the term of an act of understanding which devises the form intended in 
the thing to be produced and which, as understood, guides operation to produce the 
effect.
137
  Christ as man is an agent acting through intellect.  The intentional form in 
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 Lonergan affirms that Christ knows this end.  “...for through his immediate vision of God he [Christ] 
knows all actual reality as the secondary object of that vision, and thus the total historical effect produced 
by him [Christ] comes about not beyond but according to his intention.”  [...nam per visionem Dei 
immediatam in obiecto secundario omnia actualia cognovit, et ideo totus effectus historicus ab eo productus 
non praeter sed secundum intentionem eius oritur].  DBM, *270 [Supplement, 115].  Lonergan’s judgment 
that Christ knows the intended historical effect is based on the judgment that Christ experiences the beatific 
vision in his human knowledge.  It is not a judgment that presupposes the work of Christ and then deduces 
that Christ must know the intended end to perform his work oriented to this end.  As Lonergan notes in 
Thesis 12 of De Verbo Incarnato, we cannot infer from Christ’s work how much knowledge Christ needed 
to perform his work.  Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 400. 
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 See The Triune God: Systematics, 593.  Here Lonergan discusses the two ways in which “form” may be 
in the intellect.  In the first way, a form can be in the intellect as the likeness of a thing understood in the 
one who is understanding (in this way, the form is the principle of the act of understanding).  In the second 
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Christ is the secondary end of redemption as apprehended by Christ.  This intentional 
form is the created effect dependent on the secondary end as final cause.  This effect 
resides in Christ’s human intellect.  The effect is not located in Christ’s will.  Christ’s 
willingness to achieve the end is to be understood as an effect of efficient causality, 
where the cause is the end as apprehended.  In other words, the end as apprehended is the 
efficient cause of the act of appetition.  As such, the final cause can be understood as the 
immediate cause of the efficient cause of willing the end.   
 Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ, under the aspect of 
final causality, is indeed related to Christ’s intentionality as one would expect.  But given 
his general understanding of final causality operative in intellectual agents, he would not 
conflate final causality and efficient causality.  The secondary end of redemption, as 
apprehended by Christ, governs his intentionality according to final causality not in the 
sense that it moves his will to desire the end, but in the sense that there is an intentional 
form in his intellect according to which the secondary end of redemption is produced.  
This intentional form includes the means to the end, where the means can be understood 
as the inauguration, propagation, and perfection of the Body of Christ in history.  Christ’s 
intentionality is what is first in order of his historical causality, and that intentionality, 
understood according to final causality, is an intentional form residing in Christ’s human 
intellect.  This secondary end of redemption, as final cause, is mediated into Christ’s 
intentionality through this intentional form such that it is a true judgment that the 
secondary end of redemption is that for the sake of which Christ acts in history.  Without 
the intentional form, we could not make this judgment. 
                                                                                                                                                 
way, a form can be in the intellect not in the sense of something pre-existing by which understanding takes 
place, but rather by which, when understood, the one understanding operates.  Lonergan cites Aquinas, De 
veritate, q. 3, a. 2. 
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 A clarification is in order.  We explained that Christ knows the divine plan of 
redemption because he knows the actual order of reality conceived by divine wisdom and 
chosen by divine goodness.  And Christ knows the actual order of reality because he has 
the beatific vision.  Christ’s apprehension of the actual order of reality is not located in 
his divine knowledge.  It is located in his human knowledge.  It is Christ as man who has 
the beatific vision, not Christ as God.  However, Christ’s beatific knowledge, in and of 
itself, is not an apprehension of the actual order of reality and thus not an apprehension of 
the secondary end of redemption.  It is an apprehension and enjoyment of the divine 
goodness itself.  Through this apprehension Christ also apprehends the actual order of 
reality, the divine plan, and thus the secondary end of redemption.  This is why Lonergan 
identifies Christ’s knowledge of the actual order of reality as a “secondary object” of his 
beatific vision.  He wants to affirm that Christ apprehends the actual order of reality 
through the beatific vision, but simultaneously he also wants to affirm that the beatific 
vision in the strict sense of the word is the apprehension of the divine goodness itself, 
prescinding from any apprehension of the order of reality proceeding from the decision of 
divine goodness. 
 Finally, we should take up the nature of Christ’s willingness to carry out this 
actual order of reality.  This will serve as a transition to our next section where we treat 
Christ’s objective work.  Though Lonergan would consider Christ’s willingness to pursue 
the end intended as a product of efficient causality (internal to Christ) because of his 
general understanding of final causality in intellectual agents, he also noted how such 
efficiency is intimately connected with finality.
138
  The point is that despite the technical 
distinction between the end as apprehended and this same apprehension as the efficient 
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cause of Christ’s willingness, it is hard not to associate Christ’s intentionality, under the 
aspect of final causality, with Christ’s willingness (obedience) to fulfill the divine 
command.  And so another clarification is in order. 
 Christ’s human obedience to carry out the means to attain the end as apprehended 
is not ultimately grounded on Christ’s human knowledge.  His obedience is grounded on 
his love for the Father.  As such, his obedience is not blind obedience, not obedience in 
any pejorative sense, but obedience flowing from his love of a person for who that person 
is, not on what that person commands.  What the Father commands, which is the divine 
command common to the three divine persons, is that Christ the man carry out the 
ordination of divine wisdom and goodness which Christ apprehends as end.  The 
motivation to carry this out is not based on the ordination itself, but on the love for the 
one commanding the ordination.  Therefore, the obedience we associate with Christ’s 
intentionality cannot properly be understood simply by affirming that Christ apprehends 
this end and the end as apprehended is the cause of Christ obedience.  Christ’s 
intentionality, in terms of willingness, is ultimately grounded in Christ the man’s love for 
the Father.  Christ’s human knowledge adds specification to Christ’s intentionality.  This 
is why Lonergan stated that the impeccable will of Christ was always willing to obey 
before seeking a specification from his knowledge of reality.
139
  In fact, Lonergan even 
stated that Christ the man did not know of other possible world orders conceived by 
divine wisdom.  He only knew the actual world order chosen by divine goodness from 
among the possibilities conceived by divine wisdom.  So Christ the man could have 
certainly wondered whether or not, in another world, he could have been spared the 
burdensome condition of giving his life for the salvation of others.  But he accepted this 
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actual order of reality out of his love for the Father, out of his knowledge not of the plan 
per se, but of his knowledge of, and love for, the goodness of the Father.  
We now turn to the historical causality of Christ proceeding from Christ’s 
intentionality.  That which first proceeds is Christ’s objective work, otherwise known as 
objective redemption. 
 
7.6 The Historical Causality of Christ:  Christ’s Objective Work in History 
 
 
Christ’s objective work in history was treated by Lonergan in his third chapter.  
This work considered in and of itself corresponds to what the Christian tradition terms 
objective redemption.  This is not the focus in Lonergan’s final chapter, but it is certainly 
presupposed and he does touch on it in his article “Christ the Head.”  That article 
explains the transition from objective redemption to subjective redemption because it 
explains how “...what is done in Christ is now done in and for the whole body” (quod in 
Christo perficitur, hoc iam in toto et pro toto perficitur).
140
 
What is done in Christo is objective redemption, although Christ does his 
objective work not primarily for himself but for others.  That work, when it is now done 
in and for the whole body, applies to subjective redemption and thus assumes unification 
of head and members.  We will treat that in the next section.  For now, the point is that 
the objective work of Christ considered in itself prescinds from (1) any unification of 
head and members such that the members appropriate this objective work, and (2) any 
unification of head and members such that Christ’s ongoing work is mediated through the 
members by similar operations produced in the members. 
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Since the work of Christ produces effects, the objective work of Christ produces 
objective effects in Christ himself.  Lonergan understands these effects through the 
categories of the payment of the price, meritorious obedience, satisfaction, sacrifice, and 
intercession.  The power of the resurrection, which was also a category in his third 
chapter, is not ignored.  It is operative in Christ’s objective work understood through the 
category of intercession.  Celestial intercession or mediation proceeds from Christ’s 
ascension to the right hand of the Father, and the ascension proceeds from the 
resurrection.  So the “power” of the resurrection is not simply the power of the 
resurrection in and of itself, but the full meaning bound up with the fact of Christ’s 
resurrection: that Christ has now been made Lord and Savior, that Christ is now the 
eternal High Priest sitting at the right hand of the Father, that Christ is interceding forever 
on our behalf.  This is why Lonergan stated, in his third chapter, that scriptural passages 
on the resurrection are not only meant to call to mind the means of redemption but also 
the Mediator of our salvation. 
In relation to those who are saved, this objective work of Christ is not redemption 
in act but redemption in potency, as offer, as work done for the sake of every person in 
human history without implying that every person in history is saved.  In Christ himself, 
this redemption is in act, meaning that it is a true effect regardless of whether any person 
accepts the offer of salvation.  
Salvation comes through the appropriation of Christ’s objective work.  For 
Lonergan, at this time in his career, this appropriation is initiated when one enters into the 
Kingdom of God, the Church, since he equated these two when he wrote the Supplement.  
However, the work of appropriation is still the objective, proper work of Christ. 
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7.7 The Historical Causality of Christ:  Christ’s Objective Work Applied to the 
Members 
 
 
The article “Christ the Head” functions as a bridge from objective redemption to 
subjective redemption.  The work of Christ resolved into the cause titled “Christ the 
Head” not only recalls Christ’s objective work but it is primarily meant to explain the 
application of Christ’s objective work to his members such that what has been done in the 
head is now done in and for the whole body.   
Lonergan faces a challenge to explain this causal relationship.  There is no ready-
made metaphysical category for explaining the causal relationship.  He certainly does not 
want to use the categories of efficient or exemplary causality: 
It is true that Christ is the efficient cause of our performance of salutary works...It is true 
that Christ is the exemplar of Christian life...but it is not true that Christ's entire work on 
our behalf is reduced to the category of efficient and exemplar causality, since 
redemption as a means, or, as it is sometime called, objective redemption, means more 
than that.
141
 
 
What Lonergan is essentially explaining here is that if Christ’s work, such as 
satisfaction, is appropriated such that the body has already made satisfaction, then it is 
meaningless to understand this causal relationship in terms of efficient or exemplary 
causality.  For efficient and exemplary causality are only meaningful in reference to the 
production of similar operations in the members.  This is a judgment made by Lonergan 
which is only meaningful if one understands Lonergan’s context informing his judgment 
on what aspects of the work of Christ qualify as efficient causality.  This needs a bit of 
explanation. 
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 “Verum est Christum esse causam efficientem ut nos opera salutaria ponamus...Verum est Christum esse 
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 283 
Lonergan resolves the historical causality of Christ into its causes.  How each 
“cause” is to be interpreted through classical metaphysical categories depends on the 
context in which one is trying to understand the work under investigation.  Lonergan 
understands the work of the Lord with a view towards the end intended, the big picture if 
you will.  This is more easily explained through example.  Take the example of grace.  
On the one hand, we could say that Christ’s communication of grace is proper to Christ 
alone, which it is.  We could also say that this communication falls under the category of 
extrinsic causality, which it does.  The causal sequence, in this context, is Christ as cause 
and the reception of grace as effect.  In this context, the causal relationship can be 
understood according to efficient causality since that by which one receives grace is 
Christ’s communication of grace.  In this context, Christ’s work is not mediated through 
others.  Christ is the only cause.  The work is proper to Christ.   
This, however, is not Lonergan’s context.  His context is wider.  His is an 
enlarged context which includes Christ’s purpose for communicating grace.  In the more 
limited context, the communication of grace does liberate the sinner from bondage to sin.  
In the wider context, this liberation enables the members to mediate Christ’s work.  The 
purpose is to liberate the one who receives grace from the bondage of sin so as to set up 
similar operations of satisfaction, merit, sacrifice, and intercession in the members of 
Christ’s body.  Recall how Lonergan began his final chapter.  He recalled how the 
evangelist Luke understood the purpose of redemption.  Liberated from their enemies, 
God’s people are free to serve God in holiness and justice.  Likewise, liberated from sins, 
God’s people are free to serve God in holiness and justice.  Serving God is had by 
mediating Christ’s ongoing work in history. 
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 Christ mediates his ongoing work in history, through his members, by producing 
similar operations in the members.  These similar operations perfect the Body of Christ 
and improve the total human good of order.  In this wider context, the causal sequence 
does not “stop” in the recipient but rather the recipient is a secondary cause to mediate 
Christ’s work in history.  Therefore, in Lonergan’s framework the criteria for using the 
category of efficient or exemplary causality depends on whether Christ’s work is proper 
to Christ or mediated through secondary causes.  When the work is done in Christ, it is 
work proper to Christ, objective redemption.  When that work is applied to others, it is 
still work proper to Christ even though faith and repentance are required.  However, faith 
and repentance are not the efficient cause of the application of Christ’s objective work.  
They are conditions for such application.  When that work is done through Christ’s 
members, it is not work proper to Christ alone.  In this case, what is “proper” to Christ is 
the proportionality of the effect.  But the work is mediated through secondary causes.  In 
all three stages, it is the work of Christ.  In all three stages, there is an effect correlative to 
the work as cause.  However, in the first two stages the intelligible relation between cause 
and effect involves no mediation. 
The foregoing explains why Lonergan reserves the categories of efficient and 
exemplary causality to the work of Christ which is mediated through others, that is, when 
there is a proper causal series from Christ as man, to his ministerial agents, to the created 
effect.  In the application of Christ’s objective work to his members, there is no notion of 
mediation.  Therefore neither efficient nor exemplary causality apply.   
Nevertheless, there is a causal relationship when what has been done in Christ is 
now done in and for the whole body.  The challenge for Lonergan is to explain this causal 
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relationship without recourse to either efficient or exemplary causality.  How then is the 
application of Christ’s objective work to be understood? 
 The causal relationship in the application of Christ’s objective work is a mystery.  
We cannot understand this mystery perfectly.  We can understand it imperfectly and 
analogically.  The key analogy for Lonergan is the unification of two or more through the 
love which is called friendship.  A friend is a second self, “half of one’s soul.”142  
Therefore two or more persons can be as one through the unification of love.
143
  Since 
friends are one through a union of love, then a friend can do “something” for another 
friend, and that “something” is a reality, not just a notion.  There is a real effect.  Using 
this analogy to understand the relation of head and members, Lonergan explains how one 
can understand, imperfectly and analogically, why what is done in Christ is now done in 
and for the whole body. 
 In brief, then, the historical causality of Christ involves a form of causality not to 
be confused with efficient or exemplary causality.  It is a cause absolutely proper to 
Christ, that is, not mediated through further secondary causes.  It presumes unification of 
head and members for the cause to be activated.  Christ’s objective work is the cause.  
Application of his work is the effect.  How is the cause activated?  It is activated through 
union with Christ when one becomes a member of Christ’s body.  In Lonergan’s thought, 
this unification in and of itself is not a cause in the strict sense.  It is a condition for the 
application of Christ’s objective work.   
For Lonergan, this unification is initiated through the sacrament of baptism.  If we 
lose sight of Lonergan’s context we can misinterpret him, particularly when we try to 
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reconcile what the Church has taught regarding the causes of justification.  The Council 
of Trent taught that the efficient cause of justification is God, the meritorious cause is 
Christ, and the instrumental cause is the sacrament of baptism (DB 799; DS 1529; ND 
1932).  Lonergan is consistent with Trent, though when it comes to the sacrament of 
baptism he does not explicitly refer to this sacrament as an instrumental cause.  He holds 
this view implicitly.  In his final chapter he had called to mind the teaching that the 
sacraments confer grace ex opere operato (DB 851; DS 1608; ND 1318).  As an 
instrumental cause, the sacrament in and of itself does not possess the power to confer 
grace.  In Lonergan’s notes he distributed in 1940-1941 for the course De sacramentis in 
genere,
144
 he explains that sacraments act by signifying because Christ acts by signifying 
when he commands the effect of the sacrament.
145
  Signification, on its own, does not 
possess the causal power proportionate to the effect.  Again, we have recourse to the 
reality of mediate efficient causality.  No instrumental cause in and of itself is 
proportionate to creating an effect.  Baptism confers grace not because of the mechanics 
of the sacrament itself, but because Christ has commanded that through this sacrament 
grace be conferred. 
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Bernard Lonergan, De sacramentis in genere, 8-11, translations by F. Crowe as cited in Christ and History, 
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7.8 The Historical Causality of Christ:  Christ’s Work Mediated through the 
Members 
 
 
7.8.1 Preliminary Remarks 
 
 
Christ’s ongoing work in history is mediated through the Body of Christ.  One 
aspect of this ongoing work is the set of similar operations of satisfaction, merit, 
obedience, and intercession produced in the members.  Through these similar operations 
the members not only mediate the work of Christ in history but are themselves perfected 
as members of the body.  Christ directly intends this perfection because he directly 
intends that the members be prepared for the future life in heaven.  The members can 
only be perfected if they become members in the first place.  Therefore, Christ also 
intends to propagate the Body of Christ in history. 
According to the principle of continuity, it is fitting that the Body of Christ is 
realized on earth not in an apocalyptic fashion, but rather through propagation.  This 
propagation, if it is to conform to the principle of continuity, fittingly involves 
communication of, and conformation to, Christ’s message.  The former necessitates the 
preaching of the gospel.  The latter necessitates faith and repentance.  This propagation 
proceeds from Christ as mediate efficient cause and is realized within a social dynamic.  
The gospel is preached, understood, and actualized through human cooperation which 
depends on mutual understanding and agreement.  This causal sequence is not a 
necessity, but it is intelligible and fitting given the principle of continuity.  Any single 
person is a potential cause.  Actual causes, however, are typically social agents.  
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Lonergan understands the propagation and perfection of the Body of Christ 
through the categories of efficient and exemplary causality.  Propagation is primarily 
through efficient causality.  Perfection involves both, but Lonergan’s emphasis is on 
exemplary causality.  As such, we will treat his understanding of Christ’s ongoing work 
in history according to the division of efficient and exemplary causality. 
Christ’s efficient causality is operative in two ways: 
One is that which he now performs in heaven seated at the right hand of the Father and 
living for ever interceding on our behalf...The other action is that which he performed 
twenty centuries ago in Palestine but which has never ceased to have an influence on 
history in the past and will continue to do so always, to the end of time.
146
 
 
In the next three sections we will treat Christ’s efficient and exemplary causality.  
The first two sections are related to Christ’s efficient causality, divided according to the 
distinction in action Lonergan describes in the above passage.  The third section will treat 
Christ’s exemplary causality.   
 
7.8.2 Christ’s Efficient Causality as Historical Agent 
 
As a historical person, Christ is an agent who exerted and continues to exert 
efficient causality.  This agency originated at a particular place and time in history.  This 
is the work of Christ in history which Lonergan resolves into the specific cause “Christ 
the Historical Agent.”  He does not mean that Christ’s historical causality is limited to the 
work strictly associated to the historical Jesus.  When he speaks of Christ as a “historical” 
agent he is referring to the agency associated with Christ acting specifically as a historical 
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 “Nam alia est quae nunc de caelis ab eo exercetur, qui ad dexteram Patris sedet semper vivens ad 
interpellandum pro nobis, uti sequenti articulo dicetur.  Et alia est quae ante viginti saecula olim in 
Palaestina peracta est, sed modo historico omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem iugiter et influxit et 
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person.  He is not implying that other categories of Christ’s agency are not historical.  
They are also historical since they produce historical effects.   
 Historical agency can be individual or social, but it is highly unlikely that 
individual agency will create a lasting effect without social agency.  Lonergan certainly 
knows that originating ideas come from the creative genius or the creative minority, to 
use Toynbee’s terminology.147  However, ideas are rarely actualized without the 
cooperation of others.  For Lonergan, human cooperation is the foundation of virtually 
the whole of human causality.
148
  We need to explain why he holds this position. 
 Human beings desire particular goods.  They desire these goods on a recurrent 
basis.  A human being is also an agent acting through intellect, meaning that he or she 
can understand the conditions which need to be fulfilled in order to produce an effect.  
The effect desired is the recurrent availability of particular goods.  What determines the 
conditions?  God’s governance of the actual world order ultimately determines the 
conditions.  For Lonergan, the intelligibility of actual world order is explained through 
the theory of emergent probability.  It is thus emergent probability which governs any 
requisite conditions for a potential cause to be an actual cause. 
 There is however an overriding condition which precedes any particular condition 
whatsoever.  Lonergan noted earlier in the Supplement that no created being is capable of 
unconditioned operation.
149
  What he means is that every finite efficient cause is 
conditioned.  Finite causes are conditioned in two ways.  First, to exercise efficient 
causality assumes the fundamental conditions that there is an object, a patient if you will, 
upon which the finite cause acts in the first place.  However, no finite cause is capable of 
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creating.  God alone can create.  Second, every finite cause presupposes the fulfillment of 
other, specific conditions which place the cause and the object of its influence in an 
appropriate relationship such that the cause can actually produce an effect in the object.  
Unless these conditions are fulfilled, a finite cause cannot produce an effect.
150
  It is true 
that another finite cause can fulfill one or more of these conditions.  But that finite cause 
is also operating according to efficient causality, and so its efficient causality is also 
conditioned.  Going down this route ends up in an infinite regression and so we can judge 
with Lonergan that no finite cause is proportionate to fulfilling the conditions.  Only God 
is proportionate to fulfilling the conditions.
151
  Hence the judgment that no created being 
is capable of unconditioned operation. 
 Furthermore, and this is the critical point, it is very rare for all the requisite 
conditions to be fulfilled by a single agent.  Even though any one of us can be a cause in 
potentiality, it is another matter to be a cause in actuality.  We need others to fulfill the 
conditions so that we can be actual causes in the production of a recurrent series of 
particular goods.  This is why human causality, especially in modern cultures which have 
so many series of particular goods, is so dependent on human cooperation.  There are 
conditions for any created cause to produce an effect, and those conditions are not so low 
in number or trivial in nature that a single person can fulfill all the requisite conditions.  
The foregoing is an interpretation of why, in Lonergan’s thought, human causality 
is essentially a communitarian enterprise.  Since there are no divine afterthoughts in the 
design and governance of world order, the principle of continuity can be used to 
understand Christ’s efficient causality as a historical agent.  Christ’s agency as a 
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historical person is not exempt from the practical need of human cooperation to fulfill 
requisite conditions such that potential causes become actual causes.  Therefore, it is 
fitting that Christ’s work is mediated through others who understand and agree.  Since 
Christ is an agent acting through intellect he can and does influence other agents acting 
through intellect, resulting in a proper causal series.  The causal series began in Palestine.  
The series radiates outwards, in space and time, through generation after generation.  In 
this series, Christ acting as God remains the principal efficient cause.  And Christ acting 
as man is the principal secondary cause. 
These are true judgments regardless of the time elapsed, the space traversed, or 
the number of secondary causes involved in the causal series.  In Lonergan’s 
understanding of causality, the reason why the principal cause is precisely principal 
cannot be defended in terms of spatiotemporal proximity.  The inclination to use this as a 
criterion is a product of picture-thinking, of allowing the imagination to control how one 
is to understand the axiom “God operates in everything that operates.”  Causality is real 
because there is a real relation of dependence in an effect as influenced by a cause.  This 
is true regardless of whether God uses secondary causes or not, or how many secondary 
causes are involved in the causal sequence.  God is really, and not in name only, the 
efficient cause of every event.
152
  When we apply this to the agency of Christ the 
historical person, it is not only true that he is the principal secondary cause of the causal 
sequence, but it is equally true that he remains the principal secondary cause no matter 
the time elapsed, no matter the space traversed, no matter the number and generations of 
secondary causes who mediate his work in history.  The intelligible relation of 
dependence can always be traced back to Christ the historical person as cause. 
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 The foregoing provides a general explanation of why a principal cause remains a 
principal cause even in a causal series that traverses time and space.  Since history is 
concrete, Lonergan does not leave us with a vague notion of how to understand this 
causal series.  He explains the nature of the agency.  The ultimate ground of the reason 
why Christ the historical person remains principal cause in the causal series is because 
Christ is an agent acting through intellect.  A single idea from a single agent acting 
through intellect can effectively determine a flow of human operations in history.  As an 
agent acting through intellect, Christ influences other agents acting through intellect.  He 
informs an indefinite number of acts of the will through history.  As such, this aspect of 
Christ’s historical causality is real and ongoing.  It is to be interpreted as a proper causal 
series beginning with the agency of Christ the historical person (A), mediated through 
others (B), producing historical effects (C).  The historical effects are the propagation and 
perfection of the Body of Christ.  Christ is the mediate efficient cause.  His members are 
ministerial agents (secondary causes).  The effect is only proportionate to Christ, 
therefore the effect depends more on Christ than on the members.  
 Though the effect depends more on Christ than on Christ’s members, Christ’s 
agency is adapted to human persons: 
In addition, Christ's action, although mediated socially and historically, is personal and is 
adapted to human persons.  For the Word became flesh in order to be for human persons 
an expressive sign of a divine person (cf. Art. 3).  Since human knowledge begins from 
the senses, the Word of God became perceptible.
153
 
 
 Governing this statement is the principle of continuity.  It was appropriate that 
Christ’s agency be mediated through others according to the nature of human 
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communication.  Human communication is based on signs and symbols, as Lonergan 
explained in his first chapter.  He explained there that the first and basic medium of 
human communication is the human body.  The body, as a medium of communication, is 
constitutive of what Lonergan later described in Method as “incarnate meaning:” 
Incarnate meaning combines all or at least many of the other carriers of meaning.  It can 
be at once intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, linguistic.  It is the meaning of a person, his 
way of life, of his words, or of his deeds.  It may be his meaning for just one other 
person, or for a small group, or for a whole national, or social, or cultural, or religious 
tradition.
154
 
 
In that first chapter, Lonergan also elaborated that if the whole body manifests the 
hidden movements of the soul, then articulate speech and its transmission admits of a far 
greater development and specialization.
155
  He is referring here to what he later described 
in Method as “linguistic meaning:” meaning mediated through speech or writing.   
In Lonergan’s first chapter, in his article on signs and symbols, he did not provide 
an explicit definition of the “meaning” (sensus) of signs.156  We do have an explicit 
definition in Insight, which is consistent with a later definition in Method.
157
  In each text, 
in so far as meaning is simply cognitive, what is meant is the real.  The real is known 
through experience, understanding, and judgment.  The term of meaning is the meant, the 
known.  A formal act of meaning is conceptualization, but a full act of meaning includes 
judgment on whether that conceptualization is true.  An instrumental act of meaning is an 
expression, a sensible manifestation of a full act of meaning, for example through 
gestures, deeds, speech, or writing.
158
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 Christ’s communication of incarnate meaning, which includes linguistic meaning, 
is an instrumental act of meaning, a sensible manifestation of his full act of meaning.  
This communication then informs the very meaning of the Body of Christ.  Christ 
communicates his individual meaning to his members, and this meaning is meant to 
become common meaning.  The Body of Christ is a community, and community is not 
just a group of people in spatiotemporal proximity, but an achievement of common 
meaning.
159
  Just as a full act of meaning in the individual involves experiencing, 
understanding, and judging, common meaning includes the common field of experience, 
common understanding, and common judgment.  In terms of constitutive or effective 
meaning, we add the elements of decision and action.  In this regard, common meaning 
includes common commitment and common action intended to achieve a course of action 
proceeding from a common understanding and agreement (judgment). 
Thus, Christ’s efficient causality includes the communication of meaning, but in a 
way fittingly commensurate with the nature of human communication because of the 
principle of continuity.  Christ’s communication of meaning is meant to produce common 
meaning within the Body of Christ.  That common meaning is not simply cognitive 
meaning, but constitutive and effective meaning.  The members mediate Christ’s agency 
in history to produce actual effects in accord with Christ’s intentionality.  These effects 
are the propagation and the perfection of the Body of Christ, and improvement in the 
overall human situation. 
Though Christ is the mediate efficient cause in this proper causal series, the 
members of the body cannot perform works as a secondary cause without the assistance 
of grace.  One might expect therefore that the Supplement would include a significant 
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treatment of grace.  This is not the case, at least in my interpretation.  This is easily 
explained.  There are two primary reasons. 
First, Lonergan is not one to rehearse significant developments which he had 
already addressed in his corpus.  To produce a theology of grace, in and of itself, is a 
significant and difficult undertaking.  Prior to the Supplement, he had already written a 
substantial systematic theology of grace, De ente supernaturali.
160
  He did not feel the 
need to rehearse what is otherwise a large systematic effort. 
 Second, Lonergan’s explanation of the historical causality of Christ focuses on 
extrinsic causality.  He would consider the imperfect and analogical understanding of 
grace operative within the human person as knowledge known through intrinsic causes, 
just as he had stated that the intrinsic causes of Christ are dealt with in the treatise on 
Christ’s ontological constitution.161  For example, in De ente supernaturali, Lonergan’s 
first thesis assumes the doctrine that intellectual creatures can and do obtain God as he is 
in himself.  The purpose of the thesis is to explain how this is possible.
162
  The thesis 
already assumes the uncreated communication of divine nature to intellectual creatures.  
If one is focused on extrinsic causality, the focus will then be on the uncreated 
communication of the divine nature rather than the intrinsic causes of grace, as is the 
focus of De ente supernaturali.  Not surprisingly, the Supplement’s treatment of grace 
                                                 
160
 Lonergan composed De ente supernaturali in 1946 for his course on grace, “De Gratia,” given at the 
Jesuit Seminary, Toronto, during the academic year 1947-48.  This is Lonergan’s most extensive and 
systematic treatment of grace. 
161
 Lonergan, DBM, *285 [Supplement, 121]. 
162
 The first thesis of De ente supernaturali reads as follows:  “There exists a created communication of the 
divine nature, which is a created, proportionate, and remote principle whereby there are operations in 
creatures through which they attain God as he is in himself.”  Lonergan, The Supernatural Order, 1.  The 
created communication of the divine nature is sanctifying grace.  Sanctifying grace is the created, 
proportionate, and remote principle of the proximate principle, the habit of charity, by which there are 
operations which attain God in se.  These operations are acts of charity in the will. 
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focuses on the uncreated communication of divine nature.  That focus is most explicit in 
Lonergan’s final article where he answers the question cur Deus homo? 
In Lonergan’s theology of grace, the uncreated communication of divine nature to 
intellectual creatures is the efficient (extrinsic) cause of the created communication of 
divine nature in the intellectual creature.  In De ente supernaturali, this created 
communication (created, habitual grace) is explained as the remote principle of the habit 
of charity.  In turn, the habit of charity is explained as the proximate principle of 
operations (acts) of charity by which God is attained as God is in God’s self.  In De ente 
supernaturali, Lonergan focuses on the intelligibility to be had in the intelligible 
relationships between the remote principle (habitual grace), the proximate principle (habit 
of charity), and the operation (act of charity).  The focus is on intrinsic intelligibility, that 
which is intelligible in itself.  This does not exhaust the intelligibility, since there is an 
extrinsic cause.  However, one can treat this intrinsic intelligibility in its own right. 
 In the Supplement, Lonergan does not ignore the role of sanctifying grace, the 
infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, or sacramental grace.  Yet there is a focus on 
the uncreated communication of the divine nature, the gift of the Holy Spirit.  Even here, 
the most extensive treatment of uncreated grace in the Supplement is not meant to explain 
why God chooses to communicate grace in the first place.  It is meant to explain why 
God chooses to communicate this grace through one who is both divine and human.  That 
grace enables one to perform truly supernatural works is assumed.  Lonergan had already 
worked out his own systematic understanding of this in De ente supernaturali.  Why God 
chooses to communicate grace through a God-man is a different question.  For Lonergan, 
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the answer to this “why” is one of the reasons for the God-man, part of his explanation of 
cur Deus homo. 
Cur Deus homo is of course also the title of Anselm’s famous work.163  It is 
inconceivable that Lonergan’s treatment of the question is not meant to provide a contrast 
to Anselm.  It is not my purpose here to provide a full interpretation of Lonergan’s 
answer.  My intent is to uncover how his answer informs his understanding of the 
historical causality of Christ. 
The final article where Lonergan takes up the question cur Deus homo begins 
with the judgment that to ask “why?” is to ask about a cause.  His question is not so much 
on how Christ as cause does what he does, but rather why Christ is the type of cause that 
he is.  The question in a certain respect is related to the question of final causality.  It is a 
question of why it is fitting that the end of redemption be brought about not just by one 
who is divine, but by one who is both divine and human.   
 Lonergan’s answer is that the Son of God became man to communicate divine 
friendship to God’s enemies in due order.  The key to why this communication is from 
one who is both divine and human is the qualification in due order.  Before we attend to 
this we will explain what this communication is in itself. 
 Divine friendship is the mutual benevolent love proper to the divine persons.  It is 
the friendship in which the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit necessarily and 
eternally will divine good to each other.  Since this willing of divine good is common to 
all three divine persons, it is the divine goodness itself, the good by essence which only 
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applies to God.  Lonergan explained this in his first chapter.  Friendship with God means 
that divine goodness itself, which is both eternal and proper to the divine persons alone, 
is communicated to intellectual creatures in time such that it then becomes common or 
shared by intellectual creatures.  Specifically, this communication is communication of 
proceeding Love itself, the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit.
164
  The distinction between 
communication of divine goodness itself and communication of proceeding Love is based 
on the scholastic distinction between essential and notional attributes of God.
165
 
God could have communicated God’s friendship directly from heaven.  However, 
the qualification that this communication is in due order is a qualification meaning that 
God works according to the divine plan of redemption conceived by divine wisdom and 
chosen by divine goodness.  Since this plan is in harmonious continuation with the actual 
order of reality, it is fitting that this divine plan of redemption be carried out through (1) 
secondary causes, (2) in accordance with their natures, and (3) in accordance with the 
nature of friendship.  The first is the principle of cause.  The second is the principle of 
continuity.  The third includes the principle of the extension of friendship. 
Without the last principle Lonergan would not be able to offer fitting reasons for 
the God-man.  God communicates grace through the God-man because it is customary for 
God to act through secondary causes according to the principle of cause.  However, this 
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secondary cause cannot be a human person simpliciter.  The principle of cause would be 
preserved, but that person would not be a friend of God by his own right.  The principle 
of the extension of friendship is only preserved if this person is a friend of God by his 
own right.  Only a divine person subsisting in a human nature preserves both of these 
principles.  With respect to the communication of uncreated grace, Lonergan’s answer to 
cur Deus homo not only explains why God chooses to communicate his goodness to 
finite creatures but also why he chooses to communicate it the way he does, that is, 
through a God-man.  Ultimately, God communicates his goodness to finite creatures so 
that enemies of God can become friends of God.  God communicates this grace through 
the God-man because it is fitting to do so in accordance with both the principle of cause 
and the principle of the extension of friendship. 
The principle of continuity also adds to Lonergan’s fitting reasons for the God-
man.  However, this has more to do with Christ as exemplary cause, not the efficient 
cause of the communication of uncreated grace.  We will treat that when we come to our 
section on Christ as Exemplar.  But before we do so I will return to Lonergan’s 
understanding of sacramental grace. 
Christ’s action in history, mediated through the Church, brings about and deepens 
the renewal of the interior person through the grace conferred in the sacraments, grace ex 
opere operato (DB 844, 851; DS 1601, 1608; ND 1311, 1318).
166
  Lonergan does not 
treat sacramental grace to any large extent.  Again, since his focus is on extrinsic 
causality, his focus is on Christ as mediate efficient cause of the sacraments even though 
there are ministers of the sacraments operating as secondary causes.  The ministers of the 
sacraments have the power to confer grace, but that power comes from Christ.  There is a 
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proper causal series.  The effect is only proportionate to the mediate efficient cause 
(Christ) even though a secondary cause (the minister) is operative.  Christ as mediate 
efficient cause of sacramental grace is not to be thought of in terms of a mechanical 
causal sequence.  The causal sequence in sacramental grace has nothing to do with bodily 
contact, nothing like an artisan using an instrument to produce a work of art.  In 
Lonergan’s understanding, the grace conferred in the sacraments is grace ex opere 
operato not because Christ’s human nature is some sort of literal instrument but rather 
because Christ commands that grace be conferred through the sacraments.  He can do so 
because he is not limited to acting on his own physical body, that is, not limited to 
physical causality.  Christ is an agent acting through intellect.  The causal power of the 
sacraments is rooted in Christ’s intentionality, in Christ’s command, not in his human 
nature.  His human nature is the instrument of the signification.  
 In summary, Lonergan’s explanation of Christ’s efficient causality, as a historical 
person, is an explanation of how Christ propagates and perfects the Body of Christ in 
terms of extrinsic causality.  In this regard, Christ, acting as man, is a ministerial 
historical agent of God.  Those whom Christ works through are also ministerial historical 
agents.  Some are also ministers of the sacraments.  All are called to be ministerial 
historical agents in the sense that Christ intends to perfect them by producing in them 
operations similar to which Christ produces in himself.  Through these operations the 
members are not only perfected, not only prepared for the future life in heaven, but 
turned from evil to good, from enemies of God to friends of God, such that through their 
good works they are ministers of Christ who improve the overall human situation 
according to Christ’s intention. 
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7.8.3 Christ’s Efficient Causality as Ongoing Mediator 
 
 
 Christ continues to work in history after his death, and Lonergan understands this 
through the category of efficient causality.  There are three basic elements in Lonergan’s 
thought:  (1) Christ mediates a new and better covenant; (2) Christ lives on interceding on 
our behalf; and (3) Christ maintains his priesthood forever and his offering is one, 
complete, and everlasting sacrifice.   
 Lonergan’s focus is on the third element.  It is true that the members of the body 
are to offer sacrifice as Christ has offered sacrifice.  For Lonergan, a sacrifice is a proper 
symbol of a sacrificial attitude.
167
  Though each member of the body is to offer their 
entire life to God as an expression of his or her sacrificial attitude, Lonergan’s focus is on 
the social dimension of the sacrificial attitude, the Eucharistic sacrifice.  The Eucharist is 
the proper symbol of the sacrificial attitude of the members of the Body of Christ.
168
 
 Why is this the focus?  Lonergan wants to explain the historical causality of 
Christ in terms of reconciliation because, for Lonergan, the entire work of Christ is 
summed up in reconciliation.  Reconciliation is expressed metaphorically as drawing near 
to God, or approaching God with confidence.  The focus is thus on the Eucharist because 
the members draw near to God and to one another through participation in the Eucharist.  
This does not mean that Christ’s work as historical person is not also oriented to 
reconciliation.  The entire work of Christ, resolved into causes, is oriented to 
reconciliation.  Since Lonergan is proceeding by way of analysis, he is selecting a 
category in which to discuss reconciliation.  Reconciliation is an effect of participation in 
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the Eucharist.  In the very mystery of the Eucharist the victim is the same and the 
principal priest is the same.  Christ is now the eternal Priest at the right hand of the 
Father.  It is appropriate that the category in which to explain the causal relationship 
between the work of Christ and the historical effect of reconciliation be under the heading 
of Christ as ongoing mediator.   
 The significance of interpersonal relationships is also clear in Lonergan’s 
understanding of reconciliation.  Reconciliation occurs through the interpersonal 
relationships which hold together and vivify the Body of Christ.  From the outset of the 
Supplement, the importance of interpersonal relationships has been established based on 
Lonergan’s understanding of the nature of any human good of order.  Interpersonal 
relationships hold together and vivify any particular human good of order.  The same is 
true for the Body of Christ.  The Body of Christ is also a human good of order, but a 
supernatural order.  So the relationships themselves are supernatural.
169
  They are 
supernatural because they are ultimately grounded in the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, 
proceeding Love itself.  This is why Lonergan states that reconciliation comes from the 
Father through the Son and is accomplished in the Holy Spirit. 
 Lonergan’s category of Christ as celestial mediator certainly accords with the 
creedal affirmation that Christ ascended into heaven.  Here Lonergan is also establishing 
a causal link to the resurrection.  He is implying that the power of the resurrection is a 
means of redemption rather than the death of Christ alone, in accordance with the 
                                                 
169
 This interpretation harmonizes with Lonergan’s understanding of the purpose of the divine missions.  
Previous to the Supplement he stated:  “...since the end of a mission involves cooperation on the part of 
others, a mission is carried out not so much that works be done as that new personal relations be initiated 
and strengthened.  The end of the divine missions is not attained without the cooperation of human beings:  
‘He who created you without you will not justify you without you’ [Augustine, Sermo 169].  Hence, in 
order to understand a divine mission, one must consider not only the works proper to the person sent but 
also the personal relations that the person initiates or strengthens in order that the end of the mission may 
be attained through the cooperation of others.”  See The Triune God: Systematics, 485. 
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doctrine established in his third chapter.  In article 21 (“The Power of the Resurrection”) 
he stated that the redemption is brought about by a Mediator more than by a means, and 
is established upon the death and resurrection of Christ than upon the fact of his death 
alone.
170
  The power of the resurrection includes the ascension to the right hand of the 
Father and the sending of the Spirit.  Through this category, Lonergan is weaving into an 
explanation of Christ’s historical causality both the relevance of Christ’s resurrection and 
the relevance of Christ’s sending of the Spirit at Pentecost. 
 Finally, although Christ’s agency as celestial mediator is a work of Christ which 
originated outside of history, the effect is still within history.  The work of Christ 
resolved in the particular cause of Christ as ongoing mediator is still constitutive of 
Christ’s historical causality.  The effect is produced in history.  
 
7.8.4 Christ’s Exemplary Causality 
 
 
Lonergan’s explanation of Christ’s exemplary causality is not meant simply to 
explain how Christ’s members ought to imitate Christ.  This is true but rather obvious.  
Lonergan’s point is that Christ’s exemplary causality is grounded in divine wisdom and 
chosen by divine goodness, and as such reveals what he calls the “principle of the 
dispensation” (principium oeconomiae).171  The principle is a “...certain dispensation or 
ordering of reality in such a way that what is done with respect to the exemplar should of 
necessity be done with respect to the other members of that dispensation.”172  
                                                 
170
 Lonergan, DBM, 142 [Supplement, 58].  
171
 Lonergan, DBM, *254 [Supplement, 107]. 
172
 “...quamdam oeconomiam seu rerum ordinationem ut, quod in exemplari factum sit, etiam in caeteris 
fiat necesse est; et sic Christus per modum exemplaris nostram salutem operatus est.”  DBM, *254 
[Supplement, 107]. 
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The principle itself is clear from scripture.  Those whom God foreknew he also 
predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son (Rom 8:29).
173
  The principle is 
revealed through the life of Christ, both with respect to who Christ is and what Christ 
does.  If we can determine the principle as concretely realized in the life of Christ, we can 
explain how it should fittingly apply to Christ’s members.  This is Lonergan’s approach. 
For Lonergan, there are three basic elements determined in the life of Christ that 
are also, by way of an exemplar, to be realized in Christ’s members.  These elements are 
based on (1) the Father’s relationship to Christ, (2) who Christ is in himself, and (3) what 
Christ does. 
The Father’s Relationship to Christ: God the Father loves as his natural Son 
Christ the man.  Since what is true concerning the exemplar himself ought to be true for 
us, then the Father loves us with a similar love.  The Father’s love for the Son is 
Proceeding Love itself, the Holy Spirit.  Fittingly, this love is communicated to Christ’s 
members according to exemplary causality.  Through the sending of the Spirit the 
members receive created, sanctifying grace, and are made adopted children of the Father.  
Lonergan makes the link between uncreated and created grace by stating that the Holy 
Spirit has us as its “term” (terminetur).174  The notion of adoption is a fitting analogy 
since it is an exemplar of filiation yet it preserves the distinction between a child of God 
according to nature (Christ) and children of God according to grace (Christ’s members). 
                                                 
173
 Lonergan, DBM, *254 [Supplement, 107-108]. 
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 DBM, *256 [Supplement, 108].  Lonergan’s use of the Latin terminetur is based on his understanding of 
a divine mission.  The mission of a divine person is wholly constituted by a divine relation of origin and 
nothing more.  But what is predicated contingently of a divine person has no correspondence of truth 
without an appropriate created term, that is, a term external to God.  To predicate that a divine person has 
been sent is a contingent predication for there is no absolute necessity that a divine person be sent.  With 
respect to the mission of the Spirit, Lonergan is stating here that the uncreated gift of the Spirit is sent to us 
and the appropriate external term is created, sanctifying grace.  See The Triune God: Systematics, 457. 
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 Who Christ is:  Since Christ is a divine person operating in a human nature, Christ 
not only has human powers but also habits and acts which are supernatural.  Again, since 
what is true concerning the exemplar ought to be true for the members, the operations of 
the members ought to be modeled on the pattern of a divine person operating in a human 
nature.  As such, along with sanctifying grace the members receive the infused virtues, 
gifts of the Holy Spirit, and actual graces (movements of the Spirit). 
 What Christ does:  Lonergan states that, according to the principle of exemplarity, 
it behooves us to complete what are lacking in the sufferings of Christ (Col 1:24).  The 
members are to suffer with him so that they may be glorified with him (Rom 8:17).
175
  
Lonergan identifies the pattern of Christ’s suffering, death, resurrection, and glorification 
as Christ’s “principal acts” (principalibus actibus), though he notes that the principle of 
exemplarity applies to Christ’s other actions as well.176  
 This pattern implicitly refers to the law of the cross, which Lonergan explained in 
his fourth chapter.  I have no doubt that for Lonergan the principal act of Christ which the 
members are to imitate is self-sacrificing love that returns good to evil done such that 
God can transform evil into good.  In no other way does God draw good out of evil than 
according to this law.  It is appropriate to refer to this principle act as the “law of the 
cross” precisely because the term “law” is the meaning of the cross generalized in such a 
way that it applies to Christ as well as to the whole economy of salvation.  For Lonergan, 
the law of the cross is the governing principle in the economy of salvation.  
 Our choosing this law, understood according to exemplary causality, involves (1) 
grasping the intelligibility of this principle, (2) judging this principle to be true, and (3) 
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judging this principle to be of utmost value and thus worthy to be chosen.  This process is 
what Lonergan had, in “Essay on Fundamental Sociology,” described as an effective 
assent to the intellectual form.
177
  This affective assent is an act of love for the intelligible 
form such that the individual or community is not merely swept up and predetermined by 
the physical flow of history.  To be swept up by the physical flow of history is to be 
swept up in the reign of sin, to accept the status quo, as to either (1) shrink from the 
redemptive suffering that would return good to evil, or (2) perpetually return evil to evil 
in a vicious cycle of violence as if this would solve the underlying problem.  Either way, 
the action performatively treats the absurd as if it were intelligible. 
 No doubt there are some, whether individuals, groups, or even nations, who do so 
without even realizing they are doing so.  For them, to return good to evil is 
counterintuitive, folly, weakness.  No doubt, there are those who see this approach for 
what it is:  counterproductive and bound for failure.  They know this intellectually, but 
they performatively choose to return evil for evil anyway, because returning good to evil 
is simply not a value, or perhaps not valuable enough.  The law of the cross is not able to 
trump the other values they hold, even if those other values, from a theological 
perspective, are only apparent values.  In no way am I suggesting that there are not cases 
where returning evil to evil may be necessary.  For example, Lonergan’s understanding 
of the law of the cross is not one that suggests we should abandon our legal system, a 
system that returns the evil of punishment (for example, incarceration) to the evil of sin 
(for example, crime).  In my interpretation, although Lonergan would acknowledge such 
cases, these are not to be used as argumentative examples to undermine the fact that God 
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has revealed that, all else being equal, it is God’s will that we return good to evil done in 
accordance with the law of the cross. 
 For Lonergan, at the very heart of subjective redemption is the liberation of 
human beings from a mindset that either (1) shrinks from redemptive suffering that 
would return good to evil, or (2) perpetually returns evil to evil in a vicious cycle of 
violence.  Evil is an objective absurdity, and it invites a choice.  For Lonergan, if we 
refuse to suffer evils willingly we deny that the absurd is absurd and therefore to be 
endured.  Responding to evil with evil treats the absurd as if it were intelligible.  The 
reign of sin only propagates.  A real solution to the problem of evil is one that reverses 
this absurd propagation in history to improve the human situation.  However, returning 
good to evil is counterintuitive to sinful human nature.  As Lonergan notes in DVI, the 
law of the cross is recognized only through the Holy Spirit.
178
  The one who has not been 
enlightened by the Holy Spirit, the one who does not have the mind of Christ, will judge 
that the law of the cross is folly.
179
   
The historical causality of Christ that overcomes this sinful mindset involves a 
proper causal series.  This needs a bit of explanation.  Since both the Head and members 
are agents acting through intellect, there is a causal series originating from divine 
wisdom, mediated through the agency of Christ as man, communicated to Christ’s 
members, such that both Christ as man and his members perform operations according to 
the model that is the law of the cross.  The communication of this law from God to Christ 
as man, and from Christ as man to Christ’s members, are each instances of exemplary 
causality.  The communication of grace through efficient causality makes it possible to 
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return good to evil in the first place.  The communication of grace, understood according 
to efficient causality, heals and elevates the human person to be able to perform such an 
operation.  For Lonergan, this communication of grace has a wider scope.  The 
communication of grace is not simply the communication of divine friendship under the 
aspect of efficient causality.  Lonergan’s answer to cur Deus homo reveals a deeper 
meaning.  There is also revelatory grace, which is to be understood according to 
exemplary causality.  The grace of revelation instructs the minds and hearts of the 
members as to how to act according to this law.   
Christ’s communication of the law of the cross, understood in terms of exemplary 
causality, complements Christ’s communication of grace, understood in terms of efficient 
causality.  In fact, a substantial influence underlying Lonergan’s fitting reasons for the 
God-man is the influence of exemplary causality.  It is fitting that human beings know 
this law, know it as precept, and have an example to follow.  However, in order for it to 
be known and known as precept, it must be taught and believed.  Human beings are 
incapable of knowing this law through immanently generated knowledge.  Most 
importantly, human beings learn through linguistic and incarnate meaning.  Even if we 
know this law, we are more likely to choose it if we have a leader, an exemplar who has 
chosen it first so that we might choose it too.  The principle of continuity takes into 
account the nature of human communication and its relationship to human imitation.  
According to the principle of continuity, it was appropriate that divine agency 
communicate and exemplify this law incarnately in Christ.  This is one of Lonergan’s 
reasons for the God-man. 
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From the perspective of Christ, the law of the cross is communicated through 
linguistic and incarnate meaning.  From the perspective of his members, it is received as 
intelligible and recognized as an utmost value.  As an utmost value, it is a good worthy to 
be chosen.  All this is had through the assistance of the Spirit.  Since the Body of Christ is 
a supernatural good of order constituted by common meanings and values, the law of the 
cross is meant to become a common meaning and value of the Church.  When the law of 
the cross becomes a common meaning and value, the members, collectively, are much 
more likely to be actual causes in transforming evil into good rather than merely potential 
causes.  The reason goes back to the social nature of human causality.  A member of 
Christ’s body is more likely to be an actual cause when he or she is linked with others.  
Effective cooperation with Christ is fundamentally a social reality.   
 
7.9 Summary 
 
 
 Lonergan made a distinction between redemption as end and redemption as 
means.  In his final chapter, his focus is on the latter.  Redemption as end is considered 
inasmuch as it lays the foundation for the study of redemption as means.  As end, it is 
first in intention.  As end, it is the created effect.  Causality in history is not real unless 
there is a created effect, since there is no change in the cause as cause.  For this reason, he 
stated at the beginning of the chapter that if we neglect the end we have a poor 
knowledge of the means, and that if we ignore the effect we have a poor knowledge of its 
cause.  He starts with the end, the effect, in order to understand the means, the cause. 
 Understanding the means is equivalent to understanding the cause of redemption.  
God is the absolute first cause.  God’s agency entered human history through Christ.  
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Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ is essentially an 
understanding of God’s entry into human history, into “man’s making of man,” mediated 
through Christ.  Christ as God shares this ultimate agency with the three divine persons.  
Christ as man is a secondary, ministerial agent of God.  All aspects of Christ’s work 
prescind from Christ’s intentionality and are oriented to redemption as end.  The ultimate 
end is the divine goodness itself, outside of history.  There is a secondary end within 
history, the Body of Christ.  It is an end because it possesses the goodness of the primary 
end, and is loved by Christ for its own sake.  The historical causality of Christ, as means 
to this end, is the inauguration, propagation, and perfection of his body in history.  
Through incorporation into his body, members are reconciled to God and to one another.  
This reconciliation restores the historical order of the universe.  Since a part exists for the 
sake of the whole, this restoration restores the order of the universe itself.  How does 
Christ gather all earthly realities to himself?  For Lonergan, he does so by gathering and 
reconciling the historical order to himself. 
 Finally, Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ is not 
understanding of a new truth.  It is a more comprehensive understanding of an existing 
truth, the doctrine of redemption.  What he has presented amounts to what in Divinarum 
personarum he calls a “new step” in comprehension:  a theology that is more concrete 
and more comprehensive that both deals with and seeks to understand the economy of 
salvation as it evolves historically.
180
  His understanding of the historical causality of 
Christ represents an answer to a question of intelligence that seeks more fully to 
understand the mystery of redemption given the advent of historical consciousness.  We 
will explain this in our conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 In our introduction, we noted Bernard Lonergan’s comment to Frederick Crowe, 
in August 1972, that the Supplement was to be an addition to his book De Verbo 
Incarnato (DVI).  In our conclusion, I will begin with a brief hypothesis explaining what 
I believe to be the relationship between the Supplement and DVI.    
 
8.1 The Supplement’s Relation to De Verbo Incarnato:  A Hypothesis 
 
 
 In a Q&A session at the1974 Lonergan Workshop, Bernard Lonergan was asked 
what he was currently doing in Christology: 
Question: Would you say something about what you are now doing in Christology as 
distinct from what you did in De Verbo Incarnato? 
 
Lonergan: Well, what I am now doing in Christology is nothing!...When you write a 
textbook in theology, you do what you can, for the rest you hand out the commune 
doctorum.  One of the things that I wanted to treat and worked toward treating but never 
got around to actually putting it in a thesis form, is the historical causality of Christ.  It is 
the sort of thing that you need the theory of history and Christ as historical cause; even to 
communicate the notions connected with it in Latin would be a matter of some difficulty, 
which I did not altogether surmount, didn’t get around to doing when I was teaching.  But 
it is a fundamental question, a fundamental issue, and it’s perhaps the expression in our 
time of Christ the King, Christ the historical cause fit in more with the way people have 
been thinking.  Categories that have meaning, a category more than a symbol.
1
 
 
In this statement Lonergan refers to the historical causality of Christ that he 
wanted to treat and worked toward treating.  It is inconceivable that this unnamed work 
is not the Supplement.  Lonergan did not forget this text.
2
  In his response quoted above, 
there is concrete evidence that he intended to put the Supplement, or part thereof, into 
thesis form. 
                                                 
1
 Lonergan Workshop Q&A, June 19, 1974.  Transcription available at 812A0DTE070 / TC 812 A&B at 
www.bernardlonergan.com. 
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 I state this position in response to Frederick Crowe’s comment that “the work that he [Lonergan] forgot 
he had written had actually treated the historical causality in 1958, and indeed had done so at some length.”  
Crowe, Christ and History, 19.  Crowe does however grant the possibility that Lonergan may have not 
counted as a “work” a manuscript he never published.  I believe this to be the case. 
 312 
 The question is then raised about how this thesis form would be published.  If it 
was to be an additional thesis to one of his own texts, it would have been intended as an 
additional thesis to DVI.  This is supported by a statement he made in 1962:   
Finally, there is the theological mediation of history, the point I have already made when 
I spoke about the human good as corrupted by sin and restored by the redemption.  This 
is the notion that I developed in Insight in chapter 20 – well, the corruption by sin in 
chapters 7 and 18 and the conception, the introduction, in chapter 20 of the supernatural 
as the one way in which the surd of sin can be eliminated from the human good.  And I 
have developed that in the seventeenth thesis of my notes De Verbo incarnato on the 
meaning of redemption.  The meaning of the death of Christ is that death is at once the 
penalty of sin and the source of our salvation.  There is a reversal of roles.  What had 
been the penalty of sin becomes the source of our salvation.  And that reversal of roles is 
the key Christian, Catholic point in history.  The doctrine of loving your enemies and 
being good to those that hate you, that doctrine of the Sermon on the Mount, is what 
meets the problem of evil in human life, what breaks the venom of the virus of sin, stops 
it, as it were, in its tracks, transforms it into something entirely different.  And that is the 
fundamental aspect, to my mind, of the intelligibility of history.  I hope some time to add 
a further thesis to my De Verbo Incarnato that will bring that out somewhat more: the 
historical action of Christ.
3 
 
Given the dating of the Supplement, and given the statement above, the first 
element of my hypothesis is that the Supplement, considered as a whole, is not a 
supplement to DVI.  In fact, I do not believe it was ever originally intended as a 
supplement to anything Lonergan wrote.  I do believe, however, that after publication of 
DVI Lonergan had the subsequent intent to pull material from the Supplement, explicitly 
on the historical causality of Christ, and transpose it to thesis format with the intent of 
adding it to DVI. 
This element of the hypothesis, however, does not answer the question of why 
Lonergan started on this project in the first place.  I will reply to this question in the next 
section.  How Lonergan would follow this through in a practical manner is a different 
question.  He could have intended this to be a standalone text; a work unrelated to any 
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 A lecture at Regis College where the topic was “Method in Catholic Theology:” Lonergan, Early Works 
on Theological Method I, 259. 
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course at the Gregorian.  On the other hand, perhaps he intended it as a supplement to one 
of his courses.  If this was the case, it would have been intended as a supplement to his 
Christology course, specifically during the cycles when he was using Boyer’s manual.4   
During his Roman period, Lonergan taught Christology seven times.
5
  For the first 
three courses he used Boyer’s manual.  As Crowe notes, Lonergan was not yet ready to 
provide his own manual.  Using Boyer’s manual meant that he was not entirely free to 
plot his own course and soon felt the need to write supplements on certain questions.
6
  In 
1954 he produced the notes De ratione convenientiae.  Then, in 1956, De constitutione 
Christi ontologica et psychologica.  It is not an unreasonable possibility that Lonergan 
originally intended the text as a supplement to Boyer’s manual. 
                                                 
4
 Writing supplements was not uncommon.  Furthermore, Lonergan had already written De ratione 
convenientiae (1954) and De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica (1956) to supplement his 
course while he was using Boyer’s manual.  As to why Lonergan would feel the need for a supplement on 
redemption, I can only speculate.  In the next section I will indicate that Lonergan explicitly refutes any 
view that reduces redemption essentially to the notion of satisfaction.  Boyer certainly notes that Christ’s 
satisfaction was not necessary, but convenientiae.  There is no disagreement with Lonergan here.  Most any 
theologian at the time would agree to this.  Nevertheless, Boyer does tend to reduce the means of 
redemption to the means of satisfaction, and Lonergan most certainly would have taken issue with this.  In 
the third of Boyer’s four articles on redemption, he asks:  “Utrum Christus moriendo pro nobis 
satisfecerit?”  The status quaestionis begins with the following statement:  “Sensus tituli:  Tota vis 
praesentis quaestionis in determinato conceptu satisfactionis reponitur.  Satisfactio pluribus sensibus accipi 
potest.  Ibi enim satisfactionis nomen rite iam usurpari potest, ubi mors unius quocumque modo alios a 
poena vel malo quocumque liberat: quo sensu latiori iam nobis certum est Christum pro nobis satisfecisse, 
cum in thesi XXV ostenderimus Christum per passionem suam a peccato et daemone nos liberasse.  At 
satisfactio magis determinatur includendo modum quo liberatio obtineatur; ita ut determinare modum quo 
passio Christi pro nobis satisfecerit idem sit ac theologicam et ultimam rationem rederre ipsius 
redemptionis.”  [Meaning of the Question:  The entire force of the present question is based on a 
determinate concept of satisfaction.  Satisfaction can be taken in many senses.  For instance at the present 
time the term satisfaction can rightly apply when the death of one in any way liberates others from 
punishment or evil: now in the broader sense it is certain to us that Christ has made satisfaction for us, since 
in thesis 25 we had shown that Christ through his passion liberated us from sin and evil spirits.  But 
satisfaction is more accurately defined by limiting it to the means in which liberation is obtained; in such a 
way that to determine the means that the passion of Christ has made satisfaction for us is the same as to 
express the theological and ultimate meaning of redemption itself.]  Boyer, De Verbo incarnato, 340, 
translation mine. 
5
 1953-1954, 1955-1956, 1957-1958, 1959-1960, 1961-1962, 1963-1964, and finally 1964-1965.  Crowe, 
Christ and History, 65. 
6
 Crowe, Christ and History, 65. 
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Evidently the Gregorian ran out of stock of Boyer’s manual and Lonergan was 
faced with options of finding another manual or writing his own.  He chose the latter, and 
in the course cycle 1959-1960 issued the first edition of De Verbo incarnato.  The second 
edition was issued in 1961, and a third in 1964.  Again, it is not unreasonable that the 
subsequent writing and publication of DVI preempted completion of the Supplement. 
When Lonergan published DVI, the Supplement would have been in a file with an 
unknown future, but there is evidence suggesting Lonergan may have continued to edit 
the final chapter.
7
  In any event, a comparison of the structure and content of the 
Supplement to DVI reveals that Lonergan most likely used the Supplement as a primary 
source for Theses 15-17 of DVI.
8
  If this was the case, then the future of the Supplement 
would hinge on the future of chapter 6.  It is quite possible, even likely, that Lonergan 
subsequently intended to use chapter 6 as source for the new thesis.  I believe that having 
completed a draft of the Supplement in May of 1958, and having then published DVI in 
1960 with a second revision in 1961, Lonergan had in mind the notion of transposing 
chapter 6 of the Supplement into thesis format with the intention of adding this as an 
additional thesis to DVI.  For some reason, when DVI was published he either did not 
judge the material from chapter 6 as ready for publication or, as he stated in the 1974 
workshop, there were difficulties he did not surmount in communicating notions of a 
theory of history and Christ as historical cause into Latin. 
In brief, then, it is my hypothesis that Lonergan’s original intent was to write a 
systematic treatise on redemption which included treatment of the historical causality of 
Christ.  This was likely intended as a standalone text.  However, we cannot rule out that it 
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 Crowe, Christ and History, 101. 
8
 Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of the Supplement correspond to Thesis 15, 17, and 16 of De Verbo Incarnato, 
respectively.  Also, some passages are basically verbatim between the two texts. 
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may have been intended as a supplement to his Christology course while he was using 
Boyer’s manual.  Regardless, once it was evident that Boyer’s manual would go out of 
print, Lonergan wrote his own Christology manual.  The Supplement went into a file.  But 
he did not forget this text, and he had in mind the notion to transpose chapter 6 into thesis 
format with the intent of adding that thesis to DVI, to meet the need he called for in that 
very text.
9
 
 Next we will turn to Lonergan’s question of the historical causality of Christ, and 
to the essential elements in his answer to this question. 
 
8.2 The Question of the Historical Causality of Christ 
 
 
8.2.1 The Origin of Lonergan’s Question 
 
 
Speculative theology, as with any inquiry, begins with a question.  Lonergan’s 
speculation on the historical causality of Christ is a response to a question arising from 
historical consciousness.  Historical consciousness is the advent of a more comprehensive 
understanding of the human person.  It is grounded in the realization that what makes a 
human person who she or he is cannot simply be reduced to a constant human nature.  
This is true to a degree.  However, there is also a variable human historicity, what we 
make of ourselves through the historical process.  Human beings are products of history 
and shapers of history.  Our histories depend very greatly on the past, but we are free to 
shape the future.  For the most part, we shape the future through cooperation with others. 
For Lonergan, following in the footsteps of Dawson, the concept of a variable 
human history is bound up with the notion of culture.  Very early in his career, Lonergan 
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held what he termed a “classicist” notion of culture.  This was a notion of culture which 
held a normative, idealistic, universalistic view of culture.  It was a view of what culture 
“ought” to be.  It was a stable idea, grounded on the idea of a stable human essence, 
informing a stable way of human life, thought to be normative for all peoples.
10
  Such a 
notion of culture may have been thought to be normative, but it was certainly not 
empirical.  Empirical studies of concrete human living dismantled the older view.   
Christopher Dawson was a pioneer in this effort,
11
 and Lonergan’s reading of 
Dawson changed his notion of culture.
12
  He adopted Dawson’s anthropological notion of 
culture, a notion of culture not as static but dynamic, not as universal but local, not as 
abstract but concrete, not as constant but variable.  It is not a perspective denying the 
truth of universal human nature.  It is, however, a perspective recognizing the particular 
and concrete aspect of human living.  That concrete aspect is one of development: 
While classicist culture conceived itself normatively and abstractly, modern culture 
conceives itself empirically and concretely.  It is the culture that recognizes cultural 
variation, difference, development, breakdown, that investigates each of the many 
cultures of mankind, that studies their histories, that seeks to understand what the 
classicist would tend to write off as strange or uncultivated or barbaric.  Instead of 
thinking of man in terms of a nature common to all men, whether awake or asleep, 
geniuses or morons, saints or sinners, it attends to men in their concrete living.
13
 
                                                 
10
 Lonergan, “Transition from a Classicist World-View,” 5-6; “Belief: Today’s Issue,” Second Collection, 
92. 
11
 In Dawson’s The Dynamics of World History, he states:  “...  modern history is no longer satisfied with 
rhetorical narrative or moral criticism.  It seeks to understand the past rather as an organic process than as a 
mosaic of isolated facts.  It tends to pay less attention than in the past to the superficial activity of 
politicians and diplomatists and more to the action of the permanent social and economic forces that 
determine the life of peoples.  Above all, it is coming to accept the new concept of Culture which has been 
brought into currency by the anthropologists.  It recognizes that the state is not, as the nineteenth-century 
historians believed, the ultimate social unit and the final end of historical study.  The cultural unity is both 
wider and deeper than that of the state.  It is not an intellectual abstraction or a by-product of the political 
process.  It is itself the fundamental social reality on which all the other social phenomena are dependent.”  
See The Dynamics of World History, 19-20. 
12
 Lonergan read Dawson’s The Age of the Gods and credits that text for shifting his notion of culture away 
from a classicist understanding:  “In the summer of 1930 I was assigned to teach at Loyola College, 
Montreal, and despite the variety of my duties was able to do some reading.  Christopher Dawson’s The 
Age of the Gods introduced me to the anthropological notion of culture and so began the correction of my 
hitherto normative or classicist notion.”  See Lonergan, “Insight Revisited,” Second Collection, 264.   
13
 Lonergan, “The Future of Christianity,” Second Collection, 161. 
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 Since concrete human living is characterized by variation and development, there 
is in fact the notion of a person’s variable human historicity.  Therefore, a modern, 
anthropological notion of culture recognizes that culture does not automatically spring 
from human nature as some normative, universal reality, as if human intentionality 
played no role.  The modern notion of culture grasped by historical consciousness 
recognizes that cultures are products of intentional human activity, products of the 
concrete meanings and values governing a particular way of life.  This is why Lonergan 
so often referred to the historical process as “man’s making of man.” 
 In brief, then, historical consciousness raised Lonergan’s awareness of the role of 
culture in the human situation.  His understanding of cultural development is at the heart 
of his understanding of human development.  This is a crucial point in understanding the 
genesis of his interest in the historical causality of Christ.  His interest in history is really 
grounded in his insight into the influence of culture on human development, where that 
influence can be for better or worse, for good or evil.  This is why the cultural level is 
most critical in his structure of the human good of order.  This is why, in his thought, 
cultural good is the best expression of human nature, and cultural evil is the worst.  This 
is why he judges that it is cultural evil that calls for a heaven-sent redeemer.   
 The juxtaposition between Lonergan’s awareness of the role of culture in human 
development with what was already an interest in soteriology is the origin of Lonergan’s 
question on the historical causality of Christ.  The link is manifested in his early essays 
on history.  One also finds the link in his personal notes at the time he made his 
breakthrough to functional specializations in theological method.  In his breakthrough, he 
identified two phases in theology.  The first phase, mediating theology, mediates the past 
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into the present.  The second phase, mediated theology, is direct theological discourse 
which takes its ground from the present with an eye toward the future.  The functional 
specialties of doctrines and systematics are part of the second phase.  His handwritten 
notes on his breakthrough to functional specializations reveal that (1) he conceived the 
functional specialty of doctrines as a doctrine on history emphasizing redemption, and (2) 
he conceived the functional specialty of systematics (designated “explanation” in his 
notes) as a theological theory of history.
14
  
 Lonergan’s notes reflect his earlier insight, revealed in his student essays, on the 
intimate link between history and redemption.  Historical process, and therefore human 
historicity, is not outside of the divine plan.  History itself is constitutive of the actual 
order of reality conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness.  Since there 
are no divine afterthoughts, there must be an intelligible link between history and 
redemption.  The link between history and redemption grounds the heuristic notion 
guiding Lonergan’s effort to explain the historical causality of Christ.  He understands 
history through the lens of redemption, and redemption through the lens of history. 
 
8.2.2 The Nature of Lonergan’s Question 
 
 
 In Lonergan’s cognitional theory, he adopts from Aristotle the judgment that there 
are two basic types of questions.  The first is on the level of understanding.  They are 
questions for intelligence: What?  Why?  How?  The second is on the level of judgment.  
                                                 
14
 Doran, What is Systematic Theology, 152.  On this handwritten page the four specialties of the first phase 
of theological method are titled research, interpretation, history, and conversion.  There is a second phase 
also with four functional specialties, titled foundations, doctrine, explanation, and communication.  In 
Method in Theology, the specialty “conversion” will be named “dialectic,” and the specialty “explanation” 
will be named “systematics.”  This handwritten page is numbered A472 in file 7 of Batch V in the 
Lonergan Archives, Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto.  The page can be accessed at 
www.bernardlonergan.com, file 47200D0E060 / A471 titled “Functional specialties: Breakthrough page.” 
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They are questions for reflection: Is it so?  Is it true?  Transposed into theology, questions 
for intelligence are related to systematics and questions for reflection related to doctrines. 
 Lonergan’s question is a question for intelligence, and theologically a question for 
systematic theology.  However, his basic question is not “what” redemption is.  He does 
explain this in the Supplement because he needs to explain this as a presupposition for a 
separate question.  His question is not primarily a question of what redemption is, but 
how redemption is brought about, specifically through the historical causality of Christ.  
Both the question of “what?” and the question of “how?” are questions for intelligence.  
Where the former seeks the intelligibility of a thing in itself, the latter seeks the 
intelligibility in another, meaning the intelligibility of how that thing is produced. 
 The question of “what?” was the basic question governing Lonergan’s final thesis 
in DVI.  There he speculated that the intrinsic intelligibility, or essence of redemption, is 
the law of the cross.
15
  In his fourth and sixth chapters of the Supplement, he affirms the 
law of the cross as the governing principle of the economy of salvation.  In this respect, 
his thought foreshadows DVI.   
 In the Supplement, however, his primary question is how redemption is realized in 
history.  So the question is more a focus on the extrinsic intelligibility of redemption 
rather than its intrinsic intelligibility.  Since a thing is understood through its causes, 
extrinsic intelligibility is understood through extrinsic causes.  Although redemption is a 
supernatural reality, it is still a created reality.  As with any created reality, it must have 
an extrinsic cause.  Only God is uncaused.  Metaphysically, this means that the formal 
cause or essence of any created reality cannot explain itself, in other words, cannot 
explain why it is in act.   
                                                 
15
 Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, 576-577. 
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8.2.3 Lonergan’s Approach to the Answer 
 
 
 Lonergan’s approach to an answer is by way of analysis.  There are two basic 
elements.  The first element resolves the work of Christ into specific categories 
applicable to both objective and subjective redemption:  satisfaction, meritorious 
obedience, sacrifice, and intercession.  Through these categories, Lonergan integrates 
objective and subjective redemption while allowing for distinctions.  Though Christ’s 
work is mediated through his members, it is still the work of Christ.  There is distinction 
without separation. 
 The categories were established in his third chapter.  In that chapter he also 
discussed the category of the “price paid.”  The reason Lonergan leaves this category 
behind when he comes to his final chapter is because he is now integrating subjective 
redemption into an understanding of the “whole work of Christ.”  The giving of one’s 
life, with respect to Christ’s members, is not a generalized condition applicable to each 
and every member as a secondary cause, as a ministerial agent of Christ.  On the other 
hand, for Christ the giving of his life was a condition.   
Consider Lonergan’s statement from article 17 (“The Payment of the Price”): 
Redemption as means [ut medium] refers to that process by which this state [redemption 
as end] arises or is brought about, not only by causality [causalitate] but also and 
especially under that condition [conditione] most burdensome to Christ, namely, death on 
the cross.  The Word of God could have saved us without coming down from heaven; the 
incarnate Word could have saved us without going through his passion and death; but in 
actual fact it was through his passion and death that he did save us.
16
 
 
 In this passage, redemptio has a broader meaning than “ransom” or “payment of 
the price.”  Furthermore, the terms causalitate and conditione are found in the same 
sentence and contrasted.  Lonergan is using these terms in the technical sense to explain 
                                                 
16
 Lonergan, DBM, 127 [Supplement, 52].  For the Latin text, see chapter 4, section 4.2.2. 
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the dependence of Christ’s historical causality, understood as redemption as means, on a 
particular condition.  That condition was the giving of his life.  Hypothetically, God 
could have saved us in any number of ways, or not at all.  However, scripture is clear that 
God directly willed a condition for Christ to be the cause of our salvation.  That condition 
was the burdensome condition of giving his life.  God directly willed this condition not in 
the sense that God directly willed the evil perpetuated by those who crucified Christ.  
God never directly wills evil.  God willed this condition in the sense that God directly 
willed Christ’s obedience and love in accepting his suffering and death.  For Lonergan, 
this payment of the price or ransom is a condition applicable to Christ’s causality, but not 
applicable as a condition for the instrumental (secondary) causality exercised by Christ’s 
members who mediate Christ’s ongoing work in history.  Christ died once and for all for 
the salvation of all.  This is why, in his final chapter, the category of “payment of the 
price” is not included with satisfaction, merit, sacrifice, and intercession.  
 The second element resolves the work of Christ into its causes, its forms of 
agency, to understand how Christ propagates and perfects the Body of Christ in history 
through the categories of satisfaction, merit, sacrifice, and intercession.  Propagation 
refers to the work of Christ in history to apply to his members the fruit of his objective 
work such that what has been done in Christ is now done in and for the whole body.  
Perfection refers to the work of Christ in history to produce similar operations in the 
members, that is, operations of satisfaction, merit, sacrifice, and intercession modeled on 
Christ.  By producing similar operations in the members, Christ mediates his ongoing 
work in history through his members, with the intent to prepare them for the future life in 
heaven and to produce in them good works to improve the human situation. 
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Lonergan’s approach also reveals an intentional concern to counter a theological 
reductionism which would reduce our theoretical understanding of the work of Christ to 
a specific category, say satisfaction, based on a theological method which deduces the 
entire work of Christ from necessary reasons.  In his fifth chapter on Christ’s satisfaction, 
at the end of article 26 (“Division of the Question”), he noted that every theory gives rise 
to further questions.  He stated that Anselm’s theory is no exception.  He raised a number 
of questions in that chapter, the last being the following: “...must the whole work of 
Christ be deduced from Anselm’s necessary reason, or is there some other way to come 
to a theological understanding of this matter?”17  In that chapter, he never answered the 
question. 
He does answer the question, but it is found in his final chapter.  There he states 
that he does not follow those theologians preoccupied with deducing necessary 
conclusions from a hypothesis of condign satisfaction or any other hypothesis, but rather 
he subscribes to the method of Aquinas who looked to the concrete work of Christ and 
put down as many reasons for it as he could, whether reasons of necessity or of 
appropriateness, exemplified in a series of articles and in one outstanding article.
18
   
This comment raises two points relevant to our interpretation of his theological 
approach.  First, Lonergan is interested in understanding the concrete work of Christ.  He 
is not interested in abstract theories of the work of the Lord deduced from hypothetical 
necessities.  Just as in Insight he used an empirical approach to developing his 
cognitional theory, in the Supplement he uses an empirical approach to derive an 
imperfect and analogical understanding of Christ’s historical causality.  Relevant 
                                                 
17
 Lonergan, DBM, *184 [Supplement, 76].  For the Latin text, see chapter 6, section B.1. 
18
 Lonergan, DBM, *263 [Supplement, 112].  Lonergan’s reference to the series of articles is ST, III, qq. 46-
56, and to what he consider a single outstanding article, ST, III, q. 1, a. 2. 
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doctrines are presumed based on the authoritative teaching of the Church.  However, to 
understand the meaning of those doctrines, he attends to the data of history, to human 
development, to concrete human living.  As he noted at the beginning of the Supplement, 
only by attending to what is actual and concrete can one arrive at knowledge of created 
good.
19
  Created good is an effect, whether in the order of creation or in the order of 
redemption.  You cannot understand a cause without understanding the effect.  Any 
historical effect produced by Christ is a created good.  But all good is being, and being is 
concrete.  Therefore, if one intends to know the historical causality of Christ, albeit 
imperfectly and analogically, one needs to attend to what is actual and concrete.  
Second, Lonergan’s reference to a hypothesis of condign satisfaction is not a 
reference to the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction, but to the presupposition that the only 
solution to sin must necessarily be condign satisfaction.  Based on necessary deductions 
from this necessary presupposition, one could deduce that the whole work of Christ is a 
work of satisfaction, and not much, if anything, else.  When referring to the work of the 
Christ, Lonergan always includes Christ’s satisfaction in the wider context which also 
includes Christ’s merit, sacrifice, and intercession.20  This applies both to objective and 
subjective redemption.  This is fitting simply from a doctrinal perspective.  Christ’s work 
on our behalf is not to be understood as excluding work on our part.  Christ made 
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 Lonergan, DBM, 5 [Supplement, 3]. 
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 In Lonergan’s final chapter he refers to Christ’s satisfaction on eleven different occasions, and in all but 
one instance he always includes Christ’s merit, sacrifice, and intercession:  DBM, *259 (2x), *260, *261, 
*262, *266, *267 (3x), *272, *294 [Supplement, 110 (3x), 111 (2x), 113 (4x), 116, 125].  The one 
exception is the very last sentence of the Supplement, where Lonergan states that it is appropriate that an 
intermediary friend (the God-man) should make superabundant satisfaction for sin.  There may be one of 
two reasons he does not include merit, sacrifice, or intercession.  First, since the Supplement is an 
unfinished work, this last sentence may not have been intended to say all there is on the matter.  More 
likely, the reason is that the context of the statement involves an argument on why grace is superabundant.  
All of Christ’s works are superabundant.  I believe Lonergan’s point, as I stated in my interpretation of that 
chapter, is that Christ’s superabundant satisfaction for sin is superabundant not because it was a 
supererogatory deed, but because it was performed by a divine person. 
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satisfaction for the body, but penitents ought to make satisfaction for themselves (DB 
904, 905, 922, 924; DS 1689, 1692, 1712, 1714; ND 1630, 1633, 1652, 1654).  Christ 
merited for us, but we also should merit (DB 809, 843; DS 1545, 1583; ND 1946, 1983).  
Christ offered sacrifice once and for all, but Christ’s members are to participate in the 
sacrifice of the Mass, a sacrifice which is truly expiatory (DB 940, 950; DS 1743, 1753; 
ND 1548, 1557).  Christ lives forever interceding on our behalf, but we also ought to 
pray.
21
 
However, from a systematic perspective, Lonergan’s method to understand what 
“the whole work of Christ” really means is to proceed from concrete knowledge of the 
human situation.  For Lonergan, redemption is God’s solution to the problem of evil.  The 
problem of evil is not with God.  The problem of evil is with human beings.  So the 
solution must address the human situation.  This is why Christ works not for himself, but 
for us.  The only exception is the work of Christ understood under the aspect of merit.  
However, even here Christ merits not primarily for himself, but for us.
22
  The point is that 
Lonergan does not try to understand the doctrine of redemption, and therefore the 
historical causality of Christ, by deducing necessary reasons from a necessary hypothesis, 
whether a hypothesis of condign satisfaction or any other hypothesis.  He attends to the 
concrete world of human affairs because this is where the effect is located.  You cannot 
understand a cause if you do not understand the effect.  So although Lonergan certainly 
affirms that Christ offered satisfaction to God the Father on our behalf, the effect is not 
had in God.  The effect is in history. 
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 Lonergan, DBM, *265 [Supplement, 112]. 
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As such, there is indeed some other way to come to a theological understanding of 
what “the whole work of Christ” could possibly mean.  For Lonergan, that other way is to 
establish the historical effects produced by Christ and then proceed to understand how the 
work of Christ is causally related to the production of these effects.  This is why he stated 
that the work of Christ explained in his third chapter is better described as a principle, 
rather than a means.  That objective work of Christ is indeed a means.  However, it is not 
the whole means.  There is more to the notion of redemption as means.  A principle is 
what is first in some order.  Thus to understand “the whole work of Christ” one must also 
understand Christ’s ongoing work in history proceeding from the principle.  I believe this 
is why the first article in Lonergan’s final chapter is titled De Opere Christi.  I find it 
hard to believe the title is not revealing of an intent to answer the question raised in the 
previous chapter. 
   
8.2.4 Essential Elements in Lonergan’s Answer 
 
 
 My purpose here is to summarize what I interpret to be five essential elements in 
Lonergan’s understanding of the historical causality of Christ. 
 First, Lonergan understands every aspect of the historical causality of Christ as 
unfolding from the divine plan conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine 
goodness.  This divine plan is divine providence.  This plan unfolds according to divine 
governance.  Therefore, the historical causality of Christ can be understood as divine 
governance to redeem the historical order according to the plan of divine providence. 
 As such, although the historical causality of Christ is a dynamic process playing 
out in the dynamism of history, it is nevertheless grounded in something eternal and 
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immutable:  divine wisdom and goodness.  Lonergan’s appeal to divine wisdom and 
goodness, and his faith in the divine plan, is a thread weaved throughout the Supplement.  
This thread ties each chapter to the other, each part to the whole.
23
 
 Second, Lonergan’s consistent appeal to, and faith in, divine wisdom is a rejection 
of divine voluntarism.  The divine will always chooses from that which divine wisdom 
infallibly knows.  The implication in Lonergan’s speculative theology is significant.  
Since the divine will always chooses from what divine wisdom infallibly knows, then the 
actual world order, down to the smallest detail, is intelligible.
24
  And since it is 
intelligible, then redemption in history will be in harmonious continuation with the basic 
principles of the actual order of reality.  This judgment is based on the principle that there 
are no divine afterthoughts.  This was the fundamental theological principle guiding 
Lonergan’s heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil, presented in chapter 
20 of Insight.  In the Supplement, the principle now functions not for the purpose of 
anticipating what the solution to the problem of evil might look like, but how that 
solution can actually be understood in its historical dimension.  The principle is operative 
throughout the text.  In fact, it is the fundamental theological principle in the entire text.  
It is the ground of the two other major theological principles operative in the Supplement:  
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 There are some forty-three references to divine wisdom and goodness where the latter is sometimes 
described as divine will, divine choice, divine decree, or divine love.  Chapter 1 (5x):  DBM 5, 6, 24, 42, 64 
[Supplement, 3 (2x), 11, 18, 26];  Chapter 2 (19x): DBM 68 (2x), 69 (2x), 70, 76, 83, 93 (2x), 94, 104, 108, 
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Chapter 4 (9x):  DBM 159, 165, 166, 167, 168 (3x), 169, 178 [Supplement, 66, 68, 69 (3x), 70 (3x), 74]; 
Chapter 5 (1x): DBM, *228 [Supplement, 97]; Chapter 6 (9x): DBM, *244, *246, *249, *251, *252, *262 
(2x), *263, *281, *286, *287 [Supplement, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 111(3x), 119, 121 (2x),]. 
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 The only exception to this rule of intelligibility is the fact of sin and the evil consequences of sin.  
Neither has any intrinsic intelligibility.  But where intelligence can only order intelligibles, wisdom orders 
both the intelligibles and the non-intelligibles.  So divine wisdom orders good and evil such that God 
always wills the good, in no way wills the evil of sin, and only indirectly wills the evil consequences of sin.  
And divine wisdom has ordered good and evil in such a way that good can be brought out of evil.  That 
process by which good is brought out of evil is the law of the cross, and since that law has been chosen by 
the divine will in accordance with divine wisdom, it is a just law. 
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the principle of cause and the principle of continuity.  It is the principle of principles.  
The principle provides Lonergan with a critical guidepost to pursue an imperfect and 
analogical understanding of the historical causality of Christ. 
 Third, although Lonergan takes an analytical approach that resolves the work of 
Christ into its causes, each cause, in one way or another, is constitutive of God’s entry 
into “man’s making of man” as mediated by Christ.  This phrase acknowledges God as 
the salvific agent.  The phrase also acknowledges the role of human freedom and the 
social nature of human causality.  There is such a thing as a constant human nature.  But 
there is a variable human historicity in which human beings make of themselves who 
they are.  As Lonergan explained in his second chapter, who we make of ourselves is 
played out in the historical order.  This historical order is fundamentally a social reality.  
Each of us will ultimately be judged on what we make of ourselves qua individuals.  But 
the process itself is a social dynamic because history is a social dynamic.  Therefore, if 
God is to enter into this process to help us make of ourselves what God intends, then it is 
fitting for God to enter into this social dynamic, into “man’s making of man.”   
 God’s entry into “man’s making of man” is entry of a redemptive vector into 
human history.  This redemptive vector establishes, propagates and perfects human 
cooperation with God to transform evil into good.
25
  Recall from Lonergan’s first chapter 
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 There is an implication here for developing Lonergan’s thought in the area of pneumatology.  The end of 
the two divine missions is the same.  Therefore the secondary end is the same.  A theology seeking to 
understand the intelligibility of the mission of the Spirit would not be restricted to understanding the 
formality of that mission, where for Lonergan that formality is (1) what constitutes a divine mission; and 
(2) a contingent external term, so that there is a correspondence of truth to the judgment that a divine 
person is truly sent.  What constitutes a divine mission is a divine relation of origin.  So what constitutes 
the mission of the Spirit is the sending of the Spirit by the Father and the Son.  The contingent external 
term of the mission of the Spirit is habitual (sanctifying) grace.  But in The Triune God: Systematics, 
Lonergan acknowledges that to understand a mission one should also seek to understand the consequences, 
the created effects if you will, consequent on that term.  The two missions are for the sake of initiating and 
strengthening new personal relationships between God and human beings.  The Son initiates these 
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that the general structure of history is a threefold approximation of progress, decline, and 
restoration.  Redemption is restoration through supernatural assistance.  The redemptive 
vector reverses historical decline and restores the line of progress, the line of human 
development such that over time there is improvement in the total human good of order. 
 At the heart of this redemptive vector is Christ’s mediation of God’s meanings 
and values into human history, specifically into human culture.  It is cultural evil that 
calls for a heaven-sent redeemer.  Cultural evil is the most hideous, and human power in 
and of itself is impotent to heal it.  So it is principally cultural evil that needs to be 
transformed into good.  For Lonergan, the historical causality of Christ transforms 
cultural evil by mediating God’s meanings and values into history.  Through this 
transformation, evils at the social and particular levels of the human good are also 
transformed.   
 Furthermore, though Christ is the mediator of God’s meanings and values into 
history, Christ himself uses ministerial historical agents to carry out his work.  The Body 
of Christ is the medium by which Christ continues to act in history.  As Lonergan stated 
years earlier, the ascent of the soul towards God is not a private affair.  There is human 
solidarity in sin which deforms knowledge and perverts the will, but there is also a divine 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationships (which Lonergan understands as reconciliation), and through the Spirit’s self-donation the 
new personal relationships are (1) strengthened and (2) provided a foundation for cooperation with God.  I 
suggest here that the notion of cooperation with Christ (with God if you will) for the purpose of returning 
good to evil done is a basis to develop Lonergan’s thought in the direction of pneumatology.  In my 
opinion, this would suggests that the first effect of the gift of the Spirit would be the healing of dramatic 
and/or individual bias that judges good to be evil, and judges evil to be good.  As Lonergan stated in 
Insight, “...how is a mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias originates from a communal 
flight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?”  This effect is foremost a 
healing effect, a revelation to a person of his or her own bias such that evil can be seen for what it is.  
Alternately I would describe this effect as a healing of the pure desire to know, a rehabilitation of the 
natural orientation to ask questions, a healing from the flight from understanding such that one can allow 
the entry of otherwise unwanted insights.  See The Triune God: Systematics, 491;  Insight, 8. 
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solidarity in grace which is the mystical body of Christ.
26
  Lonergan understands this 
body through the analogy of a human good of order, but a supernatural one.  His 
emphasis on the social dimension of grace is very prominent in his understanding of the 
historical causality of Christ.  As a Catholic theologian, he identifies sanctifying grace as 
the contingent, external term corresponding to the truth of the judgment that the Spirit is 
truly sent.  At the same time, he does not think of the Body of Christ as simply an 
aggregate of individuals who have sanctifying grace.  A new reality is present.  A “higher 
synthesis” if you will emerging from the fertility of a concrete plurality of many persons 
linked together, under Christ, such that it can truly be said that the members are members 
of one another, joined to each other through a union.
27
  Lonergan understands this union 
through the analogy of friendship, a friendship initiated by the communication of divine 
friendship itself. 
 It is still Christ who is working in history, but now he is working through others, 
through the social and historical agency of the members cooperating with Christ.  Human 
cooperation with Christ, as with any form of human causality, is fundamentally a social 
dynamic.  Human cooperation depends on common meanings and common values, on 
common understandings and common agreements.  An actual cause is not typically found 
in the isolated individual, but in several working together with mutual understanding and 
agreement on where they are going.  The effectiveness by which the Body of Christ 
mediates Christ’s work in history ultimately hinges on the degree to which the members 
recognize and embrace the common meanings and values of the Head. 
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 Lonergan, “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 27. 
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 Years earlier Lonergan described the mystical body as a “concrete plurality” of many persons linked 
together.  He was using the notion of vertical finality to explain the nature of the mystical body, since 
vertical finality operates through the “fertility of a concrete plurality.”  See “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 21. 
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 Fourth, there is one meaning and value of singular importance.  It is the law of the 
cross.  Since human cooperation is done in and through others, the law of the cross is 
meant to become a shared meaning and value of those who follow Christ, with the further 
intention of spreading to the wider culture.  It is through returning good to evil that the 
members of Christ’s body transform cultural evil into good, thus improving the total 
human good of order.  The law of the cross is a meaning because it is intelligible and 
judged as such by members of the Body of Christ.  This insight and judgment is only 
possible through the assistance of the Spirit.  Through this judgment, evil is seen for what 
it is:  the absurd, the unintelligible, that which is meaningless.  The law of the cross is a 
value because God has created a world in which God has judged it good to return good to 
evil, and thus worthy to be chosen as a response to evil.  When those who follow Christ 
perform operations according to this law they performatively treat evil for what it is.  
They refuse to treat evil as good, refuse to treat the false as true, refuse to treat the 
unintelligible as intelligible, refuse to treat the meaningless as meaningful.  
 To live the law of the cross requires that the members of Christ’s body not shrink 
from legitimate suffering.  Legitimate suffering is redemptive suffering.  For Lonergan, 
we incline toward sin because we either knowingly shrink from suffering, or we 
unknowingly shrink from suffering.  We unknowingly shrink from suffering when, 
finding no intelligibility in an unintelligible (evil) situation, our intellect substitutes one 
unintelligible situation for another.
28
  Either way, in shrinking from redemptive suffering, 
we performatively deny that the absurd is absurd and therefore to be endured. 
 Christ’s communication of grace makes it possible that we can operate according 
to this law.  Lonergan attends to this communication of grace, understood according to 
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extrinsic efficient causality.  Christ, as historical cause, is the efficient cause, that by 
which his members can return good to evil.  But Christ, as historical cause, is also the 
exemplar cause.  He is the model according to which his members ought to return good to 
evil done in accordance with the divine plan conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by 
divine goodness.  It is the model according to which Christ’s members are to love others, 
even their enemies.  As such, the law of the cross is the very model according to which 
those who authentically desire to follow Christ are to love God. 
 According to the divine plan, it is fitting that this law be communicated to human 
beings.  Even though the communication of grace is required for us to be capable of 
choosing and living the law of the cross, it is fitting that we know this law in the first 
place.  Absolutely speaking, “thematic” knowledge of the law is not necessary.  There are 
certainly those who, enabled by grace, act according to this law even though they could 
not articulate this law in any systematic sense as we are doing here.  However, since 
redemption as means is in harmonious continuation with the actual order of reality, it is 
fitting that Christ’s ministerial agents understand this law and recognize it as a value.   
 Theologically, this means is that in addition to the grace of God’s self-
communication, there is fittingly the grace of God’s revelation.  This revelation is 
communication of what Lonergan later called the cognitive, constitutive, and effective 
meaning of Christ’s message.  “It is cognitive inasmuch as the message tells what is to be 
believed.  It is constitutive inasmuch as the revelation crystallizes the hidden inner gift of 
love into overt Christian fellowship.  It is effective inasmuch as it directs Christian 
service to human society to bring about the kingdom of God.”29   
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 Fifth, since in scholastic metaphysics the exemplar cause is the extrinsic formal 
cause,
30
 Lonergan implicitly associates the law of the cross as the extrinsic formal cause 
of the redemptive vector in history.  If we generalize this notion with the assumption that 
the redemptive vector is operative in all places, then the law of the cross is the extrinsic 
formal cause of history itself.  In fact, in 1962 Lonergan explicitly stated that in his mind 
the fundamental aspect of the intelligibility of history was the transformation of evil into 
good according to this law.
31
 
 Lonergan is explicit that Christ is the exemplar cause when we imitate him.  
However, Christ also operates according to an exemplar, a formam intentionalem.  That 
exemplar has been conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness from all 
eternity as the form of God’s solution to the problem of evil.  That form, or exemplar, is 
the law of the cross.  It is the intrinsic principle of the economy of salvation.  However, 
since the economy of salvation is a created reality, albeit supernatural, it must have an 
extrinsic formal cause.  Since Lonergan’s focus on the historical causality of Christ is a 
focus on extrinsic causality, it is appropriate that we identify what this extrinsic formal 
cause really is.  Lonergan does so, but he does so implicitly and he uses the language of 
exemplar causality, not extrinsic formal causality.  The law of the cross is the extrinsic 
formal cause conceived by divine wisdom and chosen by divine goodness.  Christ, as 
man, mediates this law into history according to the divine plan.  He does so by 
inaugurating, propagating, and perfecting the Body of Christ.  In fact, the Body of Christ 
itself is produced by Christ according to this same law.  
                                                 
30
 John F. McCormick, S.J., Scholastic Metaphysics (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1940), 165. 
31
 Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method I, 259. 
 333 
 For Lonergan, the law of the cross is the fundamental aspect, the fundamental 
form or exemplar of the redemptive vector in history.  In another text he identifies the 
law of the cross as the “strictly theological complement” of his dynamic structure of 
history.
32
  To the degree that this law is operative in history, it is then the fundamental 
aspect of the intelligibility of history itself, the law by which God overcomes evil in 
human history to redeem human history.  Implicit then in Lonergan’s understanding of 
the historical causality of Christ is Christ’s knowledge of, choosing of, revelation of, and 
introduction of this law into human history.  With a view towards the secondary end in 
which all earthly things will be gathered and reconciled in Christ, the law of the cross is 
the extrinsic formal cause of history itself, the model according to which Christ gathers 
earthly realities to himself. 
 As we just noted, Lonergan had at one time explicitly equated the law of the cross 
to the “strictly theological complement” of his dynamic structure of history.  He made 
this statement in the context of providing a response to a request.  The request was to 
provide a theological perspective on how a community of love adapts itself and directs 
itself to effective mission and witness.
33
  I will end on this theme, because I believe that 
Lonergan’s other motive for writing the Supplement, aside from the juxtaposition of his 
interest in redemption with his own historical consciousness, was a desire to understand 
the historical causality of Christ with the hope that a community of love could adapt and 
direct itself more effectively in mission and witness.  
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8.3 The Practical Orientation of the Supplement 
 
 
 It remains a fact that within and outside of the Lonergan community, Bernard 
Lonergan is best known for his cognitional theory and his theological method, due to the 
publications of Insight and Method, respectively.  However, the posthumous discovery of 
his student writings of the 1930s
34
 led the editors of the CWL to “revise considerably” 
their view of the course of his life and career.
35
  The contents of these student writings 
revealed his interests in the economic, political, sociological, cultural, historical, and 
religious fields rather than the gnoseological and metaphysical.
36
  The editors of the CWL 
sum up his interests at this time as follows: 
The restoration of all things in Christ (Ephesians 1:10) was closer to a motto for him than 
‘thoroughly understand what it is to understand.’  The human good proved to be more of 
a magnet than was cognitional theory.  It was in the social order that the restoration 
would take place and the human good realized, so there was a crying need for a summa 
sociologica.
37
 
 
 As the editors note, the examination of Lonergan’s student writings provide, in 
hindsight, the discovery that these interests run like a thread through the period from the 
1930s to the 1980s.
38
  These interests reveal a desire to work on the field of theory for the 
ultimate benefit of guiding praxis.  Frederick Crowe suggested that Lonergan had 
experienced a strong influence directing him to the world and its needs, and so to the 
influence Christ had for the world’s healing.39 
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 In fact, according to Robert Doran, perhaps the one thing that characterized 
Lonergan’s mode of thinking and the cognitive authenticity that he encouraged in others 
was his approach to practicality.
40
  For Doran, the main source of data for this facet of 
Lonergan’s thinking is chapter 7 of Insight.  In the year before he passed away, Lonergan 
mentioned in conversation that the chapters on common sense (6-7) and on judgment (9-
10) were the first chapters of Insight that he wrote, that they contained what he most 
wanted to say, and that it was in order to substantiate his point that he wrote the first five 
chapters of Insight.
41
  Chapter 7 treats progress and decline in history.  There Lonergan 
states that the principle of progress is liberty, and the principle of decline is individual, 
group, and general bias.  Collectively these biases set up the reign of sin, the social surd.   
The practical upshot of chapter 7 was already indicated in the Preface to Insight.  
There Lonergan asks the following question:  “What practical good can come of this 
book?”42  His answer boils down to this:  insight into insight brings to light the 
cumulative process of progress, and insight into oversight reveals the cumulative process 
of decline.
43
   For Lonergan, “to be practical is to do the intelligent thing, and to be 
unpractical is to keep blundering about.  It follows that insight into both insight and 
oversight is the very key to practicality.”44 
For Lonergan, oversight is rooted in the fundamental problem which he calls the 
“flight from understanding.”45  He stated that no problem is at once more delicate and 
more profound, more practical and perhaps more pressing than the flight from 
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understanding.  The reason has to do with the nature of the problem.  “How is a mind to 
become conscious of its own bias when that bias originates from a communal flight from 
understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?”46  The reason the 
problem is more profound than any other is because the root of the problem is a failure of 
human intelligence itself.  As such, human intelligence is incapable of contributing to the 
healing of its own perversion, and does not even recognize the perversion for what it is.  
The absurd is thought to be intelligible, the false thought to be true, and evil thought to be 
good.   
Thus what Lonergan most wanted to say “included preeminently a position on the 
role of human intelligence in history and society, and on the relation of intelligence to 
social and cultural progress and decline, especially in the view of the distinct dangers 
confronting human society today.”47  In Insight he states that there is needed an 
intelligent critique of the role of human intelligence in history before there can be any 
intelligent direction of history.
48
 This approach to practicality in Insight is a long-range 
approach.  It is an approach which Lonergan described as “a withdrawal from practicality 
to save practicality.”49  As with Insight, the practical upshot of the Supplement is the 
intelligent direction of history.  The Supplement is a systematic work through and 
through.  But it also has a practical purpose, and that practicality is a long-range approach 
to praxis.  Like Insight, it is a long-range approach because it tries to get at the root of the 
problem.  It is a practical approach because it assumes a broader understanding of what 
praxis is in the first place.  Situations are constituted by meaning, and a change in 
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constitutive meaning is in the long run the most effective form of praxis.
50
  Situations 
also reflect the values of a culture.  Systematic theology is praxis to the degree it 
promotes the changing of the meanings and values of a culture such that the human 
situation more closely approximates the reign of God.
51
  I hold these viewpoints as my 
own, but more importantly I interpret that Lonergan held them as constitutive of his long-
range approach to praxis. 
I believe this long-range approach to practicality was Lonergan’s other motive for 
writing the Supplement.  He intended to promote understanding of the historical causality 
of Christ for the purpose of informing a practical theology of  cooperation with Christ.  
Evidence for the motive is clear from his own words.  In the opening paragraphs he 
explicitly states that the aim is a fruitful understanding to address our contemporary 
problems.  He states that it is hardly surprising that we here on earth have little inkling 
about how heavenly things might be gathered in Christ.  Then he adds that it would be a 
more serious matter if we were to neglect the question of how earthly realities are to be 
brought together since it is our duty to work with Christ who gathers these earthly 
realities.  As Frederick Crowe has noted, these opening paragraphs of the Supplement 
establish the practical orientation of the whole work.
52
  The practical implication is that 
the better we understand how Christ works in history for the world’s healing, the better 
we can cooperate with Christ in the world’s healing.  The better we understand Christ’s 
means of directing history, the better we can cooperate with Christ to direct history. 
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I end with what I argue is for Lonergan at the very heart of our cooperation with 
Christ.  Christ’s acceptance of the cross shows us how to love God, how to do God’s will.  
Such love for God is possible because God has first loved us through the love of God 
poured in our hearts through the Holy Spirit given us (Rom 5:5).  Lonergan was very 
fond of quoting Romans 5:5 in the latter part of his career, and he interpreted the passage 
as referring to God’s love for us, not our love for God.53  Christians, in response to this 
gift, are called to imitate Christ, to return good to evil done.  Human development is had 
by returning good to evil done such that evil is transformed into good according to the 
wisdom, will, and power of God.  Therefore, God’s entry into human history, through the 
historical causality of Christ, is the objective entry of God’s meaning and value into 
human history that is the law of the cross.  For Lonergan, the implication is that there is a 
very practical aspect to loving God.  The litmus test for authentically loving God is to 
return good to evil according to God’s will.  For Lonergan, Romans 5:5 is perhaps the 
singular passage best reflecting the judgment that God’s initiating love has entered 
human history to redeem history.  I suggest that Romans 8:28 is perhaps the singular 
passage best reflecting his judgment on the practical meaning of the drama which unfolds 
from God’s initiating love, mediated through the historical causality of Christ:  all things 
work for good for those who love God.  
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